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This thesis investigates the processes of religious change in a Tibetan region of China 
that has experienced relative economic prosperity stemming from a government-led 
tourism initiative. This research challenges and complements the traditional research on 
religious change which is based on quantitative analysis and macro-scale statistics and 
generally lacks in-depth and systemic empirical examination of the reasons and process 
in diverse (particularly non-western) contexts. It adopts a spatially-sensitive qualitative 
approach to researching religious change, focusing on both micro- and meso-scales, as 
well as institutional and non-institutional forms of religion. This research has used a case 
study approach, focusing on Jiuzhaigou with some contextual comparisons being 
provided by additional empirical research in nearby Anbei. Ethnographic methods 
including participant observation and in-depth interview with both laypeople and monks 
have been adopted for generating in-depth and meaningful data.   
In specific, it addresses the issues of religious change from three angles to reveal its 
complexity and nuances. Firstly, it looks at the changing religious landscape with a 
special focus on the shifting balance between institutional and non-institutional forms of 
religious expression. It argues that alongside dramatic political, economic, social and 
cultural changes in contemporary Tibet, religious change presents a shift toward non-
institutional expression of religion. Secondly, it explores the changing geographies of the 
intergenerational transmission of religion by focusing on laypeople and the spaces of 
home and school. It argues that religious practices and religious belief are not equally 
and uniformly transmitted intergenerationally. Thirdly, it examines the changing 
imaginative geographies of religion and religious ‘authenticity’ with a particular focus on 
monks’ religious identities. It argues that the state othering process actually contributes 
to Tibetans’ religious and ethnic awareness, by reinforcing Tibetans’ difference from the 








Acknowledgement .................................................................................................. II 
Abstract .................................................................................................................. III 
Contents ................................................................................................................. IV 
List of tables ......................................................................................................... VIII 
List of figures ......................................................................................................... IX 
Glossary ................................................................................................................... X 
Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Imagining Tibet and going beyond the fixed perceptions ........................... 2 
1.2 Context: why study religious change and tourism in contemporary Tibet? 5 
1.3 Why study religious change and tourism in contemporary Tibet? .............. 7 
1.4 Research aims and thesis structure ......................................................... 10 
1.4.1 Aims and research questions ....................................................... 10 
1.4.2 Structure of the thesis .................................................................. 11 
Chapter 2 Theorising the geographies of religious change in Tibet ................ 15 
2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 15 
2.2 Modernisation and religious change ........................................................ 16 
2.2.2 Deinstitutionalisation of religion .................................................... 20 
2.2.3 Geographical thinking on secularisation ....................................... 21 
2.3 Spatial understanding of religion .............................................................. 25 
2.3.1 Defining sacred space .................................................................. 26 
2.3.2 Reflections on the geographical studies of sacred space ............ 27 
2.4 Modernity, tourism and religion ................................................................ 31 
2.4.1 Tourism and modernisation .......................................................... 32 
2.4.2 Tourism and religion ..................................................................... 32 
2.5 Religious identities and intergenerationality ............................................. 41 
2.5.1 Religion and ethnic identity .......................................................... 42 
2.5.2 Intergenerational transmission of religion ..................................... 44 
2.5.3 Religion and education ................................................................. 46 
2.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 49 
Chapter 3 Religion in modern Tibet since 1950 ................................................. 51 
3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 51 
3.2 Ethnic minority, tourism, government, Tibet since 1950 .......................... 53 
V 
 
3.2.1 Ethnic minorities and the Tibetan ................................................. 54 
3.2.2 Tourism and ethnic minorities....................................................... 60 
3.2.3 Government, development and tourism in Tibet ........................... 61 
3.3 Religion in Tibet since 1950 ..................................................................... 63 
3.3.1 Religion in the history of Tibet and of China as a whole ............... 64 
3.3.2 Bon and Tibetan Buddhism .......................................................... 70 
3.4 History and geography of Jiuzhaigou National Park ................................ 76 
3.4.1 On the margins of the Tibetan and Han cultural spheres ............. 77 
3.4.2 The making of the Jiuzhaigou National Park ................................ 77 
3.4.3 Locating Zharu Monastery ............................................................ 83 
3.4.4 Relations with Anbei Village and Gami Monastery in Songpan .... 85 
3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 86 
Chapter 4 Methodological issues ........................................................................ 87 
4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 87 
4.2 Research design ...................................................................................... 87 
4.2.1 Use of case study and qualitative method .................................... 88 
4.2.2 Choice of case study sites ............................................................ 90 
4.2.3 Access and sampling ................................................................... 92 
4.3 Methods of data collection and analysis ................................................... 95 
4.3.1 Participant observation ................................................................. 97 
4.3.2 In-depth interview ....................................................................... 101 
4.3.3 Other sources of data ................................................................. 104 
4.3.4 Data analysis .............................................................................. 105 
4.4 Research ethics and positionality ........................................................... 106 
4.4.1 Main ethical issues in my research............................................. 106 
4.4.2 My positionality ........................................................................... 107 
4.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 110 
Chapter 5 Tourism and changing landscape of religion in Jiuzhaigou ......... 111 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 111 
5.2 The monastery: ‘public’ religious space as contested space ................. 112 
5.2.1 Introduction ................................................................................. 112 
5.2.2 What is a Tibetan Bon monastery? ............................................ 112 
5.2.3 The boundary between tourist product and holy space for the 
government ................................................................................. 113 
VI 
 
5.2.4 The boundary between tourist product and holy space for local 
people ......................................................................................... 117 
5.2.5 The contested public nature of the monastery ........................... 122 
5.2.6 Gendered space ......................................................................... 128 
5.3 Rising non-institutional religious spaces ................................................ 132 
5.3.1 Spectacular constructions of private religious spaces ................ 133 
5.3.2 The non-stop sound of chanting ................................................. 137 
5.3.3 The revival of chanting of the Prosperity Sutra .......................... 138 
5.3.4 Risang Festival: a grassroots bottom-up religious event ............ 139 
5.3.5 Gendered space: gender politics in domestic religious spaces .. 141 
5.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 142 
Chapter 6 Intergenerationality and religious change: religious and ethnic 
identities in schools and at home ............................................................ 147 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 147 
6.2 Changing religion, language and ethnic identity .................................... 149 
6.3 Religion, ethnic identity, state schooling: exploring Tibetan identity among 
young Tibetans .................................................................................... 154 
6.3.1 Religion just comes naturally to Tibetans ................................... 154 
6.3.2 Ethnic identity and religious identity in schools .......................... 156 
6.3.3 Religion and superstition ............................................................ 167 
6.3.4 Summary .................................................................................... 173 
6.4 Intergenerational transmission of religion and home ............................. 174 
6.4.1 Meanings of religion for older and younger generations ............ 174 
6.4.2 Women and religion ................................................................... 179 
6.4.3 The power of imitation: learning from parents ............................ 182 
6.4.4 Parental love as a key of intergenerational transmission of religion184 
6.4.5 Marriage and religion .................................................................. 187 
6.4.6 Mutual misunderstandings/understandings and compromise 
between generations .................................................................. 189 
6.4.7 New challenges to religious transmission .................................. 191 
6.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 192 
Chapter 7 Monks and religious identity – seeking authenticity in Bon religion195 
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 195 
7.2 Imagined geographies of authenticity: inauthentic self, authentic other . 196 
7.3 “Tourism provides my physical food; religion gives me spiritual food” ... 200 
7.3.1 Difficulties of monasticism in Jiuzhaigou .................................... 201 
VII 
 
7.3.2 Being a monk and working in tourism ......................................... 203 
7.3.3 Being a monk and living as a husband/ father/son/brother ........ 205 
7.3.4 The importance of tourism in the lives of monks in Jiuzhaigou .. 208 
7.4 Authenticity negotiation: being a Bon monk ........................................... 210 
7.4.1 Authenticity questioned – the ideal of an authentic monk .......... 211 
7.4.2 Understanding the practical difficulties of being an authentic monk215 
7.4.3 Monks’ self-negotiation ............................................................... 217 
7.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 226 
Chapter 8 Conclusions ....................................................................................... 231 
8.1 Tourism and changing religious spaces ................................................. 231 
8.2 Intergenerational transmission of religion, laypeople ............................. 234 
8.3 Monks and religious authenticity ............................................................ 237 
Reference ............................................................................................................. 239 
Appendix A: Figuration ...................................................................................... 264 
Appendix B: Interview schedule ........................................................................ 278 
Appendix C: Information sheet .......................................................................... 284 









List of tables 
Table 3.1 Distribution of Bon monasteries in Aba Prefecture……………………….….76 
Table 4.1 Interviewees by location, gender and generation group…..........................95 
Table 4.2 What I observed……………………………………………………………........99 




















List of figures 
Figure 3.1 Three Tibetan cultural regions in China………………………………….52 
Figure 3.2 Nuorilang Waterfall in autumn………………………………………………264 
Figure 3.3 Shuzheng Lakes in winter…………………………………………………..265 
Figure 3.4 Tiger Lake in spring………………………………………………………….266 
Figure 3.5 Virgin Forests…………………………………………………………………267 
Figure 3.6 Map of Jiuzhaigou National Park…………………………………………...268 
Figure 3.7 Shuzheng Village in Jiuzhaigou…………………………………………….269 
Figure 3.8 A Tibetan house………………………………………………………………269 
Figure 3.9 The old temple in Zharu Monastery………………………………………...270 
Figure 3.10 The new temple in construction …………………………………………..270 
Figure 3.11 Monks of Zharu Monastery………………………………………………...271 
Figure 3.12 The Stupa..………………......................…………………………………272 
Figure 3.13 The construction plan of Zharu Monastery ………………………………273 
Figure 3.14 Locations of Jiuzhaigou and Anbei………………………………………..274 
Figure 3.15 The gate of the Gami Monastery………………………………….……....275 
Figure 3.16 The main temple of the Gami Monastery……………………………..….275 
Figure 5.1 Tourists spinning the prayer wheel in front of a white tower……………..276 
Figure 5.2 Tourists praying in front of Jiubaolianhua Stupas………………………...276 






Bon ─ It is generally agreed that Bon is an ancient religion in Tibet which existed before 
Buddhism.  
Hanification (Hanization) ─ This term is usually used among ethnic minorities and by 
some scholars in Chinese studies to describe the widespread influence of Han culture 
and Han people upon ethnic minorities and their cultures. 
Jiuzhaigou Administration Bureau (JAB) ─ A bureau specifically set up to administer 
tourist resorts.   
Monastery Management Committee (MMC) ─ Designed by the government to 

















Chapter 1 Introduction 
Tourism, a pillar industry for Tibet, has recently become the target of criticism as one of 
Beijing’s development strategies which results in commodification and downgrading of 
Tibetan religion, and a dilution of Tibetan culture (Sydenstricker, 2014; Dreyer, 2003; 
Murakami and Cochrane, 2008). However, in the few studies on tourism and Tibet, 
Tibetans were found to be actively engaging in the construction of their ethnic and 
religious identity rather than passive bearers of tourism outcomes, and tourism was 
found to be raising their ethnic consciousness and cultural pride (Hillman, 2009; Kolas, 
2007; Tenzin, 2013; Kang, 2009). In Tibet religion was found to be becoming more 
powerful and influential because of tourism. For example, monasteries as a main tourist 
attraction have gained increasing influence among local authorities and in public opinion 
(Kolas, 2007). This result is actually contrary to the state’s intention of promoting secular 
aspects of Tibetan culture and relegating religion “simply to a flavour of ‘Tibetanness’” 
(Murakami and Cochrane, 2008: 65). 
These studies, while few in number, reflect the complexities and richness of tourism’s 
impact on religious change and add to our limited understanding of religion in 
contemporary Tibet. They refute the narrow picture and overarching claims of the status 
of religion in contemporary China as simply being depressed, claims pressed in the west 
and among exiled Tibetans (Choesang, 2013; Sydenstricker, 2014; Kapstein, 2004: 230) 
or as being revitalized as claimed by the Chinese government (People.cn, 2011; 
Kapstein, 2004).  
They also show the significance of investigating contradictions on the ground and the 
necessity of hearing the voices of Tibetans inside Tibet, other than only from Tibetans in 
exile, westerners and the Chinese government. Tibetans in Tibet are the subjects of 
religious, social and cultural change. Their voices can reveal how tourism economies 
influence their religious and ethnic identities, how they live their everyday lives and 
practice religion, how they perceive relationships between tourism and religion, how they 
interact with Han Chinese and so on. As a response to this need for grounded 
perspectives on Tibetan issues, this thesis investigates the relationships between 
tourism and religious change by examining in depth the case of a Tibetan-inhabited 
tourist destination, Jiuzhaigou National Park (abbreviated as Jiuzhaigou in the remaining 
of the thesis) in Aba Tibetan and Qiang1 Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province, 
China. What I am interested in is the changing everyday religious practices and beliefs of 
                                                
1 The Qiang is an ethnic minority group mainly inhabited in Aba Prefecture. 
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Tibetan laypeople and monks under conditions of tourism development. I investigate this 
from three angles: the changing religious landscape (with a focus on the shifting balance 
between institutional and non-institutional forms of religious expression), changing 
geographies of the intergenerational transmission of religion (focusing on laypeople and 
the spaces of home and school), and changing imaginative geographies of religion and 
religious ‘authenticity’ (with a particular focus on monks’ religious identities).  
In this introductory chapter, I begin by reflecting the current simplified and sometimes 
biased understanding of Tibet (Section 1.1) and continue by contextualizing the Tibetans 
in Jiuzhaigou National Park in the context of Chinese state involvement, which can be 
seen in state-led modernisation projects and tourism initiatives, ethnic majority/minority 
divisions and religious policies (Section 1.2). Then I point out the gap in the existing 
studies in order to situate my own research (Section 1.3). Finally, I present the research 
aims and questions and outline the thesis structure (Section 1.4).    
1.1 Imagining Tibet and going beyond the fixed perceptions 
Remoteness and isolation make Tibet extremely hard to access. Its location and 
topography have generated considerable outside curiosity about this, the highest land on 
earth. Tibet has been constantly imagined through outsiders’ eyes (Dodin and Räther, 
2001; Hessler, 1999; Schell, 2000; Bishop, 1993; Bishop, 2001; Hilton, 1960).  
Despite various representations of Tibet in literature, films, news reports, songs and 
paintings, both in westerners’ and Chinese people’s eyes, Tibet still retains an over-
simplified and stereotypical image: a land ascribed with  purity, authenticity, simplicity, 
primordiality and spirituality (Barnett, 2001; Heberer, 2001; Norbu, 2001). Even though 
these two dominant strands of representation of Tibet (western and Chinese) are formed 
and treated in different ways, these fantasies of Tibet lead to one result. That is: 
To deny Tibet its history, to exclude Tibet from a real world of which it has 
always been a part, and to deny Tibetans their role as agents participating in 
the creation of a contested quotidian reality (Lopez, 1994: 43). 
In the remaining of the section, I discuss how the two imaginations have monopolised 
the space of understanding Tibet and call for a need to go beyond the two fixed 
perceptions of Tibet. 
In the west, the success of Hollywood film Seven Years in Tibet contributed to making 
the general public more aware of Tibet as a “mysterious and definitely impenetrable 
world” (in the words given to the actor playing Henrich Harrer, author of the book on 
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which the film was based). In this film Tibet and its people are depicted as 
underdeveloped, primitive, religious, idealized and nonviolent, whereas the westerners 
are knowledgeable, civilised and helping Tibet against China’s ‘intrusion’.  
In the west Tibet is generally regarded as a ‘Shangri-la’ (Hilton, 1960) and a “zone of 
specialness, uniqueness, distinctiveness, or excellence, that has been threatened, 
violated or abused” by China (Barnett, 2001: 273). This attitude has become mostly 
apparent since Tibet’s incorporation into the People’s Republic of China in 1950. Wide 
media attention has been attracted, most of it critical of China. This further generated 
widespread sympathy in the western world. China is constructed as an evil power 
harming and contaminating this ‘pure’ and untouched land. A general sentiment is raised: 
westerners have the responsibility to protect the weak, innocent Tibetans from China 
(Heberer, 2001). The Tibet independence movement (Davies, 2009), the Dalai Lama as 
a Nobel-Prize winner and a world-renowned spiritual figure and the prevalence of 
Tibetan Buddhism and New Age spiritualism in the West have jointly contributed to 
enhancing this perception and the sympathy it engenders.  
In academia, westerners’ romanticized view of Tibet has attracted numerous critiques 
(Lopez, 1999; Dreyfus, 2005). It is considered a form of Orientalism (Dreyfus, 2005), 
ignoring the complex realities of Tibet (Bishop, 2001; Lopez, 1999) and obscuring the 
issues Tibetans are really experiencing (Norbu, 2001). Tibet is far more diverse than the 
simplifications of a Shangri-la. The sympathy raised from these distorted imaginations 
does not have a concrete grounding. Norbu (1997) even argued on a commentary of the 
Frontline that Western sympathy is “a very fuzzy kind of sympathy, because it never 
touches on the reality”.  
It is interesting to note that China has a very similar representation of Tibet (Barnett, 
2001; Frangville, 2009; Heberer, 2001). Since the 1980s, Tibet has appeared in the 
works and policies of Chinese writers, singers, painters, film directors and politicians as 
“a heaven for spirituality and purity” (Frangville, 2009). In addition, Tibetans as well as 
other ethnic minorities have also been ‘otherised’ with qualities of incivility, 
backwardness, barbarity, exoticism and spiritualism in contrast to the civilised and 
advanced Han (Upton, 2002; Bass, 2005; Mackerras, 1999). Thus civilising Tibetans 
became a mission of the Han (Heberer, 2001) and Tibetans and other minorities are 
considered to be in need of protection, education and modernisation (Harrell, 1995b). 
Tourism further reinforces the stereotype of ‘authentic’ Tibet as a place of natural and 
spiritual purity, but replaces earlier images of backwardness and uncleanness for 
attracting China’s new middle class who “looks for escape from the competition and 
congestion of their urban working lives” (Hillman, 2009: 3; Kolas, 2004). 
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The Chinese version of Tibetan representation has also been criticized for merely 
justifying the Chinese government’s legitimate involvement in Tibetan economic, cultural, 
social and environmental affairs (Heberer, 2001), for assisting an Orientalist approach on 
the part of the Han towards ethnic minorities (Schein, 1997). Furthermore, and in 
apparent contrast state-led modernisation is accused of actually damaging Tibetan 
culture and the Tibetan environment (Barnett, 2001; Frangville, 2009).  
Despite different implications, in the eyes of both westerners and Han Chinese, Tibetans 
are uncivilised, ignorant, ‘savage’, ‘pure’, ‘simple’, ‘innocent’, ‘backward’, and spiritual 
whereas both of them are civilised, advanced and responsible for helping Tibetans. This 
simplified perception of Tibet is inevitably questionable and problematic (Frangville, 
2009).  
In the context of these representations, Tibetans are merely seen as “objects in stories of 
heroic achievement by outsiders, or as victims of abuse incapable of agency” (Barnett, 
2001: 272). Tibetans as the represented, never have a chance to be really known, as the 
Tibetan ‘other’ is only used to construct the western and the Han ‘self’. Under this 
construction, Tibet has been deprived of presenting their real history and situation 
(Norbu, 2001). 
These images have considerable political implications and connotations. The image of a 
‘virgin Tibet’ lends strength to both ‘pro-Tibet’ and ‘pro-Chinese’ political arguments 
(Frangville, 2009). However, I argue that this black-or-white perspective problematically 
dominates the space of understanding Tibet. It not only prevents the general public 
knowing the everyday realities of Tibetan people’s lives on the ground, but also 
depresses other voices. For example, Tibetans’ political identities and their relationships 
with the Chinese state are actually more dynamic and complex than the western and 
Chinese homogeneous narratives (Sperling, 2004). More concrete knowledge on Tibet is 
needed in future, rather than a simplistic reliance on imagination and fixed 
representations.   
If one wishes to accept Tibet as a real part of the global community instead of a 
dreamland on the ‘roof of the world’, maybe allowing for some disillusionment 
would be a more sensible approach and would help us appreciate the human 
face of Tibet in all its richness and vitality, rather than dreaming of a lost 
wonderland. (Dodin and Rather, 2001: 413) 
Thus, there is an urgent need to go beyond the fixed dual framework in thinking through 
Tibet as a diverse, meaningful, complex and dynamic place. Academic research, 
regardless of its political persuasion, has been less susceptible to using and reproducing 
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these simplistic, fixed representations of Tibet than the wider fields of popular and 
political discourse (Kvaerne, 2001). However, limited research attention has been given 
to the everyday lives of Tibetans in contemporary China. Thus some scholars have 
called for going beyond the over-simplified perceptions and the black-and-white 
perspective of Tibet (Barnett, 2001; Norbu, 2001).  
In all, Tibet is ‘special’, but not in the way most westerners and Chinese people imagine. 
Tibet is not a Shangri-la in fantasy, but a society facing similar political, economic, social 
and cultural issues as any other society. Tibet is special in the sense that its religion, 
culture, history, geographic and political position, and language are experiencing rapid 
change in contemporary China. It is this specialness that is worthy of academic attention.   
1.2 Context: why study religious change and tourism in 
contemporary Tibet? 
As noted above, religion is a major point of dispute between westerners and exiled 
Tibetans, who accuse the authorities of suppressing religion, and China’s claim of 
religious revival and liberty (Kapstein, 2004). However, the existing academic research 
has not contributed greatly to resolving this dispute because it has not given enough 
attention to a systematic and concrete investigation of the actual religious situation in 
contemporary China. As a response to this lacuna, this research hopes to provide a clear 
picture of how Tibetan laypeople and monks live their lives and believe and practice their 
religion in contemporary China.   
Tibet was once a Buddhist-dominated country where the Dalai Lama was both the 
spiritual and the political leader. Since the 1950s the general trend of Tibetan religion 
has largely been decided by the political climate, especially the forced secularisation 
during the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent mass return to religion with the 
advent of the reform and opening-up period. At the societal level, religion has become a 
sensitive topic. At the meso level, Tibet has experienced a functional differentiation 
which has meant that the political power, education, medical treatment and capital which 
were once mainly controlled by religious institutions have become independent of 
monasteries and lamas. At present, monasteries only deal with religious issues. They 
cannot expand as freely as before as a result of certain policy restrictions, such as the 
one-child policy, the policy that monasteries should be self-supporting, and restrictions 
on the recruiting of monks (see Chapter 3).  
At an individual level, religious ideas have been in contention with scientific, communist 
and market thoughts as the new sources forming their understandings of the world. In 
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addition, being exposed to secular education, economic development projects and a 
variety of popular culture has further imperilled religion’s traditional dominant position. 
Even the Dalai Lama has turned into an advocate of a democratic Tibetan society and of 
secular ethics (Jinpa, 2003: 82). On several occasions he has acknowledged the 
importance of secular ethics and claimed that secular and non-sectarian ethics and 
principles such as warm-heartedness, compassion and altruism are crucial in achieving 
enlightenment (Hickert, 2013; Central Tibetan Administration, 2013). Recently, religious 
commodification and monks’ involvement in secular affairs have further heated the 
debate on secularisation in Tibet. At the moment, the Tibetan religion is involved in 
various new developments under a certain level of control from the authorities; these 
include its connection to Chinese popular culture, its influence on young Han people, 
monks’ involvement in the secular world, and young laypeople’s increasing readiness to 
speak their mind over religious affairs (see Chapter 3). These conflicts between religion 
and modernisation are increasingly emerging at macro, meso and micro levels. Despite 
this, little research attention has been paid to them.  
Any study of Tibetan religion firstly needs to place it within the larger framework of 
Chinese politics and economics which to a great extent shape Tibetan society and 
generate rapid economic, political, social, and cultural change (Kolas and Thowsen, 
2005: 29). In other words, China’s ethnic minority policies, development logic and 
modernisation projects have played the most important roles in reshaping patterns of 
religious change.  
According to the system of “ethnic identification” (minzu shibie) devised in the 1950s, 
Tibetans are categorised as one of 55 ethnic minority (shaoshu minzu) groups coexisting 
with the Han ethnic majority group. As mentioned before, in general public discourse in 
China, ethnic minorities are constructed as uncivilised, backward, inferior and barbaric in 
contrary to the civilised, advanced, superior and modern Han. Thus ethnic minorities 
need the Han to help them to achieve modernisation and civilisation. Various 
modernisation and civilisation projects have been carried out in minority areas with the 
basic aim of consolidating the power of the Chinese state (Yeh, 2013). Economic 
development is set as the principle of all these projects. In terms of Tibet, since the start 
of reform and opening-up in 1978, economic development and modernisation became 
the principal elements of Chinese rhetoric on Tibet (Barnett, 2001: 295). Tourism, as an 
integral part of modernisation in minority areas (Oakes, 1998), tends to enhance Chinese 
national identity and integration of ethnic minorities. In order to attract tourists, who are 
mainly Han, the hegemonic representations of ‘ethnic minorities’ are reinforced while 
ethnic culture is negotiated and reconstructed. Many scholars have argued that tourism 
imperils ethnic culture (Mackerras, 2003; Oakes, 1998; Murakami and Cochrane, 2008; 
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Su and Teo, 2009). However, others argue that tourism does not decrease the difference 
between ethnic minorities and the Han, but raises ethnic consciousness and pride of 
Tibetans (Hillman, 2003). Religion in ethnic minority tourist areas, unlike in other parts of 
China, is constructed as a selling point of ethnic culture, for example in Tibet, tourism 
gives religion opportunities such as state funding, tourism revenue and an increasing 
profile as well as challenges such as decreasing appeal and a shrinking sense of 
sacredness (Hillman, 2003; Kolas, 2007; Schrempf and Patrick Hayes, 2009; Sutton and 
Kang, 2010a).    
Jiuzhaigou National Park is a Tibetan tourist place of this kind and was chosen as my 
primary case study site. It is one of the most visited Tibetan places. Thirty years of 
tourism development has made Jiuzhaigou a mature tourist destination. Thus it can be 
expected that Jiuzhaigou have experienced the greatest influence from outside and the 
dramatic change in many aspects. This makes it an interesting case for exploring the 
dynamic geographies of religious continuity, discontinuity and transformation.  
As shown above, for contemporary Tibet, which is going through a period of rapid 
political, economic, social and cultural change, religious change is not a simple process. 
A variety of factors and issues are involved in redrawing the map of religious change and 
many questions are waiting to be addressed. For example, how do Tibetans practice 
religion? What are their attitudes to religion? What is the meaning of religion to their lives? 
How do Tibetans see the Han Chinese and their impact on their ethnic identity and 
tourism? How do monks practice religion and get involved in tourism? Is tourism 
enhancing or diluting ethnic/religious identity? These questions will all be addressed in 
this thesis. 
1.3 Why study religious change and tourism in contemporary 
Tibet? 
First and foremost, it has to be acknowledged that little English-language research has 
been conducted specifically on Tibet, tourism and religion. Perhaps the most important 
explanation for this is that for many researchers Tibet is not readily accessible because 
of its remote location, the difficulties in mastering the language and the political tension 
that has been engendered. The sparse literature examining tourism and religion in Tibet 
has generally focused on monasteries and monks and their involvement in tourism (Kang, 
2009; Sutton and Kang, 2010a; Schrempf and Hayes, 2009; Hillman, 2005). Interestingly, 
the first three articles discuss issues in Songpan, which is very near my research area of 
Jiuzhaigou (see Chapter 4). These papers generally speaking find that both local 
government and monasteries are actively involved in tourism from which local 
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government seeks economic development and enhanced national identity, and the 
monasteries aim to empower themselves without necessarily admitting tourists to their 
rituals. The conflicts generated by the commodification of monasteries stemming from 
tourism are also identified. However, these studies do not set out to consider the 
perspectives of monks and monasteries on religious commodification and their attitude 
and reactions to local discontent and criticism. As a result, their discussion of the politics 
of monastery commodification fails to reflect the religious practices and religious belief of 
Tibetan laypeople and monks.  
Other relevant findings on tourism and religion in Tibet have been sporadically identified 
in a handful of studies which broadly concern ethnic tourism and politics (Hillman, 2009), 
tourism and place making (Kolas, 2007; Kolas, 2004), tourism development and 
propaganda (Murakami and Cochrane, 2008), tourism and cultural identity (Hillman, 
2003), and religious tourism (Shackley, 1999). It seems that the body of studies on the 
socio-cultural impacts of tourism in Tibet, while still small, is growing (Hayes, 2013; Wu, 
2012; Epstein and Wenbin, 1994), even if the religious life of Tibetan laypeople is not 
their focus.  
In contrast, considerable Chinese academic literature focuses on tourism and religion in 
Tibet. However, the majority of this literature considers themes which are irrelevant to 
religious change in the host community, but instead looks at such issues as religious 
tourism and its development and planning (Tian, 2011), resources and marketing (Zhang, 
2012), and the experiences of pilgrims (Zhong and Zhang, 2012). Probably for political 
reasons, little Chinese-language research examines the socio-cultural impacts of tourism 
on Tibetan religions. One exception is a Chinese article written by Baimacuo (2004), who 
focuses on tourism commodification in three Bon monasteries in Songpan, although her 
research is descriptive. In sum, the existing research on tourism and religion in Tibet is 
sparse, regardless of language, and ignores the local people’s involvement in tourism 
and its influence on their religious practices and beliefs.    
Given the limited amount of studies specifically examining religion and tourism in Tibet, I 
felt I needed to seek theoretical guidance from relevant disciplines and research fields. I 
turned first to Tibetan studies. In the tenth seminar of the International Association of 
Tibetan Studies in 2003, Robert Barnett stated that Tibetan studies had just experienced 
an evolution of study locale, shifting from exiled communities back to Tibet, and of 
research themes shifting from “Tibetans as victims of oppression to agents of change” 
(Childs, 2010: 128). This second shift is evident in the active engagement of Tibetans in 
constructing the image of an ‘authentic’ Tibetanness through reproducing and playing the 
scripts produced by the dominant western and Chinese narratives (Adams, 1996). For 
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example, the Dalai Lama (1995) and Tibetan government-in-exile portray Tibet as a 
place with sincerity, peace and beautiful natural landscapes seeking political and public 
support and sympathy from the west (Barnett, 2001) even though their adoption of 
western imagery mainly remains at a superficial level (Shakya, 2001). In China, Tibetans 
have been seen not only to resist the official representation of them, but also 
simultaneously to react and adapt to the idealised image proposed by the state (Hillman 
and Henfry, 2006).  This is sometimes particularly conspicuous amongst  Tibetans who 
are trying to use this image of ‘pure’, ‘spiritual’ and ‘isolated’ Tibet as a selling point of 
tourism (Hillman, 2003; Kolas, 2007). More studies are needed to examine how Tibetans 
are actively involved in tourism, how their religious practices and beliefs change with 
tourism and how the dominant image of Tibetans affects their understanding of self. 
Turning to tourism studies and in particular studies of the socio-cultural impacts of 
tourism, relatively little literature has considered the impact of tourism on Tibetan religion 
from the perspective of local people in tourism destinations (Mustafa, 2014). Moreover, 
the views and experiences of religious professionals need more attention in studies on 
tourism and religion (Olsen, 2011).  
In religious studies, there has been little work on whether and, if so, how secularisation 
theory, which is after all a theory that originated in the west and that speaks to the 
relationship between religion and modernity, might be adopted and examined in the 
context of the religions of, broadly speaking, East Asia. This thesis tries to examine 
religious change in Tibet at a meso and micro scale using qualitative methods to add a 
new context to current debates on secularisation and religious change.  
The spatial perspective has proved to be a useful lens for the study of religion, and yet it 
has not been sufficiently used (Kong, 2001a; Knott, 2005a). This study adopts a spatial 
perspective to generate meaningful knowledge on religion, an approach that remains a 
relative rarity in religious studies. For example, what kind of religious meanings and 
functions do monastery and home have for laypeople and monks? How do they practice 
religion in different officially and unofficially religious spaces?  
Having said that, in recent years the subfield of geographies of religion has expanded 
rapidly, with a higher profile in both geography and the wider field of interdisciplinary 
religious research (Knott, 2005b; Park, 2004; Kong, 2010). This has been facilitated in 
part by growing attention paid by politicians and policy makers to religion, as well as new 
research funding streams including the joint Arts and Humanities Council / Economic and 
Social Research Council programme entitled ‘Religion and Society Research 
Programme’ launched in 2007 (Buffetrille, 1999: 2). Nevertheless, so far the attention of 
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geographers of religion has mainly been focused on Christianity and Islam. More 
geographical understanding on non-western contexts and religions are needed.  
The theme of intergenerational transmission of religion has been mainly conducted in the 
field of the sociology of religion. However, recently geographers have called for more 
attention to be given to intergenerational aspects of religious transmission (Vanderbeck, 
2007; Hopkins et al., 2011). The existing research has generally emphasised the lineal, 
uniform, unidirectional transmission from parents to children. I argue that the 
intergenerational transmission of religion is a complex, multi-directional process with 
many factors playing a role, and with different forms of transmission. For example, 
secularist state schooling might interrupt transmission and young people’s religiosity, but 
not in entirely straightforward ways. Apart from the parent-to-child transmission (the 
emphasis of most literature), grandparents/grandchildren, teacher/students are also 
likely to change the transmission. Furthermore, religious beliefs, practices and affiliations 
are not necessarily transmitted together uniformly (see Chapter 6).  
Overall, the thesis demonstrates the value of using a spatially sensitive perspective for 
gaining original insights into the changing nature of Tibetan laypeople’s and monks’ 
religious practices and belief in the context of a rapidly modernising China.  
1.4 Research aims and thesis structure 
1.4.1 Aims and research questions  
In order to get at the complexity of religious change in contemporary Tibet, this thesis 
has one overall aim, which I divide into three sub-aims, each with related questions that 
cover my research interests and provide the framework for data collection and analysis.  
Overall aim: To deepen our understanding of the changing religious practices and 
beliefs of Tibetans, both laypeople and monks, against the backdrop of state-led tourism 
initiatives in contemporary China. 
Sub-aim 1: To explore the changing religious landscape by focusing on spatial 
transformations of institutional and non-institutional religion. 
1. How are local people involved in tourism and how do they relate this involvement 
to their religious beliefs? 
2. What is the changing physical spatial expression of religion? 
11 
 
3. How do the roles of monastic and non-monastic religious forces change? 
4. How do the meanings and the making of monasteries change? 
Sub-aim 2: To investigate the changing patterns of laypeople’s intergenerational 
transmission of religion from a spatial and temporal perspective. 
1. How is the Bon religion transmitted intergenerationally at home and in school? 
2. How do the experiences at school of young people influence the intergenerational 
transmission of religion?   
3. How do young Tibetans transmit religion intergenerationally after school?  
Sub-aim 3: To explore the changing religious identity of monks. 
1. How are monks involved in tourism? 
2. What kind of conflicts do they have about their religious identity? 
3. How do local people perceive the changing religious identity of monks? 
4. How do they negotiate their religious identity?  
These aims and questions were used to inform my data collection. My thesis structure 
was formed based on the analysis of the data (see Chapter 4 for details on data 
collection and data analysis). The following section will outline the thesis structure.  
1.4.2 Structure of the thesis 
In pursuing these aims and questions, the remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows.  
Chapter 2 situates the thesis in four strands of literature which inform my understanding 
of religious change in Tibet. I start with a critical reflection on secularisation debates, 
from which I identify a lack of geographical insights into secularisation theory. In the 
process of doing this, my overall approach to religious change in Tibet is articulated. I 
continue by discussing the significance and usages of a spatial approach in studying 
religion. I also consider the relationships between tourism and modernisation and the 
impacts of tourism on the religious beliefs and practices of local people, looking 
particularly at issues of religious commodification and cultural authenticity and their 
connection to tourism. Finally, I critically review the literature on religious identity and 
intergenerationality with a specific focus on the relationships between religious identity 
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and ethnic identity, intergenerational transmission of religion, and the influence of school 
education on young people’s religiosity. The value of a spatial perspective in enriching 
our understanding of intergenerational transmission of religion is highlighted.  
Chapter 3 provides a contextual discussion of the ways in which dimensions of 
modernity and religion are intertwined in Tibet. Firstly I delineate the process of 
modernisation in Tibet since 1950 with different parts of it consecutively incorporated into 
China. Special attention is given to minority policies, the state-led tourism project and the 
government’s development logic. Secondly, I discuss the history of religion in Tibet and 
the complex relationship between Bon and Tibetan Buddhism with particular focus on the 
period after 1950. Finally I provide more localised information on the history and 
geography of Jiuzhaigou.  
Chapter 4 outlines the methodological approach of this project. I discuss the process of 
research design, data collection and analysis. Given the similarities and differences 
between my participants and I (a young Tibetan academic but a not very religious 
Buddhist), I particularly reflect upon the ethical issues and my positionality in influencing 
the thesis and reshaping my own ethnic identity. 
Chapter 5 starts the empirical analysis of this thesis by exploring the changing religious 
landscape in Jiuzhaigou. I pay attention to the institutional (monastery) and non-
institutional (non-monastery) religious forces and practices and their changes after 
tourism development. I argue that the central change of religion is not best described as 
‘secularisation’ but rather as a specific form of the deinstitutionalisation of religion. The 
non-institutional expression of religion is growing in relation to the monastery’s 
decreasing authority and appeal, a trend to which the tourism economy contributes 
considerably. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the changing patterns of intergenerational transmission of religion, 
emphasising spatial and temporal analytical dimensions which have been missed in 
existing studies. More specifically, intergenerational transmission of religion is examined 
in the spaces of home and school, as well as in pre-school and after-school life stages. 
Educational opportunities in public schools outside Tibet interrupt the experience that 
young Tibetans have of the intergenerational transmission of religion. I argue that young 
people tend to come to treat religion from a ‘rational’ perspective by understanding it as 
an ethnic cultural norm. I argue that—working, as it were, counter to this—under the 
Chinese communist and scientific ideological climate, ethnicity becomes an umbrella 
reinforcing their religious identity. In terms of the intergenerational transmission of 
religion, I further argue that the intergenerational transmission of religion is not linear and 
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unidirectional, but varies under different spatial and temporal locations. Religious beliefs 
were found not to be uniformly transmitted together with religious practices.   
Chapter 7 is the final analytical chapter where I examine the changing imaginative 
geographies of religion with a special focus on monks’ authenticity. I argue that both 
hanification (hanhua in Chinese, Han-assimilation) and economic modernisation 
contribute to the authenticity crisis of Tibetanness and monks’ religious identity. The 
dominant image of Han/Tibetan division is embodied and internalised in Jiuzhaigou 
Tibetans’ understanding of what I call ‘inauthentic self’ compared to other authentic 
Tibetan places with little or no hanified culture and modernised economy.  
Chapter 8 closes the thesis by linking back to my research aims and questions and 
drawing together the empirical and theoretical findings and contributions to scholarship 
on the relationships between modernity and religion, the impacts of tourism on religion, 
the intergenerational transmission of religion, and religious authenticity.  
Overall, the thesis makes original empirical and theoretical contributions to illuminating 
the understudied and poorly-understood everyday religious practices and beliefs of 





















Chapter 2 Theorising the geographies of religious change in 
Tibet 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework for my research on geographies of 
religious change in Tibet. Specifically, this chapter situates the thesis within geographies 
of religion and broadly in the ambit of socio-cultural studies of religious change, providing 
theoretical background and support for the forthcoming analytical chapters through four 
strands of literatures. With these theoretical reflections, my research seeks to contribute 
to the current limited, western-dominated and over-generalized understanding of 
religious change and also to add some new knowledge on the state of Tibetan religion in 
contemporary modernising China. 
In 1970, Robert Bellah (1970: 72) claimed that “it has been impossible for religion to 
remain entirely indifferent to modernisation”. Given the intense processes of 
modernisation and globalisation experienced by East Asian (and other non-western) 
economies and societies since that time, his words now seem like a considerable 
understatement. The advent of modernisation has generated various forms of religious 
change in the world with different directions, patterns and dynamics. Among many 
explanations of religious change, secularisation theory has been the most salient and 
pertinent strand (e.g. Berger, 1967; Wilson, 1998; Bruce, 2002), even though it also has 
been heavily critiqued (Davie, 2013; Martin, 1991; Stark, 1999) with the evidence of 
flourishing religious belief and practice in North and South America, the Middle-East and 
Asia. New concepts such as ‘sacralisation’, ‘de-secularisation’ (Berger, 1999), and post-
secularism (Habermas, 2008) have emerged to explain the increasing visibility of religion 
in public life. However, in general the diversity, complexity and nuance of religious 
change in modern societies have not been fully revealed in the existing research (Stark 
and Finke, 2000; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Davie, 2013), because:(1) it is place biased 
(Proctor, 2006), since it generally was derived from evidence from Europe and North 
America and ignored the rising religious adherence in other countries of the world. The 
sporadic attention given to the non-western world was normally hidden as ornaments in 
the major debates about the west; 
 (2) it is culturally biased, with a disproportionate amount of focus given to Christians and 
Muslims; 
 (3) it is mostly based on quantitative analysis and macro-scale statistics; and 
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(4) it generally has rested upon flimsy empirical evidence, and lacks in-depth and 
systemic, empirical examination of the reasons and process of religious change in 
diverse (particularly non-western) contexts (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 215). 
Therefore, I argue that exploring religious change needs more attention to be given to 
non-western societies and religions and to in-depth qualitative analysis at the meso and 
micro scales. This overarching understanding navigates me to approach religious 
change in a Tibetan Bon area which is experiencing rapid economic modernisation from 
tourism, at the institutional and individual level, using in-depth qualitative methods.  
In the following sections, four strands of literatures which have informed and shaped my 
understanding of religious change in Tibet will be reviewed. First, the relationships 
between modernity and religious change will be broadly discussed (Section 2.2). Among 
various ways of understanding the relationships between modernity and religion, I will 
mainly focus on secularisation theory and, and I will further explain how the 
secularisation debates have informed my thinking on religious change. In Section 2.3, 
the spatiality of religious practices and belief will be explored. Special focus will be given 
geographic studies on religion. In section 2.4, particular attention will be given to the 
interrelationships between modernity, tourism and religion. Tourism, as a vehicle of 
modernisation in many countries, has had diverse impacts on religion. As I discuss, the 
development of tourist economies has been a key trigger for debates over the nature of 
religious commodification and cultural authenticity. Section 2.5 will examine the issues 
around religious identity and intergenerationality. In specific, studies on interactions 
between religious identity and ethnic identity, intergenerational transmission of religion, 
and the mutual-influence of school education and religion will be considered. The 
concluding section (2.6) will draw together these four strands for making a case for my 
overall theoretical and methodological approach in this research. 
2.2 Modernisation and religious change   
The relationships between religion and modernity have long been a major field of inquiry 
for researchers working on religious change in modern societies. There are many 
different expressions of religious change and different ways of understanding it. Among 
them, secularisation and the debates surrounding the concept have been seen the most 
conspicuous and important. Modernisation has been conceptualized as the fuse for the 
explosion of secularisation and as a source of problems for religion (Duffy et al., 2009: 2). 
Therefore, to better understand the nature of contemporary religious change in Tibet, I 
provide an examination of the relationship between modernity and religion.  
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I will begin by focusing on various debates on secularisation, de-secularisation and post-
secularity (Section 2.2.1), and then I will specifically review studies on 
deinstitutionalisation of religion (Section 2.2.2). Following this, in Section 2.2.3 
geographical perspectives on secularisation will be expounded. .   2.2.1 Modernisation, 
secularisation and more  
Modernisation is one of the most ambiguous and multifaceted concepts in the vocabulary 
of sociology. According to Bruce (2009: 2), modernisation “encompasses the 
industrialization of work; the shift from villages to towns and cities; the replacement of the 
small community by the society; the rise of individualism; the rise of egalitarianism; and 
the rationalisation both of thought and of social organization”. Seeing religion was 
declining in the western world, the founders of sociology such as Karl Marx, Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber asserted that modernisation would lead to a process of 
disenchantment. From the historical point of view, the concept of secularism is nothing 
new and has existed since the 19th century. It originated in the Enlightenment critique of 
religion, and was considered to stem from an inevitable differentiation of the secular from 
the religious, and a differentiation of religion from the social system. Since then, 
secularisation has become an essential term in the lexicon of modernisation. Theories of 
secularisation have become a heated topic both in and beyond the sociology of religion 
and religious studies. The decline of religious practices and organizations in the context 
of modernisation started to be taken for granted by most researchers (Norris and 
Inglehart, 2004). However, it needs to acknowledge that secularisation does not simply 
refer to religious decline. There are other concurrent processes and understandings. 
Even though there are different ways of understanding secularisation, secularisation has 
generally been explained from two perspectives: the demand side (believers) and the 
supply side (church and clergy) (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). From the demand side, 
religion is considered having declining influence on people’ social life. Modernity has 
been considered bringing rationality, scientific thinking, and managerial strategies to 
people and expelling superstitious thoughts and deeds. Some scholars (e.g. Bruce, 1992; 
Bruce, 1998; Bruce, 2002) put the focus on individualisation as it is considered to disturb 
the communal nature of religion which acts as the basis of religious belief and behaviour. 
Apart from that, privatisation is also thought to constrain conventional religious practices 
and increase privatised and localised religious practices (Bruce, 1998: 129). Berger 
(quoted in Cairangtai, 2009: 3) even predicted that “by the 21st century, religious 




From the supply side, secularisation is considered to be “the process by which sectors of 
society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols” 
(Berger, 1967: 107). Functional differentiation and religious pluralism are singled out as 
two important factors resulting declining religious authority. In terms of pluralism, it is 
thought that providing religious alternatives erodes the status of monopolistic religion 
(Wilson, 1998). As far as differentiation is considered, it is claimed that many social 
spheres, such as education, health care and welfare, which were traditionally controlled 
by the religious authority have been functionally differentiated and distributed to non-
religious offshoots (Duffy et al., 2009: 8; Wilson, 1982). Casanova (1994: 18) even 
argues that the “theory of secularisation is nothing more than a sub-theory of general 
theories of differentiation”.  
However the explanations listed above have limited explanatory power in understanding 
other trends and processes of religious change happening in the world. For example, 
pluralism does not necessarily lead to the demise of religion as a whole, but could 
generate counter-secular movements (Herbert, 2000: 1-18). Religion might instead be 
stimulated and exists in more diverse and vibrant ways. As various de-secularisation 
phenomenon came forth in recent years, scholars started to rethink the theory of 
secularisation and posited refutations. De-secularisation was developed to explain the 
wide revival of modern religion in areas like America, Middle East and Asia. Scholars 
such as Rodney Stark (1999), Roger Finke (2000) and Grace Davie (2013: 2) think that 
secularisation is an ultimately false assumption and should be put into the “graveyard of 
failed theories” (Stark and Finke, 2000: 79). Even the strongest proponent of 
secularisation, Peter Berger, found a great mismatch between the facts and the theory 
he had promoted and ultimately denied his previous assumption, admitting that 
secularisation theory is based on a false assumption that modernisation will necessarily 
bring about religious decline. Proctor (2006: 429-456) argued that religion is 
experiencing revival (sect formation) and innovation (cult formation), rather than decline 
or demise. Habermas (2008) argued that we are in a post-secular age in which religion 
has a high visibility in the public sphere of post-secular societies. However, it has been 
argued that post-secularity is a concept that is speculative and lacks empirical evidence 
(Beckford, 2012). Even in the case of Britain, post-secularity has been considered 
problematic and not helpful in explaining actual situation of public religion (Beckford, 
2012). The concept applies with difficulty in Tibet, where religion regulated in very 
different ways to the Western context, in which Habermas writes. 
Some have neutral view toward religious change contending that religion is adapting to 
and negotiating with modern societies. Religion and modernity are not necessarily 
conflicting concepts (Douglas, 1982; Taylor, 2007). Hervieu-Leger (2000) argues that 
19 
 
modernity itself can create religious demand rather than necessarily suppressing 
religious growth. New religious demands are created under the conditions of 
industrialisation, urbanisation, pluralism, individualism, rationalisation and autonomy 
which make people living in modernity eager to search for a religion to cope with the 
uncertainties grown in the modern world. On the one hand, modernity damaged the 
conditions for traditional communal and mass religion; on the other hand, it creates a 
need for new forms of religion. Thus, in this view, secularisation does not imply the 
decline of religion altogether, but rather refers to a process of adapting the nature and 
forms of religion to make them compatible with modern living. This is echoed by Borchert 
(2008) who claims that Buddhists should not be seen as necessarily in opposition to and 
passively bearing modernity. Stepping into the modern society does not mean 
abandoning the Buddhist traditions, but rather engaging in constant negotiations 
between state and non-state actors over what constitutes a legitimate and national form 
of Buddhism.  
However, in recent years cases of terror attacks and unrest related to religious 
fundamentalists demonstrate that significant conflicts still exist between religion and 
modernity, especially in Europe and the US with varying religious ideas and secularist 
thoughts competing. The conflict between the sacred and the secular is exemplified by 
the recent terror attack on the Paris magazine Charlie Hebdo in one of the most 
secularist states. Secularism is usually understood in a narrow sense as a political 
attitude or policy (Berkes, 2013: 7) that promotes the separation of government and 
religion and leaves both being independent of each other. Many studies existed and 
focused on the role of modern states in promoting religious change, especially in those 
Islamist countries where religion has always had a close relationship with the state.  
The concept of ‘secularisation’ is “so multidimensional, so ironically reversible in its 
contradictory connotations, and so loaded with the wide range of meanings it has 
accumulated through its history” (Casanova, 1994: 12). Various ideas and threads are 
embedded in this concept (Davie, 2013: 49). Even though the secularisation paradigm 
has various interpretations and critics, it is still regarded as an effective approach to 
religious change in the modern world (Casanova, 1994: 211; Davie, 2013: 51). It 
provides a “powerful set of description and explanation that remain useful even to its 
detractors” (Wilford, 2010: 330). What is needed is a concrete and accurate way to 
analyse religious change in different parts of the world. Some scholars suggest refining 
secularisation as a multi-dimensional, multi-scalar concept which has different 
expressions at different scales in order to regenerate new thinking and imagination 
(Casanova, 1994; Luckmann, 1967; Dobbelaere, 1981; Davie, 2013; Wilford, 2010). 
Dobbelaere (1981; 2002) and Chaves (1994) agreed that secularisation has three levels: 
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societal secularisation at the macro level, organizational secularisation at the meso-level 
and individual secularisation at the micro level. This perspective is clear and useful for 
the sort of empirical investigation of religious change that has been largely missing in 
existing studies.  
Religious change at individual level and institutional level are usually interconnected and 
inter-responsive. For example, individuals’ departure from church could reflect religious 
change at the institutional level.  Debates on deinstitutionalisation of religion (which will 
be discussed in the following section) particularly capture the dynamic religious change 
at the intuitional and individual level.  
2.2.2 Deinstitutionalisation of religion 
According to Davie (2013:4), in modern societies, “institutional religion at least in its 
traditional forms is in trouble”. The deinstitutionalisation of religion was borne out of 
secularisation theory and was argued to be an important indicator of meso-level 
secularisation. Berger (1967) firstly defined secularisation as the declining plausibility 
and legitimacy of religious institutions. Chaves (1994) also stated that secularisation 
demonstrates in declining scope of religious authority.  
Luckmann (1967) found that religion becomes invisible when it is deinstitutionalised. It 
does not necessarily disappear, but is more evident in new religious practices and 
spiritualities such as yoga, Zen meditation, magic, astrology, reincarnation, and private 
beliefs, values and rituals other than in conventional religious affiliations. Similar findings 
could be found elsewhere (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985: 429-56; Roof, 2001). Pollack and 
Pickel (2007) specifically used deinstitutionalisation to describe declining number of 
church members, and declining attendance of services in Germany. Some forms of 
religiosity which have no obvious connection with established religion were also found 
growing. However, they noted that self-determined non-church religiosity cannot 
compensate for the losses of institutionalised religiosity. Non-church religiosity remains 
marginal and is interwoven with traditional Christian religiosity. 
Losing authority of religious institution also demonstrates in its losing influence on 
individuals’ beliefs. Wright Mills (1959: 33) claimed that “in due course, the sacred shall 
disappear altogether except, possibly, in the private realm”. Even though this has clearly 
not yet happened, religious privatisation, from this perspective, makes the private sphere 
the last place for religion to exist. Hervieu-Leger (2000) argued that: 
Modernity has deconstructed the traditional systems of believing, but has not 
forsaken belief. Believing finds expression in an individualised, subjective and 
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diffused form, and resolves into a multiplicity of combinations and orderings of 
meaning which are elaborated independently of control by institutions of 
believing, by religious institutions in particular (2000: 74). 
Individual secularisation could also be manifested in the decline of church attendance, 
new sets of personal beliefs and practices freed from the guidance of church, and the 
compartmentalization of meaning systems. From 1945 to 1990s Britain had experienced 
declining religious participation in Church and a relatively strong religious belief which 
Davie has notably termed “believing without belonging” (Davie, 1990; Davie, 1994). 
However, the changes of institutional and individual religion have different expressions in 
Europe. A large number of Europeans still claim themselves as ‘Christian’ although they 
do not believe it, which is named “belonging without believing” (Hervieu-Léger, 2003). 
Concerning a specific group of people, Wilcox etc (2012) found that institutional religion 
is declining among the American working class, as they do not have money to support 
their religious activities. The bourgeois and familial moral logics which promoted in 
church are less influential among working class whites than before, which is accounting 
for their declining religious attendance.  
Thus deinstitutionalisation is a plausible concept for describing laypeople’s departure 
from religious institutions and the declining significance of contemporary religion in the 
public domain (Pollack and Pickel, 2007; Streib, 2007).  
So far, although secularisation debates have greatly enriched our understanding of 
religious change, various threads have not reached an agreement as each thread still 
has its drawbacks being critiqued. I identify four drawbacks of the current debates and 
argue that these could be generally interpreted in geographical perspectives. The 
following section will make an elaboration on these four drawbacks.  
2.2.3 Geographical thinking on secularisation 
Geographers have rarely used secularisation theories in explaining modern religious 
expressions (Wilford, 2010: 328). Most research done by geographers of religion tends 
to ignore the secularisation or just treated it as a broad socio-religious context without 
practical meanings. Wilford (2010: 331) has recently criticized these tendencies, arguing 
that geographers have typically either: “(1) used the concept of secularisation minimally 
and unproblematically; (2) smuggled the concept in through an unexamined equation of 
religion with non-western identity; or (3) ignored secularisation altogether.”  
However, as Wilford (2010) argues, geographical insights are potentially very useful for 
filling the gaps and overcoming the shortcomings of secularisation theory. I argue that 
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the drawbacks of secularisation theory are mainly demonstrated in four geographical 
aspects. Reflecting on these drawbacks, I identify the approach of my research 
concerning the questions of how and why religious change happens in contemporary 
Tibet at a local scale.  
Firstly, the secularisation debate is place biased and highly place-dependent (Proctor, 
2006). The current secularisation theory is “incompatible with nuanced and complex 
geography of religion” (Wilford, 2010: 330). Although church has lost appeal in Europe, 
in the America, some African and Asian countries it found fertile soil to grow. However, 
there is a huge gap between secularisation studies in the west and the non-west. Both 
proponents and critics of secularisation theory rely too heavily on evidence from the 
United States and Europe, but have failed to compare the rising religious adherence in 
other countries of the world (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 4). The sporadic attention given 
to the non-western world was normally treated as an ornament in the major debates 
about the west. Davie (2013: 52) even argues that our understanding of the relationship 
between religion and modernity “is just a European phenomenon with a European 
explanation; it is not an axiomatic connection between religion and the modern world 
taken as a whole”.  
The two primary camps of secularisation theorists tend to be associated with place. 
Specifically, the secularisation defendants such as Steve Bruce, Bryan Wilson, and Karel 
Dobbelear are all from Europe; in contrast, critics such as Peter Berger and Rodney 
Stark are Americans. Both groups made claims based on the experience of the regions 
in which they lived. However, there are some exceptions, for example, the British 
scholars David Martin and Grace Davie do not see the inevitability of secularisation and 
even suggested to abandon it completely. Others adopted more inclusive view by 
suggesting that secularisation should not be simplified into a problem of rise or fall.   
There was a notion embedded in many western scholars’ attitudes toward secularisation 
processes that what is happening in the west will eventually and inevitably take place in 
other parts of the world (Davie, 2013). However, the plausibility and applicability of the 
western experience and theories to the non-Western areas still remain a question. 
Secularisation in the non-Western world might practically be greatly different from the 
West for two reasons. Firstly, the religious system is enormously different. For instance, 
Buddhism, Islamism or Hinduism in the East has different religious traditions and 
organizations from the western religions. Secondly, the West and the East are going 
through greatly different political, social, economic modernisation processes and phases, 
which might generate different patterns of relationships between religion and modernity. 
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Therefore, when interrogating the religious change, particularities in different countries 
should be taken into account (Szonyi, 2009). 
“The field of secularisation is littered with exceptionalisms” (Iqtidar, 2011). With Europe 
and the US as exceptional cases for counter-secularisation and secularisation, Iqtidar 
(2011) claimed that the third world countries which are characteristic of state intervention 
in religious affairs were also seen as an exception of the field of secularisation. Islam 
with its prominent presence in the political sphere has been proved remaining strong or 
even stronger (Gellner, 1992: 5-22). The political involvement of Islam generated another 
kind of (de)secularisation in Turkey, Israel, and India. For example, in Pakistan, forces 
stemming right from the Islam itself facilitated secularisation (Iqtidar, 2011). Iqtidar 
claimed that in Pakistan those against secularism, such as the Islamists were actually 
inadvertently facilitating secularisation.  
East Asia also has shown strong state engagement in religion. The political driven 
secularisation of East Asian religions has been at the front of scholars’ interest in 
religious change, but the non-state driven forms of secularisation in everyday life of East 
Asian culture have been scarcely studied (Gentz, 2009: 244). By investigating the survey 
data of Asian religion, Reed (2007) found East Asia is more secular than South Asia 
based on their religious memberships and frequency of religious attendance. However 
Reed’s measures of secularisation was criticized by Szonyi (2009) who contended that 
neither church attendance nor the quantified religious beliefs can fully reflect Chinese 
people’s religiosity. Gentz (2009) identified elements of both secularisation and counter-
secularisation in China, Japan and Korea. Specifically in China, while the state leads the 
secularisation, both traditional religions and new religious movements remained vital in 
maintaining socio-political order at the local level, in particular places such as the 
Southwest China. Japan has been widely assumed as an example of non-western nation 
experiencing secularisation (Bruce, 1996). However, under the secular surface at the 
macro level, at the meso and micro levels religious beliefs and practices were remained 
important aspects of Japanese everyday life (Roemer, 2009). Most of Japanese identify 
their spiritual practices and beliefs under categories of tradition and custom, other than 
religion. Japan’s supposed non-religious situation is actually a lack of churched religion 
(Stark et al., 2005).  
Secondly, secularisation debate is culturally biased. The current secularisation theory 
almost equals theories of Christian secularisation. Considerable focus has been given to 
churches, Catholics, Christians in secularisation discussions, other than temples, 
mosques, Buddhists and Muslims. It is thought that secularisation should be examined 
more in non-Western cultures and non-Christian religions (Gorski and Altinordu, 2008), 
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because the western-originated secularisation theory has its limitations in fully exploring 
some aspects of non-western religions, such as the relationality of religion, collective 
religious experience, ritual (Spickard, 1998: 188). Moreover, even the similar civilisation 
might generate different extents and forms of secularism under different social, economic 
and political conditions. 
There might be two reasons for less scholarly engagement in non-western religions in 
secularisation discussion: firstly secularisation sprouted from and developed in the West 
which provides accessible facts for western scholars; secondly the language barrier 
confines the discussions in the western circle and leaves no much space for scholars 
with non-western background speaking out the situation of religion in their places. With 
the research focus shifting to the Eastern religions and increased proficiency of English 
language among eastern scholars, secularisation theory will receive regeneration in this 
new area. 
Thirdly, evidence for secularisation has primarily been derived from quantitative analysis 
and macro-scale statistics. Even sociologists of religion often confined their domain in 
regional or national scale, failing to touch the (non)secularisation facts and details on a 
small scale (Wilford, 2010: 331). Secularisation at the macro scale does not necessarily 
imply religious decline on the micro scale. Sometimes religious vitality was vibrantly 
maintained at micro level, or as Wilford suggested at socio-spatially differentiated places 
or “sacred archipelagos” (Wilford, 2010).  
Moreover, a large amount of quantitative research based on macro-scale data might lead 
to over overgeneralization of secularisation theory. Most early research detected 
secularisation by simply counting the numbers of adherents and times of attending 
church services. Instead of care about the question of more or less, we should concern 
more about why and how religious change happens in qualitative way. Nonetheless, due 
to its wide range of meanings and contradictions, the concept secularisation is 
“practically nonoperational for the dominant modes of empirical scientific analysis” 
(Casanova, 1994: 12). The macro survey data cannot give insightful details.  
For exploring the complex process of secularisation, qualitative approach and micro level 
studies might generate fresh understandings at different scales and penetrable and 
powerful insights into the theories of secularisation. Macro-level secularisation cannot 
represent the secularisation of individuals’ consciousness (Herbert, 2000: 1-18). 
Secularisation at the nation-state scale does not inevitably evince secularisation at the 
body, home or community scales (Wilford, 2010). In the future, Wilford (2010: 331) 
argues, the “embodied, material, and local responses to abstract, large-scale forces” 
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should be given particular attention. It is a new direction of studies on religious change 
which could broaden the current secularisation debates. 
Finally, secularisation debate lacks systemic examination and generally has rested upon 
flimsy empirical evidence, and lacks in-depth and systemic examination on the reasons 
and process of religious change of the empirical cases from different countries. The 
reasons for the decline of religion explained by secularisation theorists were not very 
clear (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). Only a handful of case studies were picked up to 
evidence the secularisation thesis. 
The complex process of religious change which involves many factors and actors has 
not been fully analysed. Streib (2007) suggested broadening the focus on 
deinstitutionalisation to the “biographical dimension, individual’s faith, its diversity of 
forms and its dynamics of change”. In addition, when religion is bound up with forces 
such as ethnicity and nationalism, it sometimes is imbued with power against 
secularisation (Duffy et al., 2009: 1-43), something which has recently been evident in 
some Islamic nations. Specifically in addressing the religious change in Tibet, there is a 
need to consider how Tibetan religion is treated under the political framework of the 
Chinese state, as the Chinese state has wide scope of administering religious affairs and 
modernisation projects.  
So far I have positioned my research in the studies on relationship between modernity 
and religion and pointed out a way forward. In the following sections, I will connect to my 
research aims and keep on discussing the changing landscape of religion and the 
various specific relations between religion and modernity, such as economic 
modernisation, education, scientific thinking. 
In Section 2.3, I will examine religious change through investigating the changing 
landscape of religion.  
2.3 Spatial understanding of religion 
According to Knott’s (2005a: 163) spatial approach, religion can be thought of as “a 
consequence of spatial practice in its physical presence, social orderings, and cultural 
forms, though it is the attribution of meaning that gives such practice its character as 
‘religious’”. Thus the changing landscape of religion could be reflected through the 
changing religious spaces, religious practices and religious meanings.  
The section first tries to define sacred space by reviewing different ways of 
understanding sacred space (Section 2.3.1). Secondly, the geographical studies on 
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sacred space will be reflected for informing my spatial understanding of religion (Section 
2.3.2).  
2.3.1 Defining sacred space 
There have been a great number of scholars analysing religion or ‘the sacred’ using a 
spatial approach. 
In contrast to earlier theoretical approaches which tended to represent sacred space as 
fixed, bounded and absolutely relative to the profane (Wheatley, 1971; Smith, 1992; 
1993; Eliade, 1959), it is now widely argued that the meanings of spatial terms such as 
‘space’, ‘place’ and ‘location’ are unclear, contested and unfixed (Massey, 1992; Knott, 
2005a).The term ‘sacred space’ has been used extensively in academic writings due to 
its unfixed, broad, diverse and ambiguous definition. This flexibility and ambiguity can be 
a strength but also a source of confusion.   
In their book on interpreting American sacred space, Chidester and Linenthal (1995) 
posed the question, ‘What is the sacred?’. Following the argument of Durkheim, who 
held that the sacred is not substantial but situational, they (Chidester and Linenthal, 
1995: 6) argued that ‘nothing is inherently sacred’. Quoting Levi Strauss, they suggested 
that ‘not full of meaning, the sacred, from this perspective, is an empty signifier’ that is 
‘susceptible to the reception of any meaning whatsoever’ (as quoted in Chidester and 
Linenthal, 1995: 6). Here, the meanings are obtained from the ‘nexus of human practices 
and social projects’ (Chidester and Linenthal, 1995) and ’social and political 
relationships’ (Kong, 2001a). 
Chester and Linenthal (1995: 15) assert that “[a] sacred space is not merely discovered, 
or founded, or constructed; it is claimed, owned, and operated by people advancing 
specific interests”. Specifically from a substantive perspective, sacred space is: 
not just the overtly religious places, but also other spaces of everyday life that 
may occasionally take on religious function and meanings (such as the 
museum and roadside) or be infused and shaped by religious values but which 
are neither overtly nor primarily about religion (such as home spaces or the 
Islamic banking system) (Kong, 2010: 15).  
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2.3.2 Reflections on the geographical studies of sacred space  
My interpretation of sacred space has been informed by a number of recent 
developments in the geographical literature. I will focus here on four particular themes 
from recent research that have particular salience for this thesis: 1) the importance of 
considering the ‘unofficially sacred’; 2) the importance of considering the intersections of 
other dimensions of diversity with religion; 3) the need to consider the complex 
entanglements between ‘secular’ and ‘sacred’; and 4) the significance of spatial politics 
in producing meanings and constructing religious spaces.  
2.3.2.1 ‘Unofficially’ sacred space 
 ‘Officially sacred space’ which refers to the formal religious built environment, such as 
churches, temples, mosques and shrines was once the main space of concern with the 
‘geography of religion’ (Kong, 2001a). The bias towards studying officially sacred spaces 
consequently limited the attention invested in understanding the relationship between the 
religious and the secular and obscured the need to look beyond the purely sacred space 
across multiple scales (Gökarıksel, 2009). Recently, religious scholars have been 
expanding their domain by extending the meaning of the traditional ‘sacred space’ to 
spaces which are not normally understood to be within the ‘secular’ realm. Thus, a range 
of more ‘unofficially’ sacred spaces which serve to reinforce religious identities and 
facilitate religious practices have been incorporated within the lexicon of ‘sacred space’. 
These spaces include historical monuments, museums, “religious schools, the premises 
of religious organizations (communal halls), pilgrimage routes (apart from the site 
themselves), religious memorials and roadside shines, domestic shrines religious 
procession routes, festival places and other secular spaces used for worship” (Grimes, 
1992; 2002: 1573). More recently, media spaces, street spaces, sites of financial 
practice and home spaces which exist in ‘everyday, informal, and often banal practices’ 
have also gradually attracted greater attention (Chidester and Linenthal, 1995; Kong, 
2010; Brace et al., 2006: 28).  
For example, museum was found invested with religious meanings (Grimes, 1992) and 
transformed into sacred spaces having effects on Jewish identity (Kong, 2005). Secular 
home could become a sacred ‘house church’ in Singapore (Kong, 2002). Technological 
‘sites’ with religious significance were also introduced into religious research, for 
example, research on how American religious broadcasting has had substantial effects 
on the international state of religion (Stump, 1991). Cyberspace is conceptualised as 
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potentially a kind of sacred space which affects people’s religious lives and identities 
(Kong, 2001b; O'Leary, 1996; Kinney, 1995).  
Given the importance of the home for Bon religious practice (as I discuss in greater detail 
in Chapters 5-7), it is worth exploring recent insights into home as an ‘unofficially’ sacred 
space. There are a number of studies that demonstrate that the home as a religious 
space should not be perceived as simply a passive container for religious belief and 
practice; rather, the home is actively involved in the meaning making of religion (Campo, 
1991; Kiong and Kong, 2000; Kong and Nair, 2012; Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 1993; 
McDannell, 1995; Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 2009; Prorok, 2000).  
Different parts of home could become places for religious use or with religious meanings. 
Based on an ethnographical research on Hindu immigrants in Southern California, 
Mazumdar and Mazumdar (1993; 2009) explored the ways in which the Hindu house 
was made as a sacred space and its relations with identity. Individuals or the family are 
actively engaging in the making of micro sacred spaces through everyday practices. 
Home gardens were found religiously significant for Buddhist and Hindu immigrants 
(Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 2012).  
Home is also an important site for intergenerational transmission of religion and cultural 
identity (1993; 2009) (see more discussion on intergenerational transmission of religion 
in Section 2.5.2). Ganapathy-Coleman (2014) found that for keeping their children’s 
cultural and religious identity, Indian migrant parents deliberately socialize their children 
into Hinduism through various religious settings, rituals, routines and religious teachings 
in domestic spaces. For some Christians, home is not only a setting for prayers, but also 
a place for teaching Christian values. 
Home sometimes has stronger religious influence than congregational religious place, 
such as for Buddhism and Hinduism which emphasises private prayers and rituals at 
home (Mazumdar and Mazumdar, 2012). Min (2010: 202) found Indian Hindus practice 
religion more at home which have stronger impact on retaining younger generation’s 
religiosity and ethnicity than religious practices in congregations. McDannell (1995), in 
research on the home schooling of Christians, shows how the home space serves to 
separate family members from the profane outside while cultivating virtues which were 
considered desirable. From this point of view, the private space of the home is the most 
significantly religious space, posing a form of challenge to churches (McDannell, 1995: 
209). .  
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2.3.2.2 Towards intersectionality  
Religion always had profound interactions with various identities (Gale, 2007). Instead of 
thinking various categories of self independently, Valentine (2007) emphasised that 
multiple categories of identities are interconnected and experienced simultaneously by 
individuals in everyday life and she called for more empirically grounded research about 
the experience of intersectionality. She discussed the interconnections between race, 
gender, class and sexuality, but did not mention an important category: religion and its 
intersections with other categories.  
Within geographies of religion, there have been quite a few studies recently focusing on 
relationships between religion and other identities such as gender (Mazumdar, 1999; 
Tobler, 2000; Dwyer, 1999), generation (Dwyer and Shah, 2009; Hopkins et al., 2011; 
Hemming and Madge, 2012), race (Kong, 1999; Gardner and Shukur, 1994), sexuality 
(Valentine and Waite, 2012; Vanderbeck et al., 2011), and ethnicity (Baumann, 1996; 
Bhardwaj and Rao, 1998; Prorok, 1998). For example, Kong (1999) found that 
patriarchy, racism and classism were strengthened by religious buildings in Singapore.  
As seen before, people in socio-culturally marginal places especially became the main 
focus of these studies. Kong (2001a) has called for greater attention of geographies of 
religion to groups that are considered vulnerable, disadvantaged, excluded, and  
oppressed. Migrant Muslim communities in Britain and elsewhere in Europe have been 
particularly examined in terms of the complex intersections of gender, generation, and 
religion. Muslim women’s various identities and embodied spatial practices have been 
the research focus (Dwyer, 1999; Secor, 2002). In addition, young people’s religiosity 
and spirituality was paid more attentions lately (Dwyer, 1999; Dwyer, 2000; Hopkins, 
2006; Hopkins, 2007a).  
The existing intersectional research on religion has greatly enhanced our understanding 
of relationships between religion and other categories of self. However, groups like 
children, the elderly were reluctant to be included into geographical research on religion 
(Kong, 2010). Furthermore, Christianity and Islam remain the primary foci for 
geographical research on religions, with more attention needed to traditions including 
Buddhism, Confucianism etc.  
2.3.2.3 Entanglements between the sacred and the secular 
The religious should not be interpreted purely without considering the secular context. 
More and more research suggests that the religious and the secular are mutually 
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constituted and interact dynamically within the context of everyday life (Kong, 2001a; 
Holloway, 2003; Gökarıksel, 2009). The traditional rigid binary of the sacred and the 
profane proposed by Eliade in 1950s is problematic (Yorgason and della Dora, 2009). 
“Entreprepreneurial, social, political and other ‘profane’ forces” (Chidester and Linenthal, 
1995: 17) are necessary and important factors for construction of sacred space. Religion 
also has significant role for understanding the secular society (Holloway and Valins, 
2002). Many rituals and prayers need to be practiced every day, for example, a Muslim is 
requested to pray five times a day, and Tibetan Buddhism believers regularly chant 
sutras and make pilgrimages to temples, monasteries, holy mountains and lakes. These 
religious practices are tightly bonded to everyday life, and there is not necessarily a clear 
separation between ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ space. The sacred/secular binary is too rigid to 
use at the moment when the sacred is fluid, contested and unbounded. 
2.3.2.4 Spatial politics 
As mentioned before, no space is inherently sacred; rather, spaces undergo processes 
of sacralisation (Chidester and Linenthal, 1995). Religious meanings could be created 
and inscribed to a space. For example, Grime (1992) examined religious objects in 
museum and argued that religious objects could sacralise a specific space and the 
space in turn could change viewers’ interpretation of  these objects.  
It is widely acknowledged that sacred space is contested space (Chidester and 
Linenthal, 1995; Kong, 1993). Van der Leeuw (1938) found four kinds of politics involved 
in the construction of sacred space:  
a politics of position, whereby every establishment of a sacred place is a 
conquest of space; a politics of property, whereby a sacred place is 
‘appropriated, possessed and, owned’, its sacredness maintained through 
claims and counter-claims on its ownership; a politics of exclusion, whereby the 
sanctity of sacred place is preserved by maintaining boundaries, carving the 
inside from the outside; and a politics of exile, which takes the form of a 
modern loss of or nostalgia for the sacred (quoted in Kong, 2002).  
The politics of exclusion is most obviously demonstrated in the gender difference. For 
example, in Tibetan Buddhism and in Hinduism menstruating women are not permitted 
to enter some particular sacred spaces as they are considered polluting.  
In a similar vein, Chidester and Linenthal (1995: 19) proposed four strategies of symbolic 
engagement in the production of sacred space which include strategies of appropriation, 
exclusion, inversion and hybridization. From Johnson’s (1986) point of view, construction 
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of sacred place is just one part of “a circuit of culture” which consists of  the construction 
as well as the  contestation and consumption of sacred place.  
Developed from the previous understanding of spatial politics, Kong (2002) suggested a 
new everyday politics of place making including politics of inclusion whereby non-church 
members and non-Christians are incorporated, politics of hybridization and in-
betweenness which fuse sacred and secular, public and private, politics of appropriation 
and nationalisation whereby a particular religion is officially sanctioned and supported by 
a secular state and politics of permanence and impermanence that balance the wish of 
permanent sense of place and the reality of being relocated. 
In sum, construction of religious spaces involves different forces with different purposes 
and attitudes, such as the state, laypeople, religious professionals, the non-religious 
groups exerting different politics. Apart from the Christianity in modern urban context, 
different religions in different contexts which might have different ways of space making 
need to be given more attention.   
This section has mainly focused on the spatial nature and characteristics of religion. The 
following section is going to place religion in a specific context with modernising forces: 
tourism.    
2.4 Modernity, tourism and religion 
Tourism is an important vehicle of modernisation which can bring various dimensions of 
modernity, such as urbanism, market rationality, specialism, individualism. This would 
further influence the religion. According to Oakes (1998), modernity should be 
considered “paradoxical processes” in which socioeconomic change creates new 
practices and discourses and alters the ways of being human. This section will discuss 
how socioeconomic changes created by tourism influence a destination’s religious faiths 
and organizations.  
Section 2.4.1 will provide a general discussion of the relationship between tourism and 
modernisation. In Section 2.4.2, the relationship between tourism and religion will be 
explored in relation to three specific areas: tourism impacts on local religion, religious 
commodification as a part of modernisation and cultural authenticity.  
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2.4.1 Tourism and modernisation  
Tourism is one of the major social and economic phenomena of modern times (Sharpley 
and Telfer, 2002). It has become a significant and integral development strategy for both 
developed and developing countries of the world. As Roche (1992: 566) states, “the 
development of tourism has long been seen as both a vehicle and a symbol at least of 
westernisation, but also, more importantly, of 'progress' and 'modernisation’”. In 
academia, considerable attention has been given to tourism in less developed countries. 
Tourism before 1970s was often represented as a blessing for the developing world, 
attracting foreign exchange earnings, creating job opportunities, generating infrastructure 
construction, improving social services while causing relatively little pollution, all for a 
small amount of pre-investment (Britton, 1982; Cater, 1987).  Tourism was viewed as 
facilitating economic modernisation while also promoting modern ways of life with 
western values (Harrison, 1992). However, since 1970s a number of critical voices  have 
attested to the multiple social, cultural and environmental costs of tourism which were 
not initially recognized or acknowledged, including unequal benefits distribution, spoiling 
of nature, cultural commodification, disruption of social structure, crimes, consumerism 
and so on (Young, 1973; Erisman, 1983; De Kadt, 1979; Wall and Mathieson, 2006; 
Wood, 1997; Liu and Var, 1986).  
For achieving economic modernisation, tourism is considered an effective development 
strategy worldwide (Jamal and Robinson, 2009: 157). For the state, tourism is not only a 
means of economic booster, but also a way of assisting government policies and 
strategies and enhancing national unity (Wood, 1997). For example, Buddhism was 
promoted in the international tourist market by Burmese government for legitimating its 
military regime (Philp and Mercer, 1999). Indian heritages were represented by the 
government in a way to consolidate its secular and nationalist basis (Bandyopadhyay et 
al., 2008). In China, the state manipulates tourism development for national goal: 
boosting economy and realising socialist modernisation (Su and Teo, 2009; Oakes, 1998; 
Xie, 2011). However, it has been criticized that many countries including the Chinese 
state have paid more attention to economic modernisation and ignored socio-cultural 
modernisation. The following section will look at tourism impacts on a socio-cultural 
phenomenon: religion.  
2.4.2 Tourism and religion 
Religion figures prominently in promoting tourism. Even the Muslim world began to 
respond to tourism in order to attract both religious and non-religious tourists to their 
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countries (Al-Hamarneh and Steiner, 2004). There are a great amount of studies 
focusing on tourism and religion. However, a large number of these are primarily 
concerned with the practice of pilgrimage, essence of pilgrimage and its conceptual 
relationship with tourism and cared much about pilgrims (tourists) and their attitudes, 
experiences and spirituality (Shoval, 2000: 253; Turner, 1973; MacCannell, 1973; Turner 
and Turner, 1978; Grabum, 1977; 1983; 1989). It has argued that this kind of studies did 
not contribute to empirically understanding the relationships between tourism and 
religion (Stausberg, 2014: 350), for example how tourism influence religious belief and 
practices, how the religious objects are commodified into tourist products, and how the 
religious meanings change after commodification. In addition, the existing studies on 
relationships between tourism and religion have not given enough attention to the 
destination site and its people (Mustafa, 2014).  
The following section (Section 2.4.2.1) begins by discussing some important exceptions 
of research on tourism impacts on religion in destination sites. Then the emphasis moves 
to tourism-led religious commodification (Section 2.4.2.2). Finally, it reflects on an 
important issue arise from religious commodification: cultural authenticity.  
2.4.2.1 Tourism impacts on religion  
Relatively little literature has considered the impacts of tourism on religion from the 
perspective of local people in tourism destinations. There remains a considerable need 
to ask how their religious lives are being affected by (and in turn, influence) the growth of 
tourist economies.  
One area of scholarly interest has been the impacts of ‘religious tourism’, in which 
religious sites become attractions of pilgrimage and ultimately develop forms of mass 
tourism.  For example, Nolan and Nolan (1992) have explored how the normal religious 
functions of some important Christian religious sites have largely ceased as a result of 
mass forms of tourism.  In this literature, there has been a seeming consensus that 
tourism serves as a secularising force which has weakened the religiosity of local 
communities and their belief in the sacredness and efficacy of religious sites, rituals and 
customs (Cohen, 1998: 7; Beckerleg, 1995).  
Research on the reaction of local people to tourism’s impacts on religion has provided 
evidence of often ambivalent feelings of both appreciation for and dislike of tourism. In 
their investigation into a sacred centre Pushkar in India, Joseph and Kavoori (2001) 
found that although local residents were economically dependent on tourism, they still 
perceived tourism as a threat to their tradition and religion. In contrast, the Balinese, 
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according to Noronha (1979), adopted an active role in negotiating tourism and their 
traditional religion. Although traditional religious rituals were performed for tourists, the 
Balinese in the 1970s strictly differentiated rituals for tourists from those that they 
performed for themselves. Elsewhere, studies in sacred places such as Jerusalem or 
Mecca have found that local people or devout believers thought that tourism presents a 
great threat to their religion and belief because their spiritual experiences are affected by 
crowds of tourists and their behaviours (Rinschede, 1992). In some Muslim countries 
non-Muslim tourists are not very welcomed as tourism is considered violating Islamic 
cultural values (Robinson and Meaton, 2005; Zamani-Farahani and Henderson, 2010). 
However, in places like Baptismal Site of Jesus in Jordan where tourists and local people 
have little interactions, local people barely perceived negative socio-cultural impacts of 
tourism as their economic benefits outweigh any concerns (Mustafa, 2014). 
In terms of the religious professionals’ views and participation in tourism, the relevant 
research is scarce and provides different results. Focusing on a Buddhist pilgrimage site, 
Pu-Tuo-Shan in China, Wong et.al (2013) found through Buddhist perspective local 
monks and nuns see tourism positively as tourism could be a good platform to promote 
Buddhism and to help people. However, Hobbs (1992) and Shackley (1998) claimed that 
tourism is considered by monks/nuns having negative influence on the spiritual life of 
monks and the sacredness of the Monastery of St. Catherine in Egypt. Monks’ religious 
duties were interrupted by taking care of tourists. In her research on two Christian holy 
sites in Greece, Mount Meteora opening to the tourists and Mount Athos to genuine 
pilgrims, della-Dora (2012) found local villagers and tourists thought tourism somewhat 
diminishes the spiritual significance of the monastery in the Mount Meteora even though 
monks and nuns actually do not have much interaction with tourists. In all, the existing 
research has only concerned about tourists’ experience of religious tourism or in 
religious site, but largely ignored the views and experience of the religious leaders and 
groups. Furthermore, reading through numerous studies on the management and 
planning of religious sites (Henderson, 2011; Olsen, 2009; Shackley, 2012), it is 
surprising to find that the views and tourism involvement of religious professionals who 
are important in making and maintaining the sacred sites have not even been taken into 
account. Therefore, in future the views and experience of religious professionals should 
be given more attention in studies on tourism and religion (Olsen, 2011).  
A number of studies of the impacts of tourism on religion have focused specifically on the 
Himalayas region. It has been generally agreed that even though tourism to some extent 
change the traditional ways of religious practices and violates the sanctity of Buddhist 
monasteries (Singh, 2004), the religiosity has not been weakened at all (Stevens, 1993; 
Shackley, 1999). In some places, tourism even contributes to the religious growth 
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(Stevens, 1991: 50). According to Shackley (1999), people living in the Himalayas 
differentiate the adapted religious festivals and rituals presenting for tourists from the 
ones of their own. In Khumbu, Nepal, Stevens (1993) also had not found religious 
decline with tourism development. Sherpas used the money earned from tourism to 
support their religion by refurbishing monasteries and temples, building new shrines and 
family scripture rooms, introducing new rituals, pilgrimaging to India and Tibet, 
purchasing new scriptures and conducting more household religious practices. 
Christopher von Furer-Haimendorf (cited in Stevens, 1991: 50) found during the period 
between 1957 and 1971, the number of monks greatly dropped, and some monks left 
monastery to get into trekking and mountaineering work. However, Stevens (1991: 50) 
found that during the 1980s religion prospered because the wealth generated from 
tourism were used to “support local monasteries, temples, building of shrines, and other 
religious gestures in a highly visible way”. In 1990, the number of (future) monks reached 
the highest level in the institution’s history. There were even several new novices from 
rich families joining the monastery. Meanwhile, local people also showed great concern 
about the potential loss of Sherpa culture, because talented and bright men emigrated to 
Kathmandu, and children were sent to boarding schools in Kathmandu or abroad. The 
studies listed above provided a holistic description of economic, environmental and 
cultural consequences; however, they lack in-depth exploration of the diverse potential 
dimensions of religious change. Moreover, small-scale tourism such as mountaineering 
and trekking is the major type of tourism in all of the case studies mentioned above. 
Places with mass tourism might have different influence on religion. Stevens (1991) also 
stated that future change in the scale of tourism would also greatly increase tensions and 
the extent of cultural change.  
Critical research on tourism impacts has given particular attention to two particular 
issues: religious commodification and the question of authenticity/inauthenticity 
(Stausberg, 2014). I critically explore these each in turn below. 
2.4.2.2 Tourism and religious commodification 
Religious commodification has been seen as an increasingly prominent phenomenon 
around the world. The connection between the market economy and religion was 
established based on the “market mechanism, technological advancement, and global 
flow of people, capital, and information, including religious symbols and institutions” 
(Kitiarsa, 2010: 564). Religious symbols and institutions entered into market in forms of 
marketable and consumable products. Religious commodification marks the shift of 
adherents’ (at both individual and collective level) attitudes toward religion from 
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obligation to consumption (Davie, 2013: 144). The process of religious commodification 
to some extent even poses a challenge for the secularisation thesis (Turner, 2010: 569), 
because the production of religious goods and enormous marketing efforts show the 
prosperity of religion even in the secular world. Religious commodification is very much a 
feature of many religious sites in Western Europe. Churches which have hosted 
tourists/pilgrims for centuries (Stausberg, 2011; Miller, 2005). Nowadays we still could 
see churches welcome tourists or pilgrims for sightseeing, purchasing religious souvenirs 
and attending religious ceremonies.   
Religious commodification generates tensions and debates among the religious 
communities and between religious and non-religious groups as religion is not supposed 
to be used as commodities and to be marketised in money-making business. However, 
the reality is that market forces have breached the walls of most religions in the world 
(Kitiarsa, 2008).  
Previous analyses of tourism commodification have expressed concerns about the 
number of western tourists who have poured into developing countries and degrading 
the once ‘pure’ and ‘authentic’ cultures and places (Wood, 1997; Cohen, 1988). Tourism-
religion encounters have often been assumed to produce negative outcomes because of 
their perceived incompatibility (Stausberg, 2014: 349): religion and the spiritual were 
represented as incompatible with economics and the material (Vukonic, 2002). The 
consumption of religious sites and experiences by tourists (as opposed to pilgrims) was 
thought to transform the very nature of religious tourism from appreciating and learning 
religious teaching to hedonistic indulgence (Vukonić, 1998). This view is echoed by 
Shepherd (2002: 192) who claimed that the most authentic cultural practices and objects 
should be reproduced outside of the exchange process and the calculative rationality of 
the market. Many scholars (Urbanowicz, 1989; Boorstin, 1971; MacCannell, 1973; Brunt 
and Courtney, 1999; Tomaselli and Wang, 2001) have expressed deep concerns of the 
risks of culture vanishing, normalizing and standardizing.  
In the Himalayan area, economic benefits are the main reasons why religious groups 
tolerate the potential negative impacts of tourism on religion. Because of the funding 
from tourism, Buddhist monks have been found to make their religious festivals fit 
tourists’ needs (Shackley, 1999). Dissenting from the taken-for-granted view of religious 
leaders and communities that commodification degrades and damages religions, Kitiarsa 
(2010) argued that religious commodification opens new fields of discussion around the 
role of religious traditions in tension-filled, fragmented modern/postmodern societies. 
Market and religion are not necessarily opposed to one another (Einstein, 2007: 12). 
Thai Buddhism is marketised as a prosperity religion (Kitiarsa, 2008). In Japan, 
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Buddhism promises worldly benefits (Reader and Tanabe, 1998). The rapidly rising 
levels of religious commodification around the world (with the exception of western and 
northern Europe) provides one grounds on which scholars (Moore, 1994) can potentially 
counter the assumptions of secularisation theory. In terms of commodifying religion, 
different religious traditions and societies have different methods. In many places such 
as Bali (McKean, 1989), Hainan in China (Xie, 2003), and Burma (Philp and Mercer, 
1999), religious commodification was found to help preserve and regenerate traditional 
cultural forms by providing material benefits and cultural products.  
In short, as an emergent, ever increasing religious phenomenon, religious 
commodification has not yet received sufficient attention in academia, especially in 
relation to the spread of tourist economies.  Much more attention needs to be given to 
local believers’ involvement in religious commodification and their attitudes and 
negotiations.  
Local cultures are transformed into tourist products. This not only opens commodification 
discussion, but also brings forward debates about cultural authenticity. Religion is 
perceived less authentic because of tourist commodification, for example in Schadler’s 
(1979) research on religious artefacts in Africa and in Shoval’s (2000) study on the ‘Holy 
Land’ Israel.  
2.4.2.3 Cultural authenticity 
The desire for authenticity now occupies a central position in contemporary 
culture. Whether in our search for selfhood, leisure experience, or in our 
material purchases, we search for the real, the genuine (Fine, 2003: 153). 
Exploration of authenticity in the field of tourism and travel studies has comprised a big 
portion of authenticity research. Apart from tourism studies, research on authenticity is 
generally concentrated in studies on art (Fine, 2006), music (Peterson, 2005), 
food/restaurant (Lu and Fine, 1995), leadership (Eagly, 2005), and theoretical 
examinations of self (Erickson, 1995). However, there is very limited research focused 
on relationships between authenticity and social positions (Vannini and Williams, 2009: 
8), such as ethnicity (Bramadat, 2005; Nagel, 2000), gender (Ashley, 2009), sexuality 
(Mason-Schrock, 1996), class (Reay, 2002), religion (Charme, 2000).  
In tourism research, studies of religious authenticity have mainly tourist-centric, 
concerning tourists and their perceptions on authenticity of tourist products, tourist 
attractions and tourist experiences (Zhu, 2012; Belhassen et al., 2008; Kim and Jamal, 
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2007; MacCannell, 1976). The views of local people regarding the authenticity of their 
own place, culture and religious practices has been relatively neglected.  
Three main approaches have been used to interpret the authenticity of tourist products 
and experiences (Wang, 1999): objectivism (Hughes, 1995), constructivism (Cohen, 
1988) and existentialism (Belhassen et al., 2008: 671).  
Touristic authenticity should be understood both from tourists’ and locals’ perspectives 
(Cohen, 1979). Given my concern in this experience with the experiences of Tibetan Bon 
believers in a tourist destination, it is necessary to ask if and how the pursuit of 
authenticity by tourists affects local people’s perceptions of themselves and their 
communities? Much research has suggested that local people have been actively 
negotiating and adapting their perceptions of authenticity. Through his investigation in a 
Thai village, Cohen (1979) found local villagers wearing their daily costumes are 
misunderstood as performing by tourists. Sometimes, for earning tourism income, local 
people adapted their traditions for tourists’ appetite. Evans-Pritchard (1989) discussed 
how a Native American woman considered making herself look more ‘Indian’ in order to 
demonstrate her authenticity to tourists. However, local people have also resisted and 
refuted the adapted culture.  
Culture is dynamic and fluid (Cohen, 1988). There is no original moment (Castañeda, 
1996). “As culture change – and with it, tastes, beliefs, values, and practices – so too do 
definitions of what constitutes the authentic” (Vannini and Williams, 2009: 3). There can 
be no universal answer regarding what constitutes authenticity, as different people have 
different attitudes. However, I argue that even though authenticity is subject to change in 
different situations, there are essential elements which mark the basic differences 
between the authentic and the others remaining immutable. Some authenticity has basic 
rules and elements needing to be strictly complied with, for example an authentic English 
breakfast must have sausages or bacon, and authentic Sichuan food must include chilli 
and pepper. No matter what interpretations of being an authentic Jew different groups 
have, the core element is not negotiable and compromisable: adhering to Judaism 
(Charme, 2000). If the core elements of authenticity change, authenticity is meaningless. 
Appiah’s interpretation of authenticity below explains this with pertinence: 
[N]either the picture in which there is just an authentic nugget of selfhood, the 
core that is distinctively me, waiting to be dug out, nor the notion that I can 
simply make up any self I choose, should tempt us. We make up selves from a 
tool kit of options made available by our culture and society. We do make 




Responding to the complexity and fluidity of authenticity, Shepherd (2002: 195) 
suggested that we can escape this trap of simply looking for what has been lost through 
commodification and rather focus on how authenticity is constructed. In a similar vein, 
Cohen and Cohen (2012) suggested that researchers direct attention from authenticity of 
tourist experience to the ‘authentication’ of tourist attractions. The question of who is 
qualified to authenticate tourist attraction thus comes to the fore in this perspective. From 
the locals’ perspective, Xie (2003) found Li dancers’ understandings of authenticity are 
shaped by other tourism stakeholders including the state, the business community and 
tourists. In Lijiang, China, by investigating the life story of a dongba (a ritual practitioner) 
named Fuhua, Zhu (2012) argued that being an authentic dongba for Fuhua is based on 
his ongoing interaction with reality which not only includes his on-stage performance for 
the tourists, but also comprises his previous memory and life experience in his home 
village, dongba training institute and his workplace, the Wedding Courtyard. Even though 
his ritual performance might be regarded as a commercial product by tourists, Fuhua 
himself insisted in being a real dongba.  
The search for authenticity is a rational and emotional response to the deeply inauthentic 
world (Erickson, 1994). The large-scale quest for authenticity could reflect the deep 
social and cultural issues of a society. For example, tourism is regarded an escape from 
the modern world filled with inauthentic elements (Wang, 1999). In a study already 
mentioned, tourists to the two Christian holy sites in Greece, Mount Meteora and Mount 
Athos, do not want to see the presence of other tourists because firstly they are the 
reminders of the everyday modern life they want to escape, secondly they are thought to 
be ‘contaminating’ the pristinity of the holy site. Thus, tourists think Mount Athos with 
limited attendance is more authentic comparing to Mount Meteora with many more 
tourists (della Dora, 2012). The similar authenticity quest in response to modernisation is 
also identified in my research, but with different subjects and motivations (see Chapter 7). 
The example above shows authenticity is interpreted geographically and tourists have a 
particular ideology: rejecting the modern and embracing the non-modern. For attracting 
tourists, local authorities, institutions and people tend to depict their place as 
authentically non-modern (Hughes, 1992; Qian et al., 2012). Xie (2003: 12) found in the 
tourist brochures, the poorest and remote villages are presented as the most ‘authentic’ 
communities. Locals’ geographies of authenticity can thus manifest in these terms: the 
longer the distance from the main centres and transport used to reach the locations, the 
more authentic the place is.   
Authenticity is sometimes discursive and geographically imagined and constructed. 
People could establish a sense of authenticity simply by imagination which might be 
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informed by books, TV programs, films, internet, other people’s narration and so on. For 
example, for many Anglican parishioners, the distant Communion existed mainly as a 
‘concept’ or abstraction without concrete meaning (Vanderbeck et al., 2010: 10).  
Without needing to travel to a destination, people have already accumulated ideas of 
what the authenticity would be like. The notion of imaginative geographies could be a 
constructive notion of thinking through the imagined geographies of authenticity. 
According to Gregory (1997: 271), “imaginative geographies describe not only 
representations of other places - peoples, landscapes and cultures - but also the ways in 
which these representations project the desires, fantasies and preconceptions of their 
authors and the grids of power between them and their subjects” (see Chapter 7 for the 
discussion of monks’ and local laypeople’s perception of religious authenticity). For 
example, from the authentic and racially benign Yankee whiteness to liberal and ‘special’ 
whiteness, the imaginative geographies of Vermont whiteness have been greatly 
influenced by American politics in different periods (Vanderbeck, 2006). 
Imaginative geographies are fundamentally shaped by unequal relations of power 
(Gregory, 1995: 474). Edward W. Said (2003) used Orientalism to describe the biased 
and problematic imaginative geographies of ‘the Orient’ represented by Europe and the 
United States. For Said, Orientalism has multiple meanings. He claimed that 
“[Orientalism is] a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s 
special place in European Western experience…a style of thought based upon an 
ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the 
time) ‘the Occident’… a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority 
over the Orient….a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, 
economic, sociological, historical and philological texts… and is particularly valuable for 
a sign of European-Atlantic power over Orient than it is as a verdict discourse about the 
Orient.” (Said, 2003: 1, 2, 3, 12, 6)  
Gregory (1997: 271) said Orientalism is an “identity making machine”. This grand 
geographic imagination relies on binary concepts of us/them, here/there and 
inside/outside. Through comparisons between us and them, here and there and inside 
and outside, the identity of self is constructed. It is often associated with ethnocentric 
bias in representation which is always based on barriers of different language, culture, 
institution and political ambience. The discourse of Orientalism as an othering process, 
defined the modern, masculine and normal West in reference to the backward, feminine 
and different East (Johnson and Coleman, 2012). The generalised and stereotypical 
images of the East are circulated to and among westerners who otherwise have little 
knowledge or experience of the East. This kind of representation is even accepted and 
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internalized by the Arab elites and serves as a justification for the colonial and imperial 
history of the West. 
While the concept of Orientalism has most often been applied to imaginative 
geographies of western people viewing distant places in the east, there have been 
attempts to extend it to consider how people construct others within the same 
geographical, cultural or political community. ‘Internal Orientalism’ has been proposed as 
a valuable approach for investigating these internal perceptions. However, internal 
Orientalism has not obtained enough attention in and beyond geographical discipline 
(Schein, 1997; Gladney, 1994; Piterberg, 1996). A few geographers carefully expounded 
the geographical dynamics of internal Orientalism in the US (Jansson, 2010; Jansson, 
2003), in Italy and Germany (Johnson and Coleman, 2012) and in Sweden (Eriksson, 
2008; Eriksson, 2010). In all, existing research on internal Orientalism has mainly 
focused on the ways in which the other is constructed, but failed to give more voice to 
the ‘suppressed’ and ‘imagined’ by considering their attitudes and active reactions.  
Looking at Tibet, as stated in Chapter 1.1, particular imaginative geographies of Tibet 
have been constructed by forces both outside and inside China. The Chinese internal 
Orientalism (Harrell, 1995b; Baranovitch, 2010; McCarthy, 2000; Schein, 1997) and 
western Orientalism has both been exerted over Tibet. 
Most religious traditions are not inherently a hindrance to modernisation and economic 
development (Kitiarsa, 2010: 567); however, modernisation and tourism-based economic 
development can pose considerable challenges to religion. The following section will 
discuss how tourism and modern education influence religion.  
2.5 Religious identities and intergenerationality  
In this section I argue for the importance of adopting an intergenerational perspective for 
understanding processes of religious change within the context of economic 
modernisation. Wider literatures in sociology, geography, and beyond have emphasised 
the value of an intergenerational perspective for thinking through processes of social 
change (Pilcher, 1994; Valentine, 2003; Vanderbeck, 2007). Through comparing different 
generations’ socio-cultural conditions, we can gain insight into the characteristics, 
directions and mechanism of social change. Building on this kind of thinking, for 
example, Valentine et al. (2010b) compared attitudes towards and practices of alcohol 
consumption amongst three generations during their youth and identified patterns of 
cultural change in youths’ drinking behaviour. This provides insight into the linkages 
between personal change at the micro level and social change at the macro level. As I 
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show through a review of literature on the intergenerational transmission of religion, this 
perspective has much to offer understandings of patterns of religious change because all 
religions rely upon the reproduction of their systems of belief and practice to survive.  
Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to reflect on the competing meanings of the 
term ‘generation’, something which has proven confusing in the social sciences and 
been a source of critique (Vanderbeck, 2007). Broadly, three specific usages of 
generation have been identified “life stages, membership of a birth cohort and positions 
within a family structure”. In practice, these three dimensions of generation are usually 
coexistent, intertwined and difficult to differentiate in everyday life (Vanderbeck and 
Worth, 2014; Biggs et al., 2011). The intergenerationality discussed in this section does 
not confine to a particular usage, as religion is transmitted through all lines of generation 
including kinships, birth cohort and lifecourse. Different kinds of generational 
consciousness and relationships jointly influence people’s religious belief and practices. 
In different contexts, particular generational identities are more prominent than others. 
For example, in schools, young people might have stronger influence from classmates 
within similar birth cohort and lifestage and from teachers with different birth cohort and 
lifestage, than from families.      
The remainder of this section will proceed as follows. I will first explore relationships 
between religion, ethnic/cultural identity and generational change (Section 2.5.1). Then, 
intergenerational transmission of religion will be discussed (Section 2.5.2). In Section 
2.5.3, the role of education in religious change will be examined.  
2.5.1 Religion and ethnic identity 
For groups with a particular religious belief and ethnic background, such as the Koreans 
migrants, Jews and Hindus religious identity and ethnic identity usually closely interact 
and are mutually influenced and constructed (Mitchell, 2006; Kim, 2011; Min, 2010). 
Changing ethnicity has important influence on religious change.  
As discussed in section 2.3.2.2, intersectional perspective should be adopted in studying 
religion. In this subsection, I examine how the relationships between religion and the 
maintenance of ethnic identities have been conceptualised.  This is particularly pertinent 
in a context like Tibet, where Tibetans are a minority ethnic and religious group 
experiencing pressures of Han-assimilation. 
As two important sources of identities, their relationships have been given considerable 
attention in and beyond academia. It has been widely argued that religion could reinforce 
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ethnic identity through various ways such as building a mosque (Naylor and Ryan, 
2002), a Christian literal work (Palmer, 2002) and in different contexts, such as the ethnic 
minorities in China (Mackerras, 1995), the African Pentecostals in Britain (Hunt, 2002). 
Ethnicity could also be transmitted intergenerationally with and through religion (Min, 
2010; Chong, 1998) (See Section 2.5.2 for more discussion).  
However, it is also argued that religious identities sometimes are actually essentially 
ethnic and devoid of religious content (Gans, 1994; Mitchell, 2006). Religious identity is 
just a subordinate element of ethnicity which exists simply for signifying, constituting and 
reinforcing the primary category of ethnicity (Mitchell, 2006: 1136-7). Gans (1994) used 
‘symbolic religiosity’ to describe Jews’ (especially immigrant descendants) belief 
condition that they consume religious symbols but not engage in church activities.   
Contrary to this ‘religion-support-ethnicity’ understanding, it has also been found that 
religious identity sometimes is manifested stronger and more meaningful than ethnic 
identity, such as for the young British Pakistanis (Jacobson, 1997), for the young British 
Hindus (Raj, 2000).  
However, these are not the only forms of relationships between religion and ethnicity. 
Ethnic identity and religious identity are mutually influenced and constituted and 
dynamically change over time and place. Mitchell (2011: 53) used ‘push and pull’ to 
describe the bumpy road of (non-)simultaneous rise and fall of religion and ethnicity. 
Additionally, he claimed that social and political changes are important for influencing 
individuals’ religious journey (Mitchell, 2006). 
Ethnic maintenance and religion are usually associated with issues such as integration, 
assimilation, resistance, adaptation. Immigrants, as a conspicuous category facing these 
issues, have attracted considerable scholarly attention (Min, 2010; Kim, 2011), especially 
the young and second-generation immigrants (Jacobson, 1997; Zhou and Bankston, 
1998; Raj, 2000; Chong, 1998).  
Through various case studies, it has been found that different generations within different 
religious traditions have different ways of handling ethnicity and religion (Min, 2010; Min 
and Kim, 2005). For example, Min’s (2010) research reveals that even though religion 
help to maintain the ethnicity of Korean protestant and India Hindus in America, both 
ethnicities are enhanced in different ways. Religious congregations for the Koreans and 
home for the Hindus mainly contributed to enhancing their ethnicity. For Hindus religious 
and ethnic identities are integrally complementary. For Korean Christians, they prefer 
Christian to Korean as their primary identity. But it is not the case for the second 
generation Koreans, it was found that they separate religion from ethnic culture and think 
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that church is only established for religious purposes (Min and Kim, 2005). However, 
their research has not given enough attention to the wider political, social and cultural 
influence on the patterns of religious transmission.  
The previous case about American Koreans and Hindus does not show strong state’s 
involvement in reshaping the ethnic identity and religious identity. Elsewhere, state plays 
important role in influencing ethnicity and religion. For example, China’s ethnic minority 
policies have actually enhanced the bonds between minorities’ ethnic identity and 
religion (Mackerras, 1995: see more discussion on China's minority policies). Public 
education has always been considered state’s most effective way of giving rise to 
assimilation (Deyhle and Swisher, 1997). Adams (1995) found Indian students in 
boarding school strategically and consciously adapted the white ideologies and 
negotiated their Indianness in the face of relentless hegemonic forces.  
In all, religion is only supporting or subordinate to ethnicity. A more dynamic view should 
be adopted in considering relationships between religion and ethnic identity. Despite 
much research on religious and ethnic identities, how much they are mutually 
enhanced/weakened remains a question. Apart from the immigrants, more attention 
could be given to non-immigrant groups. Additionally, even though state sometimes is 
powerful in reshaping ethnicity and religious identity, it needs to be acknowledged that 
ethnic groups are not passively bearing state’s influence, but actively involving ethnic 
and religious negotiation. 
2.5.2 Intergenerational transmission of religion 
If religious and spiritual identities have undergone something of a seachange in 
terms of when, where and how they are constituted, this is likely to be most 
significant for younger generations. Nonetheless, it also affects religiosity 
among other generations in interesting ways, through and beyond contact with 
young people.” (Hopkins et al., 2011: 317) 
In the quotation above, Hopkins and colleagues specified the significance of 
understanding young people’s religiosity in terms of its significance not only for the 
young themselves but also for the religiosity of older generations. This shows the crucial 
role of intergenerational perspective in thinking through religious change. The 
weak/strong and positive/negative intergenerational transmission of religion indicates the 
vatality of religion. However, this perspective has been neglected by geographers. The 
existing research has mainly discussed different generations’ religious experiences 
separately, especially on children and young people (e.g. Hemming, 2009; Hopkins, 
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2007b; 2009a; Dwyer, 1999; 2009). The older and middle generation is largely ignored 
(Vanderbeck, 2007; Valentine et al., 2009: 287).  
With regard to research on intergenerational transmission of religion, it has been 
generally agreed that parents have big influence on children’s religious belief and 
practices. Vermeer et al. (2012) studied the religious transmission in Netherland and 
found that juvenile church attendance is greatly affected by parental, especially maternal 
church attendance and is the main reasons of adult church attendance. In a similar vein, 
Dutch children’s God concepts were found largely informed by parents and teachers in 
religious schools (De Roos et al., 2001). In the United States, parents were also found 
playing as positive guides for youth’s religious orientation, behaviour and involvement 
(Cnaan et al., 2004). Moreover, the more educated and more affluent the parent(s) were 
found, the more likely that the youth will engage in religious practices. Religion was also 
used by parents to educate children in social values and was regarded as a kind of 
“social capital”. Korean Protestant immigrants in the United States were also found 
having been successful in transmitting their religion to their children (Min and Kim, 2005), 
even though not traditional Korean culture (discussed in section 2.5.1). 
Apart from the positive results listed above, it is also found parental transmission 
sometimes does not lead to children’s increasing religiosity or religious practices. While 
they (2005: 12) positively asserted that “faith may change shape but does not fade 
away”, through examining the religious situation in Britain, Voas and Crockett (2005) 
found that believing and belonging are declining at the same rate and generational 
transmission of religion is weak. 
The ways of intergenerational transmission of religion is deeply influenced by the 
religious and cultural traditions. Imitating parents is a main way of developing religiosity 
among the youth. In Peek’s (2005) research on second-generation young Muslims in the 
United States, formation of their religious identity has three stages: religion as ascribed 
identity, as chosen identity and as declared identity. The first stage is marked by young 
Muslims’ imitation of their parents, unconditional acceptance without introspection, 
limited knowledge on Islam, and unclear sense of religious identity when they are 
children and adolescents. During this stage, their religious identity was ascribed with 
their birth in the Muslim families and their religious identity was taken for granted (Peek, 
2005: 223-230). It is evidenced in Min’s (2010) research that second generation Indian 
Hindus conduct many fewer religious practices than their parents and than peer Korean 
Christians. However, according to Min (2010) Indian Hindu immigrants do better in 
transmitting their cultural traditions and identity than Korean Christians. He further (Min, 
2010: 211) argued that the groups with indigenous religions such as Indian Hindus, have 
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stronger foundation to transmit religious traditions among generations because they are 
motivated by the idea of preserving ethnic heritage. Indian Hinduism is quite similar to 
Tibetan Bon in many aspects. Firstly, both of them are quite tolerant to other thoughts 
and flexible in religious practices; secondly, they are practiced more at home, less in 
congregations; thirdly, they have a lot of deities and beliefs, and do not have a core 
scripture like the Bible for Christianity which is easy to access for ordinary laypeople. 
Apart from ethnicity, values and world views can be intergenerationally transmitted 
through religion. Haynie and Pearce (2004) found that moral codes and social 
regulations could be transmitted to children through parental religious influence. 
In all, ‘parents-to-children’ has been generally assumed the solely pattern of 
intergenerational transmission of religion. In actuality, the intergenerational transmission 
is not linear, uniform and unidirectional, but bumpy, mutual and multidirectional, and 
partial. Children also actively engage in accepting, rejecting or negotiating and 
generating the generational transmission. They even could influence the religious 
practices and beliefs of their parents, grandparents, siblings and friends. Religious 
beliefs might not be transmitted uniformly with religious practices.  Other pairs of 
intergenerational transmissions of religion have not been given enough attention, such 
as grandparents/children, youth/youth, mother/children, father/children, teacher/students. 
Different pairs of intergenerational transmission of religion usually coexistent. Thus there 
is a need to compare different sources of religious transmission, such as the religious 
influence from father and mother, from non-familial age cohorts (such as teachers, 
schoolmates).  
Young people’s sensitivity to changing locations might greatly change patterns of 
intergenerational transmission of religion, thus investigating the interruptions is 
particularly helpful in thinking through changing patterns of intergenerational 
transmission of religion. School education is one of crucial interruptions of the familial 
religious transmissions (see following section). 
2.5.3 Religion and education  
Similar to many parts of the west (Davie, 2000), religious institutions once dominated 
education in Tibet (Bass, 1998).  However, Chinese secularised state schooling has 
become Tibetans’ main means of education under the guide of modernisation projects 
and communist ideology (see Chapter 3).  
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Compulsory schooling, as an important element of modernisation, potentially can have 
important secularising impacts (Casanova, 1994; Stark, 1999). Schools became the 
fronts of exposure to secular theories and methods, scientific and rational thinking, plural 
cultures and liberal ideas. In early research, education, especially higher education was 
found a barrier for religion. It was widely assumed that higher education is a “breeding 
ground for apostasy” (Caplovitz and Sherrow, 1977: 109) and a “zone relatively free of 
religion” (Wilson, 2000: 9). However, despite frequent assumption about the secularising 
influence of modern forms of schooling, research from a variety of contexts shows a 
more complex picture. Mayrl and Oeur (2009: 264) claimed that “college is not as much 
of a ‘faith-killer’ as was previously thought”. Lee (2002) contended that more college 
students’ religious conviction is strengthened rather than weakened. Using survey data 
on Mormon populations in the United States, Albrecht and Heaton (1984) found at the 
national level the most educated are the least religious, whereas the relationship 
between church attendance and education is positive among Mormons at the 
denominational level. Two decades later, it was still found that education has positive 
influence for Mormons’ religiosity (Merrill et al., 2003). Focusing on denominational 
differences, McFarland et al. (2011) found that in the United States educational 
attainment does not have uniform impacts on different religious traditions, which is 
echoed by Schwadel (2011). It was found that increased education has positive 
contribution to religiosity among evangelical Protestants, black Protestants, and 
Catholics, but not among mainline Protestants and the non-affiliated. Schwadel (2011) 
claimed that education does not lead to uniformly decline of religion, but influence some 
parts of religion. In specific, he found that education positively affects belief in God or the 
afterlife, religious participation, devotional activities, daily religious life, religious 
conversion and scepticism, whilst negatively affects exclusivist religious viewpoints and 
biblical literalism. Also in the United States, Hill (2011) showed that education does not 
substantially change the religious beliefs of most college students, but do increased 
students’ scepticism toward supernatural religious beliefs. The elite universities have the 
biggest influence on students’ scepticism.  
Even though public education has been differentiated from religions, religion is still 
influencing and being influenced by the public education through political interventions. 
This is particularly evident in countries where national identity is strongly related to a 
particular religion, such as Orthodoxy in Greece (Zambeta, 2000), Islamism in Turkey 
(Agai, 2007), In addition to Greece and Turkey, in Europe the proximity of religion and 
public education has been legally acknowledged in countries such as Britain, Germany, 
Italy (Willaime, 2007: 81). Apart from France which has no religious education in schools, 
all the other European countries have various confessional and non-confessional 
courses in schools (Willaime, 2007: 85), although the ongoing presence of religious 
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education in the curriculum remains a source of controversy. Most of these countries 
introduce religious instruction in schools for preparing students to be responsible citizens 
in a pluralist society (Willaime, 2007: 87). In the United States, there has been fierce 
discussion and debate regarding the extent to which religion should have a presence in 
public schools, given the constitutional principle of separation of church and state 
(Fraser, 1999). These debates have also involved the extent to which religious ideas 
should be allowed to influence teaching in schools, perhaps most notably in relation to 
the science curriculum. In particular, many evangelical and fundamentalist Christian 
groups have argued that the teaching of evolution as a scientific truth (as opposed to 
Biblical creationism or so-called ‘intelligent design’) is destroying Christian children’s faith 
in God (Fraser, 1999; Greenwalt, 2003). Contrary to views of religious groups, recently it 
is argued that spiritual and religious dimensions of education should be included in 
American university education (Braskamp et al., 2006; Jacobsen and Jacobsen, 2008). 
One major element which is thought considerably destroying the base of religion is 
science. In secularisation thesis, the rise of science is assumed contributing to the 
decline of religion (Eliade, 1959). Since the Enlightenment, scientific worldview has 
gradually replaced the religious understanding of the world. Rationalism and positivism 
has grown to be a problem for religion. Wallace (2004) even claimed that religion is 
doomed to fade away with increasing scientific knowledge. The very existence of religion 
was challenged with rational or scientific thinking which is largely generated in schools.  
Wilson explained how science confronted religion as follows:  
The growth of the scientific world view means that the natural (and, later the 
social) world becomes the object of systematic scrutiny, for the purposes of 
which canons of procedure are agreed upon… The scientific world view is 
largely incompatible with a belief that there are supernatural powers. Science is 
valued not only for its practicality but also for its universalism, impartiality, and 
scepticism. The contrast between religion and science is one of values as well 
as technique (Wilson, 1978: 412-13). 
It is commonly assumed that religion and science make different claims about truth and 
reality, so it is sometimes taken for granted that they are in conflict (Stark et al., 1996). 
As mentioned before, creationists made political influences attempting to abandon or to 
downplay the evolution curriculum (Fraser, 1999; Lugg, 2004). However, it was also 
argued that the conflict between religion and science might be exaggerated (Stark et al., 
1996). According to Scheitle (2011), as the religion recently has become more and more 
individualistic and private, most US college students found no conflict between religion 
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and science. The same conclusion has been reached in research regarding the views of 
academic scientists (Ecklund and Park, 2009).  
A considerable body of research discussing religion and education has adopted a 
quantitative approach. Some general trends and conclusions have been reached by 
using this approach. However, the grand claims derived from these are lack of empirical 
justification (Mayrl and Oeur, 2009: 260). It neglects dynamic interactions and why and 
how these interactions happen. For example, how education affects students’ religious 
engagement? In addition, the quantitative survey ignored the specific educational, socio-
cultural and political contexts in which students are placed (Mayrl and Oeur, 2009: 271).  
For articulating specifically how and why school experiences might have altered 
students’ belief trajectories, in-depth data from interviews, observations or qualitative 
methods need to be incorporated into future studies. Additionally, the contextual 
influence should also be considered.  Apart from higher education which has attracted 
major scholarly attention, other forms of education should be taken into account.   
2.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have critically reviewed prior research and theory that has informed my 
understanding of religious change in contemporary Tibet and how I specifically approach 
religious change.  
Firstly, the primary concern of this thesis with religious change in a Bon region of 
contemporary Tibet requires an understanding of the relationships between modernity 
and religion. The ‘secularisation debates’ have been the most pertinent and prominent 
strand of theory concerning the relationships between modernity and religion. This body 
of theory allows me to situate my research in studies on religious change and points out 
a useful perspective in understanding religious change. I argued that the non-western 
places, non-western religions, micro-level analysis and qualitative approach are needed 
to complement our current limited understanding of processes of religious change, 
challenging some of the simplistic and over-generalized assumptions of some strands of 
secularisation theory. As I have shown, understanding religious change involves 
examining the beliefs and practices of a diverse range of institutional, state, and other 
actors. I found individual and institutional level analysis could offer me richer and highly 
nuanced insights on the dynamics and process of religious change which cannot be 
achieved by macro level analysis.  
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I also critically examined recent debates about the nature of ‘religious space’ from both 
within the geographies of religion and beyond.  A spatial approach to religion (such as 
advocated by Knott, 2009) can provide concrete and solid evidence of religious change. 
The research diversity has been greatly enhanced by more focus on relationships 
between religion and gender, generation, race and ethnicity; however the intersectional 
eyes have not been adequately casted for geographical understanding of religion. The 
sacred/secular binary is too rigid to use at the moment when the sacred is fluid, 
contested and unbounded. More research focus should be given to other religions apart 
from Christianity and Islam.  
In many parts of the world, tourism is a significant force pushing religion to confront 
modernity, especially in economically less developed areas. The growth of tourist 
economies has raised concerns about processes of religious commodification and the 
loss of cultural ‘authenticity’. However, in tourism studies on religion, local perspectives 
and reactions have been under-examined, particularly in relation to eastern religions.  
Hence, a study such as the one conducted here offers a potentially important and novel 
contribution to research in this area.  
As I argued in the final section, the perspective of intergenerationality provides an 
important lens through which to examine processes of religious change. The 
intergenerational transmission of religion is not straightforward and linear from parents to 
children. Young people are not passive recipients of religious ideas and practices. They 
are particularly vulnerable to the outside interruptions on their religion. Education as one 
of those interruptions might contribute to assimilation of religious and ethnic minorities by 











Chapter 3 Religion in modern Tibet since 1950 
3.1 Introduction  
Grounding discussions of religious change in specific places allows for a deeper 
understanding of the interplay between religion, society, politics and economy (Knott, 
2009). This chapter provides a critical discussion of this dynamic interplay in Tibet, in 
order to enhance our understanding of the nature of contemporary of religious change in 
the primary case study area of Jiuzhaigou. For example, the Chinese state plays an 
important role in shaping Tibetans’ ethnic identity and religiosity in an era when Tibet is 
going through rapid social, economic, political and cultural changes. More specifically, in 
the case of state-led tourism development initiatives, minority-civilising projects as well 
as religious policies jointly influence Jiuzhaigou people’s perceptions about Han-Tibetan 
relations, as well as their ethnic identity, their religious belief and practices.  
Before the specific discussions on modernity and religion in contemporary Tibet, it is 
necessary to delimit the meaning and extent of ‘Tibet’ and my usage of the term in the 
thesis. On account of the long term disputes over and alterations of Tibetan territory, the 
term ‘Tibet’ has been often used with different connotations, especially since its 
incorporation into the People’s Republic of China in 1950. Before 1950, Tibet had three 
large traditional cultural regions, called Ü-Tsang, Kham and Amdo (see Fig. 3.1), which 
cover today’s Tibet Autonomous Religion (TAR), as well as 10 autonomous prefectures 
and 2 autonomous counties distributed in Qinghai Province, in the western part of 
Sichuan Province and in a little corner of Yunnan province and of Gansu province (Guo 
and Mao, 2009). Based on the current administrative division, ‘Tibet’ usually merely 
refers to the Tibet Autonomous Region (Xizang Zizhiqu in Chinese), especially in 
Chinese texts. In this usage, the peripheral Tibetan areas in the four surrounding 
provinces are largely ignored. However, in much western literature ‘Tibet’ refers to the 
traditional Tibetan cultural area or ethnographic area mainly inhabited by Tibetans and 
dominated by Tibetan culture in China (Kapstein, 2013: 32; Kolas and Thowsen, 2005; 
Neuhaus, 2012). In this chapter, I will adopt the second usage, as the whole Tibetan 
cultural area has much religious interaction and cultural homogeneity which make 
different parts of it comparable when experiencing same influences and trends. Thus 
‘Tibet’ in this thesis means the Tibetan cultural area rather than solely TAR. In Chinese, 
‘Xizang’ refers to TAR and ‘zangqu’ literally means Tibetan cultural area. Thus in the 
cases when quoting Chinese documents, ‘Xizang’ will be translated as TAR and ‘Zangqu’ 




Figure 3.1 Three Tibetan cultural regions in China (made by Alison Manson) 
Ü-Tsang, Amdo and Kham were the three traditional provinces of Tibet. The central regions with 
capitals of Lhasa and Xigaze are U and Tsang which is in today’s TAR. The south-eastern part is 
Kham, today divided among the Sichuan Province, TAR and Yunnan Province. Amdo is at the 
north of Kham, located in today’s Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan provinces (Grunfeld, 1996). 
According to the sixth National Population Census, in 2010 there were 6,282,200 
Tibetans in China which accounts for 0.5% of the Chinese population. There were 
2,716,389 Tibetans out of a total of 3,002,166 people living in TAR. The other 3.5 million 
Tibetans were distributed in the neighbouring provinces. Tibetans constitute the tenth 
largest of 55 ethnic minorities in China (see Section 3.2.1 for more information on ethnic 
minorities). This relatively small population inhabits an area covering about 2,200,000 
square kilometres, which accounts for around 23% of Chinese land. In this vast region, 
dozens of Tibetan dialects coexist and are generally not mutually intelligible, whereas 
written Tibetan has been unified. Tibet’s economy has always been much below the 
national average. For example, in 2013 the annual per-capita income of urban residents 
and rural residents in TAR was 20,023 CNY (Chinese New CNY, or Renminbi) and 6,578 
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CNY respectively. The averages for China as a whole were 26,955 CNY and 8,896 CNY. 
Based on the GDP per capita of urban and rural residents, TAR’s 26,039 CNY meant 
that it was ranked 28th among 31 provinces and municipalities in 2013  (National Bureau 
of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, 2014). Compared to TAR, Aba Prefecture 
is relatively better off. In 2013 the annual per-capita income of urban and rural residents 
in Aba were respectively 23,115 CNY and 6,793 CNY (Abazhou zhengfu xinxi gongkai 
gongzuo bangongshi, 2014). These figures show a great disparity between the urban 
and rural areas. The majority of Tibetans are rural residents who are living in extreme 
poverty. In 2013 there were 740,000 urban residents and 2,380,000 rural residents in 
TAR (People's Government of Tibet Autonomous Prefecture, 2014). The same figures in 
Aba were 316,000 and 594,000 (Abazhou zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo bangongshi, 
2014). 
The remainder of the chapter is composed of three primary sections. The first section 
(Section 3.2) provides details of modernisation and economic development in Tibet since 
1950 with a special focus on minority policies, tourism and the Chinese government’s 
development logic. Section 3.3 delineates the history of religion in Tibet and the 
relationship between Bon and Tibetan Buddhism, with a particular focus on the period 
after 1950. Then more localised information about Jiuzhaigou National Park, such as 
demographics, administration system, social structure, and religious composition, will be 
given in Section 3.4.   
3.2 Ethnic minority, tourism, government, Tibet since 1950 
The policies of the Chinese government have significant influences on the expressions 
and meanings of minority cultures and ethnic identities, including those of Tibetans 
(Kolas and Thowsen, 2005: 29). In order to understand religious change in modernising 
Tibet, China’s various policies and civilising projects for the minorities need to be 
considered.  
In this section, I will discuss the situation of Tibet and Tibetans in China’s political and 
economic framework. To be specific, in Section 3.2.1, ethnic minority policies and 
projects will be examined as Tibetans are firstly treated in the minority-majority 
framework in China. This framework directs and influences Tibetan society, culture and 
identities. In Section 3.2.2, attention will turn to tourism in ethnic areas of China for a 
better understanding the role of tourism in Jiuzhaigou. In Section 3.2.3, the development 
logic of the Chinese government in Tibet will be explored.  
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3.2.1 Ethnic minorities and the Tibetan  
3.2.1.1 Ethnic minorities  
Learning from the Soviet Union, in 1950s the categorisation of nationalities (minzu in 
Chinese) took place based on the material stages of social progress. The classification 
criteria came from Stalin who thought that a nation should have a common language, 
territory, economic life and psychological condition (Lee, 2001: 23). Fifty-six nationalities 
were identified in China based on their perceived distance from civilisation. Many of 
these 56 nationalities had literally not existed before the 1950s and were just created at 
that time (Wu, 2014: 969). Nevertheless there are still some groups who claimed that 
they were unrecognised or wrongly recognised. Except for a few unrecognised groups, 
every Chinese citizen belongs to a particular group which is considered closer or more 
distant to the ‘civilisers’. According to Harrell (1995b: 9), the process of nationality 
identification was essentially “one of both objectification and scaling which classified 
people into a scale from the uncivilised to the civilised”. On this scale, fifty-six state-
recognised nationalities are divided into fifty-five ethnic minorities (shaoshu minzu) 
accounting for about 8% of China’s population and the majority Han making up nearly 92% 
of China’s population. It was hoped that through civilising projects various ethnicities, 
especially the ‘uncivilised minorities’ would finally achieve socialism on the road of 
historical progress.  
China has long had the ‘civilised self’/’uncivilised other’ division. In the history of China, 
“the world was divided into the ‘civilised’ Chinese and their ‘uncivilised’ neighbours, 
among whom were the nomadic peoples of the grasslands (Kolas and Thowsen, 2005).” 
As the Han have always been the majority nationality in China’s history, they have been 
most closely associated with ‘the Chinese’. The identification of nationalities is another 
process to separate the Han, the ‘pure’ ethnic Chinese, from the non-Han, ethnic 
minorities (Lee, 2001: 21). Looking back through history, Chinese policies have 
intentionally or unintentionally created discursive and practical distinctions between the 
majority Han and the minorities. Minorities always play the role of opposite ‘other’ to the 
Han majority. The Han as the majority are constructed as mainstream, superior, 
advanced, modern, and civilised in every aspect. On the contrary, the ethnic minorities 
are peripheral, inferior, backward, barbaric and uncivilised. Even the schools construct 
two strands of culture: “advanced Han culture and less-advanced non-Han culture” 
(Hansen, 1999: 70). There are also two kinds of educational institutions, the ordinary 
schools and universities and minority schools and universities which mainly enrol 
minority students (Yi, 2007).  
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The Han-minority distinction could also be found in the linguistic interpretation of 
nationality (minzu). The usage of the word nationality (minzu) is problematic as it breeds 
meanings that contradict its official definition. According to the Chinese government’s 
classification and definition of minzu, it literally includes all 56 ethnic nationalities in 
China, of which the Han is one. However, in practice it only refers to ethnic minorities 
(Hansen, 1999: xii). The Han are usually consciously or unconsciously excluded from 
how Chinese people (both Han and minorities) understand ‘nationality’ (minzu). It is 
taken for granted that ethnic affairs (minzu shiwu) are actually minority affairs, having no 
business with the mainstream Han. The so-called State Ethnic Affairs Commission 
(minzu shiwu weiyuanhui) mainly deals with minority issues and aims for better minority-
majority integration. A reading of the duties of this department of state (State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission, 2010) confirms that minorities are its only concern. Minzu shiwu 
(ethnic affairs) and minzu diqu (ethnic areas) which appear on almost every official 
document actually denote ethnic-minority affairs and ethnic minority areas. The state 
nationality policies (minzu zhengce) actually refer to minority affairs, not all ethnic 
nationalities. Ethnology (minzu xue) in China is actually the study of ethnic minorities, 
and not of all ethnic groups. China’s Ethnic Statistical Book (Zhongguo minzu tongji 
nianjian) describes the social and economic achievements of ethnic minorities, even 
though it is named minzu. 
Even many Chinese and western scholars are consciously or unconsciously aware that 
the meaning of minzu in China has narrowed to refer only to ethnic minorities, rather 
than the Chinese state’s definition. This can be evidenced by looking at examples from 
their work. For Yi (2007: 935), minzu and minzu diqu respectively refer to ethnic 
minorities and minority areas. Yi translated minzu, a term that appears on all government 
documents, academic works, and news, directly into ‘ethnic minorities’, for example, 
“guanyu shenhua gaige jiakuai fazhan minzu jiaoyu de jueding” as “Resolution of 
deepening reform and speeding up development of minority education”, “Woguo minzu 
diqu jiaoyu fazhan de xianzhuang yu weilai” as “Present situation and future of education 
development in minority areas in our country", and “Zhongguo bufen bianjiang minzu 
diqu chuoxue qingkuang diaocha" as "An investigation of dropout in some frontier 
minority areas". The same issue occurs in Wu (2014), Harrell (1995a) and Gladney 
(2013). They see no problem in their interpretation of the term minzu to mean ‘ethnic 
minority’. The contradictory usage of minzu and its connotation of a minority/majority 
division have barely been taken into account and questioned by academics. Schein 
(1997: 93) once acknowledged that there are several senses of minzu when used as an 
adjective in a name, and she explained that minzu is usually used as shorthand for the 
term shaoshu minzu. However, she failed to note the consequences resulting from 
different uses of the word minzu. It is taken for granted on most occasions in China that 
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the category of minzu only includes minorities, and not the Han. It reflects a view that the 
Han are too mainstream to be included under the minzu category and receive the 
consequent special treatment. These special treatments are for minorities, not for the 
Han. Since its birth, minzu has been constructed politically and culturally as a popular 
concept which on the one hand stresses the equality and unity between 56 ethnic groups 
especially in political discourses; on the other hand its usage actually differentiates the 
mainstream Han and the minorities and reshapes their perceptions of self. For example, 
Schein (1997) found minorities are important in shaping Han people’s perception of self 
as civilised comparing to the uncivilised minorities.  
For the ‘good’ of minorities, many attempts by the Chinese state have been carried out to 
transform and to civilise them into people like the Han (Harrell, 1995b). Preferential 
policies (youhui zhengce) implemented since 1980s are one example. These policies 
aim to improve the living standards of minorities and to enhance integration among 
minorities and between minorities and majority Han (Mackerras, 1994). Minority students 
can be given extra marks in university/college entrance examinations (Wang and Zhou, 
2003: 87). Minorities can have two children, which is not possible for the Han. Han 
Chinese have to pay a large fine or face the risk of being dismissed from their positions 
in public sector jobs for having a second child. Some official positions are specifically 
reserved for minorities. For example, there must be a certain number of minority officials 
in the leadership of certain government departments. Some economic investments are 
particularly for ethnic groups. Political, material and educational benefits of being a 
minority have made people eager to be identified in a minority group, even though 
minorities are seen as uncivilised. The privileges also encourage additional calls for state 
recognition from other ethnic groups (Mackerras, 2003: 40). Many Han people want to 
alter their nationality status into minority (Lee, 2001: 24). Children of mixed families often 
choose ethnic identification. As a result of the preferential policies, being ethnically 
minority in China is not only a situation of straightforward disadvantage, as is sometimes 
assumed. Preferential policies have been shown to be instrumental in creating ethnic 
elites (Sautman, 1999: 196) and in reinforcing Tibetan identity (Postiglione et al., 2004).  
From Wu’s (1990) perspective, the identification of ethnic minorities was a means of 
reinterpreting minority culture rather than a way to preserve tradition. Nationality 
identification helps both the minorities and the Han have new understandings of their 
cultures. Before this nationality classification, those recognised as belonging to a 
minority had no strong awareness that they were different from others and the majority 
Han (Lee, 2001: 24). After the identification, the minorities have been passively 
ethnicised through the process of differentiating the Han and the minorities (Yi, 2007). 
The Nuosu people identify themselves through distinction from the Han; the Hui also 
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have a clear boundary between themselves and the Han; the Nuosu and the Hui felt 
closer as they are classified within the same category: ethnic minorities (Harrell, 2002: 
321). For Tibetans, Tibetan culture and identity are also “undergoing a continuous 
process of negotiation and reconstruction… Tibetan culture is negotiated not only by 
Tibetans and Han but through the use of the categories Tibetan and Han, in the 
acceptance of certain definitions of culture…” (Kolas and Thowsen, 2005: 43). The 
identification of ethnic groups also reinforced a unified Tibetan identity (Upton, 1996); in 
the past Tibetans had been more segregated between each other based on the areas 
they inhabited and the language they spoke. There are also a few exceptional situations 
where religious identity comes before ethnic identity. As Gladney found in her research, 
Muslims in China simply divided people into Muslim and non-Muslim (Gladney, 2013: 
148-149). Religion blurred the ethnic boundaries between different ethnic Muslims in 
China, such as the Hui, the Dongxiang, and the Baonan, who were each designated as 
different ethnic minorities by the Chinese government. They thought of themselves in the 
first place as Muslims. For some Uyghurs in north-western China, ethnic identity 
associated with religion jointly contributed to acts of violence and an independence 
movement (Dwyer, 2005).  
China is claimed by the Chinese government to be a unified multi-national socialist 
country. The minority-inhabited areas are mainly located near the country’s borders, 
which makes minorities especially significant in terms of national defence and geopolitics. 
Although the areas where ethnic minorities predominantly live are sparsely populated in 
contrast to the overcrowded areas of inland China, they cover an expanse of about 64% 
of the country, with 5 autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, 120 autonomous 
counties as well as 1,256 ethnic townships. Thus unity is the supreme principle of 
China’s ethnic minority policies. All the other policies cannot conflict with national unity. 
The ultimate goal of establishing the government agency called the State Ethnic Affairs 
Committee is to integrate minorities and the Han through various administrative, 
economic, social and cultural means. Minorities have a certain degree of autonomy but 
not the right of secession. A large number of Han cadres, workers and companies have 
been sent to minority areas to assist in their development. Nevertheless, this has turned 
out to generate negative feelings from the minorities, who feel that Han people are taking 
their jobs and resources (Yeh, 2013). Han tourists are often seen as violating their 
cultural and religious traditions (Han, 2011) by, for example, washing their feet in the 
sacred lakes from which Tibetans get water to drink. Newly built hotels in Lhasa are 
considered by many Tibetans to be incompatible with the religious atmosphere of the city. 
Minorities and scholars use ‘hanization’ (or hanification) to describe the overwhelming 
influence of the Han. In Lijiang, the hegemonic hanification process was found to be 
intensified by tourism with the help of the Chinese government (Oakes, 1998; Su and 
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Teo, 2009: 85-88). Oakes considers hanification in Guizhou as a form of ‘inner 
colonialism’. Hanification intentionally or unintentionally implemented through tourism 
has become an ideological instrument for maintaining the CCP’s hegemony. Thus 
minority policies can be seen to have greatly strengthened ethnic awareness amongst 
most minorities (Mackerras, 2003: 39). In the section below I show how this division is 
specifically embodied in Tibet.   
3.2.1.2 Tibetan vis-à-vis the Han Chinese 
Tibetans, whether rich or poor, monk or layman, Easterner or Westerner, now 
more than ever before defined their identity primarily in terms of political 
nationalism, as Tibetan vis-à-vis the Han Chinese. (Goldstein, 1998b: 42) 
Goldstein’s comment on Tibetan vis-à-vis the Han Chinese in 1998 is only partially 
applicable in today’s China. Although Tibetans still use the Han as a reference to define 
their ethnic identity, politics is not always the reason for forming this distinction. Chinese 
minority policies have played an important role in reinforcing a sense of Tibetan 
distinction from Han Chinese since Tibet’s incorporation into China in 1950. Being ethnic 
minority in China places Tibetans in a framework with certain set relationships with the 
majority nationality, the Han and the other 54 minorities (Yeh, 2007a). Marx’s social 
evolution theory was introduced and developed as the CCP’s basic ideology in which 
Tibetans are thought of in the lower stage of social progress hence as inferior people 
mired in poverty and ignorance (Yi, 2007: 941). The Tibetans and other minority groups 
are representatives of ‘backwardness’ in contrast to the more ‘modern’ Han (Kolas, 2007: 
50) and are considered in need of help from the Han to be civilised (Zhu, 2007). 
Meanwhile all nationalities should be in harmonious and united relationships.  
In practice, some Tibetan students are made to believe that they are backward groups 
comparing to the Han (Zhu, 2007). In Lhasa, a widely held view among Tibetans is that 
Han people are diligent and hard-working in contrast to the indolent and spoilt Tibetans 
(Yeh, 2007b). However, it is acknowledged that the Han/minority dichotomy is not the 
only cause of social division in Tibet. Hu and Salazar (2008) found that class and hukou2 
(household registration) are more important than ethnicity in causing social division in 
Lhasa. 
                                                
2 A hukou is a document containing a household’s registration. It is used to assign a 
family to a specific place of residence. Information such as name, gender, date of birth, 
parents, spouse and children is included in this record. There are two types of hukou, 
agricultural and non-agricultural, often referred to as rural and urban. 
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Children are often considered the best objects for accomplishing civilising projects 
(Harrell, 1995b). The basic goals of public schools are transmitting culture and 
socialising youths (Garcia, 1978: 8). Apart from these, public schools in China play the 
role of promoting national unity and economic development (Johnson and Chhetri, 2000). 
For minority education, achieving integration is the ultimate goal. Bass (2008) even said 
the purpose of state-schooling in minority areas is moulding the other 55 ethnic 
minorities into a unified single nation dominated by advanced Chinese language and 
culture.  
Since the late 1970s, policies on education have been implemented for assisting 
modernisation and national integration. China has a uniform national curriculum which is 
mainly drawn from Han culture (Lee, 2001: 40). A compulsory course named Ideology 
and Morality is taught in primary and secondary schools. The main content of this course 
involves modernity, patriotism and socialism (Bass, 2008). In the history and politics 
textbooks of primary schools, the main theme is the close relationship between Han and 
other ethnic minorities, which builds on timely and generous help provided by the 
advanced, civilised and superior Han to the primitive, backward and helpless minorities 
(Hansen, 1999: 68-74). As for all the other ethnic minorities, education in Tibet has also 
been greatly influenced by national policies (Bass, 1998). In the school curriculum, 
China’s ancient traditions are celebrated, but Tibet’s pre-1950s history is depicted as 
backward and oppressive, with a slave state governed by the autocratic lamas and 
aristocracies before ‘Chinese liberation’ (Bass, 2008). Religious belief and ethnic 
awareness are regarded as barriers to the integration of ethnic groups and unity of the 
nation-state, but especially for Tibetans and Uyghurs religion greatly reinforces their 
sense of ethnicity. In terms of the specific ways in which religion is treated, Tibetan 
Buddhism was dissociated from Tibetan culture in school textbooks by leaving no space 
for Buddhist philosophies and context (Bass, 2008: 42-43). Atheism, materialism and 
science have been propagated in schools and the public (Yi, 2005). Buddhist related 
contents are interpreted in the context of common Chinese heritage traits, independent 
of religious heritage, and are used to promote socialist moralities and patriotic ideas. 
Religion is also blamed for hindering the economic development of Tibet (Bass, 2008). 
As also evidenced by the journalist Peter Hessler (1999), in Tibetan schools, even the 
elementary schools were found to have a heavy politicized and nationalist climate. 
Students were urged to serve nationalist goals in economics and politics.  
State education has not always had the expected results. Through an investigation into 
China’s minority higher education situation and policies, Lee (2001: 42) concluded that 
two aims of higher education, integration and modernisation, have been partly achieved, 
but with two unexpected consequences: “a resurgence of ethnic identity and a dilution of 
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distinctive features of minority groups”. Upton (1996) found in Songpan, a Tibetan county, 
that Tibetan educators in Tibetan schools realised a need to strengthen students’ 
awareness of their ethnic identity and culture. Pursuing formal, state education also 
disrupts minority students’ understanding of their ethnic identity. Yi (2005) found that 
Tibetan students felt a sense of backwardness compared to the Han.  
Apart from state education which serves to civilise the minorities, the Chinese state has 
also initiated various economic projects to realise its version of modernity. Tourism is 
one of those projects. As mentioned before, tourism was found to intensify hanification. 
The following section will discuss the ways in which tourism interacts with ethnic 
minorities in China.  
3.2.2 Tourism and ethnic minorities 
Tourism has been an important force for modernisation in minority areas (Mackerras, 
2003). In 1978, Deng Xiaoping declared that tourism could be an effective way of 
realising economic development in China. Responding to this call, like in other 
developing countries which put hope in tourism for economic growth, in China tourism 
has become a major strategy to boost economy, to encourage international 
communications and to enhance national unity among many growth options (Xiao, 2006: 
803). Tourism development was marked as a signifier of reform and opening-up policies 
(Xiao, 2006: 812). Foreign tourists were the first travellers coming to ethnic inhabited 
areas. With the foreign tourism creating more income and tourist facilities, domestic 
tourism was encouraged by the authorities. Since then tourist numbers have surged and 
tourism has become one of the largest industries in China (CCTV, 2014). China has 
become the biggest market for domestic tourism and the fourth largest destination for 
international tourism. In 2011 the number of domestic tourists reached 2.64 billion 
person-times and the revenue of domestic tourism was 1,930 billion CNY. Tourism’s 
value added accounted for about 4% of China’s GDP in 2013 (People.cn, 2014). The 
rapid growth in the tourism industry has been accompanied by a great expansion in the 
geographical reach of tourism (Bao and Ma, 2010; Oakes, 1992). 
In 1990, developing ethnic culture came to be treated as a way to better showcase the 
fruits of socialism (Sofield and Li, 1998: 373) and the extent of integration of the 
minorities (Matthews and Richter, 1991: 127). Tourism was developed to preserve 
cultural traditions and to boost the economies of the minority-inhabited areas. Many 
tourist projects and ethnic tourism routes have been promoted by the government.  
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The development of tourism in ethnic areas of China brought both positive and negative 
results. It has encouraged the construction of infrastructure, an increase in incomes and 
greater gender equality. In the meantime, tourism has introduced host/guest conflicts, 
the transformation of cultural forms, diseases etc. Even though tourism has some 
negative consequences, Mackerras (2003: 73) believes that minorities in China greatly 
welcome tourism as it could really improve the standard of living of minorities.  
Furthermore, the influence of tourism cannot simply be considered in terms of good or 
bad. Although tourism reinforces the hegemonic representations of “ethnic minorities”, it 
also provides a new space for negotiating and reconstructing ethnic identity and the 
meaning of ‘minority areas’. Tim Oakes (1998) found that in the process of developing 
tourism in order to modernise Miao-inhabited areas, the Miao were represented as 
primitive, exotic and the opposite of modernity. He used the term “false modernity” to 
describe the contradiction between the aim of preserving ethnic cultures and the practice 
of damaging ethnic cultures through economic development (Oakes, 1998: 186-7). On 
the other hand, Hillman (2003) found that ethnic tourism in China has been shown to 
raise ethnic consciousness and pride in ethnic cultural heritage.  
This chapter now moves on to discuss how tourism developed specifically in Tibet under 
the government’s development logic for ethnic minorities.  
3.2.3 Government, development and tourism in Tibet 
Even though different parts of Tibet had been consecutively incorporated into China from 
1950 to 1954, efforts to modernise Tibet actually only started at the beginning of the 
reform period in 1978. During the years from 1950 to 1978, Tibet, and indeed the whole 
of China, experienced serious convulsions. In the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CCP 
Central Committee in 1978, Deng Xiaoping declared that economic development is the 
party’s principal aim in the pursuit of modernisation and socialism. Since then, 
“development is hard theory” (fazhan cai shi ying daoli) has become a national discourse 
and belief.   
In Tibet, development is also a hegemonic state project which follows a particular logic, 
complexly negotiated and contested (Beckwith, 1993: 605). In the ideologies of the CCP, 
Tibet was always depicted as a place of backwardness and barrenness, being closed, 
seeking to become prosperous, modern and advanced, in need of urgent development 
especially economic development (Yeh, 2007b: 593-4). Economic development is 
considered as a panacea addressing peripheral peoples and realising modernity and 
progress in Tibet (Zhu, 2007: 284).Thus, in the report entitled Sixty Years Since Peaceful 
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Liberation of Tibet (referring to TAR here), published in 2011 (GOV.cn, 2014), “launching 
Tibet’s drive to modernisation” was especially written as one of Chinese government’s 
successes in Tibetan affairs. Another success claimed by the CCP was “implementing 
reform and opening up, promoting Tibetan economy to change from a closed one into an 
open one and from a planned one to a market one.” The Chinese government believes 
that modernisation and a market economy are crucial to and the right direction for the 
development of Tibet. From 18 to 20 January 2010, Hu Jintao (the then president of the 
People’s Republic of China) laid out the guidelines for the development strategy of Tibet 
in the Fifth TAR Work Forum. Economic development was still set as the central task of 
future work in Tibet (People.com.cn, 2014). This development logic is also considered 
helpful for defusing political tensions and strengthening unification through establishing 
closer economic ties with the inner lands of China (Hessler, 1999). Mackerras (2003: 38) 
found that the focus on economic development and social welfare of ethnic groups had 
improved ethnic issues and shifted people’s attention from rebellious movements.  
Deng Xiaoping specially pointed out that Tibet should be open to tourists and foreigners. 
Tourism was expected to contribute to the economic modernisation of China and Tibet. 
With the continuous efforts of Deng’s successors, tourism is regarded by government as 
an efficient way of realising economic development in Tibet. Making Tibet into a world 
important tourist destination was listed as one of the goals of the strategy in the Fifth 
TAR Work Forum. The Secretary of Communist Party of Aba Prefecture emphasised at 
the Meeting of Prefectural Tourism Work in 2012 that tourism has always been and 
should still be the leading industry of Aba Prefecture. Cultural tourism, including religious 
tourism, he maintained, should be made a priority of tourism development 
(Abazhou.gov.cn, 2012; 2013).  
However, development is not always welcomed by its subjects. Hu and Wen (2001) 
criticized that the modernisation strategy in Tibet was always putting a focus on the 
growth of economy and the speed of GDP increase and ignored the needs of Tibetans 
and the actualities of Tibet. Makley (2007: 224) warned that “the danger for all Tibetans, 
men and women, was that the exotic appeal of a Han-mediated modernity substituted 
consumption for local autonomy and power, and diverted attention from the ongoing 
emasculation of all Tibetans in intensifying state efforts to exploit the frontier in the drive 
to capitalist modernisation”. In Yeh’s (1993: 603) research, one of her interviewees 
complained about the pervasiveness of the talk of “economic development” in Tibet, 
saying he got “a headache whenever someone starts to talk about economic 
development”. In Jiuzhaigou, some old people, especially women expressed their 
nostalgia for the people's commune period. They liked the fact that people lived simple 
lives without plotting and fighting for money. The market economy made them feel 
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exhausted mentally, even though it brought them substantially more money than before 
(see discussion in Chapter 7).  
Sometimes development, however, is seen as coming at the cost of culture. The Potala 
Palace was made a museum open to domestic and international tourists some time ago. 
This invited criticism from some Tibetans in and out of Tibet as tourists sometimes 
appear to be disrespectful of Tibetan culture. The accusation that tourists lacked respect 
for Tibetan religion is also evidenced by Kolas (2007) in his research on Shangri-la. 
Modernisation is seen by some as a force threatening Tibet and leading to a diminution 
of the differences among nationalities and between minorities and the Han (Mackerras, 
1994: 270-271). Hessler (1999) describes how modernisation, along with Han influence, 
has had effects on Tibetans and Han migrants in TAR. He found that economic 
development per se was regarded by some Tibetans as a major barrier to the  
preservation of Tibetan culture, no matter whether there is Han influence at play or not. 
In my case study site, Jiuzhaigou, excessive development of tourism sometimes caused 
annoyance to local people. In “golden week”3 (huangjin zhou) in October 2013, hundreds 
and thousands of tourists (mainly Han tourists from mainland China) poured into 
Jiuzhaigou, which caused serious traffic jams in the park (FlorCruz, 2013). Some 
annoyed tourists had fights with the locals who were trying to maintain order. Locals 
were further irritated by piles of rubbish and human excrement left in the park (as 
documented by local people’s Weibo feeds4).  
3.3 Religion in Tibet since 1950 
The previous section discussed state-led modernisation approaches in Tibet since 1950, 
which have had profound consequences for the Tibetans. This section aims to provide 
background information on Bon and the history of religion in Tibet to provide the context 
for a better understanding of the religious changes currently happening in Jiuzhaigou. In 
section 3.3.1, a brief history of religion in Tibet will be given with particular attention to 
the period after the 1978 reform and opening-up. Following that, I will briefly explain Bon 
religion and its relationships with Buddhism (Section 3.3.2).  
                                                
3 October golden week (1 October to 7 October) is one of the two national holiday weeks 
in China. Another one is in May (1 May to7 May). The golden week is the only chance 
working people having a long holiday, so in every golden holiday all tourist sites in 
China are filled with visitors. 
4 Weibo literally means ‘microblog’ in Chinese. It is an equivalent to Twitter in China on 
which people could share texts, audios, videos and other materials. 
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3.3.1 Religion in the history of Tibet and of China as a whole 
Religious policies of the CCP have been through three periods (Mackerras, 2013: 30): 
1949 to the start of the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution, the Cultural Revolution, and the 
period since then. Tibetan religions had grown on Tibetan soil for more than a thousand 
years before 1950. Even though the focus will be put on the post-1950 era, there is a 
need to briefly introduce the history of religion in Tibet before 1950.  
3.3.1.1 The era before 1950 
The indigenous religion of Bon is argued to have existed in Tibet from before the arrival 
of Buddhism (Snellgrove and Richardson, 1980). The Bon religion originated from 
primitive nature worship and prospered until King Songsten-gampo prohibited it in the 7th 
century CE. Despite the significant influence of Buddhism, the Bon religion has been still 
in existence (Tucci and Samuel, 1988). To survive despite the spread of Buddhism, the 
Bon religion incorporated a great number of ideas, concepts and teachings from 
Buddhism (Snellgrove and Richardson, 1980). Nowadays, Bon monasteries and shrines 
are scattered around the whole of Tibet, and are especially numerous in East Tibet 
(Tucci and Samuel, 1988: 213).  
Buddhism was introduced into Tibet in the 5th century CE. There were severe struggles 
both between Bon and Buddhism and amongst different political parties who supported 
different religious currents. Buddhism gradually pervaded Tibetan society. Under the 
reign of king Trisong Detsen in the 8th century, Buddhism successfully became the 
official state religion whose power and benefits were confirmed by law (Grunfeld, 1996). 
Monks constituted the privileged estate and were protected by the King and the law. 
There was even a law that stated that each monk should be supported by seven peasant 
families (Chen, 2002).  
Against the background of disputes between various local power-holders from the mid 9th 
century to mid 13th century, different Buddhist monasteries aligned with these local 
power-holders, and contributed to the formation of several Buddhist sects, including the 
Nyingma, Kagyu, Sakya, Jonang and Gelug sects. In the meantime, serfdom gradually 
came to prevail in Tibet. 
From 1206, the Mongol Empire started to gain suzerainty over Tibet (Chen, 2002; 
Snellgrove and Richardson, 1980). The Mongolian ruling class were attracted to the 
ideas of Buddhism. With regard to the social structure, “the best single description of pre-
1950 Tibetan society is ‘feudal’” (Grunfeld, 1996: 8). A small group consisting of lamas 
65 
 
and nobility predominated in exercising political power, both at times when power was 
centralized form and when it was decentralized (Grunfeld, 1996). The Dalai Lama was 
the supreme spiritual and political leader in the whole area, while local power was 
distributed among monasteries and nobility. Apart from these members of the privileged 
estate, the majority of Tibetans were serfs. They provided a service (including cultivating 
their lords’ fields, repairing his house, transporting his crops, collecting firewood, cooking, 
etc.) for the masters (local aristocrats and monasteries) in return for military protection 
(Bell, 1992).  
As in other mainly pastoral and partly agricultural societies, land was extremely 
significant and had great value in Tibetan society. But land was controlled and used by 
manorial estates composed either of monastic estates or of the estates of the lay nobility, 
although they were officially claimed to be the property of the government (Zeng, 2004; 
Grunfeld, 1996). Land was farmed by a labour force of serfs (Goldstein, 1989: 3). As 
Goldstein explains:  
For the manorial estate system and the political and monastic system, serfdom 
was the foundation. It was an efficient system of economic exploitation that 
guaranteed to the country’s religious and secular elites a permanent and 
secure labour force to cultivate their landholdings without burdening them 
either with any direct day-to-day responsibility for the serfs’ subsistence or with 
the need to compare for labour in a market context (Goldstein, 1989: 5).  
However, this strategy greatly expanded the privileges of monastery estates, whose 
lamas and monks could be fed without having themselves to work. Besides, a monk 
could step into the upper class no matter how low he was by birth, but this was not 
possible for a layman. Thus, a large number of men and women swarmed into 
monasteries which significantly enlarged the monastic body. For the Tibetans, “It is an 
ordinary event in a family for a little daughter to leave the house and enter a nunnery; 
and one son at least, while still young, is likely to go off and take the vows of monkhood” 
(Bell, 1931: 169). 
3.3.1.2 1950 – Cultural Revolution 
Over the period from 1950 to 1954, different parts of Tibet were consecutively 
incorporated into China. In 1955 land reform was initiated breaking up the estates and 
liberating the serfs. At the same time, each household was categorised into one of eight 
classes which includes chieftains (tusi), slave owners (nuli zhu), serf owners (nongnu 
zhu), land owners (dizhu), wealthy farmers (fu nong), middle farmers (zhong nong), poor 
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farmers (pin nong), serfs (nongnu) and slaves (nuli) (Kolas, 2007: 42-43). A large 
number of people were identified as poor farmers, serfs and slaves. The first five classes 
were the target of criticism, political teaching and land confiscation. Monastery land was 
treated in the same way. Monks were told to work in the fields like other lay people. Then 
communes were established in 1958 for people to work and eat collectively. All the 
products made in the communes were managed and redistributed collectively. Food was 
spread to each family based on the number of workers. This however led to mass 
starvation across China as productivity fell really low.  
Under Marxism-Leninism, religion found little space to survive. According to Marxist 
theory, religion is a tool of the dominant class suppressing the lower class and an illusory 
tool of the working class for escaping poverty and misery. It has no place in socialist 
society, where the exploiting class no longer exist and where science, political 
consciousness and human cognition continue to develop (Hansen, 1999). During this 
period, another important thing happened and changed the direction of Tibetan history 
and religion. In 1959, the fourteenth Dalai Lama fled to India, and this became the main 
cause of the Tibetans’ campaign for independence, freedom of belief and autonomy. 
Nowadays, the Dalai Lama, the supreme religious leader of Tibet retains a wide-ranging 
religious influence in Tibet. 
3.3.1.3 The Cultural Revolution 
Political programmes of laicization greatly spurred on societal secularisation 
(Dobbelaere, 2002). During the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1976, political force 
completely crushed religion. It was initiated by Mao and later perpetuated by the Gang of 
Four to protect and uphold Maoism. Students and workers were the major force in this 
movement.  
The ‘Four Olds’, which refers to old ideas, culture, customs and habits, were targets of 
attacks in this period of totalitarian iconoclasm. Religions were seen as harmful feudal 
remnants to be completely banned and crushed. Monasteries, temples, shrines and 
Buddha statues were demolished (Mackerras, 2013: 31). Monks and people who were 
engaging in religious and cultural activities were attacked as well. They were forced to 
leave their monasteries to ‘live a normal life’, while those who resisted were imprisoned. 
The ‘normal life’ here means to marry and to live a life like other laypeople.  
The Cultural Revolution also created a generational gap between old monks and young 
monks. Today the middle-aged monks, who are supposed to be the supporting power 
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behind religious transmission, are much fewer and less educated because of the 10-year 
religious prohibition.  
It is noteworthy that according to1975 Constitution, every citizen of China was allowed to 
“enjoy freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to 
propagate atheism”.  
3.3.1.4 Reform and opening-up 
At the historic 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China 
in 1978, the Chinese government decided to shift its focus from the political struggle to 
economic development and market economy. At the same time, it adopted a policy of 
opening-up toward other countries. These are altogether termed gaige kaifang zhengce 
(reform and opening-up policies), which has become a household term in China. 
Economic modernisation was set as the central task. At the same time, controls on 
religious belief were relaxed. 
In the 1982 Constitution, people were officially allowed to believe freely in China 
(Mackerras, 2003: 115). After 1984 policies and practices which emphasised freedom of 
religious belief and respect of traditional ethnic culture were added into the Constitution. 
Religious beliefs and practices in China witnessed great growth and considerable revival. 
As for Tibet, Tibetan monks who were expelled in the Cultural Revolution went back to 
monasteries, in the meantime, a considerable number of young people joined 
monasteries. Tibetan laypeople also restarted their various religious practices. However, 
not all kinds of spiritual beliefs are encouraged. Being recognised by the state is crucial 
in deciding the future of a particular religion or belief. For the Chinese state, the concept 
religion is a western construct which was introduced into China in the late nineteenth 
century from Japan (Gladney, 2013: 61). Religion officially refers to “a formally 
constituted social organization associated with a body of written doctrine that expressed 
both a cosmology and an ethical system (Szonyi, 2009: 317)”. For fitting into the state’s 
definition, Buddhism, Islam, Daoism and Confucianism have reworked their traditions. At 
the same time, based on socialist ideology, traditional cultures, especially certain cultural 
practices, are criticized for being unscientific, feudal, anti-modern and anti-socialist 
(Sofield and Li, 1998: 367).  
Moreover, a number of independence demonstrations in 1987, 1988 and 1989 in Tibet 
and Xinjiang made the atmosphere around religion tenser. Religious practitioners and 
institutions were sometimes over-regulated and tightly controlled by the state (Sofield 
and Li, 1998: 372). The CCP still strongly opposes what it calls ‘superstition’ and has 
68 
 
kept some control over established religious bodies to maintain its own power 
(Mackerras, 2003). Religion might be tolerated if it is linked to economic development, 
and it is believed by the government that as the minorities become better educated, they 
will be less ‘superstitious’ (Sutton and Kang, 2010b: 103-4).  
Religion is always regarded as a political issue rather than as a simple spiritual issue by 
the CCP (Mackerras, 2003: 116). In the summer of 1996, a ’patriotic education’ 
campaign was implemented in monasteries as well as lay societies in Tibet with the aim 
of strengthening Tibetans’ Chinese national identity and enhancing control over 
opposition powers. Goldstein (1998b: 48) quoted a paragraph from a document of 
patriotism education in Sera monastery as follows: 
The time has arrived for patriotic education to take place in Sera monastery by 
means of Comprehensive Propaganda Education. The purpose of carrying out 
this education session is to implement the Party’s policy on religion totally and 
correctly, to stress the management of religious affairs according to law, and to 
initiate efforts for the harmonious coexistence between the religious and 
socialist societies. It is also aimed at creating the thought of patriotism and 
implanting in the masses of the monks the view of the government, the political 
view and the legal view. The campaign is also for the purpose of educating 
[monks] to oppose completely any activities aimed at splitting the motherland. 
(Goldstein, 1998b: 48)  
However, in 2008 a series of riots, protests and demonstrations started in Lhasa and 
soon spread to other parts of Tibet. Monks associated with some protesting Tibetans got 
involved in the unrest. It was thought that social discrimination, ethnic hostility and 
religious control were factors contributing to the uprising (Miles, 2008). In the following 
years, more than 100 self-immolations happened in Tibet, in Eastern Tibet in particular. 
More and more young laypeople got involved in this kind of protest, and are regarded as 
the new force of protest in addition to protests issuing from the monastic (Terrone, 2014). 
These protesters mainly concerned issues such as the return of the Dalai Lama, ethnic 
unity, and the disappearing traditional Tibetan clothing and Tibetan language (Terrone, 
2014). 
Religion, as a ‘positive’ official construct has always been closely associated with 
superstition, its ‘negative’ counterpart, in Communist China. Superstition is associated 
with other characteristics such as being backward, uncivilised, poor and isolated, all 
seen as features of minority peoples (Kolas, 2007: 80). The negative and anti-science 
characteristics of superstition have been widely propagated in schools, media and 
government documents in China. However, no clear distinction between religion and 
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superstition is given by the government. Thus, minorities’ religions are sometimes 
regarded as superstitions and become the targets of elimination during the civilisation 
process. Some Han people have sceptical attitudes toward minority religions, which they 
think of as superstition and lacking in scientific grounding (Yi, 2008: 57-63), although in 
theory the state recognised religion is acknowledged as generally playing a positive role 
in the mainstream discourse.  
Even though there is no clear differentiation between religion and superstition, the state 
has an official list of xiejiao (literally meaning evil cult), which is a political concept in 
China (Xi, 2001). Once defined by the government as a xiejiao, a religion will be 
seriously suppressed. For example, the state identified xiejiao, Falun Gong once 
considered a great challenge to Chinese authority in 1990s. Thus all these various 
implicit and explicit relationships and reasons have made religion a sensitive topic in this 
officially atheistic country. 
In contemporary China, some new trends in Tibetan religion have appeared alongside 
the modernisation process. The first one is the successful dissemination of Tibetan 
Buddhism to non-Tibetan areas. Many people, especially young people, have converted 
to Tibetan Buddhism and follow the teaching of distinguished lamas (Lin, 2014). In non-
Tibetan areas, lamas have become especially popular in the lay world. They have 
opened blogs, Weibo accounts and Wechat5 accounts to share their life and thoughts on 
Buddhism and other matters. They have celebrity adherents who make Tibetan 
Buddhism a fashion among young people and help to spread their name in the lay world 
(Lin, 2014). From Lin’s interviews with young Han people, we can see that for them 
practicing Tibetan Buddhism is considered cool and trendy. Lamas give talks in 
universities. To some extent, some of them can even be regarded as religious celebrities. 
However, according to an article from ifeng.com (a Chinese news agency) (Yu, 2013), 
some fraudsters pretend to be reincarnated lamas and swindle people of their money. 
People are persuaded to buy religious objects or to donate money. This has generated 
some suspicion toward Tibetan Buddhism.  
In her article, Lin Meilian raises another pressing issue, that of monks’ involvement in 
secular life. She writes that some reincarnated lamas are accused of being deeply 
involved in secular life, and to be straying therefore from their accepted duties (Lin, 
2014). Apart from Buddhist scripts, it is said that they even learn computer skills, driving, 
English and urban development. Some work for record albums which combine pop 
                                                
5 Wechat is a Chinese version of Whatsapp, a mobile messaging application on which 
people could broadcast their life experience, thoughts etc. 
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music and Buddhist scripts. Some are directors and writers. Some get married. Monks 
now have a variety of new roles and jobs to do. What it means to be a monk and what a 
monk’s life should be like have become questions that are much debated.  
Monks, especially young monks now have different ways of existence in the world. I still 
remember two young novices in Zharu Monastery in Jiuzhaigou secretly going off to an 
internet bar to play computer games and watch TV dramas at night. The contradictions 
between the modern and the traditional are shown here. All these new trends impel us to 
think how the monks situate themselves in the overwhelming process of secularisation 
(see Chapter 7, where I focus on this theme). Mills (2003: 80) argued that the world that 
monks are supposed to renounce is essentially ‘society’ itself, so monks’ renunciation is 
necessarily incomplete. From this discussion of general perceptions of religion in mind, 
the following section will narrow down the focus to two religions on the Tibetan plateau: 
Bon and Tibetan Buddhism. 
3.3.2 Bon and Tibetan Buddhism 
3.3.2.1 What is Bon? 
The historical nature and meaning of ‘Bon’ religion is contested amongst scholars. As 
mentioned previously, Bon is believed by many to be a religion which had existed for 
centuries before the arrival of Buddhism in the 7th century (Snellgrove and Richardson, 
1980). Tonpa Shenrap, the founder of Bon, later came to be regarded as the ‘true 
Buddha of our world age’ (Kværne, 1993). It grew first in ancient Kingdom Shangshung 
in the west of Tibet, which was once the centre of the Bon religion and was conquered 
and brought into the Tibetan empire in the 7th century (Kvæ rne, 1995: 13). Since then, 
Bon has experienced constant adaptations, transformations, and struggles and mutual 
learning with Buddhism.  
Western scholars have characterised Bon as a religion with three main significations 
(Kværne, 1993: 9-10). Kværne’s summary below is particularly cogent: 
1. The pre-Buddhist religion which was gradually suppressed by Buddhism in 
the eighth and ninth centuries….  
 2. A religion, so most scholars believe, which developed in Tibet at the same 
time that Buddhism became dominant, and which manifestly has many points 
of similarity with Buddhism. The fact that the adherents of this religion, of whom 
there are many thousands in Tibet and in exile even today, maintain that their 
faith is anterior to Buddhism in Tibet, and, in fact, identical with the pre 
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Buddhist Bon religion, has tended to be either contradicted or ignored by 
Western scholars…  
 3. A vast and somewhat amorphous body of popular beliefs, including 
divination, the cult of local deities, and concepts of the soul. However, Tibetan 
usage does not traditionally designate such beliefs ‘Bon’, and since they do not 
form an essential part of Buddhism or of Bon (in the sense of the word outlined 
under point 2 above) – although such beliefs are to a large extent sanctioned 
by and integrated into both religious – a more appropriate term is that coined 
by R. A. Stein, viz, ‘the nameless religion’. (Kværne, 1993: 9-10) 
In 2000, Bon and its significant role in Tibetan society were acknowledged by the 14th 
Dalai Lama by saying:  
Bon is Tibet’s oldest spiritual tradition and the indigenous source of Tibetan 
culture, played a significant role in shaping unique identity [of Tibetans]. 
Consequently, I have often stressed the importance of preserving this tradition 
(the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, 2007).  
By stressing the importance of Bon as an identifier of Tibetans, Dalai Lama actually 
implied the unity between the Bonpos (Bon adherents) and the Buddhists as a whole. 
This view of unity, rather than discrimination or struggle was also expressed by some 
people I talked to in my case study areas. The following section will particularly look at 
the relationships between Bon and Buddhism.  
3.3.2.2 Relationships between Bon and Buddhism 
Bon is deemed identical with Buddhism in many respects, such as in its “rituals and other 
religious practices, as well as meditational and metaphysical traditions” (Kværne, 2013: 
187). For example, both Bon and Buddhism conduct practices like turning prayer wheels, 
circumambulating sacred places such as monasteries and holy mountains, raising prayer 
flags, chanting sacred scriptures and carving them on stones or cliffs (Kvæ rne, 1995: 
12). Its believers “follow the same path of virtue and have resource to the same 
meditational practices as Buddhist Tibetans” (Kværne, 1993: 12). Some scholars found 
that Buddhism and Bon influenced each other mutually; it was not one-way traffic. The 
establishment of Bonpo monasteries and the monastic life were significantly influenced 
by Buddhist traditions and rules, especially those of the Gelug sect of Buddhism 
(Kværne, 1993: 12; Bell, 1931: 15). The images and pictures in the Bon monastery 
seemed like those in the Buddhist monastery, but had different name, for instance, the 
Gautama Buddha of Buddhism was also called ‘Teacher Shenrap’, the founder of Bon 
(Bell, 1931: 17). Moreover, “books in the Bon monastery appeared also to be Buddhist, 
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but the titles were different and the contents were altered to some extent to suit Pon 
[Bon]” (Bell, 1931: 17). Furthermore, in regard to their doctrines, “the view of the world as 
suffering, belief in the law of moral causality (the ‘law of karma’) and the corresponding 
concept of rebirth in the six states of existence, and the ideal of enlightenment and 
Buddhahood, are basic doctrinal elements not only of Buddhism, but also of Bon” 
(Kværne, 1995: 13). Kværne holds that it is hard to distinguish between contemporary 
Bon believers and Buddhists for the casual observer. However, there are some 
conspicuous differences. For example, the ritual movement for Bon is counter-clockwise, 
but is the reverse in Buddhism; in addition, according to Bell’s research, some Bonpos, 
or adherents of Bon, asserted that their “religion comes from Shang-shung. The 
Buddhists pray ‘Om Ma-ni Pe-me Hun’, but we pray ‘Om Ma-tre Mu-ye Sa-le Du’” (Bell, 
1931: 17). Moreover, Kvæ rne (2013: 183) claimed that even though there are many 
similarities in rituals, monastic system and metaphysical traditions, “key differences lie in 
their concepts of sacred history and sources of religious authority ” which refer to “Bon 
tradition’s claim[s] that it predated Buddhism in Tibet by several centuries… in 
Shangshung [as opposed to Buddhism’s origin, India]… [and that] Tonpa Shenrap (as 
opposed to the Buddha, Sakyamuni) is the source [also founder] of Bon religion”. 
Tucci (1980: 245-248) found that Bon and Buddhism have become more and more 
similar to each other both in religious practices and in doctrines. Kapstein (2013: 205) 
even claims that Tibetan Bon is a form of Buddhism in its organized and clerical 
dimension. This view also resonates with those of my monk respondents (which will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 7). It was also said by my respondents that parents 
of the founder of the first Buddhist sect (Ningmapa) were Bonpos. There have been 
close and frequent interactions and communications between Bon and Buddhist 
monasteries and monks. The relationship between the Bon and the Tibetan Buddhism is 
usually described as “Bon inside Buddhism, Buddhism inside Bon” (Li, 2005).From the 
insider’s perspective, especially among the monks both Bonpos and Buddhists assert 
their differences in history, deities and practices, but still admit that they are have many 
fundamental similarities. Thar (2006a) even found followers of Bon and Buddhism go to 
each other’s temples on some occasions. Speaking of the attitudes toward these 
similarities, Bonpos seemed to be proud of the similarity. One chief priest of Bon 
delightedly told Bell that “Bon was nearly the same as Buddhism” (Bell, 1931: 18).  
The close relations between Bon and Tibetan Buddhism are also evidenced in the mixed 
usage of the religious terminologies. The word “Bon” (Benbojiao in Chinese, Bonpo in 
Tibetan) is not a commonly used concept. Jiuzhaigou people prefer to use Buddhist 
terminology like Buddha (fo) and Buddhism (fojiao) to refer to their own god and religion. 
This mixing usage shows very close relations between Tibetan Buddhism and Bon. Like 
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a monk in Gami Monastery, Agu Jiacuo said “we are all Tibetans. Buddhism and Bon are 
the same.” Nevertheless, some of local laypeople, especially the young people even 
have no or little idea that their religion is called Bon or there are differences between Bon 
and Buddhism.  
Despite the positive attitudes of Bonpos and the Dalai Lama’s official acknowledgement, 
Bon has been and still is looked down upon by some Buddhists. This happened in Suopo 
township in Danba, where some Tibetans are despised by other Tibetans and their Bon 
religion is in a marginal position which might obstruct their ‘authentic’ Tibetan identity 
(Tenzin, 2013). Some Bonpos still wish to walk out of the shadow of Buddhism and to 
see their rightful place being recognised in the international spiritual community 
(Bellezza, 2014).  
3.3.2.3 Monastic development 
Monasteries were, and despite changed circumstances still are, at the heart of 
institutional religion (Kapstein, 2013: 219). Mass monasticism was widely supported by 
Tibetan families through sending their sons and making donations to monasteries. These 
deeds, it is believed, bestow merit and help avoid evil.   
Before 1950 in Tibet, mass monasticism was popular. Monasteries accommodated a 
large number of monks. Monasteries and monks had always lived a life of abundance. 
They had strong support from central or local governments. They had their own estates 
and businesses. They also received a large amount in donations and alms from 
laypeople. Goldstein (1998a: 35) described the financial situation of the famous Drepung 
Monastery in Lhasa like this: “In the old society, Drepung’s income primarily came from 
the monastery’s own resources – its manorial estates and its money lending operations – 
and from the government. For the individual monks, alms from donors were also an 
important source.” This helps demonstrate the wealth of Tibetan monasteries before their 
incorporation into People’s Republic of China. Even though monks traditionally received 
no salary or alms from their monastery, they were better off than laypeople. What needs 
to be clarified here is that only a small number of monks were involved in running the 
monasteries and their businesses, the majority of them focused on religious studies and 
practice.     
Since 1950, in order to be socio-politically compatible with the realities of socialist society, 
monasteries in Tibet have been through a process of adaptation of their traditional 
values, customs and beliefs. Three policies have had an undue influence on monastic 
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development in contemporary Tibet: the one-child policy, a change in recruitment age 
and self-support policy.  
The one-child policy, as well as controlling the population has also led to a reduction in 
the number of monks. In the past, a Tibetan family normally had more than 3 children. 
Each family sent at least one child to the monastery in order to show support and respect. 
As members of a national minority, Tibetans have been allowed to have two children, but 
this has nonetheless had a damaging effect on the supply of monks.  
In 1982, Chinese government issued an official document “The Basic Views and Policies 
of Religious Issues in Socialist Period” which ruled that only people over 18 could 
become monks (State Administration for Religious Affairs of P.R.C, 2005). In the past, 
monks were sent to a monastery by their parents when they were very young, aged 7 or 
8. But senior monks think that when children are 18, they have already been influenced 
by the outside world and the Chinese language, making it more difficult for them to 
become accustomed to a monastic life.  
In the same document, the government also asked religious institutions to “resolve their 
own problems” and start “self-management and self-support” (zizhi ziyang) (Ran, 1999; 
State Administration for Religious Affairs of P.R.C, 2005; 2010). This means monasteries 
not only lost traditional sources of huge financial support from the Tibetan government 
and nobles but also were not allowed to solicit large donations from laypeople. They 
were encouraged to participate in economic activities to generate income in support of 
the monastery and their own life. Since then, a large number of monasteries have started 
their ‘self-support’ activities, including commerce, transportation, farming, and 
stockbreeding etc. (Ran, 1999). For example, in the early 1980s Drepung monastery 
started various ventures involving activities such as tourism, selling apples, herding yaks 
and selling butter and yogurt, operating grocery stores and a restaurant, hiring trucks, 
selling tree branches and ceremonial scarves to pilgrims (Goldstein, 1998b: 35). In the 
meantime, the Chinese government also provides some financial subsistence, even 
though this cannot be compared to the traditional support monasteries had obtained. For 
example, each monk receives a minimum subsistence from the government of 120 CNY 
a month. In addition, they still have donations from their families which might also be in 
destitution and patrons of religious services. In all, the ‘self-support’ policy has 
contributed to the transformation of monastic economies and enhanced monks’ 
involvement in economic activities, even though not all monasteries have successful 
experience of running businesses. Meanwhile, monks’ standard of living cannot 
comparable to the period with mass monasticism. According to Adams (1996: 523-525), 
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religious oppression or cultural museumification were not the prior worry for monks, but 
the financial hardship constitute their major concern. 
As discussed previously, in the past being a monk was seen as honourable and a merit 
for both the monk himself and his family. Once a man had become a monk, he could 
enjoy a respectable and relatively prosperous life. Monasteries therefore tended to 
attract men of talent. Nowadays, laypeople do not donate such large amounts of money 
anymore; and monasteries generally lack financial means. Monks have to perform 
religious services for laypeople to earn alms. Thus the monastery is no longer as 
appealing for potential monks as it once was. For most parents, their first choice is to 
send their children to Chinese schools for a better future. Monasteries only have a 
limited number of recruits.  
3.3.2.4 Geographical distribution of Bon 
Generally, Bonpos in Tibet are a significant minority and can be mainly found in some 
eastern parts of the Himalayas (Bell, 1931: 19). According to Kvæ rne (1995: 22), there 
are two main Bonpo areas, the Sharkhog area in eastern Tibet in Sichuan province 
(where my two case study sites are located) and the region of Gyarong, also in Sichuan 
province. In addition, some scattered communities adhering to Bon can be found in 
central and western Tibet, north of Nepal and exiled Tibetan diasporas in India. Mount 
Kailash in southwestern Tibet and Mount Bonri in the southeastern district of Kongpo are 
the major sacred mountains for Bon. 
As for the distribution of Bon monasteries, Bon monasteries are mainly distributed in 
eastern and north-eastern Tibet (Kværne, 1995: 17). After a comprehensive investigation 
of Bon monasteries conducted between 1996 and 2000, the Tibetan scholar Tsering 
Thar (2006b) reported that there were 218 registered Bon monasteries -- that are on the 
official temple list. He estimated that there were nearly 300 temples and monasteries in 
total including unregistered ones on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau. Among them, 40 Bon 
monasteries were located in Aba Prefecture, including my case study monasteries, 






Table 3.1 Distribution of Bon monasteries in Aba Prefecture (case study 
monasteries are highlighted) 
Province Prefecture County  No. of monastery 
Sichuan Aba Aba 4 
Sichuan Aba Ma’erkang 5 
Sichuan Aba Jinchuan 5 
Sichuan Aba Hongyuan 2 
Sichuan Aba Ruo’ergai 5 
Sichuan Aba Songpan 12 
Sichuan Aba Jiuzhaigou 5 
Sichuan Aba Wenchuan 2 
 
Source: from Thar (2006b) 
Tibetan scholar Thar (2006b) also classified two kinds of Bon adherents, pure Bonpos 
and Bon believers who worshipped Buddhism too. Therefore, the population of Bonpos 
is around 40 to 50 thousand but there are 400 to 500 thousand Bon believers (Vevien, 
2005). 
3.4 History and geography of Jiuzhaigou National Park 
My primary case study is located in one of China’s most visited national parks, the 
Jiuzhaigou National Park. This section aims to delineate the localised background 
information of Jiuzhaigou National Park. Section 3.4.1 discusses the special location of 
Jiuzhaigou on the border of Han and Tibetan cultural influences. Following this, Section 
3.4.2 examines the trajectory of Jiuzhaigou, growing to become a well-known tourist 
destination and its characteristics. Brief information about Zharu Monastery, religious 
centrepiece of the park, will be provided in Section 3.4.3. Section 3.4.4 will explore the 
relationship between Jiuzhaigou and nearby Songpan (the site of my secondary case 
study site which is used to contextualise my findings in Jiuzhaigou). 
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3.4.1 On the margins of the Tibetan and Han cultural spheres 
Over half of the Tibetan population lives near the border with ethnic Han areas. These 
regions are almost as large as the TAR. Jiuzhaigou sits on the frontier between Tibetan 
influence from the west and Han influence from the east. Fei Xiaotong, the distinguished 
Chinese sociologist and ethnologist proposed in 1979 the concept of a “Tibet-Yi Corridor” 
which lines the borders between the Han and the many ethnic minorities living west of 
that line drawn from northwest to southwest China (Fei, 1982; Shi, 2005). These ethnic 
groups have special languages, cultures and identities. A similar concept, the “Han-Tibet 
Corridor”, had been named by Stein (1992) to describe the peripheral Tibetan area 
distributed along the border of Sichuan and Gansu provinces on the one side and 
Qinghai Province and Tibet Autonomous Region on the other. This area can be seen to 
have had complicated and intimate relations between the Han and the Tibetans, as is 
copiously evidenced in this thesis. Wang (2010) found that people living in this area were 
influenced by and also despised as being a part of the periphery by both Tibetans and 
Han people. Through his ethnographic research on the Sino-Tibet borderlands in Danba 
County, Sichuan Province, Tenzin (2013) found both culture and identity in this 
peripheral area to be products of hybridisation and creolisation of both Tibetan and Han 
cultural centres. Tibetan people living here are a subgroup of Tibetans called Gyarongwa 
and practicing Bon. They are defined by the author as “non-Tibetan non-Han; Tibetan as 
well as Han” (Tenzin, 2013: 23). Their ethnic identity and religion are frequently disputed 
and not recognised by the big neighbouring Khampa subgroup in the west. Local 
Gyarongwa felt the Bon religion to be a marginalised religion that formed a barrier to 
their claim to an authentic Tibetan identity. In order to diminish prejudice and defend their 
Tibetan identity, local elites constantly emphasise that Bon is a religion of inclusiveness 
and openness and is in harmony with Buddhism. Living in this Han-Tibet Corridor, the 
Jiuzhaigou people I talked to experienced similar issues over the authenticity of their 
ethnic identity (see Chapter 7).   
3.4.2 The making of the Jiuzhaigou National Park 
In order to understand local sense of identity and understandings of religion, it is 
essential to know the nature, characteristics and particularities of Jiuzhaigou National 
Park.  
Jiuzhaigou National Park is a part of Jiuzhaigou County which sits in the north-eastern 
region of Aba Prefecture in Sichuan Province. In Jiuzhaigou National Park, there are four 
Tibetan villages and one Bon monastery (Zharu monastery), and these are my main 
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research areas. At the moment, there are two main routes for tourists to get into 
Jiuzhaigou: one involves a 6 to 8 hour drive from Chengdu to Jiuzhaigou; the other one, 
a 40-minute flight from Chengdu airport to Jiuzhaigou-Huanglong Airport and about a 2 
hour drive from the airport to Jiuzhaigou.  
Jiuzhaigou National Park covers 720 square kilometres. According to the official web site 
for the park: “It is best known for its fabled blue and green lakes, spectacular waterfalls, 
narrow conic karst land forms and its unique wildlife” (Jiuzhaigou National Park, 2014). 
Jiuzhaigou was named a UNESCO World Natural Heritage Site in 1992 and joined the 
Man and Biosphere Conservation Network in 1997. Figures 3.2 – 3.5 from the official 
website of Jiuzhaigou National Park illustrate the magnificent and beautiful scenery in 
Jiuzhaigou which are the main attractions.  
Jiuzhaigou in Chinese means Nine Village Valley, so named because it was home to 
nine Tibetan villages (see Fig. 3.6-3.8 for the images of the villages). Although nine 
villages had been recomposed into four villages, the name is still kept. There are 1189 
residents and 334 families in the park, 95% of who are Tibetans (Jiuzhaigou 
Administration Bureau, 2012a). They were living a farming and herding life before the 
start of tourism.  
Tourism started in Jiuzhaigou in 1984. Since then, Jiuzhaigou has become a mature 
tourist destination. Local residents (including laypeople and monks) have been involved 
in tourism to a greater and greater extent. Tourism could be considered Jiuzhaigou’s 
sole means of living creating huge fortune for them. According to data provided by the 
Jiuzhaigou Administration Bureau (local level government specifically managing the 
Jiuzhaigou; abbreviated as JAB), apart from young people who are studying, almost all 
local people directly or indirectly work in tourism. The majority of locals let Tibetan 
costumes out to, take instant photos for, and sell souvenirs to tourists. In addition, some 
run family inns and hotels. Some local people are working in the JAB. Both women and 
men at different ages have taken part in these various forms of tourism business. For 
those who are not formally employed in public sectors, as a dividend they can split the 
total amount of 7 CNY from each ticket sold (the ticket price is 220 CNY in peak season; 
80 CNY in off-season). According to statistics from the JAB, in 2005 every qualified 
Jiuzhaigou resident 6  got 14,000 CNY dividend (Jiuzhaigou Administration Bureau, 
2012a). In comparison with the whole Aba, in 2005 the average annual income of urban 
and rural residents were respectively 7,830 CNY and 1,881 CNY (Aba Statistics Bureau, 
                                                




2006). The income from the tourism dividend only in Jiuzhaigou is far more than other 
areas in Aba Prefecture, not to mention the income from the tourism business. According 
to the latest statistics (Abazhou.gov.cn, 2010), in 2010 the average annual income of 
urban and rural residents in Aba rose to 15,939 CNY and 3,741 CNY. But according to 
an estimate provided by a government official, the annual income of a Jiuzhaigou 
resident was at least 50,000 to 60,000 CNY.  
Apart from their economic status, their hukou status has changed as well. In 1992, their 
hukou was changed from agricultural to non-agricultural. In 2000, in order to protect the 
environment and sustain tourism, the central and local government required local people 
to convert their farm land into forest. In 2003, Jiuzhaigou people were forced to get rid of 
nearly 2000 livestock, which signified that their traditional ways of production were to be 
completely abandoned. They turned from farmers and herders into ‘urban’ residents, 
even though they still live in the four ‘villages’. Some local people complained to me that 
they do not feel secure without their fields by saying “We are now turned into urban 
residents without any welfare… I would rather be a farmer”; and “Now we lost our land, 
tourism is our only choice”. They felt confused about their role as urban hukou holders 
because they can enjoy neither privileges of those who hold urban hukou nor those who 
hold rural hukou.  
The number of tourists has rapidly increased with local people’s increasing wealth. Since 
2001, Jiuzhaigou has had more than 1 million tourists every year. In 2011 and 2012, 
there were about 2,830,000 (Aba Tourism Bureau, 2012) and 3,860,000 tourists visiting 
Jiuzhaigou respectively (Jiuzhai.com.cn, 2013). The gross revenue from ticket sales 
reached 539,000,000 CNY and 654,000,000 CNY. From 1984 to 2011, Jiuzhaigou 
received about 223.9 million visitors in total. Jiuzhaigou tourism has become the leading 
industry of Aba Prefecture. Mass tourism is the main type of tourism in Jiuzhaigou and 
tourists are mostly Han Chinese. Tourists come to Jiuzhaigou mainly to view the 
beautiful natural sites. Most of them just stay in Jiuzhaigou for one day (Jiuzhaigou 
National Park is open from 07:00 to 18:00) rushing between the waters, forests and 
Tibetan villages. Most tourists are on package tours run by tourist agencies which leave 
only one day for Jiuzhaigou National Park. The ticket price is comparatively high, 310 
CNY including gate ticket and shuttle bus ticket. This also prevents tourists from staying 
longer than one day in the park. Tourists stay outside the park as accommodation is not 
permitted inside. Tourists and residents do not have abundant contact between each 
other. Their encounters are superficial, limited to the ‘businesses’ of tourism.  
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In the following paragraphs, four prominent characteristics of Jiuzhaigou, namely its 
nature as a gated, economically constricted, socially inward-looking and religiously 
confined space, will be examined.  
3.4.2.1 A gated park 
In order to preserve the natural environment and to manage tourism effectively, 
Jiuzhaigou as well as local people are enclosed into a 62-square-kilometre area. Both for 
tourists and local residents, there is only one entrance into the Jiuzhaigou Valley. The 
gate regulations are very strict not only for tourists, but also for the local residents. 
According to the gate policies, the park opens from 7:00 to 18:00 to tourists. Except for 
this period, tourists are not allowed to stay in the park. As to the local residents in 
Jiuzhaigou, a tourist shuttle in the park is their only means of public transportation and 
this only runs in the daytime (7:00-18:00). They are only allowed to use their own 
vehicles in the tourist off-peak time (12:00-14:00) and at night and early morning (from 
18:00 to 7:00 on the following day) to move around in the park or drive out of it. For the 
non-tourist outsiders, it is extremely hard and complicated to go into the park. Anyone 
including relatives and friends of the local residents who visit the park, needs to buy a 
ticket or get a permit from the Administration Bureau in order to get in. Every resident 
has a quota of people they can invite each year. At the moment, it is 3 persons a year.  
These gate regulations cause inconvenience for the life of people living in Jiuzhaigou. 
They are not free to go back home. Some young people who come back only in summer 
and winter holidays are often stopped at the entrance because they  are not be 
recognised by the guards. Friends and relatives of local people are not easily invited 
home. At the same time, tourism development as well as the gate regulations, make the 
park feel as if it is endowed with exclusive social and economic characteristics.  
3.4.2.2 An economically-constricted park 
Tourism is the only economy which local people in Jiuzhaigou can be directly or 
indirectly involved in. Almost all of the locals are working inside the park and could be 
economically self-sufficient with little connection to the outside.  
Not only are the older and middle generations deeply enmeshed in Jiuzhaigou tourism, 
the younger generation is also attracted back home by tourism after graduation from 
college or university. For young people, working in the tourism business back home is a 
comparatively good and easy career choice from which they can get a decent income 
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and flexible working hours. Like their parents, they are running tourist souvenir shops, 
photographing for tourists, renting Tibetan costumes to tourists, working in the 
Jiuzhaigou Administration Bureau, and so on. Contrary to the description of “lazy” and 
“spoiled” Tibetans in Lhasa in Yeh’s (2007b) study, most Tibetans in Jiuzhaigou are 
working hard in tourism.  
In order to efficiently preserve the environment and manage tourism, the JAB has 
adopted a series of strategies of regulating the types of economies in the park. The 
traditional economic activities that were considered damaging environment and causing 
disorders were forbidden, such as food-stalls and yak-photographing. There are fixed 
jobs within the tourism business which are allowed by the JAB. A quota is given to each 
family in the park for renting Tibetan costumes and taking photos for tourists every day. 
Even though working opportunities are exclusively for Jiuzhaigou hukou holders, there 
are some exceptions; for example, local people can rent out their shops or stalls to 
outsiders; the monastery was once leased out (see Chapter 5 for full story).  
In 2013, JAB undertook a project identifying people who could get the Basic Living 
Allowance. For locals, this is a way of officially identifying Jiuzhaigou people. This project 
originated in complaints from Jiuzhaigou people about the current dividend policy. As I 
mentioned earlier, the dividend is the gross of 7 CNY from each ticket sold at Jiuzhaigou. 
In 2012, this dividend was called the Basic Living Allowance to make it clear it was 
meant to help Jiuzhaigou people7 who have no official job and stable monthly salary, 
such as self-employed couriers in the tourism business, students, and the unemployed. 
Workers in public or private organizations like the government sector, national 
corporations and the public sector JAB are not qualified to receive the allowance. Some 
complain that their salary is far lower than that of many self-employed people working in 
the tourism business and saying that they should be given the allowance. People who 
married an outside woman/man tend to think that their spouse and children are 
Jiuzhaigou people as well and it is unfair that they cannot be enlisted in the Basic Living 
Allowance system. In these ways, the current way of identifying and treating Jiuzhaigou 
people is challenged and questioned by local residents. The economic benefit becomes 
one of the elements constituting local people’s sense of their identity. Furthermore, 
whether or not you hold a Jiuzhaigou hukou in Jiuzhaigou has a series of consequences. 
In Jiuzhaigou there are some collective investments which only allow official Jiuzhaigou 
hukou holders to take part in. For example, one of the main issues around the newest 
hotel development project in Jiuzhaigou is to decide who is qualified to buy shares in this 
                                                




project and how many shares each person can buy. This raised difficult questions about 
who a ‘proper’ Jiuzhaigou person is. This project was carried out among four villages. 
The main stakeholder, who is a current allowance receiver, had conducted a poll 
regarding the main question of who could receive the Basic Living Allowance attached to 
this project. They decided that their own and relatives’ families should benefit. They 
asked, for example, if people agreed that their daughters-in-law, sons-in-law and their 
grandchildren should obtain the allowance and if they are happy to see residents with 
official jobs getting the allowance. Getting a hukou in Jiuzhaigou turns out to be like 
obtaining citizenship in another country. They even designed a question in the poll 
asking after how many years of marriage the spouse could start to enjoy the allowance.  
The enclosure of Jiuzhaigou National Park changed the form and nature of the economy 
in Jiuzhaigou. Moreover, the significance of a specific Jiuzhaigou identity has been 
significantly enhanced. 
3.4.2.3 A socially-inward-looking park 
As stated before, tourism provides locals opportunities and privileges. These factors 
greatly influence local people’s decisions on marriage. They prefer to marry someone 
inside so that the couple can enjoy the working opportunities and dividends in 
Jiuzhaigou. At the same time, their families can help each other in various ways inside 
Jiuzhaigou. Women are not very willing to marry a husband from outside. Even when 
they do marry a man from outside, they still keep their hukou registration in the park and 
come back inside to do business. In these ways, Jiuzhaigou people share a lot of 
communal relatives. The hukou of an outside woman who marries an inside man cannot 
be moved to the park.  
3.4.2.4 A religiously-confined space  
In Jiuzhaigou, there are two important sacred sites with regional religious appeal, Zharu 
monastery and Zhayizhaga sacred mountain. Zharu monastery provides religious 
services to laypeople in Jiuzhaigou National Park as well as in some other towns and 
villages nearby. However, the gate of Jiuzhaigou National Park sets an invisible barrier 
between the outside laypeople and the religious sites in Jiuzhaigou. People from nearby 
places do not have easy access to the Zharu Monastery and Mount Zhayizhaga. They 
are only allowed to get into Jiuzhaigou freely on important religious days, such as the 
fifteenth day of every lunar month. The inconveniences caused by the gate regulations 
affect the religious involvement and enthusiasm of outside people for Zharu monastery. 
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Some chooses other monasteries or sacred mountains to which to make pilgrimages and 
devotions instead.  
3.4.3 Locating Zharu Monastery 
As the only religious institution in Jiuzhaigou, it is necessary to locate Zharu Monastery 
within the broader religious sphere, in Jiuzhaigou tourism and in the local area first, to 
better understand the nature and characteristics of the monastery. 
In terms of scale and religious status, Zharu Monastery is a local level monastery in Tibet 
and in Bon. Zharu Monastery itself does not have broad religious appeal and is at the 
lower level of the Bon monastic hierarchy. It has a relatively small ‘parish’ which 
occupies the most part of Zhangzha Township, including Jiuzhaigou National Park, 
Pengfeng Village, Congya Village, Longkang Village, Yazha Village, Shaba Village and 
Zhangzha Village. There are about 6,000 Tibetan and Han Chinese living in this area. In 
the monastery a total of 63 monks are registered at the moment and they all come from 
monastery’s ‘parish’ (see Fig. 3.9-3.12 for images of Zharu Monastery).  
The Zharu Monastery has been reshaped in various ways by the tourism economy. For 
tourism purposes, it is necessary to elaborate on the uniqueness of Zharu Monastery. 
Differing from other Bon monasteries in Tibet, Zharu Monastery has some unique 
characteristics due to its special geographical location in Jiuzhaigou National Park. 
Compared to other Tibetan monasteries, Zharu monastery has more space for 
development allowed by the government. Given the recent tense relationship between 
Tibetan monasteries and the Chinese government, monasteries in Tibet have not been 
encouraged to freely develop and expand by the government. Monastery-related issues 
tend to be seen as headaches by local government officials who fear getting into trouble 
as a result of any major changes to the monastery. Zharu Monastery not only avoids 
much interference from government, but also is publicly encouraged to develop tourism. 
It is regarded as an integral part of Jiuzhaigou National Park and its tourism. It has 
always been considered as one of the important tourist sites in Jiuzhaigou and one 
which needs to be integrated into the whole tourist product in Jiuzhaigou. Cultural 
tourism is propagated as an important strategy for future tourism development in 
Jiuzhaigou (Abazhou.gov.cn, 2012). Zharu monastery is an important component in this 
plan. This means it is easier of access for tourists, and secures easier and bigger funds 
from government for maintenance purposes and tourism development. However, tourism 
has also brought Zharu Monastery disputes and contestations. During 1999-2002, Zharu 
Monastery was firstly included in tourism industry by some Han business men. But the 
religious commodification generated numerous complaints among tourists, local people. 
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The monastery contraction was banned by prefectural and county governments. 
Meanwhile, the governments also ruled that the monastery can only be managed by the 
Monastery Administration Committee. From 2002 to 2005, monastery continued its 
tourism operation. All monks have also involved in similar tourism-related jobs to 
laypeople. All these forms of tourism involvement have played a significant role in 
reshaping Zharu Monastery (this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5) and monks (see 
more detailed discussion in Chapter 7). 
So far Zharu Monastery has gained more prestige and funding from the secular world but 
obtained little increase in renown in the world of Bon. Zharu monastery is trying to 
expand its influence and scale both in the secular and sacred sense by constructing new 
buildings and recruiting more monks (Fig. 3.13 for the construction plan). The expansion 
plan started in around 2006. It was planned to use 12,000,000 CNY for fulfilling the 
whole project. It received 8 million CNY from the JAB. The remaining funding will be 
sought from other sources. They aim to build it into a religious and tourism centre. 
According to the plan, there will be several Bon temples, the biggest stupa in Tibet 
(which has finished, see Chapter 5), a big dormitory for monks, a Bon and Buddhism 
scripture library and a residential care home for the elderly. Functionally, it is hoped that 
Zharu Monastery could become a religious centre, an important cultural tourist site in 
Jiuzhaigou, a Bon school having a complete system of Bon teaching and a home for old 
people in Jiuzhaigou. Tourism will be its main source of income through entrance tickets, 
donations and souvenir sales. The revenue from tourism is planned to be used in 
religious development.  
However, its location also gives it more restrictions compared to other monasteries. It is 
administered and supervised by the Bureau of Religious Affairs and national park related 
government sectors at local, prefectural, provincial and national levels. No one has sole 
authority over the monastery. For example, building a new house in the monastery 
grounds cannot only decided by the JAB. It needs to be approved by the national level 
government sectors.  
As a World Heritage Site, national park and nature reserve, there are a number of laws 
and regulations implemented at national, provincial and prefectural levels for the 
sustainable preservation and management of Jiuzhaigou (UNESCO, 1992). To name 
just the main laws and regulations: the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Protection of Cultural Relics, Law of the People’s Republic of China on Environment 
Protection, Environment Protection, Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on 
Scenic and Historic Areas, Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Nature 
Reserves, Regulations of Sichuan Province on World Heritage Protection, Regulations of 
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Sichuan Province on Scenic and Historic Areas and Regulations on Implementing 
Sichuan Provincial Regulation on World Heritage Protection in Aba Autonomous 
Prefecture. Most of the activities in Jiuzhaigou are strictly controlled under these 
regulations and laws. Most big planning and construction must be reported to and 
approved by four levels of government, namely JAB, Aba Prefecture, Sichuan Province 
and the national government.   
3.4.4 Relations with Anbei Village and Gami Monastery in Songpan 
The previous sections have elaborated on my main case study area, Jiuzhaigou National 
Park. This section will briefly discuss Anbei and its social, cultural, economic and 
religious relations with Jiuzhaigou. In Chapter 4 I will specify the reasons for choosing 
Anbei and Gami Monastery as my supporting case study.   
Geographically, they are neighbouring areas (Fig. 3.14 – 3.16). Anbei is on the only 
tourist route from Chengdu to Jiuzhaigou. Anbei and its surrounding villages in Songpan 
have close social, economic and religious connections with Jiuzhaigou. Songpan is one 
of Aba’s 13 counties and is next to Jiuzhaigou County. It takes about 3 hours to drive 
from Jiuzhaigou National Park to the main settlement in Songpan County. Songpan 
occupies a strategic location that tourists coming from Chengdu must pass through. This 
advantage greatly helps Songpan in developing its tourism industry.  
Generally in the past, Songpan was an economic and religious centre attracting 
Jiuzhaigou people to go and work there and visit on pilgrimage. Songpan has played an 
important role in Tibet’s history, in defence, economics and cultural integration. Many 
Muslims living side by side with Tibetans in Songpan reinforces a sense of its traditional 
role as political, economic and cultural centre. Songpan people have a long tradition of 
trade and herding, but not farming. They exchanged their butter and meat for salt, grain 
and tea with outsiders. According to my respondents, Jiuzhaigou people once worked in 
Songpan for money. In terms of religion, Anbei has always been a religious centre for the 
surrounding area, first because there is a very important Bon sacred mountain behind it, 
Mount Xiao Xitian. Many Jiuzhaigou pilgrims make devotions here. Secondly, there are 
some educated and learned monks in Gami Monastery who have attracted many young 
monks and novices to come to learn from them, one of whom is now abbot of Zharu 
Monastery, Jiuzhaigou. Thirdly, Gami Monastery is the chief monastery for the nearby 
monasteries. It holds many big religious ceremonies every year. 
However, the economic and religious positions of the two monasteries have changed 
after tourism. Songpan people now go to Jiuzhaigou seeking work and business 
opportunities (see Chapter 5 and 7). As for religion, as tourism has grown quickly in 
Jiuzhaigou, a new counter-directional religious move from Anbei to Jiuzhaigou has 
sprung up. Due to the shortage of Jiuzhaigou monks to fulfil religious services, the 
demand for monks in Jiuzhaigou attracted many monks from Anbei to perform religious 
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rituals and scripture chanting for laypeople both outside and in Zharu Monastery.  
3.5 Conclusion  
Modernisation in Tibet is largely a state project. The development logic of minorities and 
the Han/minorities division have served as the guidelines for dealing with minority issues 
in China. According to the Han/minorities division and development logic, the backward, 
uncivilised minorities need the support of the advanced, civilised Han to achieve 
modernisation like the Han. Minority policies are supposed to strengthen integration 
between the Han and the minorities. However, the Han/minorities division is reinforced 
and the distinct ethnic identity of the minorities is enhanced. State education and tourism 
provide two examples of the ways in which ethnic identities of the minorities have been 
strengthened rather than diluted. 
I argued that the politically constructed category of minzu is essentially problematic in its 
usage, a point that has been ignored both in and out of academia. The problematic 
usage of minzu has demonstrated and further reinforced minority/Han division, the 
othering practices. Each ethnic minority is now having a newly constructed and shared 
panethnic identity: shaoshu minzu. The ideas about minzu and shaoshu minzu have 
been deeply woven into the identity system of both the ethnic minorities and the Han. 
Both minorities and Han people’s perceptions of self and of each other have been 
shaped by the Han/minority division.  
For the minorities in China, modernisation has ethnic implications. It is associated with 
the Han, or hanified society. It has deep bonds with the Han conceptually and practically, 
because modernisation in minority areas is initiated, organized, regulated and managed 
by the majority, ‘advanced’ Han.  
The development and modernisation discourse and practices in minority areas also 
provided chances for minorities to promote their particular ethnic identity and culture. 
Economic modernisation might reduce cultural differences between ethnic groups, but 
these cultures have yet to be homogenized or eliminated (Mackerras, 2003: 76). From 
Mackerras’ (2003: 46) long term observation of Tibet from 1980 to 2002, Tibet has 
experienced a strong cultural revival. 
What also needs to be emphasised (as is also evident in Chapters 5-7) is that minorities 
and Tibetans are not simply passive receivers of the results of modernisation, they also 




Chapter 4 Methodological issues 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses the methodological approach employed in the thesis.  As 
Silverman (2005: 120) argues, “Decisions about methodology are always theoretically 
loaded”. The methodological approach adopted here responds to the recognition 
(explored in Chapter 2) that there is a need for more in-depth, qualitative research at the 
micro-scale for understanding patterns of religious change in the context of economic 
modernisation. In this research, for obtaining in-depth understandings of the changing 
patterns of religious belief, religious practices and religious institution at the local level, I 
employed ethnographic research methods within a case study design to generate a 
unique body of first-hand qualitative data. Conventional methods of survey based 
quantitative research were judged to be inadequate to the task of reflecting the meanings 
attributed to the religious space, religious practices, and religious identity which I was 
interested in.  
During the research process, I encountered a variety of methodological challenges, 
which is common in forms of ethnographic research. These included challenges 
accessing informants (in part due to the sensitivity of discussing religious issues in this 
context), my positionality influencing fieldwork, and the fieldwork in turn reshaping my 
understanding of religion and ethnic identity. This chapter provides discussion of (and 
critical reflection on) the methodological approaches and techniques that were adopted 
for this research. The chapter is organised as follows. I begin by discussing issues of 
research design, with particular attention to the choice of a qualitative approach and the 
decision to use a case study design (Section 4.2). Following this, I will present the 
relevant methods of data collection, and the process of data analysis (Section 4.3). In 
Section 4.4, the ethical issues that arose in the research process and the reflections on 
my positionality will be considered.  In the conclusion (Section 4.5), I will draw out some 
further methodological insights I obtained through the research process.  
4.2 Research design 
As Bradshaw and Stratford (2010: 69) assert, “Research that is poorly conceived results 
in research that is poorly executed and in findings that do not stand up to scrutiny.” This 
section addresses the choices that were made to develop a research design that would 
best facilitate achieving the research aims while also being practical within the practical 
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constraints of doctoral research. In specific, I will explain why a case study approach was 
chosen (Section 4.2.1), the rationale for choosing Jiuzhaigou as the primary case study 
area (with Anbei providing important context for comparison) (Section 4.2.2), and how I 
accessed and sampled research participants (Section 4.2.3). 
4.2.1 Use of case study and qualitative method 
By comparing different ways of researching religious change, case study method was 
found most effective and plausible in accessing data and creating new and pertinent 
understanding of the dynamics of religious change in contemporary Tibet. There are 
three reasons for undertaking case study approach. Firstly, case study method is 
generally acknowledged enabling researchers to “retain holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events” which cannot be obtained from theory or a large-
sample study (Yin, 2003: 2; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Baxter, 2010). Secondly, different from 
large-scale quantitative research which has been widely used in examining religious 
change in the field of religious studies, a case study approach aims to provide a detailed 
focus on the underlying social processes within a particular context. The third reason 
concerns the practical aspect. There is little readily-used source of survey data on 
Tibetan religion. Case study is more practical and easier to handle for generating first-
hand data.  
Rather than multiple case studies, I adopted single case study for three reasons. Firstly, 
my primary case study area Jiuzhaigou is a revelatory case which is one of the first 
explorations into contemporary Tibetans’ everyday religious practices and belief. As I 
stated in chapter 1, this provides grounded information onto once obscure and biased 
understanding of Tibetan people’s religious practices and beliefs. Secondly, even though 
Jiuzhaigou is not a typical community in Tibet in the sense that it is one of a few Tibetan 
communities that is richer than other Tibetan places and developing tourism, it is 
because of its frontier location to tourism, modernisation and hanification that has 
accelerated Jiuzhaigou’s religious change and makes religious change easier to identify. 
The dramatic change makes Jiuzhaigou an ideal case for capturing the relationships 
between religion and modernisation in Tibet. Thirdly, for minimising the 
misrepresentation, Anbei was chosen for providing context for comparison and various 
sources of data have also been adopted.   
As I stated before, Tibetans’ religious belief and practices cannot be well detected by 
simply counting the numbers and calculating the percentages. Qualitative approach was 
set as the central approach to my thesis. Recently qualitative method has experienced 
general renaissance in studies on religion after long term dominance of quantitative 
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method. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, much research on secularisation and 
religious change has mainly taken a macro-scale, quantitative approach. This method 
potentially provide general understandings of large scale shifts and relationships 
between variables, but are less effective at explaining the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of particular 
phenomena. One of its limitations is its incapability of interrogating the small scale social-
cultural phenomena and providing highly nuanced, dynamic and detailed nature of 
human practices and meanings. Thus, quantitative method is of limited use for exploring 
the key issues of interest for this thesis, which involve issues of religious belief and the 
meanings of religious practices and religious spaces. Overall, qualitative approaches 
have more potential to elucidate the meanings, processes and relationships that are of 
importance for this research (Marks, 2004: 219).  
Specifically, this research adopted an ethnographic approach which combined in-depth 
interviews and observation/participant observation as methods of data collection. This 
choice was made because this study needed the researcher to spend time immersed in 
the everyday life of people in the research sites, investigating their life routines, everyday 
religious practices and the meanings of the religious (see Section 4.3 for a more detailed 
discussion of these specific techniques of data collection and how they were deployed).  
In Chapter 3, I provided a brief introduction to the primary case study site, Jiuzhaigou. I 
was partially inspired to conduct doctoral research here based on prior research 
experience that I had gained in this area. I first developed an interest in Jiuzhaigou 
during fieldwork in 2009 for a master’s dissertation project on general impacts of tourism 
on religion (which did not go deep into the research questions I explored in this thesis). 
Before that I had never been to Jiuzhaigou, even though my hometown, Maerkang 
County, the capital county of Aba Prefecture, was very “near” Jiuzhaigou (it takes about 
7 hours to drive from Maerkang to Jiuzhaigou). Prior to 2009, Jiuzhaigou was only known 
to me as one of the most important tourist sites in China. There is a widely known saying 
in China complimenting the beauty of Jiuzhaigou’s lakes: “There is no need to see 
waters when you come back from Jiuzhaigou”.  It means once you had seen 
Jiuzhaigou’s lakes, you would not want to see other bodies of water, which will be less 
beautiful. After two periods of fieldwork in 2009, it was not only Jiuzhaigou’s beautiful 
waters that had caught my attention, but also the local people’s ambivalent feelings 
toward culture preservation and economic development that generated a sense of 
research curiosity. It is this curiosity which has been suggested by Phillips and Johns 
(2012: 190) for its efficiency in generating “new ideas and lines of enquiry” that has 
driven me to conduct my doctoral research and to be an “explorer” (see 2012: 188-207) 
on the familiar and strange land of Jiuzhaigou (it was strange because of my previous 
limited knowledge on Tibetan religion and culture and Jiuzhaigou). As a Tibetan 
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researcher, I felt an urgent need to shift the research focus from the ancient traditions, 
texts (although of course I acknowledge that they are always very important part of 
Tibetan culture) to the contemporary situation of Tibetan society and culture. Reflecting 
what Tibetan people are currently doing and thinking is as significant as wandering 
through historical materials and sacred texts. Thus in my PhD research, I decided to 
significantly extend and deepen my investigation and to keep on exploring the current 
situation of Tibetan religion, an integral part of Tibetan culture. My master’s research (an 
investigation which I now realise was quite rudimentary compared to the more 
theoretically and empirically ambitious project I have completed here) only touched on a 
small portion of the dimensions of religious change. A number of questions and intriguing 
issues were waiting to be addressed, such as the meanings of various religious spaces 
for local people and tourists, the embodied religious practices, the relationships between 
everyday religious life and non-religious life, the ways in which local people of different 
generations and genders confronting the economic modernisation, negotiating religious 
needs and economic demands, adapting their tradition. Research in Jiuzhaigou, I felt, 
could provide a broad in-depth and fresh insight into the contemporary social-cultural 
condition of Tibet.  
Bearing in mind the issues I mentioned above, the final formation of my research aims 
and questions had been accomplished through rounds of negotiations and amendments 
during the processes of literature review, fieldwork, data analysis and writing up. During 
fieldwork, I found that monastery and home were the two most important religious 
spaces for Jiuzhaigou people. To provide greater clarity, I chose to give particular 
attention to these two types of space in my research design. As I elaborate in Section 
4.2.3 and 4.3 I specifically built an intergenerational perspective into the research both 
through my sampling of respondents and my approach to designing interview questions. 
However, the authenticity issue (which I discussed theoretically in Chapter 2) is a theme 
that emerged saliently in the fieldwork and the process of data analysis. In the first 
fieldwork, the minority-majority ethnic issue arose and was further assured by a number 
of literatures on China’s minorities and their development. Thus, although some of the 
issues discussed in Chapters 5-7 were anticipated prior to the research, there were also 
unanticipated themes and dimensions that emerged.  
4.2.2 Choice of case study sites 
I chose Jiuzhaigou National Park as my primary case study and Anbei Village (see Fig. 
3.14) as a supporting case study to explore the religious change in current Tibet. The 
focus was on the four villages (Shuzheng Village, Zezhawa Village, Zharu Village and 
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Heye Village) and a Zharu Bon Monastery in Jiuzhaigou. Anbei Village and the Gami 
Bon Monastery were chosen to provide some comparisons from a site with linkages to 
Jiuzhaigou but which is rarely directly affected by tourism. Thus even though I conducted 
research at two sites, I do not portray this research as a systematic comparative study. 
Rather, Anbei served to further my understandings of religious change in Jiuzhaigou 
itself. Tibetan Bon people in Anbei have had close (and changing) relationships with 
Jiuzhaigou over the years (as discussed in Chapter 3, and in the empirical chapters), 
and as such the insights and experiences of people there helped me to understand 
Jiuzhaigou’s position within the region and the perceptions of other Tibetans.  
There are three specific reasons to choose these two places. Firstly, these two places 
are located in Tibetan-Han culturally bordering area, which renders tremendous 
economic, cultural interactions between Tibetans and the Han. These cases are really 
helpful in demonstrating Tibetan-Han relations. Secondly, geographically these two 
places are very close (see Chapter 3). Thirdly, these two places have a long history of 
religious, cultural and economic connections (see Chapter 3). They have very similar 
religious and cultural traditions. People in both places are Amdo Tibetans8. Bon has 
been the dominant religion in these places for centuries.  
Before starting fieldwork in 2011, Anbei Village and Gami Monastery were not on my 
original plan. Instead, I initially considered using the Langyi Bon Monastery and its 
surrounding Amdo Tibetan villages in Wa’erma Township in Aba County, to see if it is an 
appropriate site to provide wider context for my study of Jiuzhaigou. However, when I 
went back for fieldwork in 2011, I was told by one of my friends who was working in Aba 
County that it was not a good time to conduct fieldwork there, especially about religion. 
At that time, Aba County was a focal point of government surveillance, because there 
have been dozens of self-immolations there in recent years which are primarily focused 
on the Tibetan Buddhist monastery Kirti. The Kirti Rinpoche, the head of Kirti monastery 
is in exile in India. In the whole Aba Prefecture, 44 out of 131 self-immolations have 
occurred since 2009 (International Campaign for Tibet, 2014). When I was back in 2011, 
I was told that in order to prevent more immolation from happening, the government 
working groups have been sent there to each monastery to do patriotic education. The 
internet was cut. All foreign tourists were forbidden to get into Aba County as well as 
many other Tibetan counties. Considering the tense religious and political situation in 
Aba County, I decided to not use this site. After many conversations with Jiuzhaigou 
                                                
8 Amdo Tibetan is a branch of Tibetans who mainly lives in northeast part of Tibetan area, 




people, Anbei Village emerged as an appropriate site (in fact, in retrospect, far more 
appropriate than Wa’erma Township) due to Jiuzhaigou and Anbei having had very close 
relations in religious, cultural and economic aspects.  
Anbei has 53 households and 363 people, most of whom are Tibetan Bon believers. 
Most of the women and older generation in Anbei Village spoke no or little Chinese. 
Their fluency in Chinese was far less than the norm amongst Jiuzhaigou people. Their 
overall education level was much lower than Jiuzhaigou. Most people had finished only 
primary school or junior middle school. Children and teenagers went to village level and 
county level schools. Unlike children in Jiuzhaigou, their parents could not afford to send 
them to big cities for schooling.   
People living here were less influenced by and connected to the outside world compared 
to Jiuzhaigou. Farming and herding were still one of their main sources of income. In 
June 2012, some households of Anbei started a tourism business which is managed by 
a large Chinese corporation. One room of each household was rented to the company. 
The Han tour guides pretended to be Tibetans selling silver products to tourists.  
Religion remained vibrant even though it did not have as many magnificent religious 
buildings as Jiuzhaigou people had. The domestic religious rituals were seemingly also 
less frequently practiced than Jiuzhaigou, but Anbei people did more pilgrimages to the 
sacred mountains. Older generation regularly attend the Gami Monastery for doing 
prayer. Young people expressed having more knowledge of religious belief and practices. 
Some of them chose to go to the monastery. The Gami Monastery played an important 
role in maintaining the religious atmosphere in Anbei. Many monks lives in the 
monastery and are ready to fulfil laypeople’s religious demands. 
4.2.3 Access and sampling 
Based on my prior experience working in the area, it was relatively straightforward for me 
to gain good access to Jiuzhaigou. In Jiuzhaigou, I had several close contacts. Apart 
from this, I had friends and relatives working and living in Jiuzhaigou and surrounding 
areas. Two friends are residents of Jiuzhaigou and Tibetan Bon believers. As Jiuzhaigou 
is not open to outsiders, I needed to apply for a permit from JAB. I presented JAB the 
information sheet for my research, my student identity and the confirmation letter of my 
scholarship status from the Chinese Scholarship Council. I also verbally introduced 
myself and explained my research. I was accompanied by my cousin to process the 
whole application, which helped make the process faster. Then I was issued a permit 
allowing me to freely enter Jiuzhaigou during my fieldwork. I was asked to directly 
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contact the Department of Science and Research of JAB if I had any problems and 
inquiries in my fieldwork. In exchange I was asked to work on a small cultural planning 
project. I spent seven days in the department conducting this project, during which I 
established close relationships with some JAB officials and locals. Through these 
acquaintances, I was introduced to more local people, monks and officials.  
In relation to Anbei Village, I did not have prior acquaintances with people there before 
the fieldwork. I asked two of my participants in Jiuzhaigou to introduce me to their friends 
in Anbei and in Gami Monastery. They did so, and I was treated in a friendly and 
welcoming way. I succeeded in finding a local family to live with. Through this family, I 
had opportunities to get to know more local people and to attend local events. This 
snowball method is potentially well suited for gaining trust of the potential interviewees, 
particularly when aspects of the research can be sensitive.  
However, there were also various difficulties in being fully accepted by the local people. 
Firstly, my Tibetan dialect differs from theirs. This created some distance between us. In 
order to be better embraced by the community, I learnt some local expressions and used 
them in my conversations with local people. It appeared that this was a successful 
strategy. Secondly, during the fieldwork I attended many get-togethers with local people 
to establish rapport. Social relations sometimes are established through close 
interactions. To be accepted by the young people, I was invited by my friends to attend 
informal settings of local people, such as dinners and karaoke parties. Sometimes local 
people’s hospitality made drinking (barley wine or beer) unavoidable (as it would have 
been perceived as rude to decline). Thirdly, political tensions made them cautious to talk 
to any stranger. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, it is not encouraged that religious issues be 
talked about openly in China. In Tibet, the religious professionals (i.e. monks and nuns) 
are the main force in support of independence. Cases of self-immolation conducted in 
the name of Tibetan independence and appeals for the return of the Dalai Lama made 
religious topics even more sensitive to discuss. In order to alleviate their suspicion, I 
always stressed the social scientific side of my research and my interest in Tibetan 
culture rather than the issue of Tibetan independence. Considering my safety and my 
participants’ safety, I rarely initiated talk about issues such as self-immolations (which 
had not taken place in Anbei or Jiuzhaigou) with my interviewees.  
The sample of informants I developed included Bon monks and Bon laypeople living in 
the research sites. They provided direct insight into their daily lives and religious 
practices. In order to obtain a full picture of the same “reality”, different people’s 
perspectives were considered based on characteristics such as gender, age, and 
occupation. Other people who work or temporarily live in Jiuzhaigou and Anbei, such as 
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tourists, government officials, migrating monks, Han Chinese etc. were also investigated. 
They provided some background information and their opinions about religious practices 
and beliefs in the study areas.  
When sampling participants, I sought to include both men and women of diverse ages. 
Using purposive sampling approach rather than random sampling approach was largely 
determined by my research concern on intergenerational transmission of religion and the 
nature of different patterns of religious practices and beliefs between people with 
different genders, generations and occupations. For example, local people who work in 
JAB might have different attitudes toward tourism and religion, because of their particular 
education background, personal interests and relations to government. Although it was 
not a random sample, my participant observation helped corroborate the findings from 
the interviews.  
Specifically, I have conducted 71 semi-structured interviews in Jiuzhaigou and 26 semi-
structured interviews in Anbei from three generations (see Table 4.1; I break these down 
in greater detail in Section 4.3.2). Originally I had hoped to capture generational change 
by conducting interviews based on the family unit, which means to interview a 
grandparent, a parent and a child from each family. In practice, however, this proved to 
be difficult because firstly there are not many families with three generations and 
secondly for various reasons (language, shyness, unwillingness etc.) it was hard to get 
all three generations together to participate. Thus, I instead included a range of younger, 
middle, and older generation in the sample to explore the generational nature of change. 
This strategy meant that people who did not live in a household with grandchild, parent, 
and grandparent present were not excluded, nor were people who wanted to participate 











Table 4.1 Interviewees by location, gender and generation group 
Jiuzhaigou 
 
Lay women: 23  
Older: 4; middle: 8; younger: 11  
Lay men: 28 
Older: 4; middle: 9; younger: 15 
Monks: 15 
Older: 1; middle: 8; younger: 6 
Government officials: 5 
Anbei 
 
Lay women: 7 
Older: 2; middle: 2; younger: 3 
Lay men: 7 
Older: 2; middle: 2; younger: 3 
Monks: 10 
Middle: 4; younger: 6 (including 3 young 
novices) 
Government officials: 2 
 
4.3 Methods of data collection and analysis 
This section discusses the specific data generating methods and techniques which will 
be used in my research. I will describe the ways in which data were gathered and 
generated through participant observation (Section 4.3.1), in-depth interviews (Section 
4.3.2), archival/documentary research and web searching (Section 4.3.3). I will also 
provide a discussion of the process of qualitative data analysis that I employed (Section 
4.3.4). 
I stayed in Jiuzhaigou for fieldwork for 8 months in total. This was divided into several 
different periods. As I mentioned above, my first fieldwork in Jiuzhaigou, for a Master’s 
degree, took place over eight weeks in 2009. I do not reproduce this earlier data in this 
thesis; rather, I discuss this fieldwork period here because it provided both important 
background information for this research and allowed me to work quickly in the field 
when I revisited Jiuzhaigou to conduct doctoral research.  By contacting some of my 
friends in Jiuzhaigou, I succeeded to live in a friend’s home in Jiuzhaigou National Park. 
During this period of fieldwork, I conducted preparatory investigations of my case area, 
aiming to get familiar with local residents (laypersons and monks) and officials in JAB, 
and to gain general information about research subjects. Because of my Tibetan cultural 
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background, I successfully engaged in the everyday life of the field site relatively easily. 
By participating in the daily lives of Bon laypeople (including helping them with tourism 
business, attending some of their religious practices and short-term work for Jiuzhaigou 
National Park Administration) I attained detailed information, for instance, regarding the 
nature of people’s religious practices both before and after tourism development, and 
how have their roles changed.   
For my doctoral research I planned to spend further six months in the region of my field 
sites for data collection. However because of the rules of the Chinese Scholarship 
Council, it was necessary to break this into two discrete periods (the Council does not 
allow funded students to spend this many months consecutively in China for their 
research). I broke the fieldwork period into two trips in the summers of 2011 and 2012. 
The reason for choosing summer was to allow me to have access to young students who 
only stay at home during summer and winter holidays. Summer holiday was better firstly 
because some residents in Jiuzhaigou leave for other places like Chengdu to have 
holiday in the winter, and also because there are many more tourists in summer which 
provides good chance for seeing tourist-host interactions. Splitting into the fieldwork into 
two periods also gave me the opportunity and time to re-evaluate my research plan after 
the first fieldwork period and to intentionally seek out data that I realised I would need to 
complement and extend the analysis I had started to develop.  
In summer 2011 I conducted a period of fieldwork in Jiuzhaigou and Anbei. This period 
was very important for me to be re-familiarise myself with the fieldwork setting in 
Jiuzhaigou. I gained a deeper understanding of the socio-cultural-economical 
background of two research areas. I also managed to live with a local family taking part 
in their daily lives and religious practices. I did interviews with a sample of both laypeople 
and monks. People in Jiuzhaigou quickly recognised me as the young woman 
conducting research fieldwork two years ago. Someone had even kept business card I 
gave to them in 2009. I told them I was not in Sun Yat-sen University anymore, but doing 
a PhD in University of Leeds, UK. They were surprised and often gave me compliments 
for studying at a foreign university (which is also happened in Anbei). In this period, I did 
25 interviews with laypeople and 10 interviews with monks and also conducted many 
informal chats with local people. I also observed their everyday life, religious and non-
religious practices.  
My next trip to the fieldsites was in summer 2012, spending approximately 8 weeks in 
Jiuzhaigou and 5 weeks in Anbei. Given my previous experiences in the region, this 
period of fieldwork felt like the most purposeful and efficient. Most of the people of 
Jiuzhaigou knew me as a Maerkang Tibetan girl, a UK student and a researcher. People 
97 
 
who I had not met directly before often had already heard my time. I would clearly figure 
out what I need and how to do. In this period, I managed to conduct 40 interviews with 
laypeople and 15 interviews with monks (45 minutes – 1.5 hour long). Seven government 
officials were also interviewed. I attended three public religious practices and several 
private religious practices, including a funeral, a wedding ceremony, a monastery ritual 
and some familial rituals in Jiuzhaigou. Unfortunately, I did not see any public religious 
practices in Anbei during that time because most of their public religious events were 
conducted during winter and there were no weddings or funerals held during my stay in 
Anbei. But I have been told the details of some important public religious events, such as 
Mazhi Festival, wedding and funeral from interviews and talks. In addition, I also took 
part in some private religious practices like familial chanting. 
4.3.1 Participant observation 
The data gathered from interviews were supplemented with participant observation.   
Participant observation can “provide unreplicable insight into the processes and 
meanings that sustain and motivate social groups” (Herbert, 2000: 550). Through 
participation and observation, detailed and deeply embedded experiences and meanings 
will be easily enacted. By examining and contrasting what people say and what people 
do (the relationship between discourse and practice), participant observation allows for 
observation of both discourse and practice and could double-check the second-hand 
data. Another advantage of participant observation is that it is neither overly indulgent in, 
nor excessively detached from the research field (Van Maanen, 1988).  
In order to explore the nature of religious change in detail, this research adopted 
ethnographic techniques to interrogate everyday life, religious practices, and the elusive 
nature of religion of particular social groups with richness and complexity. To minimise 
some of potential criticisms that can be made of research that relies on participant 
observation alone, different data sources including interviews and documentary sources 
(discussed in more detail below) were used to allow for a form of triangulation (Flick, 
2004). During the process of data collection and emergent analysis, I frequently 
communicated my ideas and discoveries with participants, my peers and supervisors to 
enhance reflexivity about my observation and representation.  
In comparison to interviewing or documentary analysing, participant observation provides 
a different way of interpreting and presenting data which can in some ways be more 
grounded, concrete and intensive (Watson and Till, 2010). It allows the researcher to 
observe and capture non-verbal behaviours and practices which are not accountable and 
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articulable from words or texts. Through observation, people’s daily routines, behaviours, 
actions, conversations and interactions can be examined in greater detail than possible 
with simply oral accounts gathered from interviews. Additionally, because the research in 
some ways gets to experience some of the same events and share feelings, participant 
observation can provide multiple viewpoints and provide deeper insights into people’s 
retrospective accounts which may be partial, incomplete or misleading. 
The term participant observation can obscure the varying balances between 
‘participation’ and ‘observation’ that can occur in different research projects, or at 
different times during the same research project (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2011: 19-40). 
More active forms of participation were mainly used to understand everyday lives, 
patterns and meanings of religious practices of laypeople in the fieldsites. As I stated 
earlier, I lived in a local people’s home and attended their family activities, such as doing 
household chores, helping with tourism businesses and participating in their religious 
practices. I became acquainted with more people when I was introduced into their social 
networks attending more ceremonies and gatherings, such as weddings, funerals, 
religious rituals, dinners, Karaoke parties. Generally, young people were comparatively 
easier to approach. This is probably because I was of a similar age as my young 
participants, which meant that we had certain common memories, interests and attitudes 
to share. Specifically in my fieldwork, I participated in the Bon laypersons’ everyday lives 
through attending activities of men and women of different generations and attending 
their religious practices (pilgrimages, rituals, rites, ceremonies and daily religious 
behaviours such as praying, chanting).  
Non-participant observation was used to study religious and non-religious activities of 
Bon monks of the two monasteries (Zharu and Gami). Monks normally live in isolated 
monasteries. It was impracticable for me as a woman to live in the monastery. Therefore, 
I lived in the villages and visited monasteries every day from dawn until dark. Jiuzhaigou 
monks live at home, but not at the monastery (see Chapter 7 for the explanation and 
discussion), so I had more chances to meet them through various public and private 
events. Monks from Gami Monastery often came to Jiuzhaigou to conduct religious 
services. I got to know some Gami monks on these occasions. We chatted about various 
things, such as the origin of Bon, the history of Tibetans, the relationships between Bon 
and my Buddhist sect, Nyingmapa, and the religious relationships between Jiuzhaigou 
and Songpan, and many other issues related to religion.   
In addition, I used observation to record the religious settings of various religious 
practices. These included physical settings such as monastery and home, as well as 
religious events such as home prayer and the village rite  (these kinds of public religious 
99 
 
ceremonies carried out are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5). Table 4.2 below 
provides a summary of the observational research I conducted during fieldwork. 
During observation, both shorter and longer field notes were written to assist my 
constant reflections about research process and my role and position as a researcher 
and friend.  
Although participant observation has many advantages, one does not straightforwardly 
move from being an outsider to an insider. The process of employing participant 
observation involves negotiating complex identities and relationships between the 
researcher and the researched (Dawson, 2010). In carrying out participant observation, I 
inevitably encountered some difficulties. 






Different religious events (e.g. public and private rituals, religious 
ceremonies, pilgrimage); embodied religious practices 
Time; location; people and their appearance; organization; procedure; 
interactions; social relations; behaviour; environment 
Religious 
spaces 
Temple, monastery, home, shrine, sacred mountain etc.  
Location; Layout; shape; style; space users; ways of using space 
Everyday life 
Religious and non-religious daily routines of each family members 
(grandparents; parents; children); their engagement in tourism 
 
First and foremost, gaining trust in a relatively sensitive place was not easy at the 
beginning. Suspicion was often apparent during my first contacts with local people. 
Previously I mentioned that the pressurised religious and political atmosphere increased 
the difficulties of gaining trust and discussing religious issues. People often felt cautious 
around me at the beginning. I was even asked “are you sent by the JAB?” Jiuzhaigou 
people did not have a good relationship with the JAB because of many conflicting 
opinions on Jiuzhaigou management. When they heard I was conducting research, they 
thought I was a spy from JAB to collecting their complaints. To ease their suspicions, I 
showed them my student ID and my information sheet. My friends in Jiuzhaigou also 
helped to explain my role and fieldwork to local people. My name was quickly spread 
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among many villagers. As time went by, they gradually trusted me as a researcher. Local 
people were also cautious in talking about religious issues. In order to decrease their 
suspicion, I normally directly showed my information sheet and stated that my purpose 
was to investigate everyday life and local culture (rather than Tibetan politics). This to a 
great extent alleviated their doubts. My identity as an Aba resident and a Tibetan also 
helped considerably in gaining their trust. My hometown is Maerkang County, which is 
near Jiuzhaigou, and hence we shared a place attachment to Aba Prefecture. Most of 
them had known and been to my hometown. My Tibetan identity further let them treat me 
as an insider, which encouraged them to share Tibetan things (religion, culture, history) 
with me and created common ground. My actual knowledge on Tibetan culture and 
religion, my Sichuan dialect and my life experience in Aba helped me to start 
conversations and to find topics fluently. Therefore, talking about religious issues was 
like sharing similar feelings with someone who understands. For example, I compared 
the substantial number of religious buildings in Jiuzhaigou to to the situation in my 
hometown (which has far fewer religious buildings), and asked them to express their 
views and feelings on the contrast and change.   
Another technique I used to reduce the sensitivity in my interviews and chats with local 
people was to use the term “xinyang” (belief) to replace “zongjiao” (religion). In Tibetan, 
there is no direct equivalent to the concept of religion (or zongjiao), superstition (mixin) 
and nationality (minzu). The Tibetan language even contained no word for Buddhism. 
Tibetans, traditionally, did not think of themselves as Buddhists (Stein, 1972: 192; 
Kvaerne, 1972: 22; Bishop, 1993: 17). In Chinese, “zongjiao” and “xinyang” to some 
extent are interchangeable. When I spoke about “xinyang”, they could understand it 
refers to their Bon religion. Most of the time “zongjiao” appears in political discourses and 
government documents other than daily discourses, so speaking about “zongjiao” has 
more formal and political implications. If I wanted to say “zongjiao”, I normally used 
“zongjiao wenhua” (religious culture). When religion is connected with culture, the 
political connotations of “zongjiao” are greatly decreased.  
Secondly, participant observation involved issues of power relations between the 
researchers and the participants (Valentine, 1997). The researcher has ‘analytical power’ 
which allows her to determine the direction of fieldwork, what to ask, what to present and 
how to interpret data (Rose, 1997: 311). In my fieldwork, power was present in 
relationships between me and participants. My identity as a PhD student created some 
obstruction for my communication with local people in the first place. I was regarded by 
the local people as a knowledgeable person who has a certain kind of authority. 
Sometimes I encountered remarks such as, “You are a PhD. You must know much more 
than us.” In actuality, many people had little idea what a PhD actually is. It was often 
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assumed that I would have complete knowledge of Tibetan religion and culture. The 
researcher-researched relationship could influence the ways in which data are produced 
or presented. To lessen the differences, I stressed their local knowledge which I do not 
have. In my self-introductions, I always stated this as well as my wish to learn about local 
religion and culture.  
4.3.2 In-depth interview 
Qualitative interviewing can reveal people’s knowledge, views, understandings and 
interpretations which can be hard to acquire by observation alone (Dunn, 2000). 
Therefore, in addition to observation, in-depth interviews were also an essential method 
for examining the Bon believers’ religious practices and their attitudes to religion through 
their narratives and discourses.  
To generate high quality data of this kind, it is necessary “to talk interactively with people, 
to ask them questions, to listen to them, to gain access to their accounts and 
articulations, or to analyse their use of language and construction of discourse” (Mason, 
2002: 64). Drawing on the interview strategies proposed by Mason (2002: 68-73), my 
interview questions and topics were designed to ensure that I was collecting data that 
would contribute to achieving my research aims.  
Questions of sampling for interviews are based on the nature of the research projects on 
which gender, age, class, ethnicity, race and other forms of difference have bearings 
(Valentine, 1997). Based on knowledge gained from my previous fieldwork experience 
and my personal experience as a Buddhist believer, I designed the research knowing 
that gender and generational difference could to a great extent reflect the changes in 
religious belief and practices (as stated in Section 4.2.3). Based on generation and 
gender difference, I classified my potential interviewees of laypeople into 6 groups 
(women and men, each from three broad generational groups), and for monks into 3 
groups (three generations) (see Table 4.1). As discussed in Chapter 2, defining a 
‘generation’ in practical terms can be a complex process.  I defined three generational 
groups based on different significant patterns of life experience related to changing 
patterns of education and also the timing of the development of the tourism economy in 
Jiuzhaigou. I classified the three generational groups as follows:  
Younger generation: This group consisted of people age 16-35, who were born around 
the time that tourism was introduced, and thus have lived most or all of their lives during 
the period of tourism growth. In Jiuzhaigou they tend to be well-educated and are 
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becoming a new force of tourism development. They normally have boarding school 
experience and have finished college or university education. 
Middle generation: This group consisted of people aged 35-55.  They have experienced 
and remember traditional religious practices prior to the growth of tourism in Jiuzhaigou. 
They did not have many educational opportunities and are the major force of tourism 
development;  
Older generation: Consisting of people over fifty-five years old, this group had been 
through the Cultural Revolution, were primarily illiterate, and once the major force of 
tourism and have been less and less involved in tourism with age growing. Now most of 
the older generation just stay at home.  
My semi-structured interview questions were informed by the existing literature and my 
previous research experience in Jiuzhaigou. They were adapted to some extent during 
the fieldwork, particularly between the first and second periods of research in 2011/2012, 
which provided time to reflect on the data and to adapt questions to make sure that I was 
fully addressing the research aims and could fill gaps in my understanding. Through 
interview questions, I hoped to get richer and thicker understandings of three particular 
types of issues: the role of tourism, religious practices, and the nature of spiritual belief. 
My interviewees concerned the three major elements of religion: religious professionals 
(monks), laypeople and religious space, any one of which cannot be dismissed to form a 
religion. Particular attention was given to gender and generational aspects of religion. 
Table 4.3 lists the main interview topics covered in my interviews with the laypeople and 
monks. The translated, detailed interview questions are attached in Appendix B.  
The interview topics listed above are the main points for guiding my interviewing. My 
interview questions were not fixed to this schedule. Based on the actual interview 
process, I added new questions, reduced irrelevant ones, and also changed the question 
orders. For example, in Anbei I asked them to describe their interactions with Jiuzhaigou 
people and monks and their attitudes towards them. And I also ask Jiuzhaigou people 
about Anbei. 
In my 2011 and 2012 fieldworks, I interviewed 97 persons in total, with lengths varying 
from 30 minutes to 2 hours. Five of these 97 people were interviewed on more than one 
occasion. For example, I did two interviews with a young monk in Jiuzhaigou, once in 
2011 and again in 2012. The average length of interview was around one hour. All of 
them were recorded. In Jiuzhaigou, I interviewed 51 laypeople, 15 monks and 5 
government officials; In Anbei Village, I interviewed 14 laypeople, 10 monks and 2 
government officials (see Table 4.1). Apart from the interviews, I also had informal chats 
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with tourists, people and monks from other places for complementing my understanding 
of religion in Jiuzhaigou and Anbei.  Most interviews were conducted in places like the 
interviewee’s home, office, their work place (souvenir stalls, shops) for their convenience, 
because summer is their busy time in doing tourist businesses. On a few occasions, I 
encountered someone without a prescheduled appointment and we spontaneously 
chose grassland or a quiet outdoor place nearby to sit and start our interview.   
Table 4.3 Interview topics for laypeople and monks 
Research 
questions 




Oral history of Jiuzhaigou and Anbei in past 50 years; history of 
tourism development; tourism impacts in general and on religion in 
specific; tourism involvement; meaning of tourism; interactions with 
and attitudes toward tourism and tourists  
Religious 
practices 
Everyday religious practices, and their characteristics and patterns; 
meanings of religious practices; important religious events; Gender 
and generational difference in religious practices; intergenerational 
transmission of religion.  
Spiritual 
belief 
Knowledge of Bon; strength of belief in Bon; relationships between 
laypeople, monks and the local monastery; laypeople’s and monks’ 
attitudes to each other; spiritual experiences in different public and 
private religious spaces; meanings of different religious spaces; 
ways of using space; religious practices in specific spaces; life 
experience as a monk (for monks) 
Non-religious 
life of monks 
Leisure activities; connection with the original home; future plans 
 
Chinese (specifically, the Sichuan dialect 9 ) was used in all my interviews and my 
communication with locals. Language was also a barrier sometimes, especially in 
interviews with old people. Many of the old people, especially old women barely speak 
Chinese or just speak a little, so they sometimes could not fully understand what I said.  
In these situations, I invited local people as translators when I interviewed old people 
who do not speak Chinese. There was some information loss because translators cannot 
translate accurately and word by word. Hence, some interview questions which are not 
easy to understand were given up. For example, it is extremely hard for old people to 
                                                
9 The Sichuan dialect is a kind of Mandarin dialect mainly spoken by people living in 
Sichuan Province. Tibetans in Sichuan also speak the Sichuan dialect.  
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use three words to describe their feelings of their belief. This probably is because most 
of them are illiterate. Thus I give up this question and replace it with the question “how 
much do you believe in Bon”. I admitted that language barrier might create a bias 
towards the people who can speak Chinese. Those who can only speak the local Tibetan 
dialect are therefore somewhat underrepresented in the research, despite efforts that 
were made to include them. However, apart from the old people and a few women in 
Anbei, most of the people could speak fluent or passable Chinese. Furthermore, from my 
observation, I found for majority of local people Sichuan dialect is usually 
interchangeably spoken with the local Tibetan dialect in their daily life. In particular many 
young people and children prefer to use Sichuan dialect in their daily conversation 
among themselves. Doing interviews with the middle-aged people (especially women) 
was a bit difficult. As I mentioned before, the main reason is the tense political ambience 
which made people not dare to talk too much about religion to someone they did not 
know much. Women seemed more cautious and reserved in talking. However, as I 
stayed longer, people saw me often in their villages, in many of their events and get-
togethers, I became familiar to them. Some of them even said to me “you are becoming 
a Jiuzhaigou person now.” 
English-Chinese language differences also created difficulties in interviewing. For 
example, space is not a daily used word in Tibet. It is used mostly in formal occasions. 
Thus in my interviews and informal conversations, I gave examples or rephrased 
questions where necessary to provide a clearer understanding for interviewees. For 
instance, when I asked them to tell me the most sacred religious space in their mind, I 
normally provided examples helping them to understand, such as monastery, temple, 
home chanting room, sacred mountain. Sometimes I used place (difang) instead of 
space (kongjian), because place is a more apprehensible word.  
4.3.3 Other sources of data 
Apart from the primary data derived from participant observation and interviewing, there 
were some second-hand data collected from other sources such as documents 
(academic literatures, Statistical Yearbooks, government documents, personal books 
from local people etc.), pictures (photos, paintings etc.), web pages (blog articles, 
Wechat, Weibo, news etc.) which will help to supplement the information I obtained and 
provide greater context for the research. For example, from their Weibo, young laypeople 
seem concerning their religion and culture as they often post religion and cultural related 
materials in the public internet space. In addition, rather than a solitary image, young 
monks present their diverse life styles, such as fancying celebrities, following TV dramas.  
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4.3.4 Data analysis 
All my interviews were transcribed by using the software Expressscribe. In some cases 
material that was not deemed to be relevant (such as conversation that obviously did not 
relate to the research aims) was not fully transcribed. Transcribing 102 recroded 
interviews was a large undertaking. Field notes from participant observation, which were 
originally written by hand, were also typed up. The whole process of typing up materials, 
though time consuming, was useful for re-familiarise me with the data before conducting 
systematic analysis. 
After finishing the transcription of interviews, I started analysis of each interview and my 
research notes. These transcribed talks were in Chinese. I read and coded them in the 
original language and translated into English those extracts that I thought I would be 
likely to quote as evidence in the final write up.  
By searching for and identifying patterns, themes, similarities and differences I 
conducted a form of open coding for my data analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) to 
identify emergent themes. Firstly, I went through each interview for analysis one by one, 
which allowed me to understand each individual participant. For each interview, I 
analysed sentence by sentence. Field notes were helpful in identifying key themes 
before analysis. In this process, I was consistently comparing and contrasting the new 
interview analysis and the previous ones. Once I finished all the interview analysis, I had 
achieved a clearer view of the important themes which were evident in the data. Using 
the open coding to develop a final set of interview themes, I then systematically reviewed 
data from all interviews again to identify where the themes occurred in the data. I tried to 
understand why and how these things are meaningful for the participants. I then 
organised the codes into larger central themes which form the basis of the empirical 
chapters (Chapters 5-7). 
I considered using the software NVivo to assist in managing the data and conducting 
analysis. However, as Flick (2002) noted, qualitative analysis software might lead to data 
loss or modification because of the mechanical abstraction of data, and further interrupt 
the usual reflexive process of qualitative research. With this in mind (and based on 
experience experimenting with NVivo), I decided to use manual coding throughout the 
whole process of analysis.  
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4.4 Research ethics and positionality 
The whole research process requires researchers to be constantly reflective upon ethical 
issues and to be reflexive about their positionalities. These are not an “unnecessary 
chore” (Silverman, 2005: 159), but an indispensable step for reassuring and validating 
the research. This section is composed of two parts: Section 4.4.1 explains the ethical 
issues which arose the research; in Section 4.4.2 I discuss the various problems 
revolving my positionalities.    
4.4.1 Main ethical issues in my research 
This research was conducted in adherence with the principles of the Framework for 
Research Ethics (ESRC, 2012) produced by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
Key principles of ethical research include informed consent; protecting confidentiality; 
and minimizing potential risk and harm for both the researched and the researcher.   
To ensure informed consent, potential research participants need to be made as aware 
as possible of the nature of the research. To facilitate this, an information sheet (see 
Appendix C) which was translated was given or read to my participants and interviewees 
before interviewing. After a brief introduction about my research, the information sheets 
clearly set forth what interview participants will be asked to do, how I will use and store 
data and their rights to withdraw research etc. I always gave a detailed verbal 
explanation of my research, because on the one hand some my participants were 
illiterate, on the other hand for some participants paper work made my research too 
formal to let me get close to them. In contrast, in other cases the existence of formal-
looking paperwork (including information sheets helped to a great extent to demonstrate 
the legitimacy of my research and proved helpful for winning the trust of government 
officials and some cautious local people.  
With regard to the consent of interviewees, verbal consent was considered more feasible 
than written consent in my case area (and this was agreed by the relevant University of 
Leeds research ethics committee which approved the research), because firstly the 
independence movement of some Tibetans has generated political tension in the Tibetan 
area (although the level of tension can differ considerably in different parts of Tibet); 
secondly many older Jiuzhaigou Tibetans are illiterate. Such conditions can make them 
feel insecure and highly self-conscious and protective about participating in social 
research. Most of them are afraid of being trapped into trouble based on things they 
might say, especially women. For them, a signed document represents an extremely 
formal agreement or contract which has unavoidable legal responsibilities and 
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consequences. They were afraid of paper work. This is not uncommon in places where 
people are poorly educated or have no/little knowledge of law, especially in developing 
countries. To avoid generating unnecessary suspicion and scaring them off, I chose to 
employ verbal consent rather than written consent. Hence, I orally described my 
research to them first and requested their consent to interview them. 
Audio recording were accepted generally by my close acquaintances and those who are 
open-minded and well-educated, such as young people. For those who refused to be 
recorded, I sometimes took written notes or just gave up the interview if I found the 
participant was not very willing or hesitant to talk. But this just happened occasionally to 
the people I came across without appointments in advance.  
All the participants were told that they were free to withdraw their consent anytime during 
and after fieldwork. All the data were stored by myself under locked and password-
protected personal laptop. Once it reaches 5-year storage limit for further academic 
writing and dissemination, the data will be destroyed. No one besides me has access to 
them.  
The confidentiality of my research subjects has been strictly protected. Before starting 
analysis, all the names were changed pseudonyms. In the thesis, people can only see 
the pseudonyms with their home place, gender and generational group. In a few cases, 
minor details about a respondent have been obscured to protect anonymity.   
Researchers also have moral and ethical obligations to the people we have observed 
(Kearns, 2010: 255-6). I am still keeping in touch with many of my participants through 
internet and phones and keep them updated with my work progress and life experience. 
For me it is not only the research obligation, but also my will that makes me to maintain 
the ties with people I met in Jiuzhaigou.  
4.4.2 My positionality 
Researchers’ positionality is highly consequential to the outcomes, process and direction 
of the research (England, 1994). Positionality “refers to aspects of identity in terms of 
race, class, gender, caste, sexuality and other attributes that are markers of relational 
positions in society, rather than intrinsic qualities” (Chacko, 2004: 52). It concerns the 
complex nature of the researcher-researched interaction (Dawson, 2010). The contested 
and contingent nature of positionality can raise issues relating to issues such as “the 
disclosure of personal information and the politics of representation of the Other, unequal 
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relations of power and possible exploitation, and even lead to ethical problems for the 
researcher” (Chacko, 2004: 52).   
As a Tibetan born into a Buddhist family, my positionality of course affected the data 
collection and thesis formation on a project about Tibetan religion (as I discussed in the 
section above). As for my personal religious belief, I often felt that I was in a similar 
position to many young people in Jiuzhaigou. I always replied to people who asked about 
my religion as follows: “I was born in a Buddhist family, but I don’t claim myself to be a 
Buddhist. The reason is I just practice religion with my parents’ guidance and have little 
knowledge on theories and principles of Buddhism”.  I believe in Buddhism, but with 
some doubts, which prevents me from fully adhering to it. My feeling was echoed by 
Jiuzhaigou young people who have been exposed to formal school-based education 
since a very young age, similar to myself. Some other issues I found in the fieldwork also 
resonated with my feelings and experience, such as the concern of the future of Tibetan 
culture, their ethnic pride as Tibetans, and the questioning of current monks’ identity (see 
Chapter 7).  
In terms of positionality, Vanderbeck (2005) has explored how experiences in the field 
can influence how we view ourselves as scholars. I found the fieldwork experience also 
shapes my understanding of ethnic identity and religious identity. I had been through 
struggles in positioning myself in Tibetan research cohort or in Chinese research cohort, 
and as a participant or as a researcher.  
Based on different attitudes toward Tibet, scholars on Tibetan studies have some 
different interpretations on Tibetan issues from Han Chinese scholars. Chinese scholars 
are secretly criticised for lacking full understanding of Tibetan culture and issues. This is 
sometimes demonstrated through the usage of language in writing names. Using Tibetan 
words means being predisposed towards Tibet. Using Chinese words is often not 
recognised as good research by ethnic Tibetan scholars. Being a Tibetan but writing in 
Chinese made me feel ashamed at times. I thought I should use Tibetan words to 
express my ethnic identity, even though I have never formally studied Tibetan language 
in school, but rather learned it informally at home. Therefore in the reports I wrote at the 
early stage, I adopted Tibetan names, such as Ngawa Prefecture and Barkam County, 
instead of their Chinese names, Aba Prefecture and Maerkang County. I thought being 
too Chinese might diminish my legitimacy in writing about Tibet. However, I found it was 
not convenient as my first instinct was always Chinese. I realised it does not matter 
whether I use Tibetan words or use Chinese words, because this is my way of 
understanding and communicating with my respondents and the field, and most of the 
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young people in Jiuzhaigou also are very likely to use Chinese in their everyday 
communication.   
On account of its more empathetic and flexible qualities, ethnographic methods require 
the emotional input of the researcher. My emotions did affect my thoughts on my thesis. 
In the first stage, I struggled with what I should present to the audience. My pride as a 
Tibetan did not want me to present Jiuzhaigou monks who were opposed to the 
traditionally assumed image as isolated, religious, and non-commercial. However, as I 
heard and saw criticism and worries about Tibetan monks’ and monastery’s changing 
roles in the modern society both within and outside of Tibetan group, I realised this is an 
issue I really want to confront as it is a current issue for Tibet. To face and to write about 
this issue is, for me, actually a way to address this issue. Now I am proud of my research 
as it reflects the current Tibet, and I am also proud of myself being a Tibetan researcher 
as I have the chance to write about Tibet.  
My identity as a Tibetan has disadvantages. Insider positionality and knowledge 
sometimes result in omissions of important issues and failing to step back to get a full 
picture (Kitchin and Tate, 2013: 29). For myself, I sometimes took some important 
findings for granted. After my first fieldwork, I found this was a problem for furthering my 
understandings and posing questions. For example, I at first did not recognise the 
importance of a frequently deployed discourse of the local people. They frequently 
mentioned ‘hanification’ (see Chapters 3, 5 and 6 for detailed discussion about 
hanification) when we talked about the current situation of Tibetan religion. I soon 
realised this was a very important point as a part of my thesis.  
The identity as an insider sometimes is challenged and doubted by the participants. 
Even though Sikic-Micanovic (2010) was a mother and wife, her femininity was 
questioned by her female informants in Croatia, as she was perceived to be not properly 
doing the jobs ascribed to mothers/wives, such as ironing her children/husband’s clothes 
and staying mostly with children. I came across the similar situation. Sometimes my 
ethnic identity was doubted when I asked them to tell me issues about Tibet. They 
replied by asking “Are you a Tibetan? You should have known these.” I would then 
explain that the traditions in my hometown were a little different from the ones in 
Jiuzhaigou and Anbei, and I was interested in knowing the differences and the situation 
there.  
As Hopkins (2009b) noted, even though as researchers we will never exhaust our 
positionalities and how they influence the research (including questions, study design, 
attitudes of participants and data interpretation), being reflective about our positionalities 
could encourage researchers to realise the importance of their research and methods. In 
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order to decrease their biases, researchers need to be careful in choosing methods and 
sources of data. When I came across the problems above, I tried to be a friend with 
rapport and as a researcher with reflexivity for minimising my bias, and the influence of 
my presence on their ways of life, behaviour and talk etc. Apart from this, triangulation of 
data sources and methods (as listed previously) were used to increase reliability of my 
findings. Additionally, continuous conversation and discussion with extant literatures, 
scholars and my research participants helped to enhance my reflexivity and to make me 
more self-critical about my practices of observation and representation. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined the key methodological issues involved in conducting this 
research, including choosing a case study design, accessing and sampling participants, 
conducting participant observation and in-depth interviews, analyzing data, and ensuring 
good ethical practice and reflexivity about my positionality.  
Later, sharing the same ethnic identity was the key for accessing and gaining trust of my 
informants, especially when my project is about Tibetan culture, namely our shared 
tradition, memory and identity. This put us in a similar position under the particular 
political and cultural climate of China and thus greatly decreased their cautiousness and 
distance to me. In other words, on the one hand, the current political climate in China 
construct barriers to approaching my potential participants who had strong sense of self-
protection; on the other hand, it to some extent helped me to be closer with my 
participants once I was accepted as an ethnic insider. And this kind of rapport cannot 
easily be achieved by people with other ethnic backgrounds.  
I argued that the fieldwork experience and the researcher’s positionalities are mutually 
influenced and shaped by each other, especially for the researcher who is in the similar 
position as the researched. My ethnic identity and the whole research process are 
mutually affected. My ethnic identity and my life experience have constantly affected the 
orientation and forms of representation of my research. The process of making this 




Chapter 5 Tourism and changing landscape of religion in 
Jiuzhaigou 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to explore the transformation of the institutional and non-institutional 
religious landscape of Jiuzhaigou, with particular attention to two key spaces: the 
monastery and the home. I argue that deinstitutionalisation is a prominent feature of the 
spatial transformation of religion in Jiuzhaigou. Deinstitutionalisation of religion, by 
focusing on both institutional and non-institutional change, describes laypeople’s 
departure from religious institutions and the declining significance of established religion 
in the public domain (Pollack and Pickel, 2007; Streib, 2007), however the concept has 
not been well studied and used outside of the western context.  
Existing research on deinstitutionalisation of religion has mainly adopted the quantitative 
approach to describe the general and macro trends of rise and fall of religious institutions. 
However, simply examining attendance at church and the size of church membership, for 
example, cannot fully demonstrate the nuanced, complicated reasons and dynamics of 
institutional religious change (Streib, 2007: 152). Additionally, to date most research on 
deinstitutionalisation has focused on western countries. However, the institutional 
expressions of religion are different from country to country, culture to culture and 
religion to religion and hence there is a need to consider deinstitutionalisation in non-
Christian religions and non-western countries (Gorski and Altinordu, 2008).  
As seen above, there are still blanks in portraying a solid and detailed picture of 
institutional change in a religion (Streib, 2007: 152). This chapter aims to explain ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ of institutional change happening in the Bon religion at meso and micro level to 
“allow us to refine our account of exactly what has happened” (Taylor, 2007: 427). In 
specific I begin by investigating the ways in which Zharu monastery is contested in the 
tourist destination, Jiuzhaigou and suffers from declining appeal (section 5.2). The 
spatial transformation of Bon would be poorly understood without mentioning the 
domestic religious space. Section 5.3 provides an examination of the strong growth of 
non-institutional religious spaces.  
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5.2 The monastery: ‘public’ religious space as contested space 
5.2.1 Introduction 
With tourism development and the rapid and broad economic, political and social 
changes in contemporary Tibet, Zharu Monastery has been through a complex 
transformation. The whole of Section 5.2 will discuss how the public nature of Zharu 
Monastery is contested. Specifically, it will start by defining Bon monastery and its public 
nature (Section 5.2.2). In Section 5.2.3 and in Section 5.2.4, the monastery as a 
commodity and a holy space will be explored. Then in section 5.2.5 I will focus on the 
ways in which the public nature of the monastery has been challenged by different forces 
claiming ownership to the monastery and by its declining public role. In the following 
section (Section 5.2.6), I will explore the gendered difference in monastery life.  
5.2.2 What is a Tibetan Bon monastery?  
“Religious space is not uniform: it is multi-dimensional, incorporating both the material 
and the metaphysical” (Livingstone et al., 1998: 146). Physically, a proper Tibetan 
monastery should have at least a temple and a residential area housing monks. In 
addition, some monasteries have colleges and medical houses. Traditionally Tibetan 
monasteries (including both Buddhist and Bon) had multiple functions. They were not 
only religious centres, but also served as educational, cultural and medical centres 
(Goldstein, 1998a). Monasteries were once the only place for learning language, history, 
medicine, philosophies of Bon, astrology and so on. They had a substantial influence on 
every aspect of Tibetan life, such as politics, economy, science, education, culture and 
social structure. Mass monasticism made the monastery the biggest institution in Tibet. 
The functions, forms and organisations of Tibetan monasteries have been through 
constant changes (see Section 3.3), especially after 1950. Since then the traditional 
economic, educational, medical functions of monasteries have been differentiated, 
replaced, and transformed. Monasteries are supposed to be the main place for practicing 
institutionalised religion, teaching religious knowledge and providing religious services. 
However, in contemporary Tibet, some monasteries are inevitably involved in new fields, 
such as tourism and cultural industries, and Zharu Monastery is clearly one of these.  
Chidester and Linenthal (1995: 15) argue that “a sacred space is not merely discovered, 
or founded, or constructed; it is claimed, owned, and operated by people advancing 
specific interests”. Thus, for different people, a sacred space is imbued with different 
meanings through contestation, declaration of ownership and operation. The meaning of 
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the sacred space is not static but contested and changing. For monks, a monastery is 
the place where they live and study. For laypeople, a monastery is a place for prayer, 
meditation and taking part in public religious practices. Tibetan monasteries have always 
been regarded as an ostensibly public religious space. However, they have both public 
and private attributes. Monasteries are not simply temples, that is to say, a public space 
for laypeople to pray in and also take part in religious ceremonies, but also serve a home 
for monks. They therefore combine elements of public and private space.  
There is therefore no fixed answer to the question of the nature of a Tibetan Bon 
monastery. People in Jiuzhaigou would have their own understanding and ways of using 
and producing this meaningful space. These will be discussed in the following sections. I 
start by examining the boundary at Zharu Monastery between tourist product and holy 
space as set by government. 
5.2.3 The boundary between tourist product and holy space for the 
government 
Although the beauty of the natural landscape is the primary tourist draw for Jiuzhaigou, 
religion has also increasingly been used as a commodity to attract tourists in connection 
with many religious spaces, such as Zharu Monastery, the Stupa, Zhayizhaga Sacred 
Mountain and laypeople’s home shrines. Of these, the religious commodification of 
Zharu Monastery has generated most discussion and disputes among local people. In 
considering the process of change of the monastery, we should look first at the role of 
government because of its considerable power of influence over the monastery (see 
Section 3.4.3).  
In contemporary China, it is not rare to find temples involved in business. Some temples 
are even set up as commercial entities. It has been reported that specific sticks of 
incense can sell for as much as 300 CNY (Ji, 2012). The widespread commercialisation 
and commodification of religion in China have attracted broad attention and ignited 
serious criticism in some circles (Yin, 2013; BBC Chinese, 2011). People are quoted as 
saying, "It's excessive. It's looting" (Ji, 2012). Whatever the critics might say, there are 
also a few voices claiming that commercialisation is understandable because they have 
no other way of making a living. Nevertheless, responding to the wide-range criticisms, 
the central government in Beijing issued a notice on 8 October 2012 banning profiteering 
in temples throughout the PRC and enjoying them “not to let money be their mantra” 
(State Administration for Religious Affairs, 2012). The following quote from the notice 
illustrates the government’s view. 
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Since the Reform and Opening-up… most Buddhist and Taoist temples have 
been administered properly with correct religious atmosphere, solemnity and 
seclusion. However, some places are motivated by economic profit, allowing 
‘religion to build a stage, economy to play on it’. There are some abnormal 
phenomena emerging which manifest themselves mainly in the following ways: 
some places, companies and individuals invest in building or contracting 
temples in order to make money promoting traditional culture and local 
economy as an excuse.… Some registered temples, especially ones in scenic 
spots, are accepting investments and are [commercially] managed; some are 
becoming a public company; some coerce or tempt tourists and adherents to 
pay a high price to burn incense and have their fortunes told. These 
phenomena seriously violate the religious policies of the Communist Party and 
the State’s laws and regulations, disturb normal religious activities, harm the 
rights and image of religious groups, hurt the feelings of adherents, damage 
the lawful rights of tourists and, further, have deleterious social impact which 
attracts wide attention. (State Administration for Religious Affairs, 2012) 
In this notice, the government made the point that Buddhist and Taoist temples should 
have an appropriate religious atmosphere of solemnity and seclusion. The ‘correct 
religious atmosphere’ is a vague idea without clear and specific explanation here. But the 
notion of solemnity and seclusion helps to elaborate what is meant by a ‘proper’ Buddhist 
temple as defined by the government. Solemnity and seclusion are qualities of Buddhist 
temples. But some elements of commodification which are clearly stated in this notice 
are not compatible with these qualities. However, as noted by Ji (2012), we can see from 
this notice that the boundary between commercialism and profiteering drawn by 
government is vague and ambiguous. Even though the government criticized profiteering 
in Buddhist temples, new regulations do not specify what profiteering is. Rather they 
simply listed some examples which should be prohibited. Nevertheless, what is certain is 
that tourism is not the target of the government’s ire and is still permitted in temples.   
When we look at the JAB, religion as a tourist commodity was ostensibly supported and 
explicitly included in the tourism development planning of Jiuzhaigou (see Fig. 5.1-5.2 for 
tourists conducting religious practices). In the 2005 general plan of Jiuzhaigou National 
Park, Zharu monastery was named as one of the seven most important tour sites in 
Zharu Scenic Valley (Jiuzhaigou Administration Bureau, 2005). Tibetan monasteries and 
temples are one of its selling points. Echoing a proposal put forward by the general 
secretaries of Sichuan Province and Aba Prefecture who emphasised in recent 
speeches the strategic role of cultural tourism in Sichuan Province and Aba Prefecture, a 
new company called Jiuzhaigou Tourism and Cultural Industries Company was set up in 
2012 as part of the Jiuzhaigou Administration Bureau to promote cultural tourism. In the 
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meantime, A Planning of Cultural Tourism Projects (Jiuzhaigou Administration Bureau, 
2012b) was published. Culture was elevated to an equal position as nature in 
Jiuzhaigou. A Tibetan Cultural Experience Tourist Area is depicted in this planning 
document which includes five functional areas: the entertainment area, the museum and 
exhibition area, the religion and folklore area, the traditional artefacts area and the 
revitalised Tibetan village area. In it, Zharu monastery is named as the Zharu Monastery 
Bon Cultural Centre and planned as an integral part of the Jiuzhaigou tour. According to 
the planning of the functional areas (Jiuzhaigou Administration Bureau, 2012c), Zharu 
Monastery Bon Cultural Centre will be jointly developed by the government and other 
non-governmental religious organisations. Profits will come from single activity charges 
and shopping 10 . The beneficiaries will be Zharu Monastery and the residents of 
Jiuzhaigou.   
A JAB official, Qinjiang , briefly described their plan of making Zharu Monastery a tourist 
commodity and expressed their views toward it.  
Ying: Will Zharu Monastery be one of the scenic sites in your future 
development? 
Qinjiang: Yes. 
Ying: How would you do this specifically? 
Qinjiang: It is a monastery. [It] must be open to tourists, arranging some 
Buddhist activities [for them]11. Among things talked about by local people, 
there will be a nursing home, no, no, no, an Activity Centre for the elderly 
[where they could] spin prayer wheels and do stuff like that. 
Ying: The Zharu Monastery is preparing to open for tourists?  
Qinjiang: Yes. Opening to tourists cannot be like that, [like] some religious 
places, cheating the tourists. [The monastery] cannot do things like that. This is 
very important. [It] cannot be commercialised. [It] cannot be too 
commercialised.  
                                                
10 In this document, ‘single activity’ is not specified and remains to be determined. But 
according to officials from JAB, single activity refers to tourism activities for which 
charges apply, such as entrance to the monastery. 
11 The conversation was in Mandarin. The speaker here used the Mandarin words foshi 
huodong, which literally means Buddhist activities. There is no equivalent Tibetan 
word referring to general activities of Bon or Buddhism. Most of the Mandarin 
terminology for Bon is borrowed from Buddhist terminology. In Jiuzhaigou, foshi 
huodong is used to describe the overall activities of both Bon and Buddhism. There 
are many other examples of this kind of mixed usage. Another example is the 
character for fo, which in Mandarin means Buddha but is also used to refer to the 
Buddha or Buddhas in Bon by local people in Jiuzhaigou. 
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Zharu monastery is considered to be a strategic part of their tourism development by the 
JAB. Religion-themed tourist products are permitted and promoted by the bureau. 
However, it does not specify the boundary between being commercialised and being too 
commercialised. It rather presents a vaguely defined idea that cheating the tourists is not 
good and not permitted.  
As for the religious meanings of the Zharu Monastery, the bureau adopts an intricate 
view as is evident in the following interview with an official of the JAB. 
Ying: What is your [JAB’s] attitude to religion when you decide to develop 
cultural tourism products? 
Zuojian: Inclusiveness. 
Ying: How do you understand inclusiveness? 
Zuojian: Er…Religion, the positive sides must be promoted. But [it] cannot be 
too much. 
Ying: Cannot be too much? Does that mean that it cannot be over-publicised? 
Why is it that it cannot be too much? 
Zuojian: There should be like, no conflict with laws and regulations. In our 
country, like in minority areas, there should be no so-called Tibet-
independence issues here… like us, our place is a scenic spot, [we] should be 
more like this [no dependent issues mentioned before]. 
Generally speaking, from the government’s perspective religion should not be over-
publicised and should be practiced according to the laws that regulate it. Tourist resorts 
in particular should be more cautious and low-key about the prominence they give to 
religious manifestations. This is particularly the case in Tibet, where religion, especially 
Tibetan religions, is a sensitive issue which has generated various conflicts (see Chapter 
3). The Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader for many Tibetans is regarded as a separatist 
and a traitor by the Chinese government (China.org.cn, 2005). Therefore, Tibetan 
Buddhism and Bon are regarded as factors inducing instability to which special attention 
needs to be paid and special treatment given. The JAB official’s view reflects Chinese 
state’s conflicting cultural attitudes toward ethnic minorities which promote cultures of 
ethnic minorities while simultaneously playing down the religious (spiritual) aspects 
(Sofield and Li, 1998).  
On the one hand, the JAB is promoting Zharu monastery as an important cultural tourism 
product, while on the other hand there is an understanding that religion cannot be over-
promoted. Zharu Monastery is seen more as a tourist commodity which is characterised 
by its religious meaning and as a representation of Tibetan culture. For the JAB, it has a 
crucial role to play in forming the whole development of tourist product in Jiuzhaigou. 
However, the religious meaning of the institution is not seen as entirely relevant by the 
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JAB. Local government operates according to the principle of ‘obeying central state laws 
and regulations’. However, the central state itself does not give a clear guide, which 
leaves local government with a lack of certainty. Facing the call to develop cultural 
tourism (including temples) from provincial and prefectural leaders as well as the central 
government’s consistent suspicious attitude to religion, the local government is trying to 
find a balance. 
It is clear from the above that there is an ambiguous boundary between what is 
acceptable to government and what is not. In the words of Mary Bergstrom, a marketing 
consultancy in Shanghai, quoted in Ji (2012): “There aren't the established checks and 
balances in China that exist in other countries, so people are more willing and able to 
test the boundaries of what is acceptable, especially if the end result of these tests is 
potential profit”.  
5.2.4 The boundary between tourist product and holy space for local 
people 
It is because there is no clear boundary set by the government that Zharu Monastery is 
testing the limit itself. The following section will examine the boundary for local people. It 
will first address how the monastery was commodified into a tourist product, and, second, 
how local people react to this commodification. 
5.2.4.1 The process of commodification  
From interviews and conversations with local people who witnessed the emergence and 
growth of the tourism business in monasteries around Jiuzhaigou, I have reconstructed 
the following account of the history of the Zharu monastery’s involvement in tourism. In 
1999, some Bon monasteries in Songpan which are on the only tourist highway from 
Chengdu to Jiuzhaigou leased themselves out to Han Chinese businessmen (Sutton and 
Kang, 2010b: 105). Without any experience of tourism operations, Zharu monastery 
joined this trend and contracted itself out at that time as well. In the following paragraphs 
I will explain what this leasing entailed.  
As various informants told me, it was the first time these monasteries had been involved 
in tourism. At that time, they had no idea what tourism could bring them and how tourism 
works. They did not know how to attract tourists, how to organise a tour, how to manage 
their relationships with tour agents, tour guides and tourists and how to show the history 
and stories about the monastery and Bon in Chinese. “At that time [people are] silly. 
118 
 
[They] know nothing about the outside world” (Agu Yongzhong12, a middle-aged monk in 
the Gami Monastery). They simply knew that the Han Chinese businessmen promised to 
refurbish the monastery, to give them a small amount of money for maintenance, 
expansion of the monastery and monks’ salaries. As they were experiencing some 
financial difficulties, they accepted the offer. 
However, the nature of the business-centred tourism operations was not acceptable to 
laypeople and some monks. The monasteries drew criticism from laypeople as well as 
monks (Sutton and Kang, 2010b; Baimacuo, 2004). According to the recollections of 
monks and laypeople from my interviews and research from Sutton and Kang (2010b) 
and Baimacuo (2004), all the monasteries were subjected to the same practices as the 
Han businessmen were coming together as a group from the same place. The Han boss 
hired Han workers (female and male) and a few monks pretending to be Tibetan tour 
guides and high-ranking lamas. They wore Tibetan costumes telling tourists that they are 
Tibetans and showcasing Tibetan culture and religion to tourists, while tour guides tried 
to persuade tourists to purchase religious objects such as Buddha statues and 
thangka13, and make donations. There was always an older monk around pretending to 
be a prestigious lama who was said to have supernatural power.  
This was a profitable business. The Han contractor made a deal with tourist agencies 
promising to give them sales commission (of about 50%) as long as they took their 
tourists to the monasteries. The tourism business at Zharu and the other monasteries 
was greatly boosted with the help of tourist agencies. Apart from this, tour guides 
working in the monastery were also offered commission related to their total sales, which 
motivated them to adopt commercial behaviour. Agu Wuden, a middle-aged monk in 
Zharu monastery, described the way tourists were charged as follows:  
They [a group of workers of the Han contractor] sold Buddha statues and 
incense to tourists. Tourists were also led to stand in front of the ‘lama’. If a 
tourist looked wealthy, the lama would tell the tourist that they were in bad luck, 
and suggested they buy a big Buddha statue and donate some money to do a 
religious ritual [to get rid of the bad luck].  
From this description, we can see how tourists were persuaded to purchase things from 
the monastery. Setting the scene with an ‘authentic’ Tibetan religious atmosphere was 
the first priority. The entrepreneurs used Mandarin-speaking Han Chinese who were 
                                                
12 Agu is the title of monks and used before the name for respect. 
13 Thangka is a religious painting on cloth or paper and sometimes embroidered on silk 
depicting a Buddhist/Bon deity, scene or mandala of some sort. 
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skilled at impersonating Tibetan tour guides. In fact they were sales persons selling 
religious objects like incense and Buddha statues and religious activities which came 
with high price tags. They used scripts designed to help their sales, scripts that were 
criticised by locals for being misleading.  
The whole tourism business in Zharu monastery stirred up complaints and objections 
among the local people and tourists. Local people were not happy with what the tourist 
business brought to the monastery, such as the introduction of female tour guides (see 
Section 5.2.5). Tourists found themselves coaxed into buying overpriced religious 
products. 
In 2002, complaints from local people and tourists prompted the prefectural and county 
governments to stop the contract business in monasteries. But monasteries were still 
encouraged by the government to run tourism by themselves in order to be self-
sufficient. From then on, monks and lamas were requested to wear an ID when they 
worked with the tourists. The prefectural Bureau of Religious Affairs and Bureau of 
Pricing regulated the price of all the commodities and entrance tickets to monasteries. 
Here the government considered religion a tourist commodity (Sutton and Kang, 2010a: 
106).  
From 2002 to 2005, Zharu Monastery Administration Committee started to operate a 
tourism business by itself without the profiteering of the Han businessmen. In 2005, 
Zharu Monastery knocked down some of its old buildings and initiated a reconstruction 
plan. Since then, the monastery has been undergoing a large reconstruction project (see 
Section 3.4.3). Tourism is set as one of the important strategies in the monastery 
development agenda. Even though the monastery secured funding worth 8 million CNY 
from JAB, it still ran up a big deficit in order to complete the reconstruction. Indeed, it has 
not been able to open to tourists for the past 8 years. Public religious practices ceased 
for 7 years from 2005 to 2011. A few religious ceremonies have been held in the 
monastery since 2011 as some of the building work is finished.  
At present, Zharu Monastery is regarded as an important point in the future cultural 
tourism route and in the development of Zharu Valley (an undeveloped valley in 
Jiuzhaigou). In the near future the newly refurbished monastery will reopen to laypeople 
and tourists. There will be more chances for interaction with tourism, which might 
continue to make a significant impact on the monastery and monks.  
Even though the extreme religious commodification at Zharu monastery introduced by 
the Han businessmen is a thing of the past, it has had profound consequences for the 
current status of the monastery. For example, laypeople lost their loyalty and trust in the 
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monastery because of this. Local laypeople started to actively get involved in the 
reconstruction of Zharu Monastery by donating/investing money for the reconstruction 
project in order to avoid the previous unhappy experience and have a say in the 
monastery’s affairs (which will be discussed in Section 5.2.5).  
5.2.4.2 The reactions of local people 
As tourism was very new for monks and laypeople, the changes it caused in the 
monastery had a big influence on both of them. A sense of disappointment and 
unhappiness was a common theme expressed when local people recalled the period 
before the closure for refurbishment of Zharu Monastery.   
In Tibet, the monastery is home to celibate monks who are supposed to renounce 
worldly love, desire and wealth (Goldstein and Tsarong, 1985). Therefore, monks are 
thought to be solitary, staying away from the secular economic, social and emotional 
entanglements and monasteries are deemed to be appropriate places for a life of 
renunciation. Local people in successive interviews with me expressed their 
unhappiness at what they saw as excessive profit-making activities at Zharu Monastery. 
For them, what happened at Zharu Monastery challenged the ideal of monastic life and 
was contrary to the expectation for a monastery, which should be detached from the rest 
of the world. They noted that the monastery had been transformed into a market or a 
shop selling religion, and no longer felt like a sacred space. The sacredness of Bon was 
challenged and harmed by market economy ideas which emphasise the significance of 
worldly pursuits (see also Sutton and Kang, 2010a). A middle-aged layman, Xila, gave 
me his views on Zharu Monastery’s engagement with tourism. “The monastery is a 
sacred place. It is a place for deities and buddhas, not for these things and people. 
These will displease the buddhas.” It was clear from the context that his reference to 
things and people denoted the commodification of religion, the Han Chinese 
businessmen and the female tour guides. These views were voiced at the start of most 
of the interviews that I conducted. Time after time, my interviewees insisted that, “the 
monastery is a sacred place”.   
As local people sensed that the Zharu Monastery was losing its sacred quality, they 
adopted a direct way of showing their discontent and disagreement. According to Agu 
Caidan, a young monk in Zharu Monastery, they began donating money to monasteries 
outside Jiuzhaigou. They were, he said, driven to attend religious events away from 
Zharu Monastery at other nearby tourist-free monasteries. Sutton and Kang (2010a) also 
found that commodification in some Songpan monasteries made local people turn to 
smaller temples. Despite the discontent of local people with Zharu Monastery, many of 
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them preferred to adopt a pragmatic stance of compromise. They did not directly 
complain to the monastery, but complained indirectly. A middle-aged layman, Qudeng, 
told me, when I asked if he had told the people at the monastery about his feelings:   
Impossible. They [the Monastery Administration Committee] had rented it 
[monastery] out. How can I say things like “I’m not happy with that” to them? 
Besides, we live in Jiuzhaigou together. It is not wise to say bad words. 
Villagers who are not happy with this just gossiped about it amongst each other. 
His answer suggests that even though they did not agree with the monastery’s tourism 
business, they chose to express their disagreement in a private way rather than make 
their views public. The crucial factor here is that religious commodification is seen as an 
affront and a threat to the deep social ties between the monastery and local community. 
The Tibetan monastery has always been deeply embedded in local community, its 
monks coming from local families, while the monastery itself provides religious services 
for the members of the community. 
Apart from the sacred quality, Zharu Monastery was stressed as a ‘Tibetan’ monastery 
and not a Han space repeatedly by local people. As I argued in Chapter 3, Han Chinese-
ness has become an important element in defining and shaping the identity of ethnic 
minorities in China, such as Tibetans (Yi, 2007; Yeh, 2007b), Uyghurs (Gladney, 2005), 
Miao (Schein, 2000) and Naxi and Dai (Hansen, 1999). One middle-aged layman, 
Basang showed his dissatisfaction with the way Han Chinese had pretended to be 
Tibetans in order to make money out of tourism at Zharu monastery. “At that time”, 
Basang said, “the monastery was rented to a Han businessman. They employed a lot of 
Han tour guides. They wore Tibetan clothes selling pricy religious objects and asking for 
large donations from tourists.” For them, a sense of Tibetanness became more 
pronounced as a result of Han businessmen’s pretention of Tibetans. The activities of 
the Han Chinese in Zharu Monastery became an act of transgression. The episode 
appears to have reinforced Tibetans’ feeling of otherness from the Han Chinese, 
strengthening a Han/Tibetan dichotomy which deeply shapes the Tibetans’ idea of self 
(this theme will be developed in Chapters 6 and 7).  
These sentiments were voiced by Wangzen, a middle-aged layman in Jiuzhaigou, who 
told me that, “it is these Han Chinese who made the monastery reek.” I asked Kangzhu, 
a middle-aged laywoman in Jiuzhaigou, whether there would be any difference if the 
businessman had been a Tibetan. She replied that, “Tibetans wouldn’t do these things. 
We Tibetans have religion. [We] won’t blaspheme Buddha.” This kind of expression 
frequently appeared in my conversations with local people. From what they said to me, 
an underlying sense could be identified that for them Tibetans are generally morally good 
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because they have religion. Religion became the source bringing them pride and 
differentiates them from the Han. Yeh (2007b) studied the self-formulated tropes of 
indolence about Tibetans in Lhasa which partly originate by perceiving the hard work of 
the Han Chinese around them. The Han Chinese are the Others against whom Tibetans 
measure themselves. It should not, however, be thought that Tibetan ethnic identity is 
always uppermost in the minds of most people. It is only conspicuous around certain 
issues central to this identity such as religion.  
During my fieldwork, I occasionally wondered whether my respondents would have said 
the same things to me if I had been Han Chinese. Since I identified myself as Tibetan 
when I was doing fieldwork, it is possible that the emphasis on the Tibetan was 
sometimes a performative act in front of me, a fellow Tibetan. However, I not only 
undertook formal interviews in my fieldwork, I also conducted participant observation in 
the local community, staying there as a friend with local people. In other words, even if 
sometimes they might have been performing their Tibetanness, they could not always 
have been acting in front of me. Hence I have interpreted their invocation of the Han 
Chinese as their counterpart as an ingrained way to show their difference and identity. 
However, notwithstanding their disapproval of the monastery’s commodification, local 
people’s belief in Bon and buddhas appears not to be substantially undermined by the 
perceived failings of the local monastery (a point evidenced by the bourgeoning growth 
of domestic religion, see Section 5.3).  
In summary, the previous two sections examined the boundary between a tourist 
commodity and a holy space. In order to avoid political controversies, the local 
government has an ambivalent attitude towards whether monasteries should be treated 
as tourist products or holy space. In Jiuzhaigou it is more inclined to see the monastery 
as a tourist product used to complement the nature-centred tourist attraction that is the 
national park. For local people, the commodification diminishes the sacredness which 
was taken as the core of the monastery’s meaning in their lives. In addition to 
contestations around the meaning of the monastery as a tourist product or a holy space, 
another attribute of the monastery is being challenged too, its public nature, and this will 
be elaborated in the following section.  
5.2.5 The contested public nature of the monastery  
In Tibetan, ‘dgon-pa’ means a monastery or hermitage, traditionally isolated from the 
nearest village by the distance that the sound from a human voice carries (Keown, 
2003). The root dgon means essentially ‘isolated’ or ‘remote’. Here, the monastery is an 
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isolated and remote place for monks. From this definition, it has nothing to do with 
laypeople. Nowadays, in the contemporary context of Tibet, dgon-pa not only means 
monastery, but also refers to a religious centre (not necessarily of celibate monks) 
(Samuel, 2012). It is a place welcoming all believers and non-believers (according to the 
Bon idea of love and compassion for all sentient beings). Therefore, the monastery is 
supposed to be a public place. In Jiuzhaigou, many of my respondents have expressed 
in practice and discourse their different understandings about the monastery as a public 
space.  
In this section, I discuss four ways in which the public nature of Zharu Monastery is 
contested. Firstly, on account of the commodification of the monastery, I found a 
tendency for local people to think the monastery’s public nature was being violated. 
Secondly, many of my respondents claim ownership of the monastery and a prominent 
local stupa in order to have a say in the monastery’s affairs. Thirdly, some of them have 
bought up ‘fragments’ of the monastery, which has privatised the monastery in portions. 
Last but not least, a significant number of them accuse the monastery of failing to fulfil its 
public role. 
5.2.5.1 A monastery for Jiuzhaigou people? 
As I described earlier in Chapter 3 and in Section 5.2.3, local people generally were not 
happy about the commodification of Zharu Monastery. They expressed their disapproval 
of the commodification because it went against the sacredness of the Bon religion and 
their understandings about the function of a monastery. 
Moreover, the question of who should ‘own’ the monastery also generated substantial 
discussion under-surface. For laypeople, Zharu Monastery is considered as a place 
which belongs to all Jiuzhaigou people, not to a group of monk managers. Almost all of 
my respondents stated that they found the idea that the monastery was used for making 
profits for some monks unacceptable. They see the monastery as a communal property 
of Jiuzhaigou people. In the words of Zhayang, a middle-aged layman from Jiuzhaigou, 
“It is not good that some monks used the monastery to make money for their own sake”. 
For him, the monastery belongs to all local people as they built it out of nothing after the 
Cultural Revolution. Zezhen, an elderly female resident of Jiuzhaigou, recalled this 
process:  
At that time, we had no money. [We] looked for wild medicines [in the forest to 
sell for money]. Once we get some money [from that], we gave it to the 
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monastery. Each family had [at least] one family member to help build [the 
monastery]. 
The perception that the monastery belongs to the wider people of Jiuzhaigou for their 
benefit is challenged not only by the making of profit by monks but also by new trends 
whereby elites seek to influence the monastery with money, which I turn to below. 
5.2.5.2 Claiming ownership of the Yongzhong Laze Stupa 
The construction of the Yongzhong Laze Stupa14  (abbreviated as the Stupa) in the 
grounds of Zharu Monastery initiated a round of ownership competition between different 
forces. The Stupa was the first building finished in 2012 as part of the wider 
refurbishment of the monastery (see Fig. 3.12 for the appearance). According to local 
monks, it is one of the biggest stupa in the whole Tibet. It has been opened to local 
people to conduct religious practices since 2012, and, as I was informed by monk 
managers that it was planned to be opened to tourists in the near future.    
As mentioned above, my respondents overwhelmingly saw themselves as the legitimate 
owners of the monastery. They did not like to see the monastery being used as a means 
of making profit for some monks and its sacredness being degraded as a consequence. 
Indeed, there was an active response from local people. In order to have more say in 
monastery affairs, some rich members of the local elite started to interfere in the new 
construction plan of the monastery by donating a large amount of money to the 
construction of the Stupa. When I asked Zega, a Jiuzhaigou middle-aged man, why he 
donated to the monastery, he explained as follows: 
The monastery is the most important place for local people for worship. We 
must help. And this is doing good deeds as well.… You know, the monastery 
was not properly run in the past, which affected the monastery’s image. Now 
we are donating some money just so as to tell the monastery the way 
forward. … The monastery is a sacred place. And [it] should do religious things. 
I hope in the future the monastery could do tourism properly in accordance with 
national laws and regulations, concerning itself more about local people, not 
just making money. 
For him, donating money was simultaneously both a way to do good deeds and show his 
reverence to the Buddha while also becoming involved in monastery affairs to help 
                                                
14  A stupa is a Buddhist or Bon religious monument imbued with special religious 
significance, often dedicated to the memory of a buddha or bodhisattva. It houses 
scriptures, religious objects and sacred relics of the holy persons or buddhas. 
125 
 
ensure the monastery avoids repeating its former practices. According to other local 
people who talked to me, local elite residents tried to use this approach to raise their 
profile and voice in monastery affairs. They thought, I was told, that if you donate more, 
you will have a bigger say in monastery affairs. They want the income from tourism to be 
used for monastery development or be distributed among local people. But some people 
argued that for rich people donating money was like buying shares. Once the Stupa 
opens to tourists, they may profit.  
With regard to the government, the investment in the Stupa is also part of their strategy 
for being involved in the monastery’s affairs. The monastery is a special place on which 
JAB cannot have sole claim. JAB does not directly take part in monastery affairs, 
because the monastery is directly administered by the Bureau of Religious Affairs.  
However, as the monastery is set to become a strategic tourist spot as soon as it 
reopens fully, JAB needs to make sure the monastery is run and developed in 
accordance with tourism purpose and laws and regulations. 
By connecting with tourism, the ownership of the monastery becomes penetrable and 
contested for different non-monastic forces. For the time being, however, and despite still 
being partially closed while refurbishment is completed, Zharu Monastery remains a 
contested space, with laypeople, local elites, monastery officials and local government all 
looking to have a say in the way the monastery is run.  
5.2.5.3 Privatising public religious spaces  
There are other means by which the monastery is experiencing new forms of 
privatisation which challenge the perception that it is a resource for everyone in 
Jiuzhaigou.  
In 2012, when the Stupa was finished, the Monastery Administration Committee initiated 
a programme according to which worshippers would pay 1,000 CNY for a small buddha 
statue and a small cuboid space within the stupa into which the statue could be placed. It 
was claimed that within a very short period of time several hundred buddha statues had 
been sold. I was told that almost every household in Jiuzhaigou donated at least one 
small statue. A few wealthy local people donated big statues of buddhas each worth from 
100,000 to 500,000 CNY. All the buddha statues have their donor’s name on the front.  
In this sense, the public space of the Zharu Monastery through its patronage of the 
Stupa was partly transformed into private space. Donors will from now on, have their 
own spiritual space to claim in the monastery. In interviews, laypeople expressed strong 
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views about their enthusiasm for donating Buddha statues. As Cuomo, a middle-aged lay 
woman from Jiuzhaigou, explained:  
Buying a statue is good for your soul. It is your gewa15. And the statue will be 
there [in the Stupa] forever, blessing you all the time… It belongs to yourself. 
Putting your statue in the monastery could make you enjoy all the monastery 
worshippers’ gewa.   
The statue has been regarded as their private property.  
An opening ceremony was held for the Stupa during 2012 Mazhi Festival16. Even though 
the monastery and religious festival were open to the public, only donors received an 
invitation to attend the ceremony. This otherwise public religious event was privatised for 
the limited number of patrons. During the ceremony, Gasang, a young layman in 
Jiuzhaigou, described the scene of the ceremony in the following words: 
The people who donated were being given special hospitality by the monastery. 
During the ceremony, they were given a Hada17. Monks sounded trumpet for 
them. At the same time they were led to see the Buddha statue they donated 
with their name on it in the Yongzhong Laze Stupa. At that time, everyone was 
looking for and pointing at their own Buddha statue. 
Here, the ceremony gave each person who made a donation a special and exclusive 
honour in front of the public which made it an individualised ceremony for each person. 
Apart from that, it could be argued that placing a name tag on each buddha statue 
carves the stupa up into piecemeal privatised fragments. 
5.2.5.4 Failing to fulfil a public role: fewer religious services  
As mentioned previously, Zharu Monastery, like other Bon monasteries, has a public role 
to play. It is supposed to fulfil religious needs for its ‘parish’, including teaching, chanting, 
performing rituals, leading religious ceremonies, conducting prayers and so on. 
However, the monastery is still for the most part closed for reconstruction and most of 
                                                
15  It refers to religious merit one got from doing good things to sentient beings or 
devoutly serving Buddha and gods. As can be seen from this stupa, Bon is a syncretic 
religion and buddhas form an important part of its pantheon. 
16 One of most important religious events in Zharu Monastery 
17 A strip of cloth (normally white or yellow) is used to give distinguished guests for 
showing high respect. 
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the monastery’s monks are involved in the tourism business or related work in 
Jiuzhaigou. Furthermore, as we will see in Chapter 7, local people maintained that 
monks involved in tourism businesses and rarely performed religious practices for 
laypeople. They say monks make choices from a pragmatic and economic perspective. 
This is how Zewang, a middle-aged layman from Jiuzhaigou, put it:  
They do business and have no time for chanting. Think about it. They only earn 
100 CNY per day for chanting, but they can earn 400-500 CNY or [even] 700-
800 CNY per day for taking photographs for tourists. They certainly don’t want 
to come to chant for you. 
Bearing this in mind, local laypeople have turned to other nearby monasteries in the 
Songpan area where monks receive less in alms from religious services compared to 
Jiuzhaigou. Repeatedly during my field stays, I was told that Zharu Monastery had failed 
to meet its public religious functions and that these had been replaced by monasteries in 
Songpan. Many Jiuzhaigou people, I was told, would rather go to nearby monasteries 
rather than their local monastery. There was little sympathy for the fact that during the 
past several years, most of the religious practices which are supposed to be held in 
Zharu Monastery have had to be stopped due to the reconstruction work there with no 
proper space and no monks available for holding big public religious events.  
Another consequence of the long closure of Zharu Monastery is that laypeople and 
monks alike have been denied the opportunities for religious teaching. This too has 
caused unhappiness among local people, as testified by the words of the monk Agu 
Wuden, who was quoted below:  
We haven’t had anyone teach us for 7 or 8 years. Zharu Monastery has always 
been under construction for the last few years. So there is no place for public 
teaching. People only perform religious practices, without knowing the reasons 
why they are doing them and understanding the meanings and principles 
behind them. Many young people don’t have correct knowledge about Bon. 
Teaching is very important for maintaining the religion. 
To summarise this section, both monastery and monks engage in tourism business 
without fulfilling laypeople’s public and private religious demands and this forces 
Jiuzhaigou people to go to nearby monasteries in Songpan.  
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5.2.6 Gendered space 
Gender attributes have an important bearing on how the monastery is seen. From the 
point of view of my respondents and other local people, the monastery should be a male 
space. The following comment from a middle-aged layman, Xila, about female tour 
guides living in Zharu Monastery reflects the attitudes of both laymen and laywomen:  
Xila: In particular, some tour guides were women. And they were even living in 
the monastery. 
Ying: What do you think about that? 
Xila: Of course it is not good. The monastery is not a place to accommodate 
women. It desecrated the monastery. 
All my respondents reckoned that accommodating female tour guides was an act of 
desecration to the gods of Bon. They were not happy with the existence of women in the 
monastery, which they consider a sacred and male dominated space. The word used in 
the Tibetan language for “woman” literally means “born low”. The idea that “‘femaleness 
is an ‘inferior or unfortunate birth’ is so deeply ingrained, so taken for granted” (Gross, 
1993: 82) in the everyday discourse of Tibetan people. Especially during menstruation 
and pregnancy, women are considered unclean. Even in the religious world, nuns are 
generally less respected and supported than monks.   
In many societies “sacred things and places are to be protected from defilement. 
Holiness and impurity are at opposite poles” (Douglas, 2002: 9). In the religious sphere, 
women’s bodies have often been associated with taboos because they are thought to 
symbolise pollution. According to Douglas (2002: 35), “Where there is dirt there is a 
system”. Behind the understanding of women’s body as polluting and the practices of 
excluding women from centres of Bon religion lies the fact that women have always had 
a marginal place in Tibetan society, even in current modern Jiuzhaigou where women 
are better educated and are more economically independent, a point I return to later in 
this chapter, when I discuss women’s role in domestic religion (section 5.3.5).  
The gender difference is obviously demonstrated in Tibetan religion. Once when I was 
chatting with Agu Sanlang, a middle-aged monk from Zharu monastery, he 
complimented me for studying Bon seriously saying, “after your study, you could practice 
to become a bodhisattva.” According to Ohnuma (2001: 73), the bodhisattva’s body is 
constructed as feminine in order to contrast the Buddha’s body gendered as masculine. 
For him, this was a well-intentioned wish for me, because women can only practice to be 
a bodhisattva but men can practice to attain the buddhahood. He wished I could reach 
the highest level of practice among women. Buddhahood, which is the highest level of 
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practice, in Bon is regarded as exclusively male. Another middle-aged monk, Agu Sangji 
in Jiuzhaigou reaffirmed the gender difference in and out of religion. He asserted that, 
“modern society promotes equality between women and men. The Bon religion 
emphasises equality of all sentient beings.” Gender equality as a worldwide value in 
modern society is highlighted firstly here as the baseline of the gender perspective of 
Bon. I asked if women are allowed to attend all the religious practices. He admitted that 
there are some places like Dharmapala Palace and Tonpa Shenrab Palace into which 
women are not allowed to enter. He then acknowledged the gender inequalities and 
used the Han Chinese as yardstick to describe the gender difference within Tibetan 
society: “Tibetans’ tradition has this -- always putting women‘s position a little low. It is 
simple [to see]. Men do nothing [and] just sit there waiting to eat. Women do all the 
things. Han Chinese are not like this,” indicating that he believes that Han Chinese are 
better in terms of gender equality. This again shows that Tibetan ethnic identity is often 
subconsciously defined through reference to Han Chinese. He attributed the view about 
‘lazy men and hard-working women’ to the tradition of the whole of Tibetan society that 
Tibetan women have a lower position.  
What he described reflected a general gender division in Jiuzhaigou. The gender-based 
labour division is, in his characterisation, “men do nothing” and “women do all the 
things”. In Jiuzhaigou, women not only take part in the tourism business, but also are 
bound to do all the housework and major domestic religious practices (see also Section 
5.3.5).  
I personally also experienced the obvious gendered division of labour on multiple 
occasions, such as when I was attending a funeral in Jiuzhaigou. The following is an 
excerpt from my field diary documenting the situation on the day I attended the funeral in 
2012.  
Today I was lead by Laji [a young woman in Jiuzhaigou] to a funeral in *** 
Village. I met her at noon in her place of work. She said she is going to help the 
family with the funeral going on this afternoon. She has some blood relations 
with this family, so she needs to go there.  
We then went to the house of the family she referred to. I was surprised seeing 
so many monks chanting in the living room. This was the biggest funeral 
ceremony I had ever seen. Someone told me there were about 40 monks 
invited there. They said it had started for two days ago. That day was the last 
day of the funeral. And after that, there would be about 6 monks left continuing 
the chanting ceremony for the deceased for 49 (7 x 7) days.  
I was led by Laji directly to the kitchen area where all the women stay. Some 
women were busy preparing food for the monks and guests coming to pay their 
condolences. Others were sitting on the benches outside the kitchen cracking 
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sunflower seeds. I asked a middle-aged woman why they didn’t go into the 
house where the men were having tea, chatting and playing cards. She said, 
“We women have work to do here. There might be a need to help later here.” 
They, [the Jiuzhaigou women] did not think it was unfair at all that they had to 
stay in the kitchen while men rested in the house. They told me it was always 
like this. It seems they thought this was natural. When I asked Laji whether I 
could go into the house to look at what the men were doing and chat with them, 
she told me that it was better not to as it was not good for women to go inside. I 
did in fact get a chance to go inside when I was helping serve the food to the 
men. There were no women inside. All the men were sitting around smoking, 
drinking, playing cards and chatting. The women here strike me as being very 
efficient in doing their housework. They were able quickly to decide what was 
needed, what to cook, who was in charge of what, how to organise the delivery 
of the food and serve it. Every woman quickly found her role and worked in the 
team. I really felt like I was a part of the team when I was helping serve the 
food. I needed to bow my body a little as I served the food on the table. I had to 
wait to see if someone asked for food. I need to react quickly to provide food. 
It was considered normal for local women to think that they are bound to take the gender 
role set by ‘Tibetan tradition’. In my diary, I asked myself if women think this gender-
based labour division is natural. On the basis of my observations and interviews in 
Jiuzhaigou, both women and men seem to take it for granted. In this funeral, women 
clearly know where their place is and what they need to do. The kitchen is a space for 
women vis-à-vis men’s space in the living room of the house. Cooking, serving food, and 
other aspects of traditionally-defined domestic work are thought of as a woman’s job. I 
myself was even influenced by the atmosphere of this team. I needed to behave like 
them in these conditions, so I let myself bow a bit and quickly react to the requests for 
food from guests. In many other public events I attended, women always put themselves 
behind the men. They belonged to the kitchen, and to the back stage. There is a distinct 
line between men’s and women’s space. This does not just concern of old and middle-
aged women but also young women too. Laji is a young woman with a college degree 
and a decent job. She dissuaded me from going inside the house into men’s space. 
None of my female respondents felt they were put in a position of inequality in terms of 
their role in public and domestic situations. Zeduo, a young woman told me as follows 
when I asked how she felt about women’s role in religious practices: 
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I don’t have any opinions. I think it should be like this, because women have a 
stronger Yin18 aura. For example, women must wear a coat and mouth mask to 
go into the Buddha hall. If they don’t, their aura will displease the buhhda.” 
This young woman also has a college degree. For her (as for the larger majority of 
women), the differentiation between gender roles is not a problem. As she sees it, it is 
because women have a stronger Yin aura which is not compatible with the Yang (male) 
religious atmosphere. This simple Yin-Yang explanation reflects the view widely 
accepted among women and men that women have a specific aura or quality which is 
not completely compatible with the Yang religion. Gross (1993: 84) found that in 
Buddhism a woman’s body is regarded as impure. This idea is borne out in Bon by many 
of my respondents, even if they did not always express it out loud or were reluctant to 
admit it. The reason why women are refused access to some religious spaces and 
religious practices is because of their perceived embodiment. These special qualities or 
auras of women’s body are used to justify the gender inequality.  
The examples above of the funeral is of course an event in domestic space and not the 
monastery (I return to the issue of domestic space subsequently), but it does illustrate 
the lasting power of gendered prohibition in relation to the religious life. Speaking about 
women’s role in religious space, Agu Yongzhong, the middle-aged monk in Gami 
Monastery, made a comparison between the present and the past: 
In the past the monastery was not like this [allowing women into the temple]; 
women were not allowed to get into the main hall of the monastery. Rules were 
strict. In the past, everywhere was like this. Once [the doors were] opened, 
[women] could come in whenever they wanted. A monastery is a very sacred 
place. [In the past], women only took a peek standing by the temple gate when 
they came to the monastery. They didn’t dare go inside. Now they don’t care. 
This to some extent decreases the authority and identity of monks. Now 
[women] are just forbidden on the second floor. The first floor is open. Now, if 
the Dharmapāla Hall19 [on the second floor] is open, women will go inside; that 
is meaningless. [The hall] turns into an exhibition hall, without authority. …. [It 
is better] keeping a sense of mystery.  
Agu Yongzhong compared the situation of women’s role in the monastery between the 
present and the past. He spoke nostalgically about how and why women were not 
                                                
18 Yin is a concept originated from Taoism in China. It implies feminine qualities which 
contrasted to yang relating to masculine qualities. 
19 Dharmapāla is a type of deity and the name of law protectors in Bon. Dharmapāla hall 
is installed with statues or paintings of dharmapāla. 
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allowed to go into the monastery. He stressed that rules of the monastery excluding 
women should be strictly observed everywhere. The situation in the past was 
acknowledged by Agu Yongzhong as women were strictly prohibited from entering. He 
thinks that keeping women away from the monastery is a way to maintain the monks’ 
authority and the monastery’s sense of mystery. This further demonstrates that the 
Tibetan monastery is a male-centred religious space. In the past, women were conscious 
of keeping their distance from the temple, and they just “took a peek standing by the gate 
of the temple”. But now, women dare to step inside, which Agu Yongzhong sees as 
degrading the masculinity, sacredness and mystery of the monastery and the authority of 
monks. In this way, it might be thought that the exclusion of women is to some extent 
used to strengthen the authority of monks.  
To sum up, Zharu Monastery, a public religious space of the Bon religion has been 
through dramatic changes alongside the social, economic and politic changes of 
contemporary Tibetan society in China since the development of tourism in the early 
1980s. The general meaning of a monastery as a sacred, public and male-dominant 
space has been greatly challenged and contested with different levels of spatial politics 
placed on it. In this process, the monastery gradually lost its appeal. 
From this discussion of public religious space, the focus moves to domestic religious 
space examining how the Bon religion has been revitalised in domestic space.  
5.3 Rising non-institutional religious spaces 
The transformations in the importance of the monastery in the religious life of Jiuzhaigou 
should not be interpreted to suggest that there has necessarily been a decline in 
religious belief and practice. Rather, I argue that there has been a transformation in its 
forms and expression. In this section examines the revitalisation of domestic religious 
spaces and the growth of family and community-led practices. In Section 5.3.1, I will 
draw a picture of the increasing number of religious structures. Following that, I will 
describe the thriving domestic religious practices (Section 5.3.2) and the revival of 
chanting of the Prosperity Sutra (Section 5.3.3). Then Section 5.3.4 will examine a 
family-based bottom-up religious festival organised by non-monastic forces. Right after 
this, the gender politics evident in domestic religious space will be explored (Section 
5.3.5).   
133 
 
5.3.1 Spectacular constructions of private religious spaces 
Religious buildings and their compounds like temples, churches and mosques are the 
most obvious representation of religion in space which can provide believers with a 
sensual experience of religion. For Hindus, by placing appropriate religious materials and 
artefacts around the house, many parts of home can be sanctified (Mazumdar and 
Mazumdar, 2009: 260-262). As it suggests, home is a very important religious space 
which is more private, family-oriented and non-institutional. For Tibetans, at home there 
are ostensible religious objects such as chanting rooms20, altars and prayer wheels. 
When I asked my interviewees which religious space was most meaningful for them, 
home and the Zhayizhaga sacred mountain were the two most frequently mentioned 
places apart from institutional spaces such as monasteries and temples.  
When I arrived at Jiuzhaigou for the first time, I was astonished by the density and scale 
of religious constructions erected by local people. There are far more domestic religious 
constructions in Jiuzhaigou than other Tibetan areas that I have visited. Almost every 
family has a big stupa in their courtyard and several prayer flags surrounding their 
house. Agu Yidan, a migratory monk from Anbei who sometimes comes to Jiuzhaigou 
shared the same feeling as mine: “People here [in Jiuzhaigou] spend more money on 
religion. Every family builds a stupa in front of their house; this doesn’t happen in my 
hometown.” He was surprised to see a stupa erected in front of every house because in 
Anbei there are just a few village stupas in communal areas. Agu Yidan thinks the 
reason for the large scale religious construction is that Jiuzhaigou people are enjoying a 
better economic life and hence have more money to spend on religious constructions. In 
Anbei people cannot afford a stupa for each household. Apart from the stupas and 
prayer flags which can be seen everywhere, most families now have a separate, 
refurbished chanting room, something that was not affordable before. This provides 
physical space for more domestic religious practices. According to Zewang, a middle-
aged layman expressed the changes resulted from better economic condition below: 
We do sutra chantings far more than before. Chanting 2 or 3 times a year is 
reasonable. But we do it 7 or 8 times a year. It is like this when economic 
conditions are better. …This is related to the economy. Han people build 
houses when they get rich, Tibetans do sutra-chanting when they get rich. It is 
                                                
20 A chanting room in Tibet is a separate room/hall for placing statues of Buddha/gods, 
scriptures and other religious objects like drums, gongs and bells. This room should 
be specifically for religious use. Most of the domestic religious ceremonies are done 
here, such as chanting by monks and family prayers. In most places, the chanting 




the same all over the Tibetan area. Now there are many rich people chanting 
sutras every day in Shuzheng and in Zharu villages. There is a saying here, 
‘Tibetans do more chanting when richer, Han people build more houses when 
richer.’ 
However, some new domestic religious practices and religious buildings and objects are 
emerging for replacing the older practices such as circumambulating Mount Zhayizhaga. 
When I asked her to describe the changes in religious belief and practice from the end of 
the Cultural Revolution to the present, Zhuoga, a middle-aged woman, concurred that 
the emergence of large scale religious buildings is the result of better economic 
conditions that have been in place since the development of tourism in Jiuzhaigou. She 
also talked about people’s stronger enthusiasm for circumambulation around the sacred 
mountain in the past. Then she described the present condition as follows: 
Now people are lazy. [They] have many [other] ways of doing these [religious] 
things, or replacing them. [We] can make prayer wheels to represent them. 
[We] can make prayer flags in place of undertaking other more strenuous 
activities …. We don’t need to chant [by ourselves]. Monks can chant [on our 
behalf]. Look at now, we use electronic prayer wheels, which can automatically 
chant for us. Modernisation gradually comes out like this. Then people are 
becoming lazy. Once upon a time, there was no modernisation. We retained 
our belief through [personal] effort. That is true [belief]. But even though it looks 
like [our belief] is weaker, in our heart it hasn’t changed.  
Zhuoga maintains that because people are lazy now, they are using many more religious 
objects as alternatives to fulfil the same religious purpose as circumambulating the 
mountain. As she sees it, it is modernisation that changes their ways of practicing 
religion and leads to more religious objects and fewer religious practices. She believes 
modernisation brings more modern techniques, which makes people more lazy. In her 
comments on the changes of religious practices, bodily effort was praised and labelled 
as emblems of true belief, especially in contrast to current times, when many religious 
practices have been watered down. She was clear that religion is still important in 
people’s hearts even though the religious atmosphere is weaker. Despite the increasing 
religious constructions, the element of ‘true’ religion, bodily efforts is replaced and 
weakened.  
Many people I talked to mentioned that they do not circumambulate their sacred 
mountain, Zhayizhaga Mountain as often as before because they think they have 
become lazy. This wide-ranging similar response reflects the fact that in people’s 
thoughts being lazy is the main reason for undertaking fewer bodily challenging religious 
practices. As a matter of fact, Jiuzhaigou people are not lazy when it comes to doing 
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religious prayers and rituals at home. A considerable revival of domestic religious 
practices in Jiuzhaigou testifies to the diligence of locals in practicing religion. Thus what 
they mean by “lazy” appears to be that they have less involvement in religious practices 
that are more strenuous.  
Bodily effort is an important quality which is highly praised in Bon both among laypeople 
and monks (see Chapter 7 for the importance of bodily effort in religious practices for 
monks). The body is a significant element in Bon practice. Bon and Buddhism focus on 
bodily practices such as meditation and yoga, which eventually enable the fulfilment of 
Dharma practice. For example, meditation requires one to break through the body’s 
pains and tensions in order to achieve peace and gain clarity of thought. The greater the 
bodily effort one makes, the higher the degree of one’s practice. Nowadays, Jiuzhaigou 
people acknowledge that they are doing fewer religious practices which consume bodily 
effort than before and fewer than people in Anbei. The main reasons cited for this relate 
to their new working and living patterns which make them less capable of intense labour-
consuming activities and afford them less flexibility with their spare time. They are 
engaged in tourism which is far less labour-demanding than their former activities of 
farming and herding. In the past almost everyone was physically strong as they honed 
their bodies by cultivating the land and herding stocks. Therefore, bodily religious 
practices were easy for them. Zhuoma, an older woman in Jiuzhaigou, recollected her 
experience of circumambulating Mount Zhayizhaga during the Cultural Revolution. She 
told me that, “At that time, religious practices were forbidden, but we still very much 
wanted to go to circumambulate the [Zhayizhaga] mountain.” She drew a comparison 
with young people of today:  
Young people nowadays aren’t like us. They are lazy when it comes to 
circumambulating the mountain. My son has just done the circumambulation a 
few times. When I was young, [I] went to circumambulate the mountain every 
now and then…. [During the Cultural Revolution] I would finish 
circumambulating overnight, starting at about 8 at night, finishing the whole 
circle at about 4 or 5 the next morning. Sometimes it was too dark to find the 
road. I didn’t feel tired or cold at all. After circumambulation [I] kept on doing 
farming work in the day time. [I was] full of energy at that time. Now young 
people need one whole day or two days to finish the walk. 
When I asked my interviewees which religious practices do they liked most, most of them 
answered walking around Mount Zhayizhaga rather than any other institutional 
ceremonies or domestic chanting. The reasons varied. Many of them said things like 
circumambulating the mountain “could purify your mind and body”, “is a way of practicing 
religion”, and “a good exercise for health”. However almost all of them emphasised that 
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the most important reason was that “[I] put great effort in the whole process, and did it on 
my own in person”. This reflects the way that people cherish religious practice into which 
they put bodily effort. There lies a paradox that even though Jiuzhaigou people say that 
they like walking around the sacred mountain most, but they do it less. 
As we have seen, a large amount of money has been put into domestic religious 
constructions in Jiuzhaigou thanks to funds from tourism, which provides local people 
with ways of earning a good living. This is compatible with Gentz’s (2009) broader claim 
that economic growth has facilitated an increase in the number of temples and religious 
professionals in China. These domestic religious constructions also give people an 
excuse for not visiting public religious spaces. One middle-aged woman named Gexicuo 
explained why she was not walking around the Zhayizhaga Sacred Mountain as follows:  
Walking round the Zhayizhaga Mountain is very exhausting. I did it several 
times when I was young. But I can’t do it now. Staying at home burning incense 
and prostrating before the Buddha is the same [as circumambulating the 
sacred mountain]. Once you are devout to Buddha, doing everything is the 
same. 
Gexicuo’s argument that domestic religious practices can be a replacement for visiting 
public religious space is shared among local people in Jiuzhaigou. However, in Anbei 
people have different views, as can be seen from a response made by Diki, a middle-
aged woman from Anbei, when I asked her if chanting and burning incense at home 
could replace circumambulating the sacred mountain.  
No! Circumambulating the [sacred] mountain is much more important. It is very 
good for driving away bad karma, [and being] better blessed. Merely burning 
incense is not that good [for gaining merit].… What Jiuzhaigou people said is 
their excuse for laziness. We circuambulate the [Xiaoxitian]21 Mountain 3 to 4 
times every year. Some young people do it even more. 
This understanding of circumambulation is different from that of Jiuzhaigou people. Diki 
made a clear distinction between circumambulation and domestic religious activities. The 
spectacular construction of private religious spaces in Jiuzhaigou to some extent reveals 
a rise in domestic religion that in part involves changes in attitudes about the relative 
importance of different kinds of practices taking place away from the home. 
                                                
21 The nearest sacred mountain to Anbei village 
137 
 
5.3.2 The non-stop sound of chanting 
Constructing physical space helping to generate religious feelings is an important aspect 
of space-making, but it is not the whole story. Religious practices are crucial in making 
religious space as well. With the huge increase in domestic religious spaces, domestic 
religious practices have also vigorously grown in Jiuzhaigou.  
According to my communications with local people, it is normal that each family hold 
religious ceremonies several times a year. Families with older generation and monks 
particularly engage more in domestic religious practices. Older generation put most of 
their time and money into various domestic religious practices (see Chapter 6). I was 
surprised when I first got to know the high frequency of private religious practices in 
Jiuzhaigou compared to my hometown. Agu Langsang, a monk from Songpan who 
frequently performs religious services in Jiuzhaigou, told me that, “They are doing a lot of 
religious rituals. Basically the sound of sutra-chanting in this village [Shuzheng Village] 
never stops. Every day there is at least one family doing religious rituals.” This 
description depicts a picture of vigorous domestic religion in Jiuzhaigou. The sound of 
sutra chanting is used as a prominent signifier of religion. This ceaseless sound of 
chanting in a village with only about 40 families means that on average each family has 
at least 9 days each year when they invite monks to conduct familial rituals and 
ceremonies.   
Locals generally felt proud of this non-stop sound of chanting, as they consider this a 
sign of their strong religious commitment. The following account, from Nuobu, a middle-
aged Jiuzhaigou man, provides an example:  
We might not be as pious as Songpan people, but [we] definitely do more 
chanting than them. The sound of chanting here never stops. You’ve been here 
for long enough. [You] must know [this]. At least judging from this, Jiuzhaigou’s 
religious enthusiasm is not low. Even in the whole of Aba, Jiuzhaigou does well. 
Nuobu and I discussed the differences in the religious situation in Jiuzhaigou and 
Songpan. He acknowledged that Jiuzhaigou generally is not as religious as Songpan; he 
felt that Songpan people do more religious practices and are more spiritually devout. For 
him, the strength of Jiuzhaigou lay in the high frequency with which chanting was 
conducted.  
This non-stop sound of chanting also generates competition for monks. As is easily 
imagined, there is an extremely high demand for monks conducting rituals for laypeople, 
but local monks are involved in the tourism business. The supply of monks becomes a 
138 
 
large problem for Jiuzhaigou people. I once conducted an interview with a grandmother 
in Jiuzhaigou during which there was a monk chanting for her family. She said it was 
very hard to invite monks nowadays, because there was high demand and limited 
supply. After a tough process, the monk who was at the time in her house was 
successfully obtained. She called him several times in order to make a booking in 
advance. Her son drove about two hours to pick him up from Songpan. Once a monk 
gets into Jiuzhaigou, he normally has a tight schedule. People have learned to listen 
keenly to hear if there is a monk at a nearby house. The news of his arrival will be 
quickly spread by local laypeople. Other families will come and extend an invitation. In 
order to ensure that the monk concentrated fully on his chanting without disturbance, the 
grandmother had the ritual performed in secret and asked the monk to chant in a low 
voice so that he would not be heard by neighbours. 
The significant rise of domestic practices provides more evidence that locals’ religious 
enthusiasm is not declining in a linear way but rather is transforming. Contrary to the 
decreased appeal of the monastery discussed in Section 5.2, domestic religious 
practices as well as domestic religious buildings have experienced a significant increase. 
Among many domestic religious practices, chanting of the Prosperity Sutra 22  has 
become more popular; this sutra is more relevant to the individual pursuit of fortune and 
has been particularly regenerated since the introduction of tourism.  
5.3.3 The revival of chanting of the Prosperity Sutra  
Tourism not only boosts the growth of both domestic religious spaces and practices, it 
has also led to the revival of an old sutra, the Prosperity Sutra, known as yogu in 
Tibetan.  
Agu Caidan, the young monk from Zharu Monastery whom I quoted earlier, told me that 
one of the direct impacts of tourism on religion was the prevalence of the chanting of the 
Prosperity Sutra, which he insisted was done for economic reasons. The Prosperity 
Sutra is a short Bon sutra mainly used for blessing people and wishing they have good 
fortune and make money. In the past the Prosperity Sutra was not popular at all, and the 
old monks in Jiuzhaigou were not able to chant this sutra as they had not learnt it. This 
meant that young and middle-aged monks were the only people who had mastered this 
sutra.  
                                                
22 The purpose for chanting the Prosperity-Scripture is to bless people have good fortune 
and make money. 
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Monks normally learn the sutras which are in demand. Before the development of 
tourism, people in Jiuzhaigou earned a living by farming and herding, which is highly 
dependent on the weather and the nature of the land. Making money for a cash economy 
was not their priority and was not even on their minds. Agu Caidan commented that he 
had heard from the old monks that, “In the past, people in Jiuzhaigou were praying for a 
good harvest, but now they are praying for tourism and getting money from tourism.” As 
we saw in Chapter 3, since the introduction of tourism in 1984, Jiuzhaigou people have 
gradually given up farming and herding. At the moment, they do not have any arable 
land or livestock. Tourism has become their dominant source of income. To make this 
source of income secure, they turned to their religion to ask for blessings for their tourism 
business. In these conditions, the Prosperity Sutra has been revived as a result of the 
high level of demand from local people. Tourism is now one of the key themes that 
shapes the agenda for prayer. 
5.3.4 Risang Festival: a grassroots bottom-up religious event 
Individuals and communities now claim direct access to the sacred, without 
mediation by religious professionals or a clerical elite. This new immediacy 
allows individuals and communities to construct the sacred in ways that are 
more democratic, egalitarian, playful, inventive and potentially subversive than 
in the recent past.(Fenn, 2001: 3)  
With the decreasing influence of the monastery, in Jiuzhaigou laypeople play the leading 
role in initiating and organising a big religious ceremony, the Risang Festival. Monks and 
the monastery just assist with religious issues in this festival. 
In 2012 local laypeople in Jiuzhaigou initiated a new annual Jiuzhaigou-wide religious 
festival, Risang Festival. In the past, it was just a small scale religious ritual conducted in 
each village. In the summer of 2012, the heads of three villages decided to expand it into 
a Jiuzhaigou-wide religious festival. The reasons they gave were threefold. Firstly, 
serving Buddha and gods is beneficial for gaining good fortune for Jiuzhaigou and all 
sentient beings, as well as for preserving the waters and mountains. Secondly, the 
festival could become a cultural tourist product attracting tourists and spreading Tibetan 
culture. Thirdly, they said that locals need this festival because of the closure of the 
monastery and its decline as a dominant power in organising religious events in the past 
few years. One of the festival organisers, Norbu, a middle-aged layman from Jiuzhaigou, 
told me that the festival is organised because of demand from local people. He said that,  
We feel people need this kind of event. Since Zharu Monastery closed, there 
has been no big religious event for a long time. Sometimes people here have 
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to go to other nearby monasteries to attend big events. Without teaching from 
lamas, people don’t know their beliefs very well, especially young people. 
Inviting prestigious lamas to give sermons would actually help them to know 
more about our religion.  
People have big demand for this kind of big religious events. Norbu especially 
emphasised young people’s lack of knowledge in their religion which could be 
complemented somewhat through having the Risang Festival. Norbu and his fellow 
organisers managed the whole festival, including inviting lamas and monks to teach, 
chant and perform rituals, getting permission and support from Jiuzhaigou JAB and 
raising money and arranging for every family to provide logistic support. The family is the 
basic unit of the festival’s organisation. Each family was assigned to help in running of 
the festival and providing food.   
In this festival, the role of monks and the monastery is diminished. Although there is no 
official involvement from Zharu monastery in festival management, Risang Festival has 
received positive feedback from laypeople, monks and JAB. The teaching element was 
the most welcomed and memorable part of the festival for the laypeople who have not 
experienced this for many years. For young people, they have been able to gain a new 
understanding of their religion. Xiuying, a young laywoman from Jiuzhaigou, put it in the 
following words: 
The teaching was impressive. I have never seen this before. Even though the 
lamas were just talking about issues like not smoking and gambling, I felt 
things about Bon are close to me and easy to understand. It is not as 
complicated as I imagined before. In the past, I knew nothing about Bon; I just 
practiced what my parents told me to. I hope there will be more events like this. 
Because the Tibetan Bon sutras are not easily accessible to laypeople as they are 
written in Tibetan which only a small proportion of Tibetans recognise, Tibetan laypeople 
need guidance to understand them, and that guidance needs to come from monks. 
Xiuying does not know the Tibetan language. She explained to me that, before the 
festival, the religious ideas she derived were mainly from her parents who themselves 
were not properly taught. Therefore, religious ideas were abstract and complicated for 
her. She said that after the festival she felt much closer to her religion. Many other 
people told me they had a positive experience of the festival. Unlike the traditional 
monastery-organised Mazhi Festival (see Section 5.2.5.3) which receives mixed reviews, 
Risang Festival obtained unanimous praise.  
This religious festival is also supported by JAB. I asked how they obtained support and 
approval from the JAB to Zerenzhu, a middle-aged man. He answered me as follows: 
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Our Risang Festival is not only a religious activity, but also an important [kind 
of] ethnic culture. … We reported to JAB that this could be developed as [a 
product of] cultural tourism and folk tourism. And this could attract tourists. [So] 
the JAB approved this activity and gave us money.  
For gaining the support to hold this festival, local people adopted some tactics. Firstly, 
they connected it to tourism and make it a cultural tourist product for expanding their 
product-line; Secondly, it is promoted as a kind of ethnic culture and its religious aspect 
was deliberately deemphasised. Through these strategies, Risang Festival not only was 
permitted, but also received funding from JAB.  
Because of Zharu Monastery’s current lack of visibility in religious affairs, community 
power actively takes on the role of fulfilling the religious needs of Jiuzhaigou people. This 
is possible not only because of the latent enthusiasm of Jiuzhaigou people for Bon but 
also because Zharu Monastery cannot easily host a wide range of religious activities 
given current political tensions. 
5.3.5 Gendered space: gender politics in domestic religious spaces 
Home is often given religious and spiritual meaning. Women in a range of cultures have 
traditionally been regarded as the people who are responsible for maintaining and 
making the home (Valentine, 2001: 63-104). For Chinese families in Singapore, domestic 
religious rituals are taken care of by the matriarchs (Kiong and Kong, 2000: 42). For 
Muslim women, non-institutional domestic spaces, as their main sites of religious 
practice, enhances women’s social interaction and identity (Mazumdar, 1999). 
Compared with the monastery and other public spaces, the gender role in domestic 
religious space has a different significance. In Jiuzhaigou, women play a leading role in 
domestic religious practices which are important (yet accorded lesser significance than 
tasks performed by men).  
Cuomo, the middle-aged local woman whom I quoted above told me that, “Normally 
women undertake most of the domestic religious work. The formal religious activities are 
done by men, and during that time women stay aside. For example, the big chanting 
ceremony every winter and things like this are done by men. The small things like 
cooking and cleaning are done by women.” This suggests that a general classification of 
religious practices is based on gender difference. The formal and big religious activities 
are assigned to men; the domestic and small religious practices are for women. This 
clear gender division of religious work is also in men’s minds. At home, religion becomes 
for them a trivial thing which is in the charge of women. Men normally are not much 
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involved in domestic religion. Xila, a middle-aged man from Jiuzhaigou quoted above, 
spoke for this gender difference.  
Xila: At home, religious activities are mostly taken care of by my wife. I don’t 
involve myself in these things. I believe her, she can manage these [affairs] 
well.  
Ying: Why? 
Xila: Normally these things are taken care of by women. I just need to drive a 
car taking the monk here and send him home.”  
Xila leaves his wife to do domestic religious practices. The everyday routine of burning 
incense in the morning is mainly conducted by his wife. He said, “-I always feel at ease 
when my wife is in charge of this”. In familial rituals, men always sit in front of women. 
Yidan, the wandering monk from Anbei, explained that this “shows respect to men. 
Women can sit in the front if men are not there. If men are there, both a wife and other 
women should respect men.” In the family, men still have a relatively higher position than 
women, something that is taken for granted by men and women in most households.  
What needs to be emphasised here is that nowadays women contribute as much as 
(sometimes even more than) men to the domestic income, as tourism provides them 
almost equal job opportunities. Women’s rising role in the family economy has not yet 
however made much change to their status in terms of dealing with trivial things in and 
out of the religious sphere.  
5.4 Conclusion 
“Religious landscapes may reveal symbolically and literally a local politics, or local 
structure of power and authority” (Kong, 2002: 1574). In this chapter, I examined 
transformations of the religious landscape in Jiuzhaigou, with a focus on changes to the 
two most prominent institutional and non-institutional religious spaces: the monastery 
and the home before and after the advent of tourists. More specifically, I discussed the 
challenges and contestations to the traditional meaning of the monastery as sacred, 
public, Tibetan-exclusive and male-dominant, and the revitalisation of domestic religious 
space since tourism development. In Section 5.2, I examined contestations and the 
politics of place-making in Zharu Monastery. Firstly, I discussed how the government and 
local people perceive the boundary between the monastery as tourist product and as 
holy space. The government prefers to see the monastery as a tourist product and play 
down its religious significance. Local people regard it as a holy space whose sanctity 
should not be defiled by profiteering. Secondly, we saw how the public nature of the 
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monastery is being challenged by ownership-claims from non-religious institutions 
(laypeople, local government), by fragmentising and privatising the Stupa, by 
monastery’s failure to fulfil its public role. Thirdly, after the affair of the fraudulent Han 
tourist business, the monastery has become a place that demonstrates Tibetan identity 
in contradistinction to Han Chinese identity. Lastly, the monastery is also a space with 
serious gender divisions in which women and their bodies are seen as vectors of 
pollution. Through these, the monastery somewhat loses its appeal and significance. 
In section 5.3, I explored the revival of domestic religious space. Jiuzhaigou people have 
greatly increased their capital investment in religious buildings, objects and practices 
thanks to tourism, which has fundamentally changed their work and living style (see 
Chapter 4 for a detailed description of local people’s close relationships with tourism). 
The high demand for domestic religious observances also leads to competition for the 
services of monks, and a revival of the Prosperity Sutra and a family-based bottom-up 
religious festival organised by laypeople. It seems domestic religion somehow 
supplements the loss in institutional or public religion. While on the one hand, they are 
able to invest more in religious practices and structures such as chantings and stupas, 
on the other hand, some people regret that Jiuzhaigou people are less likely to exert 
themselves in pursuit of religious practices. Modernisation, which brings new labour-
saving technology, can be seen as one factor contributing to the increasing use of 
domestic religious space. Women, who are assigned to domestic religious duties of 
lesser significance, still have a relatively lower position than men in the family.  
The first concluding point that can be drawn from this chapter is a shift toward a non-
institutional expression of religion. Before I began my fieldwork, I had a pre-supposition 
that Jiuzhaigou is experiencing secularisation. Through careful examination of the 
transformation of religious spaces in the light of secularisation theories, I found that the 
central change is not towards secularisation but specifically towards the 
deinstitutionalisation of religion. To quote Peter Berger (1999: 10), “a shift in the 
institutional location of religion” would be more accurate in describing religious change in 
Jiuzhaigou than secularisation. Religious commitment and affiliation with religious 
institutions have become less relevant in assessing the vitality of a religion (Dobbelaere, 
2002: 38-44). In Jiuzhaigou, religious change takes on a path that is not simply 
unidirectional. The role and meaning of the monastery have been diversified and 
contested, which makes it harder for its monks to perform their religious duties and 
transmit religious ideas to laypeople. The monastery’s significance is declining. 
Monasticism is under threat, given that Zharu Monastery has gradually failed functionally 
and lost its appeal and reputation among laypeople in Jiuzhaigou. The decline of 
institutional religion under these conditions has not been accompanied by the decline in 
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religious belief among laypeople. On the contrary, laypeople have moved their practice 
of religion outside of the institutional sphere.  
The second conclusion is that the tourism economy is now a fundamental factor in 
reshaping religion in Jiuzhaigou. It dissolved the traditional authority and power of the 
monastery, but not Tibetans’ enthusiasm toward Bon. It generated new burgeoning 
religious demands and facilitated the material realisation of these demands. Based on 
large-scale quantitative data, Norris and Inglehart (2004: 25) claimed that the rich 
societies in the world are becoming less religious; in contrast poor societies with growing 
population still have vital religious expressions. From my study, it would be hard to 
conclude that the economically advanced Jiuzhaigou is less religious than the 
economically backward Anbei. Even though they generally see themselves as less 
religious than the people of Anbei because of less bodily effort of themselves in 
practicing religion, the physical presence, high demand of religion have been thriving. 
Just as Jiuzhaigou people themselves argued, the non-stop sound of chanting is a point 
evidencing their strong religious feelings. Sometimes religious vitality has been vibrantly 
maintained at micro level rather than at macro level (Wilford, 2010). My study suggests 
religiosity is related in a more nuanced way to a complex set of elements, rather than 
simply determined by monastery membership, or self-claimed piety on a scale of 1 to 5. 
Responding to Norris and Inglehart’s claim, I would argue that economic conditions are 
not the sole consideration in determining the strength of religious feeling in a specific 
place.  
The process of modernisation will not necessarily lead to the decline of religion in social 
life, but rather to transformations in its social forms (Pollack and Pickel, 2007: 604). For 
example, the Christian church accommodates itself to attract more membership, 
especially in America; and it becomes a place to socialise and to meet friends. In 
Jiuzhaigou, Zharu Monastery has been re-designed as a crucial tourist product, and this 
generates struggles and conflicts between local people and the government, amongst 
the local laypeople themselves, between local laypeople and the monks, between 
Tibetans and Han Chinese. According to the new construction plan for Zharu Monastery, 
the monastery compound will house an activity centre for the elderly as well as being a 
tourist site. Tourists, laypeople and monks will have more interactions in the monastery. 
Its physical space, social forms and social-spiritual meanings will have further changes. 
It will be worth following up these changes in the future to add to our understanding of 
religious change at the macro level.  
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Secularisation as a trend is of relevance to the extent that Tibetans find themselves 
confronted by the secular and powerful Han China and this serves to reinforce ethno-
religious identity among Tibetans (which will be further evidenced in Chapter 6 and 7).  
Although the conclusions I have made are drawn from one case, Jiuzhaigou and Zharu 
Monastery are singled out among many other places which have common sets of issues 
confronted by ethnic and religious minority groups throughout the China. Many of these 
groups are, for example, encouraged to develop tourism by the government; local 
religions in many areas where minorities live are used as a tourist resource; in all of 
these places, there is secular pressure from Han China (Oakes and Sutton, 2010). Many 
Tibetan monasteries are experiencing pressures stemming from tourism and other forms 
of economic development, and will have to face similar challenges. While the focus is 
often on the macro level, this analysis of religious change in Jiuzhaigou presents a 






























Chapter 6 Intergenerationality and religious change: religious 
and ethnic identities in schools and at home 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on processes of religious change in Jiuzhaigou through the lens of 
intergenerational relations. An intergenerational perspective is particularly useful for 
understanding processes of religious change because all religions rely upon the 
reproduction of their systems of belief and practice for their survival – no religion can 
persist if it does not produce new generations of believers and practitioners. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the mechanism through which religions reproduce themselves 
has conventionally been conceptualised as a process of intergenerational transmission, 
whereby an older generation transmits its beliefs and practices to younger generations. 
However, recent scholarship on intergenerationality and religion has critiqued notions of 
straightforward intergenerational transmission, recognising that younger generations 
often adapt and rework religious ideas and practices in relation to their contexts and 
circumstances (Hopkins et al., 2011). Periods of rapid economic, political and social 
change can disrupt established patterns of intergenerational religious transmission. 
Research on minority religions and cultures in a range of different contexts has also 
shown that states that are seeking to assimilate minority groups often view children and 
young people as especially vulnerable to assimilative policies and practices. In particular, 
states have often adopted educational practices that seek (as least partially) to separate 
children and young people from the influence of parents for the purpose of instilling 
particular dominant values and belief systems. In the case of Jiuzhaigou, as a result of 
increased economic prosperity caused by tourism, parents could afford to send their 
children to boarding schools (unlike in Anbei), and hence parents chose to engage in a 
practice that potentially contributed to further Han assimilation and religious change. This 
chapter seeks to understand the intergenerational dimensions of religious continuity and 
change at a time of rapid economic modernisation in Jiuzhaigou and pressures of Han 
assimilation on people of Tibetan ethnicity. 
Over the course of 30 years of tourism development, Jiuzhaigou has grown to be a 
frontier of modernisation and Han-assimilation in Tibet. In the western academic 
discourse, modernity has been widely considered as a damaging force for traditional 
religion (Wilson, 1982; Bruce, 1992; Lambert, 1999; Dobbelaere, 2002; Weber, 2009). 
However, drawing on qualitative data from members of different generations in 
Jiuzhaigou, I argue that the story of religious change in this context is not one simply of a 
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linear trajectory of religious decline despite the changing economic landscape and the 
pressures of Han assimilation. In particular, it is younger generations who have 
experienced the deepest and most comprehensive contacts with modernity. I argue that 
younger generations who are experiencing new forms of educational practice compared 
to older generations (such as being sent to Han-dominated boarding schools outside of 
Jiuzhaigou) are producing a new synthesis of ‘traditional’ Bon ideas and the atheist 
ideologies encountered during their educational experiences. Young people’s religious 
and ethnic identities show evidence of fluidity, change and adaption in different times 
and spaces. State schools have played a key role in reshaping their patterns of religious 
practices and of understandings of religion and Tibetan identity. Traditional patterns of 
intergenerational religious transmission have in some ways been interrupted, but this 
interruption is far from complete or total. Modernist and atheist ideas such as superstition, 
rationality and science provide a basis for their critical attitudes toward religion. However, 
when they return home, they adopt a more accepting attitude toward religion. Young 
Jiuzhaigou Tibetans seem to adopt a more critical attitude towards religion when they 
are attending boarding school and acquiring formal education; however, they seemingly 
adopted a more accommodating view when returning home and taking on more familial 
duties, feeling it important to pass Bon religion to their own children.   
Home serves as a hub for maintaining and developing patterns of religious transmission 
and exchange for both younger and older generations. The process of becoming parents 
and feelings of parental love seemingly stimulated a strong wish in Jiuzhaigou young 
laypeople to be more involved in - and also to involve their children in - religious 
practices. In other words, children to a great extent contributed to the 
increasing/rejuvenated religiosity of parents and grandparents. Transmitting Bon values 
and practices to children/grandchildren is considered to be women’s familial duty, thus 
marriage seems to serve as an important turning point for women to have stronger 
attachment to religion.  
As stated in Chapter 2, the term ‘generation’ is used in varied ways both colloquially and 
in academic discourse (Vanderbeck and Worth, 2014). The term is used in this chapter 
to refer both to a particular peer cohort of similar age and to a particular kinship status in 
a family.More specifically, generation refers to children/parents/grandparents when it is 
discussed in a setting like home, while it denotes a particular cohort in a specific age 
range when it is discussed in a setting like school.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. I will begin with a discussion of Jiuzhaigou 
laypeople’s general understanding of religion and its relationships with language and 
ethnicity (Section 6.2). Although this section does not deal directly with 
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intergenerationality, it is important for understanding the wider religious environment in 
Jiuzhaigou. And then, I will focus on young people who obtain education opportunities in 
state boarding schools thanks to the wealth brought by tourism, exploring the ways in 
which young people’s religious and ethnic identity is reshaped in state schools, a multi-
ethnic and atheist space (Section 6.3). In Section 6.4, the focus will shift to home, a hub 
of intergenerational religious transmission and exchange. I will examine how religious 
values and practices are transmitted among younger and older generations.  
6.2 Changing religion, language and ethnic identity  
In this section, I will explore how local young people generally understand religion in 
relation to language and ethnic identity for setting the scene for the later discussions on 
young people’s changing religiosity and ethnic identity, intergenerational transmission of 
religion.  
A prominent response I encountered during my fieldwork is that Jiuzhaigou Tibetans 
often link religion with wider issues of Tibetan culture, illustrating the extent to which 
religion was not necessarily conceptualised as a clearly separate sphere of Tibetan life 
(see also Chapter 4 for a discussion of my choice of terminology when discussing issues 
of religion with respondents). When I spoke about religion in Jiuzhaigou, the 
conversation would very often naturally lead to broader issues of Tibetan culture and, 
more specifically, Tibetan language. For Jiuzhaigou Tibetans, ideas about religion and 
language are significantly linked in people’s minds. Religion and language are crucial 
indicators of Tibetan ethnic identity. As found by Zhu’s (2007) study on ethnic identity of 
Tibetan students in neidi schools23, Tibetan language is a central feature of Tibetan 
ethnicity. This is illustrated in the following example, which demonstrates the close 
connections and flowing transitions between ideas of religion and language in the 
narratives of Jiuzhaigou Tibetans:  
                                                
23 Neidi literally means inner land and geographically refers to non-peripheral areas of 
China. Neidi schools/classes are a type of boarding school located in inland China 
and established specially for providing students from TAR and Xinjiang Province free 
secondary level and secondary vocational education since 1984. The neidi 
schools/classes are distributed in big cities in inland China. According to 2010 
“China’s Ethnic Statistical Yearbook” (Guojia Minzu Shiwu Weiyuanhui Jingjifazhansi 
and Guojia Tongjiju Guominjingji Zonghetongjisi, 2011), in 2008 there were 13689 
junior middle-school students and 4401 senior middle-school students from TAR 
studying in neidi schools/classes. According to news report from a state sponsored 
website “Tibet.cn”, in 2012 there were 46789 students in Tibet attending junior 
secondary entrance examination, among them there were 15020 wishing to be 
enrolled in the neidi Schools (Wang, 2012). As reported by the Tibet Daily (Liu, 2013), 
in 2012 there were 1540 students from TAR enrolled in neidi schools. 
150 
 
Ying: Compared to your younger sisters and brothers, do you think that your 
religiosity when you were young was similar to theirs? 
Gaxi: Of course different. 
Ying: Why? 
Gaxi: Nowadays children stay in Chengdu. They barely speak Tibetan. 
Economic conditions are good. All [parents] send their children outside [to big 
cities such as Chengdu and Mianyang] to study. We were different. We were 
sent out when our economic conditions had just begun improving. But [we] 
still experienced some influence [in terms of social and cultural changes]. 
[Nowadays] they always study outside and come back to stay for a one-
month holiday and leave. Many aspects [of religious life] can’t be seen by 
them. They just know that they are Tibetan, but know nothing of what they 
should know. (Gaxi, a young layperson in Jiuzhaigou) 
When Gaxi explained the reasons why he perceives his level of religiosity to differ from 
that of other (younger) young people, his very first response was related to language. 
For Gaxi, religious change and changes in patterns of linguistic acquisition were closely 
linked together. This form of discourse was not unique to Gaxi but rather was widely 
shared by almost all of my respondents. Religion and language served jointly as 
signifiers of Tibetan ethnic identity. Gaxi claimed that, as a result of their ignorance of 
Tibetan language and religious practices, contemporary people nowadays were not 
aware of the meaning of being Tibetan. This weakening of language ability was thought 
by Gaxi and others to be linked to young people’s seeming decreasing involvement in 
religious practices (I return to this issue of the relationship between ethnic identity and 
religion for young people in Section 6.3.2).  
The fact that language and ethnic identity were consistently invoked in discussions of 
Bon religion by my respondents also meant that issues related to the influence of the 
Han Chinese frequently featured in our conversations. The situation of Tibetan religion 
and culture could not be understood without reference to the influence of the Han 
Chinese (also see Section 5.2 for discussion of Tibetaness in the monastery in contrast 
to Han identity). Zezhen, a middle-aged woman in Jiuzhaigou, expressed her concerns 
on language loss of Jiuzhaigou young people in these terms:  
Ying: Have any children recently been sent to the monastery in Jiuzhaigou to 
become monks? 
Zezhen: Longkang [a town near Jiuzhaigou National Park] is good at holding 
onto religion. There are some children [from Longkang] studying Bon [in 
Zharu Monastery]. There is no one from Jiuzhaigou. It is like a Han place 
now. Older people say ‘children are studying outside, barely know Tibetan. 
They are turning into Han Chinese.’ They are called Tibetans. But they can’t 
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speak even one word of Tibetan. My sister’s children are all in Chengdu. She 
bought an apartment and is taking care of her children in Chengdu. They [her 
sister’s children] don’t know Tibetan at all. When we speak Tibetan, they will 
say ‘ah…! Speak in Chinese. I don’t understand at all.’ My Mom, who speaks 
little Chinese, cannot talk with them. 
Ying: Since when have they been studying Chengdu? 
Zezhen: Since they started at kindergarten. I told my sister to speak Tibetan 
to them. But they never stay here [in Jiuzhaigou] for a long time. They can 
learn nothing.  
Ying: As far as I know, there are many children like this. 
Zezhen: [They] don’t speak Tibetan anymore. It’s like [speaking] Chinese is 
easier for them. They just don’t speak Tibetan. Older folk say “speak [in 
Tibetan] to them even though [they don’t know the language], or they will turn 
into Han.  
Although schooling was considered the primary reason for young people’s lack of 
knowledge of the Tibetan language, over-exposure to tourism was considered another 
important factor. This was illustrated with a combination of humour and dismay in the 
account of Wangcuo, a young woman in Jiuzhaigou: 
Once upon a time some friends and I went to circumambulate the Xiaoxitian 
Sacred Mountain. We normally use Tibetan to do prayers. But one of my 
friends used Chinese to say ‘please bless me’. We then said to her ‘you are 
really influenced by the Han. You can’t even speak Tibetan.’ She replied ‘don’t 
you know that because of tourism development, sacred mountains now can 
understand Chinese.’ We are supposed to chant a mantra on our way to the 
sacred mountain. But we started to sing [Chinese] pop songs on our way.  
Tourism brings millions of tourists to Jiuzhaigou every year, most of whom are Han 
Chinese. It has become an important factor contributing to Han assimilation and the 
increasing popularity of Chinese language among young people. Even religious activities 
somehow relate to Han, as Chinese is used in many Tibetan religious occasions 
nowadays, especially among young Tibetans.  
Many parents expressed frustration about the current state of affairs, but found that 
these efforts to promote the use of the Tibetan language had limited success. Bamu (a 
young woman in Jiuzhaigou) told me regretfully that “the Tibetan language is going to 
disappear soon. Tibetan culture is almost totally assimilated by Han culture.” She then 
talked about her two-year-old daughter:  
She is young. I speak Tibetan to her all the time. But she hears other people 
speaking Chinese, she speaks Chinese most of the time. I didn’t teach her 
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Chinese. But she learnt it from many sources, such as from tourists living in our 
house. Now she can say words like sit down, eat, go and bring in Chinese.  
Bamu wants to keep her daughter’s sense of ethnic identity by intentionally creating an 
environment conducive to speaking Tibetan. However, her attempts to intentionally 
cultivate use of the Tibetan language by her daughter appear to be failing as the 
influence of the Chinese language seemingly proved too powerful to resist. Her daughter 
is already choosing to speak the language which has more influence on her life.  
Cuomo (a middle-aged woman in Jiuzhaigou), a mother with a teenage son also found 
that her son responds to her in Chinese even though she speaks Tibetan to him. Like 
Bamu, she tries to speak Tibetan as much as possible at home with her son. She 
explained her reasons for this as follows:  
It is necessary to learn the language of our ethnic group. As a Tibetan, [we] 
should at least know how to speak, even though we can’t read and write. It is 
simple to learn. Just speak with parents [in Tibetan]. Many [Han] women who 
married here can speak our language now. How come we can’t speak 
Tibetan? ... Sometimes I just want to laugh when my husband speaks Chinese 
to me. I say to him, ‘I’m not a Han wife. Why speak Chinese?’  
Cuomo has the same wish to keep the Tibetan language alive for her son to raise his 
awareness.  
Even though it is widely accepted that the Tibetan language is important in maintaining 
Tibetan identity in Jiuzhaigou, in practice most parents are not willing to send their 
children to Tibetan language schools or monasteries, which are the only institutions 
providing Tibetan language education (See Section 7.3.1). The following account of a 
monk’s attitudes to language from Bamu provides insight into the difference between the 
ideal and the practice.  
He didn’t want to learn Tibetan. He wanted to learn Chinese. He still blames his 
grandfather [for sending him to the monastery]. He once said ‘if I learnt 
Chinese, I could be different [from what I am now]’. He barely recognises 
Chinese words. He can only write his name in Chinese. He also cannot clearly 
express his thoughts in Chinese. …… He envies his friends who accepted 
Chinese language education. He yearned to study Chinese in schools. One 
feels more regret for what he can’t obtain. He’s like this. …… In terms of 
identity and social status, it seems to me that he isn’t willing to admit his 
identity, because he has always yearned to learn Chinese. His friends are 
successful now. Because he didn’t learn Chinese, he feels his status is a bit 
lower [than his friends’]. 
153 
 
It is noteworthy that for this monk (at least in Bamu’s interpretation) the Tibetan language 
was not something in which he had much pride. On the contrary, this account suggests 
feelings of regret for having learnt Tibetan and not having learnt Chinese. This difference 
is particularly demonstrated by communication skills and social status which he lacks, 
compared to friends who have stable jobs and incomes from which he is excluded by his 
inability to speak Chinese.  
Thus, language is not simply related to people’s ideal of maintaining ethnic identity, but it 
is crucial to social and economic aspects of life. Another account from a young monk in 
Gami Monastery echoed this fact. Like most other monks, Agu Qujian was sent to the 
monastery when he was a child. Since then he has started to learn Tibetan and Bon 
scripture. 
What I regret most is that I haven’t learnt Chinese. Now it is very hard not 
knowing Chinese. On Wechat I can’t send [text] messages to my friends. [I] 
don’t recognise messages sent by my friends. … [When I] go out [to other 
places], I can’t find my way around. Everything is in Chinese. [I] don’t know 
[how to take] a bus. Every time I take a taxi I feel as if I’m lost. 
This young monk expressed his regret at not learning Chinese. He detailed the 
inconveniences he has experienced because of language. He cannot efficiently 
communicate with others through social networks. Knowing little Chinese creates 
problems for his social life and basic life skills. Because of language, young monks are 
somehow marginalised in today’s society (see Chapter 7 for further discussion). 
In sum, for laypeople religion is closely associated with language contributing to the 
retention of Tibetan ethnic identity. Older generations showed deep concern at the 
gradual loss of language and religion among the younger generations. They tried to 
change this situation by for example intentionally speaking Tibetan to young people. 
However, in practice the Chinese language seems more practically useful and pervasive 
than Tibetan. This constitutes an important reason why Tibetan parents send children to 
public schools rather than monasteries in contemporary Tibet (see Chapter 7 for more 
discussion).  
As shown above, public education is considered one factor changing young Tibetans’ 
knowledge of religion and Tibetan language. The following section will discuss in detail 
how state schooling influences young Tibetans’ ethnic and religious identities.  
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6.3 Religion, ethnic identity, state schooling: exploring Tibetan 
identity among young Tibetans  
Building on the previous discussion of religion, ethnicity, and language, this section 
examines how the religious and ethnic identities of young Jiuzhaigou Tibetans are 
constructed within a modern Chinese school environment. To be specific, what will be 
explored is young people’s understandings of religion and the meanings of religion for 
them. In Section 6.3.1 the relevance of ethnic identity to young people’s religious identity 
will be discussed. This is followed by a discussion of how young people’s religious 
identities and ethnic identities are influenced by their interactions with the Han and other 
minority students (Section 6.3.2). In Section 6.3.3 particular attention will be given to 
young people’s attitudes to ‘superstition’ which greatly influenced their religious identity.  
6.3.1 Religion just comes naturally to Tibetans 
In Peek’s (2005) research on second-generation young Muslims in the United States, 
formation of their religious identity was argued to have three stages: religion as ascribed 
identity, as chosen identity and as declared identity. The first stage is marked by young 
Muslims’ imitation of their parents, unconditional acceptance without introspection, 
limited knowledge of Islam, and unclear sense of religious identity when they are children 
and adolescents. During this stage, their religious identity was ascribed by their birth into 
Muslim families and their religious identity was taken for granted (Peek, 2005: 223-230). 
Similar to these young Muslims, my young Tibetan respondents in Jiuzhaigou also feel 
religion is an ascribed identity coming with birth. It is a common sense view in Tibet that 
“all Tibetans believe in Tibetan Buddhism or Bon.” Kolås (1996) argued that Tibetan 
culture is a religion-induced culture. Religion provides emotional power and sustenance 
for Tibetans seeking to maintain and strengthen their ethnic identity. She found that in 
exiled Tibetan communities, religion is integral to defining Tibetanness. For Tibetans, 
whether or not to believe (in Bon/Buddhism) seems to be a question never considered by 
Tibetans, because their ethnic identity has already decided their religious identity 
(Epstein and Peng, 1998).  
Ethnic identity constantly and naturally appeared in my conversations about religion with 
Jiuzhaigou Tibetans, just as the Tibetan language did. From the following conversations 
with Cuomo (the middle-aged woman quoted above), we can see how she connects 
religious pilgrimage with her identity as a Tibetan.  
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Ying: Why do you want to go to Lhasa or Guanyinqiao24 for pilgrimage? 
Cuomo: If you are a Tibetan, you always want to go to Lhasa! You want to 
have a look at what it is like, and to pay your respects to the Buddhas. 
As it did with Cuomo, the close bond between religion and ethnicity implicitly showed up 
on many occasions in my conversations with local people. I asked Jamyang (a young 
man in Jiuzhaigou) if he intends to teach his children about Bon religion. He replied that 
“There is no need to teach. They will believe. They are born in this place. They will 
believe [this]. Not possible to believe anything else. This is tradition.” Jamyang and many 
others did not seem to worry about their children’s understanding of their religion. From 
Jamyang’s perspective, the place of birth and the culture of origin decide his children’s 
religious orientation. He felt it was natural and unquestionable that his children would 
believe in Bon like him and other Tibetans in Jiuzhaigou. Most of the younger 
respondents in this study expressed the same view that formation of religiosity is a 
natural process that is related to Tibetan identity and Tibetan cultural environment. Even 
though they think religion as a crucial Tibetan tradition should be transmitted, they are 
open to letting their children make decisions. Nevertheless, they believe their children 
will choose their Tibetan religion. In response to the same question, another young 
woman, Suonan, replied in an assertive tone. She said, “Of course [I] will teach. It’s not 
Tibetan if having no knowledge of this…. This must be transmitted.” Even though she 
expressed the same opinion that religious identity and ethnic identity are closely bonded, 
she is one of a few respondents who have definite attitude toward the need to 
intentionally transmit religion from parents to children in order to maintain Tibetan ethnic 
identity.  
Another question which derived similar answers from most of the young respondents 
was: “Who has the greatest influence on your belief?” Family members were highlighted 
by most respondents as the most influential person(s). Gaxi (a young man in Jiuzhaigou) 
answer in the following terms: “Definitely family. [I] have been educated since I was very 
young to burn incense in the mornings. A Tibetan must burn incense in the morning.” 
Gaxi pointed out that he was influenced to be familiar with religion by his family since he 
was very young. His very first contact with Bon was through his family. His religiosity was 
first formed at home when he was a little child. Like Peek’s (2005) findings on ascribed 
identity, Gaxi was given a taken-for-granted religious identity with his birth into his family. 
This ascribed identity had been reinforced through regular daily rituals like incense 
burning.  
                                                
24 Guanyinqiao is a well-known pilgrimage centre located in Ganzi, near Aba Prefecture. 
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All in all, Bon has many similarities to religions such as Indian Hinduism and American 
Judaism which inscribe into people a particular religious belonging and ethnic 
consciousness at birth (Bramadat, 2009). This religious identity is undoubtedly highly 
intertwined with ethnic identity and is experienced by people at a deep level. The 
following section will explore how state education reshapes the mutually inscribed young 
people’s religious identity and ethnic identity. 
6.3.2 Ethnic identity and religious identity in schools 
Mainstream education is an arena for the discussion and explication of values 
and moral issues, of national virtues and dilemmas, of national 
accomplishments and shortcomings, of supra-national dedication, aspiration 
and concern. (Fisherman, as quoted in Hansen, 1999: xi) 
The school as a formal place of socialisation serves to forge the value systems and 
identity systems of students. According to Peek (2005: 226-230), going to college for the 
young Muslims in the US is a significant turning point for their religiosity and religious 
identity. Their religious identities are strengthened in college by getting a chance to meet 
with the wider Muslim community, and to gain specific knowledge of Islam and being a 
Muslim through religious organisations. However, as they learn more about Islam (a 
religion which discourages national segregation), they are more likely to reject their 
ethnic identity.  
While schooling for young Tibetans in this study did not lead to a rejection of ethnic 
identity, state education did serve to recast their initial understandings of Bon and 
Tibetan identity, which had been formed in the family prior to school. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, state schooling is the dominant means of formal education in China. Unified 
and standardised textbooks are used in every public elementary school, secondary 
school, college and university throughout China. Does school education have an 
influence on young Tibetan students? If yes, what kind of influences does it have, 
especially on religion? And how does it form these influences? These questions, which I 
explore below, have only been partially answered by previous studies focusing on 
education and ethnic minorities in China.  
For Han people who have interactions with Tibetan students in both ordinary (or 
mainstream) schools25 and in neidi schools, Tibetan students are generally considered 
                                                
25 Ordinary school is used here in relation to neidi school (see explanation below) and 




uncultivated, less restrained, less self-disciplined, disruptive, violent, and having less 
intellectual capacity compared to their Han counterparts (Yi, 2007: 945; Zhu, 2007). In 
comparison to Tibetans in neidi schools, even though those accepting education in 
mainstream schools are seen as less “typically” Tibetan (Yi, 2005), they were also 
generally considered to be less easy to communicate with and less able to fit into 
modern society. Nevertheless school education was perceived as an effective way to 
make Tibetans like the more ‘cultivated’ Han. This argument is echoed by Postiglione 
(2008), who agreed that state schooling has remodelled ethnic identity of Tibetans and 
has made Tibetans more like Han Chinese, in terms of the national mainstream ways of 
thinking, feeling and acting (Postiglione, 2009: 140-141).  
In order to achieve a high degree of cultural and political homogenisation, minorities in 
China have been educated to accept “the message of national commitment, love of the 
ruling CCP, and cultural homogeneity” (Hansen, 1999: xii). However, many studies of 
Chinese minorities have suggested that school education is self-contradictory and fails to 
realise the aim of homogenisation (Yi, 2007). Postiglione (2009) contends that the 
experience of studying in neidi schools enhances Tibetan students’ ethnic identity and 
ethnic consciousness. This argument is also evidenced in my research on young 
Tibetans in ordinary schools. Similar observations have also been made in relation to 
other ethnic minorities in China, such as the Naxi and the Tai (Hansen, 1999), as well as 
various Muslim ethnic minorities (Gladney, 2013).  
The ways in which education enhances ethnic identity are sometimes different. In his 
study of minority education for the Naxi in Lijiang and the Tai in Pana Prefecture in 
Southwest China, Hansen (1999) argued that state education has helped the Naxi to 
establish a stronger and more forcefully expressed ethnic identity (Hansen, 1999: 61-86). 
The educated Naxi people have successfully strengthened their ethnic identity by 
promoting their traditional Dongba culture to the mainstream public. In contrast, Tai 
students found that anti-religious teaching affects their self-esteem and feelings of their 
own religion (Buddhism) and customs (Hansen, 1999: 137). Students are educated with 
a communist interpretation of “why religions still exist in the socialist society, how they 
will eventually disappear, why the government allows freedom of religion, and what this 
freedom implies” (Hansen, 1999: 138) Tai students, according to Hansen, feel relieved to 
some extent when their religion is officially acknowledged as ‘real’ religion rather than 
superstition, which is considered ‘backward’ in schools and not publicly tolerated.  
Similar to what Tai young people had encountered in relation to their religion in schools, 
Tibetan students are taught that Tibet’s poor educational levels and social-economical 
performance are attributed to religion and the monastic system (Bass, 1998). Tibetan 
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culture and history were found by Bass (2008) to be disconnected from Tibetan 
Buddhism in school curriculum. Zhu (2007) investigated neidi schools and found neidi 
schools function to transmit state ideologies including patriotism, state unification, ethnic 
unity and atheism. Postiglione (2009: 901) also suggested that Tibetan neidi schooling 
heavily emphasises state ideology: “[Chinese] patriotism, love of Tibet, Han-Tibetan 
relations, civilised behaviour, and revolutionary traditions”. 
With these restrictions on Tibetan religion in schools, Zhu (2007: 180) suggested that 
even though Tibetan students study and live in atheist schools and Han-populated 
environments, they still believe in Tibetan Buddhism because it was thought of as the 
identifier of differences between Tibetans and the Han. In similar vein, Postiglione et al. 
(2004) argued that even though the neidi Tibetan schools reinterpreted and represented 
Tibetan religion and culture, Tibetan students did not lose their cultural pride and strong 
sense of ethnic identity. USUS 
Previous research mostly focuses on education’s influence on the ethnic identity of 
ethnic minorities, and religion has been discussed as a small component of the whole 
study. In addition, most of the research focuses on Tibetan neidi schools where Tibetan 
young people do not have much interaction with their peers of other ethnic backgrounds. 
The influence of classmates from the Han or from other minorities has been given little 
attention. The ordinary school (where my young respondents study) has a different 
education system from the neidi schools. In the ordinary schools, what do schools teach? 
How do schools remake Tibetan identities and Tibetan understandings of their religion? 
What are students’ views? How are Tibetans being educated? These questions will be 
discussed in the following sections.  
6.3.2.1 No religion-related teaching at school 
In order to explore questions related to the influence of state education, we first need to 
examine what is taught in schools about religion. When asked what have they learnt 
about religion in schools, in his research on minority students in south-western China 
Hansen (1999: 138) found minority students generally answered that they have learnt 
nothing.  
For Tibetans, prior to 1950 the monastery was the main place where young Tibetans 
were educated about Tibetan religion and history. Even though knowledge was confined 
to monks and nuns, mass monasticism assured that a certain amount of people had 
detailed knowledge of Tibetan religion. After 1950, mass monasticism had greatly 
contracted. For those attending state schools, a question emerges: how much and what 
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do they learn regarding Tibetan religion and culture at school? According to Zhu (2007: 
269), Tibetan history is not included in the standardised school textbooks. Tibetan 
students also felt they have limited knowledge of their own language, culture and history 
(Postiglione et al., 2009: 140). This resonates with what I found amongst Jiuzhaigou 
Tibetans. When I asked young people in Jiuzhaigou if they have learnt anything about 
Tibetan religion or culture at school, they normally replied “no” or “I can’t remember”. The 
following conversation with Gasang, a young man in Jiuzhaigou, illustrates how young 
people have not been educated at school about their religion and culture.  
Ying: Do you know anything about Bon? 
Gasang: Persons like me know about the richness and significance of 
Chinese culture. In terms of Bon, I don’t even know how many sects [of 
Tibetan Buddhism] there are. 
This excerpt from our conversation illustrates how little knowledge Gasang had of 
aspects of Tibetan culture and Bon. In contrast, he felt that he had deep awareness of 
Chinese culture. He thought that he knew more about Chinese culture than his own 
religion, Bon, and he showed no awareness of Bon as being different from Buddhism. 
Young people like Gasang are educated to know Chinese culture. In this sense, Tibetans 
have become more like Han Chinese.   
Another young Jiuzhaigou man, Jianzan, replied as follows when I asked if he knows 
anything about Tibetan culture. 
I’m ashamed as a Tibetan, [as] I barely know Tibetan culture. I don’t know what 
to talk about. 
This response was not a unique case, but was widely echoed by other young people I 
spoke with in Jiuzhaigou. They felt unconfident in talking about Tibetan culture and 
religion. All of my young respondents expressed their regrets for not having learnt 
Tibetan culture and their wish to learn some Tibetan culture soon. Zhu (2007: 269) found 
similarly that the absence of Tibetan knowledge and history in school education 
enhances Tibetan students’ desire to learn more about their own culture, potentially 
contributing to the construction of ethnic identity.  
6.3.2.2 Studying and living with the Han and with other minority students  
Most of the Jiuzhaigou Tibetan students live in mainstream boarding schools with 
students and teachers of other ethnic origins who are mostly Han Chinese. In this 
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section, I will examine the interactions between young Tibetans and other students to 
explore in greater depth how their ethnic identity and religious identity are forged. 
Ethnicity  
My interviews with students explored how they perceived their interactions with others at 
their boarding schools. The previously mentioned stereotypical understanding of Han 
people is also felt by my respondents. Jamyang, a young man from Jiuzhaigou, recalled 
his experience with classmates in boarding schools when I asked if he had felt ethnic 
difference when he interacted with other students. He felt that being from an ethnic 
minority group affected his interactions with his classmates, who perceived him as 
different.  
I’m minority. They are the majority [referring to the Han]. I felt that many 
classmates viewed me as different. [They] thought Tibetans are like this and 
that. [They] were curious about Tibetans. They felt I’m different from them. 
They thought Tibetans are strange. Maybe because they are students staying 
in school [who don’t therefore have other chances to meet Tibetans and go to 
Tibetan areas], they were ignorant. They have many questions. They have 
heard that Tibetans are barbaric and uncivilised. 
It is apparent that the minority-majority difference that is broadly stressed in official 
discourses from the government and in schools was clearly felt by Jamyang. He believed 
that Han students have preconceived notions of Tibetans as different, strange, barbaric 
and uncivilised. This image echoed what Zhu (2007) and Yi (2007) found in their broader 
studies of Han people’s stereotypical perceptions of young Tibetan students. Zhu (2007) 
found that as a result of the influence of government discourses about the ‘superior’ Han 
and the ‘inferior’ minorities, Han people thought themselves to be more civilised than 
Tibetans, who were perceived as backward culturally and economically. Education in 
China conveys the state sanctioned definition of ethnic minorities as backward (Hansen, 
1999). Jamyang stressed that the misunderstandings of the Han students about Tibetans 
served to illustrate the ignorance of Han students concerning Tibetans and Tibetan 
society. Even though the state’s ultimate purpose is to reinforce homogeneity and unity 
through practices of schooling, in reality it is in schools that the differentiation between 
groups is created and reinforced. Even Tibetan students themselves absorbed the state 
discourse that they have a “poor and backward status in Tibet” (Zhu, 2007).  
The previous quotation from Jamyang suggests what Jamyang felt about majority 
students’ perception of Tibetans. The following two accounts from Suonan, a young 
woman in Jiuzhaigou, and Duoji, a young man in Jiuzhaigou, illustrate specific 
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interactions between themselves and the Han students. Suonan described her 
experience as follows: 
When I first went to do my secondary school outside, the Han students asked 
me, ‘Do you Tibetans take three baths in a whole life?’ This was the question I 
was asked most often. I was thinking how they could be so foolish.  
Suonan was surprised and upset that the Han students know so little about Tibetans. 
Duoji, a young man in Jiuzhaigou, faced a similar situation when he first went outside to 
study. 
Duoji: In Aba Prefecture, when I was in my secondary school, there were 
many minority students, so there was no difference. But when I went to 
Chengdu, I was the only Tibetan. There were only a few students from Aba. 
At that time I felt more deeply that other students were curious about, feared 
and stayed away from me.  
Ying: How could you feel that? 
Duoji: They respect me. And sometimes when we got closer, they ask 
questions which made me feel they are naïve. 
Ying: What questions? 
Duoji: Is it okay for you Tibetans to kill people? How many wives could you, a 
Tibetan, have? Do you ride horses to go to schools? 
Ying: Then how did you reply? 
Duoji: Sometimes I told them that it isn’t like that. Sometimes I felt they are so 
ignorant so I joked and exaggerated [their conjectures]. 
From his recollection, he sensed his ethnic difference when he went to a Han-dominated 
school. He was feared by and kept his distance from Han students. The context of his 
talk and other young people’s responses is consistent with evidence that Tibetans are 
normally thought to be barbaric and violent. This is reflected in the questions the Han 
people asked. Because of these factors that are characterised as uncivilised, he was 
also ‘respected’ by his classmates. Here, ‘respect’ was actually based on the imagined 
intimidating physical strength of Tibetans, and hence ‘respect’ stemmed from fear rather 
than admiration. For Duoji the curiosity and the questions they asked showed the naivety 
of Han students.  
Most Tibetan students were misunderstood by Han students when they first encountered 
one another. In spite of that, a degree of commonality among young people made them 
reach at least partial mutual understandings when they got to know each other more. 
Young Tibetans made friends with Han students once they got involved within the whole 
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class. Gaxi, a young man in Jiuzhaigou, told me his experience with Han students 
eventually changed from being strange to being familiar.  
Ying: Have you felt any inconveniences caused by the ethnic difference 
between you and other classmates? 
Gaxi: No. Normally they [the Han students] fear Tibetans. 
Ying: Fear? Why? 
Gaxi: When I went out to study for the first time, they asked me where I came 
from and I said Aba Prefecture. I was the only one from Aba. … The [Han] 
locals thought Tibetans are not very sensible and kind. After one or two 
months, I got involved with them. We could then talk much more. 
Ying: What did you talk about? 
Gaxi: Things like on-line games. We played basketball together and drank 
together sometimes. 
Ying: Would you intentionally expose your ethnic identity as a Tibetan?  
Gaxi: Normally not. Our class was a tight-knit class. 
Gaxi felt and experienced Han students’ fear of him at the beginning, because Tibetans 
were imagined to be physically strong but lacking sensibility and kindness. Hillman and 
Henry (2006: 266-267) have suggested that Tibetans’ physical strength and masculine 
ideals have a wide reputation in China and are used as a way of showing their 
superiority. Even though my respondents (including both young women and men) did not 
directly state this, their facial expressions, speaking tones, postures and body language 
during interviews conveyed that they did consider that Tibetan physical strength was a 
source of superiority over the Han students. However, despite differences and some 
mutual stereotyping, the misunderstanding did not serve as an insurmountable barrier to 
further interactions between the Han and the Tibetan students. Common interests 
shared by young people helped to dissolve misunderstandings and make them closer, 
which resonates with the findings of Zhu (2007: 265). In their early interactions with 
Tibetan students, Han people think Tibetan students are “barbaric, utterly unreasonable, 
bold, and unconstrained”. Later on, Tibetan students were perceived as “lovely and 
unsophisticated, brave, good-mannered, rule-abiding, and having a good relationship” 
with the Han, even though this might just be a new form of stereotyping.  
Nevertheless, Zhu (2007) concluded that school education, whether intended or not, 
created an environment of Han superiority which could contribute to the construction of 
Tibetan ethnic identity. Young Jiuzhaigou Tibetans in this research were mostly happy to 
show their ethnic identity at school rather than attempting to hide it.  
Ying: Did you expose your ethnic identity to other Han classmates or just 
keep it a secret? 
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Jianzan: Of course I told them I’m a Tibetan forthrightly. Even if I didn’t say, 
they could easily tell from my name. 
Ying: Why did you tell them forthrightly? 
Jianzan: A sense of ethnic pride. This is a must-have. 
Ying: Why do you have such a strong sense of ethnic pride? 
Jianzan: I’m a Tibetan. I’m proud of my culture. 
Jianzan so strongly felt ethnic pride that he wanted to disclose his ethnic identity to his 
classmates. This ethnic pride was also shared by other young Tibetans and made an 
important reason for young people to expose their Tibetan identity, even if some of them 
were not as forthright or confident as Jianzan about showing their ethnic identity.  
Apart from their willingness to reveal their ethnic identity in schools, some young 
Tibetans were motivated to search for their ethnic identity by their school experience.  
Zewang, a middle-aged layperson in Jiuzhaigou, recounted the experience of a young 
Tibetan man approaching him and searching for his ethnic roots as follows:    
I knew a young guy who is a Tibetan. One of his parents is a Jiuzhaigou 
Tibetan, and the other is a Han Chinese. … [Some information has been 
adapted or deleted to maintain confidentiality] He has been raised in a Chinese 
environment. His friends are Chinese. He speaks Chinese since he was born. 
He cannot speak Tibetan. He said when he was in school in Chengdu, his 
friends often asked him to speak Tibetan and to tell them something about 
Tibet and his religion, but he could not. He felt so depressed and ashamed 
because of his ignorance. After that, he asked his father to teach him Tibetan 
and tell him something about Tibet. He kind of had a sense of seeking his roots. 
Then he came to me to learn the Tibetan language and history. 
The process of searching for ethnic identity and “roots” firstly showed that school 
education enhances Tibetans’ ethnic identity in a way that school interactions with other 
students motivated young Tibetans to learn more about the Tibetan language, culture 
and history. This wish of searching for roots was expressed by many other young 
respondents. As mentioned earlier, Han students have many misunderstandings and a 
great deal of curiosity about Tibetans. They have various questions to ask when they 
meet Tibetan classmates, who are something of a rarity. Young Tibetans encountered 
difficulties in answer some of their Han classmates’ inquiries because they found that 
they have little awareness of many of the issues themselves. For the Tibetans who faced 
these inquiries for the first time, like the boy mentioned in Zewang’s story, their 
motivation to learn the Tibetan language, culture and religion was often activated. 
Secondly, this process revealed that ethnic identity changes in different contexts. This is 
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clear from the case of this boy, who has been raised in a Chinese environment. When he 
was in an ethnically homogeneous environment, his ethnic identity was not something on 
which he reflected very often; when he met Han Chinese students with little knowledge 
about Tibetans, his ethnic identity was activated, making him more aware of it and 
creating a sense of pride.  
Religious identity  
In the previous section, I focused on how young Tibetans’ ethnic identity is influenced by 
the process of schooling. In this section, I explore how state education impacts upon 
young Tibetans’ thoughts on religion.  
From interviews and fieldwork it became apparent that when young people were away at 
school, they barely conducted Bon religious practices. The majority of religious practices 
are conducted when they are with their families at home. Even though they infrequently 
conducted religious practices while at school, they sometimes experienced 
misunderstandings from their classmates who have different attitudes toward religion.  
Gasang: I believe in Bon. If you believe something, you believe with your 
whole heart. You feel it is your consolation. Your prayer definitely will be 
repaid. But if you are denied by those who don’t believe, this makes you 
upset. 
Ying: Have you experienced this? 
Gasang: Yes. Those atheists. Some classmates, they don’t believe, and feel 
some of your acts are funny, such as doing prayers, bowing in front of the 
Buddhas. For example, we once went to [a Han Buddhist temple on] the 
Tiantai Mountain. I was praying wholeheartedly. But my friends [mainly Han] 
thought I was acting funny. 
Ying: How did you react? 
Gasang: What reaction? We are classmates after all. They were not very 
serious. But I just said to them that ‘We [Tibetans] have religion since a young 
age. It’s okay if you don’t believe. But please show a little respect as we use 
our heart to believe in this. 
Ying: Did this affect your belief or religious practices? 
Gasang: No. I still practiced as I wish. My belief won’t be affected because of 
this little thing. 
Ying: So you did prayers in the Tiantai Mountain as well? 
Gasang: Yes. There is a Buddhist temple in the Tiantai Mountain. It serves 
the Mile Buddha.  
Ying: A Han temple? 
Gasang: Yes. I think Han temple and Tibetan temple are the same. Both are 
Buddhist. Buddhas are almost the same. 
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Gasang and his classmates went to Tiantai Mountain as tourists. In this rare experience 
of religious practices conducted during school time, Gasang was teased by his 
classmates. Even though there were some misunderstandings about belief and the 
possibility of being made fun of, he still insisted on practicing religion in front of his 
friends. Gasang’s reactions showed his strong commitment to the Bon religion, but he 
also went to a Han temple to pray. From his perspective, there was no major difference 
because both the Tibetan temple and Han temple are Buddhist temples (as discussed in 
Chapter 3, local laypeople generally consider Bon to be similar to Buddhism). It is also 
possible that Gasang intentionally practiced religion in front of his classmates to 
demonstrate his ethnic difference.   
Apart from influence of classmates, young Tibetans’ religious understanding is also 
influenced by their teachers. The following account of Kunchen reflects how education 
influences young people’s perception of the relationship between their religion and 
superstition.  
Kunchen: A history teacher once said most of the people who believe in 
Buddha are inclined to favour superstition. He then said to me that ‘yours is 
definitely not [superstition]. Yours is religion not superstition. There is big 
difference [between your religion and superstition]’.  
Ying: So he thought your belief is religion, not superstition? 
Kunchen: Yes. 
Ying: What did you feel when you heard this? 
Kunchen: Very pleased. Because he said this to the whole class. 
Kunchen did not want to see his religion being categorised as a superstition, because 
superstition is legally prohibited. The approval from his teacher was like an official 
acknowledgement of the legitimate status of his religion, even though his teacher 
assumed he was a Buddhist rather than a Bonpo. Declaring this in front of the whole 
class, he felt, further increased the legitimacy of his religion. Elsewhere, Hansen (1999) 
also found Tai minority students felt relieved when their religion was officially 
acknowledged as religion, not superstition.  
So far in this section I have attempted to provide a picture of the complex relationship 
between young people’s ethnic and religious identities in schools. However, religiosity 
can be affected by both changes in time and environment. Religious identities, in 
common with other identities, might change when young people go to work, go abroad or 
return home. In her discussion of lesbian identities in the United Kingdom, Valentine 
(1993) described how lesbians strategically present, negotiate and maintain their multiple 
identities in different places and times within a heterosexual and patriarchic society. 
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Young people performed their identities differently in different contexts, and their beliefs 
evolved as they aged and changed places of residence. The following conversation with 
Xiangba, a young man in his early 30s in Jiuzhaigou, illustrates how his religiosity 
changed after he left school. 
Xiangba: When I was in school, I was a pure atheist and didn’t believe in any 
religion. I liked materialism and was sceptical about idealist things. I learned 
physics and chemistry which made me much more likely to think that 
superstitious things are nonsense. But when I came back and knew more 
about Bon and Buddhism, I changed my mind. I think there are reasons why 
religion has existed for such a long time. It can give people peace and 
comfort, especially older people.   
Ying: What made you change so much? 
Xiangba: I think it is because I live in this environment. When I was in school, 
I had little time to spend at home. But now everyone around is doing that. And 
also it is because of my marriage and my child. Now I would like to do some 
religious practices because I feel I have a responsibility to do that in order to 
bless my child. 
Like some other young Tibetans discussed in previous sections, Xiangba was educated 
to be an atheist in school. However, when he went back home, he reconsidered the 
meaning and importance of religion. Upon returning home, he had more opportunities to 
come to know religion, which influenced his perceptions of Bon religion. He dropped the 
exclusively materialist or scientific view he had developed at school to better understand 
religion, demonstrating how the influence of school education on young people’s 
religiosity is partial and varies in different places and at different times.  
His hometown in Jiuzhaigou provided a different set of opportunities to cultivate and 
explore his religiosity. In contrast to Han-dominated schools that might be seen as 
propagating homogenised secular ideologies and creating minority-majority disparity, 
being at home in Jiuzhaigou contributed to religious growth and ethnic awareness in a 
context with a large number of believers of same ethnic origin.  
Marriage and the process of having children were stressed as the turning points of 
Xiangba’s religiosity. His perception of familial needs encouraged him to treat religion 
seriously, with family bonds serving as a key to the intergenerational transmission of 
religious practices.  
In this section, I have provided an overview of key dimensions of young people’s 
experiences of state education and how it relates to their ethnic and religious identities. 
In Section 6.3.3, I explore in greater detail how young people reconciled and negotiated 
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the rational and socialist understanding of religion taught in schools, and I explore the 
issue of religious transformation after leaving school in more depth in 6.4.  
6.3.3 Religion and superstition 
6.3.3.1 Reconciling science, religion and superstition 
As discussed in Chapter 3, religion in China is a highly politicised concept which needs 
to be compatible with the state’s ideology. Marx said “religion is the opium” of the people. 
China as a party-state, upholds atheist ideologies of dialectic materialism and historical 
materialism. These ideologies are written into the 1992 “Curriculum Plan of Full-Time 
Primary and Junior Secondary Nine-Year Compulsory Education” (Chinese Education 
Committee, 1992) as guidelines for spiritual education as follows:  
Subjects and activities need to connect theory and practice, to provide 
education on dialectic materialism, historical materialism and atheism.  
It also sets “loving country, loving people, loving work, loving science and loving 
socialism” as one of the purposes of primary education, and further adds “knowing the 
basic ideas of dialectic materialism and historical materialism” as another objective for 
junior-secondary-school students. For most Tibetan children in China, this Chinese 
secular education system is the only educational option. Religion is described in a 
negative way in the common curriculum (Mackerras, 2013: 38). It is prohibited to conduct 
religious activities in schools (Zhu, 2007: 61). The principle of secularity is strictly 
implemented in state sponsored schools, in which superstition is seriously criticised. 
According to political materials in schools, superstition is depicted as obstructing the 
development of modern science and making people ignorant and poor (Hansen, 1999: 
137). Hansen (1999: 138) found that Akha, Blang and Jinuo minority students in 
Southwest China become embarrassed about their religious practices back home, which 
they come to think of as superstition. Negative constructions of superstition which 
circulate in schools and in pubic rhetoric greatly influence the understanding of their 
religion held by Jiuzhaigou people, especially young people who have been through the 
state school system.  
As an exercise to get people to describe their degree of religiosity, I asked them to 
describe in quantitative terms how this had been affected by the process of schooling. 
Ying: If you use a percentage to describe the degree of your adherence to 
Bon, how much would it be? 
Renqing: After education, it was about 90%. 
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Ying: Why [90%]? 
Renqing: Because it is a cultural tradition. All my family believe in it. I have 
been raised believing it since I was born.  
Ying: How about the remaining 10%? 
Renqing:[That is because] I have been affected since I went [outside] to be 
educated. Because I believed in the Communist Party, [and was] an atheist.  
Ying: What did the textbooks or education tell you? 
Renqing: Atheism. 
Ying: What did you act like when you were an atheist? 
Renqing: I told my parents not to chant prayers any more. [I told them] ‘This is 
hopeless. Go to hospital when you are ill. Work hard if you need money. 
Renqing acknowledged the influence of school education on his religious piety, even 
though the influence was not deep. When he studied at school, he was influenced to 
believe in the Communist Party and atheism. During that period, he asked his parents to 
stop doing religious practices, because he thought they are of no use in solving problems 
in practice. When he went back to work in his hometown, he regained aspects of his 
belief in Bon because of the strong familial religious influence. He even thinks his opinion 
of and ways of dealing with religion was ridiculous. He now self-consciously views his 
religion as a cultural tradition. This newly added meaning contributes to him maintaining 
a relatively high degree of religious commitment.  
Apart from the atheism and communist secularist ideology, schools also promote 
science, which is thought to oppose superstition.  
Zeren: But I think sometimes we need to believe in science. I think it [my 
religion] is a superstition. But I have to do it, because it’s a habit, a tradition. 
Ying: So you don’t believe it [your religion] can protect you. You do it just 
because it’s a tradition and custom. 
Zeren: Yes. When I was at school, my politics teacher talked about 
superstition and science. 
For Zeren, a young woman in Jiuzhaigou, school education is a site where science and 
superstition are brought into confrontation. She believed in the truth of science and 
accepted her religion as a superstition. It is noteworthy that religion was once again 
regarded as a cultural tradition or a custom, and it was in these terms that religion was 
considered meaningful by these young people. In terms of her degree of religious 
believing, Zeren half believed in Bon as she insisted that “superstition is not right. We 
need to believe in science”. Compared to Zeren, her younger sister, Zeji, had spent less 
time in school and identified herself as believing in Bon “80 percent” because she said “I 
always feel it is a bit useful but for no special reason. I feel that I am protected by the 
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deities when I have good luck.” Differing from Zeren who adopted a discourse of 
rationalism, Zeji did not make as clear a differentiation between science and superstition.  
Some young people attempt to maintain a clear conceptual differentiation between their 
religion and superstition, and they seek to prevent their religion from being labelled as 
superstition. A young girl, Meiduo, once told me: “My history teacher told us that Chinese 
beliefs tend to be like superstition; foreigners’ beliefs tend to be like real religion.” She to 
some extent agreed with her teacher and explained that “it is probably because Chinese 
belief has ghosts and deities.” When I asked if she thought Bon is a superstition, she 
answered “Bon is not [a superstition]! Ours is religion.” “But it has ghosts and deities”, I 
said. She fell silent. Certainly, Christianity has its ghosts too. The history teacher’s 
perception of foreign religion reflects the aims of the Chinese state to make its definition 
consistent with other religions around the world. This conversation also reflects the clash 
between ideas on superstition taught at school and the experience of their own religion, 
with many Tibetan graduates criticizing the superstitious aspects of Tibetan religion. 
Elsewhere, Tibetan students in neidi schools were found to have even directly 
abandoned their belief in Buddhism and denied the existence of Buddhas, deities and 
ghosts. They adopted a “scientific and humanistic point of view” when considering 
Tibetan religion, which they thought is “psychological medicine for some people” 
(Postiglione et al., 2009: 138-9). This understanding of Tibetan religion is evident among 
some of my respondents. Meiduo was taught in school by her teacher to have a vague 
idea of superstition. She was convinced that Chinese beliefs are superstition being 
characterised by belief in ghosts and deities. But, without perceiving a contradiction until 
challenged, she directly denied that Bon constituted superstition, even though she knows 
there are concepts of ghosts and deities in Bon as well. As far as I know, elements of 
ghosts and deities constantly appear in Jiuzhaigou people’s religious practices. For 
example, Bon believes that there are deities inhabiting in and controlling the sacred 
mountains and waters. In addition, several people told me that Jiuzhaigou has a 
particular ritual for telling people’s fortune. People participating will go into a trance which 
explained by local people that their bodies are inhabited by deities.  
In contrast to Meiduo, Renqing had a more clearly defined understanding of the 
differences between superstition and religion.  
Renqing: I think sometimes they [schools] mixed superstition and religion.  
Ying: Do you think your belief is religion or superstition? 
Renqing: There is a big difference between superstition and religion. Mine is 
certainly religion, not superstition.  




Renqing: Superstition is more about the things about ghosts and deities 
which are not real. According to the textbooks, superstition should be 
resisted. Religion is more serious. It is in your heart. 
Renqing’s firm denial that Bon constitutes superstition is based on his emotional 
attachment to his religion, something which he suggests that believers in superstition do 
not experience. For him, religion exists in his heart and should be seriously treated. It is 
this emotional attachment that differentiates religion from superstition.   
For the ones who have graduated from schools, with richer life experience they have 
formed a reconciled and neutral attitude toward relationships between science and 
religion. Bamu, a young woman in Jiuzhaigou, described her experience of the impacts 
of education on her understanding of religion in detail.  
I doubted our religion once. At that time teachers told us ‘superstition 
superstition, more believe more enchanted’26. This was obviously against our 
religion. But at home, I was instilled to do good deeds and asked to do this and 
that [religious practices]. I feel the essence of Bon is that everything has spirits 
and involves doing good deeds. But according to scientific ways of thought, it is 
like ‘superstition superstition, more believe more enchanted’. It feels as if 
superstition cannot be believed. Once you believe, you will have aberrations. It 
is what teachers instilled in us. That’s why we doubt [our religion] and have 
dialectic views. We need to make sure whether what we believe is true or not. 
After rich life experiences, [I found that] many things cannot be explained by 
science. At a certain point, for example when we graduated from college, we 
suddenly started to doubt science. There is no proof [to say religion is 
superstition]. Now we have two ideologies to control our thought on one thing. 
For the ones who didn’t accept education, they have one point of view. They 
firmly think [religion is good], like [people] in Ruoergai [one of thirteen counties 
in Aba Prefecture]. For them, if someone says bad things about their religion, 
they will instantly fight back. [They will think] my holy religion cannot be violated. 
But we are different. We have our own views. We have two ways of evaluating 
things. We know what is important and what is not. So we are very rational. We 
don’t mention Tibetan independence. We have our own views that we need to 
calm down. For the people who are not educated, they would say go, go. If we 
are not educated, we would go [like them]. But now [I] feel a need to protect 
ourselves. So education has a big impact.  
                                                
26 It is a local idiom which means the more you believe, the more you will be enchanted 
and confused. The original Chinese saying is “mixin mixin, yue xin yue mi”. Mixin 
which means superstition is composed of two Chinese characters: mi (means enchant 
and confuse) and xin (means believe). 
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Bamu detailed her experience from doubting religion to doubting science and how she 
had a dialectic views toward religion. It is evident that teachers from her school used 
‘science’ as a contradictory concept in an attempt to get her to reject religion. She was 
made to believe superstition is dangerous and will lead her to aberrations. At the same 
time, she was influenced by familial religious education. She inclined to believe science 
and to doubt religion. When she went back home after graduation, she started to doubt 
science because it cannot prove everything. It should be mentioned that there is another 
factor affecting her changing attitude that did not appear in this quote, the influence of 
religious environment at home. This reflects the significance of environment in 
maintaining religion. As the second half of her account shows, she seems to be happy to 
have two ideologies, rational thinking obtained from school and religious thinking from 
home, which makes her to have a neutral view to see issues like Tibet independence. As 
a matter of fact, these two ideologies create conflicting attitudes toward ethnic identity. In 
her mind, radical actions for Tibet independence such as self-immolation are irrational 
and would not be conducted by educated people. But this does not suggest she has no 
strong sense of ethnic and religious identity. Under the current political state, her neutral 
position is a way of protecting herself.  
6.3.3.2 Rational thinking  
The conflicting thinking on religion brought about by school education is not a unique 
case. Postiglione (2009: 138-139) found that some young Tibetan students who had 
been educated under the state schooling system had a strong sense of ethnic identity 
but had completely turned into atheists. They differentiated Tibetan religion from their 
ethnic identity. Religion was thought of as a crucial element of Tibetan culture, not a 
belief. It reflects how the national educational policies affect a generation of religiosity 
and ethnic identity of minority groups in two different ways. The conflicting experiences 
were evidenced by other respondents of mine as well. I asked Duga if he believed in 
religion’s capacity to realise people’s wishes and to bless adherents. He answered: 
To be honest I very much doubt it. Actually many things [things igniting doubt] 
are a part of belief. You don’t need to prove it using your rationality, because 
once you use rationality, it is not belief. 
He thought that religion is essentially contradictory with rationality. If someone wants to 
believe, just put rationality aside. Based on this, he adopted a new attitude toward 
religion, just seeing it as a tradition: 
In the past I felt there are many irrational things in our religion which cannot be 
explained in a scientific way. Now I think it’s wrong to understand it that way. 
172 
 
You just practice many rituals, following [others, especially parents]. Don’t think 
too much. It’s just an ethnic tradition.  
For Duga, religion does not need to be thought out. It just needs practice. This is his way 
of dealing with the contradictions of rational thinking and religious thinking. He equates 
religion with tradition. In a similar vein, young Hindus in the USUS are found to be more 
religious than some of the literature suggests (Min, 2010: 202). The cultural and 
philosophical values of Hinduism are acknowledged by the majority of the young 
generation. It is thought good in promoting humanity, nonviolence and compassion. The 
non-supernatural aspects of Hinduism, such as meditation and scripture reading are 
given more attention and emphasis than supernatural rituals. Zewang, a middle-aged 
man in Jiuzhaigou, echoed Duga’s opinion on the cultural basis of religion when I asked 
him to define Bonpo.  
Bonpo firstly is an inheritance of our ethnic culture. And then, Bon has a deep 
and rich basis, for example, various legends transmitted from generation to 
generation. I don’t think Bon is ignorant and benighted. I think these are 
Tibetan traditions and folk customs inherited from my ancestors. I feel this is an 
inheritance. 
Zewang did not answer this question by referring to, for example, the scriptures a Bonpo 
should read, the principles a Bonpo should know or the practices a Bonpo should 
conduct. Similar to a number of respondents’ perception, he thought Bon is a tradition 
and folk custom and a Bonpo is someone inheriting this ethnic culture. Religion was 
once again equated with culture and ethnicity, even though they considered themselves 
Bonpos. This opinion suggests “belonging without believing”, a different trajectory from 
Davies’ (1994) “believing without belonging”, drawn from the Britain context. Religion 
needs to be transmitted generation by generation in order to maintain its vigour 
(intergenerational transmission of religion will be discussion in Section 6.4). 
In sum, we can see school education on superstition and science has nurtured in young 
Tibetans a rational ideology of reconciliation between religion, science and superstition 
and to further recast their religious and ethnic identities. However, with regard to the 
future of their religion, Nuobu, a middle-aged man in Jiuzhaigou, had a positive view. He 
said:  
Even if there are more people accepting higher education, religion will still exist. 
And I do think even if all Bon believers accept higher education, this religion 
will still exist. Just with more rational explanations.  
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As can be seen from the many respondents quoted above, when they go back home, 
they adopt an inclusive and neutral understanding their religion and ethnicity (see 
discussion in Section 6.4).  
6.3.4 Summary 
Mackerras (1995) argued that the education policies of the Chinese state failed to control 
the enthusiasm of ethnic minorities toward their culture and language even though young 
Tibetans are seen to be growing more similar to the Han. Religion, it seems, still plays a 
significant role in forming ethnic identity among minorities in China. This conclusion has 
also been reached in research on other ethnic minorities in China besides Tibetans 
(Hansen, 1999; Gladney, 2013). Education plays an important role in reshaping young 
Tibetan’s religious and ethnic identities. For young people, their religious identity is 
closely connected with and greatly enhanced by their ethnic identity. Being a Tibetan 
means being born to Bon religion. Their ethnicity is reinterpreted and represented to 
them in schools. Chinese standardised education teaches what it means to be a member 
of a minority group and of the Chinese nation. To reach national homogenisation, little is 
taught in school about Tibetan religion, language, culture and history. This, however, 
tends to encourage young people in their search for their ethnic identity. In environment 
of state schooling, Tibetans are differentiated. They are thought of as different, backward, 
barbaric, and uncultivated. This creates tensions between Tibetan students and Han 
students. After a period, some young Tibetans can find a comparatively harmonious 
balance with Han students.  
In terms of religion, young people’s religious identity is especially volatile and variable. 
Their identity is easily influenced by the atheist education they encounter at school. They 
start to critically think about religion, using the secular ideologies instilled in school. 
Superstition, science and rationality are frequently mentioned perspectives gained from 
school and applied to the understanding of religion. Compared to their strong sense of 
ethnic identity, young people do not have a strong religious identity. In the process of 
identity shifting and construction, young people move from home, an ethnically and 
religiously homogenous environment to school, a multi-ethnic and atheist environment. 
At home, their religious identity is taken for granted and not reflected upon critically (See 
Section 6.4). In school, their taken-for-granted identity formed at home is challenged by 
atheist views. The whole process shows young people’s religious identity varies 
according to the setting.  
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They adopt a neutral and reconciled view towards religion and ethnicity, believing that 
with critical thinking they can uphold ethnic pride through rational behaviour (2007: 176-
180; 2009: 138-139).  
 6.4 Intergenerational transmission of religion and home 
In the previous section, we have looked at young Tibetans’ religiosity and ethnic identity 
in school. It was also stressed that religiosity and religious identity change spatially and 
temporally. In this section, the focus is on home and processes of intergenerational 
religious transmission and exchange. Specifically, I explore the ways in which religion 
and ethnic identities are transmitted between the older and younger generations. The 
analysis addresses questions regarding the kinds of religious ideas and practices that 
are transmitted between generations, the means through which this happens, and 
potential enduring characteristics of intergenerational religious transmission. 
In order to address these issues, this section will start with a broad, schematic 
contrasting of the younger generation’s understanding of religion with those of the middle 
and older generations (Section 6.4.1). This is followed by an examination specifically of 
gender and women’s role in religious transmission (Section 6.4.2). I next focus on three 
important factors influencing religious transmission: the power of imitation (Section 6.4.3), 
parental love (Section 6.4.4), and marriage (Section 6.4.5). Following this, the mutual 
understandings and misunderstandings between generations will be examined (Section 
6.4.6). Then the challenges of religious transmission will be discussed (Section 6.4.7).  
6.4.1 Meanings of religion for older and younger generations 
This section provides some broad contrasts between older, middle and younger 
generations and the meaning of religion for them. Members of the older and middle 
generations in Jiuzhaigou tend to lead lives that are comparatively fixed with a stable 
family (spouse/children/parents), regular work, stable income and similar social circle. 
Because of these factors, the older and middle generations have relatively similar and 
stable patterns of belief and religious practice -- although there are some differences as 
well. In contrast, the younger generation is subject to various sources of external 
influence, many of them ultimately related to the relative prosperity brought by tourism 
and (as discussed in the previous section) contemporary practices of state education. 
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6.4.1.1 The older and middle generations  
The older generation in Jiuzhaigou has experienced the people’s commune system 
(1958-1981), the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the household responsibility system of 
rural land (1981-), and tourism development (1984-present). They have witnessed the 
demolition of monasteries and the banning of religion in the Cultural Revolution, the re-
opening of monasteries after the Cultural Revolution and rapid economic growth from the 
development of tourism.  
Most of the older generation have little if any formal education. A few older men learnt a 
little Tibetan when they were monk-candidates. Many older women are illiterate both in 
Tibetan and in Chinese. Only a few can understand Chinese, and the ability to speak the 
language has seldom been mastered by older people. As for the middle-aged, under the 
household responsibility system they were withdrawn from schools by their parents to 
work in the fields as their families were allocated contracted land to farm (Postiglione et 
al., 2004: 201). Almost all of them failed to even complete primary school. At the same 
time the tide of enthusiasm for religion after the Cultural Revolution resulted in many 
children attending monasteries rather than Chinese state schools (Bass, 1998: 215).  
As discussed in Chapter 5, a considerable number of religious practices are carried out 
in Jiuzhaigou. As Yidan, a middle-aged man in Jiuzhaigou, said, “We are doing lots of 
chantings here. Some families do this 20 times a year. I just do about 10 times a year” 
(20 times would be considered quite a large number for religious rituals). These 
chantings are mainly initiated by members of the older generation and organised by the 
middle generation. If a family has an older member, he or she is likely to conduct most of 
the religious activities. Yidan explained that “those [families] with older people [do more 
religious practices]. Older people have nothing [else] to do. They put all their energy into 
religious things.” Older people are widely recognised as the leading force contributing to 
religious practices in Jiuzhaigou. Families with older people do more religious practices 
as the older people usually urge other younger family members to practice religion. The 
grandfather in the family of Cuomo, a middle-aged woman, plays this role: 
[I] should attend all of them (religious practices). They all have their own 
reasons. For the ones which you should attend, you just do what you are asked 
to do, always listening to decrees [from grandfather].  
For Cuomo, attending religious practices is her routine rather than something she 
enthusiastically involves herself in. In her family. Religious practices are mostly guided 
by her father-in-law who plays a central role in organising familial religious practices. 
Older people know clearly when to do religious practices, what they should do, who to 
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invite and how to proceed. Other family members typically just follow the older people’s 
lead. For families without older people, the eldest will naturally take on this role.  
Religion is the primary thing they are dedicated to do. The following quotation provides 
an illustration of older people’s dedication to religion. Pema, an older woman in 
Jiuzhaigou, complained that her sons did not take care of her and her husband: 
I’m old and why I am still going to rent [Tibetan] costumes [for tourists] to make 
money. Because I need to make money to invite monks to come and chant and 
pray for our family. I spend all of my money on it. If I don’t take care of us, how 
could we live?  
Like other older people in Jiuzhaigou, Pema contributes most of her income to religious 
practices. Unlike the middle-aged, older people do not have the pressure of supporting 
their family. Religion provides the primary motivation for her to work hard in tourism even 
though she is over 60 years old. She practices religion for the whole family’s well-being 
and also for her and her husband’s health and for the afterlife. She puts her hope of 
having a good this-life and a good afterlife in religion, and she expects her son to take 
care of her.   
Similar to Pema, religion is the only reason that motivates Yama, an older woman in 
Jiuzhaigou, to rent costumes to make money, even though her children are supporting 
her:  
My children give me money every month which is enough for me. But the 
reason why I am renting Tibetan costumes is to invite monks to chant for us. 
Besides, I need money to invite many monks to pray and do religious rituals for 
me when I die. 
Yama either spends all of her money on religious activity or saves it, as she believes that 
a large religious ceremony for her funeral will be a significant expense. Like many older 
people, religion is closely connected with her life in every aspect and is seen as 
connected to familial prosperity, health, and the afterlife.  
As for the middle-aged, their dedication to religion is not expressed as strongly as is 
evident among older people, even though they are actually central to organising, 
financing, and participating in religious practices. Compared to the older generation, the 
middle-aged generation have more this-worldly concerns, such as their tourism business, 
their jobs, their families’ health, their children’s performance in schools. However, they 
rarely expressed direct doubt about their religion in the language of rationality, in contrast 
to the younger generation, whom I turn to below.  
177 
 
6.4.1.2 The younger generation 
Young people were born after the introduction of tourism when the fortunes of Jiuzhaigou 
people rapidly increased. They are also more fully exposed to the outside world, having 
gone away from Jiuzhaigou to be educated. They can afford to send their children to 
receive education in big cities outside Jiuzhaigou and even abroad. The majority of 
young people have college or university degrees. They have been sent to boarding 
schools or Han-Chinese homestay families outside since they were teenagers or even 
little children.  
Most of my younger generation respondents did not appear to have a deep 
understanding of the meaning of attending religious practices, especially teenagers and 
those in their early twenties. I asked Zeren if she likes attending religious chanting 
sessions. She replied “We must attend. We can’t dislike it.” In terms of her feelings, she 
said, “I just finish the tasks [given to me].” Zeren does all the religious practices that her 
parents ask her to do. But she expresses little awareness of the meanings of these 
practices. For her, these are the tasks she has to finish. She does not have special 
feelings and emotional attachments to these religious practices like her parents and 
grandparents. The emotional detachment toward religion suggests that for young people 
religious practices are like routines which do not generate special feelings.  
Some young people do not believe the supernatural aspects of Bon. They have a realist 
view of Bon religion. As discussed in section 6.3.4, this rational attitude toward religion 
comes in part from the influence of school education. Meiduo (a young woman in 
Jiuzhaigou) provided the following account of her apprehension of religion:  
I don’t like the parts about ghosts or deities [in Bon]. I don’t believe it is true. 
And I don’t believe the myths in the history of Bon. I think they are not real. So I 
think you don’t need to care much about the mysterious parts [in Bon]. It mostly 
provides you philosophies of how to practice Bon. It makes you calm and 
comfortable; gives you peace and happiness.  
Meiduo understood Bon in a realist way. To her, Bon creates a sense of peace and 
contentment through the practices that she conducts.  
Even though many young people realistically considered that “praying or chanting 
scriptures is just a consolation” (Suonan, a young girl in Jiuzhaigou) without supernatural 
functions, they still expect religion to bring them good luck, in exams, for example. I 
asked Suonan if she conducts religious practices in schools. She answered as follows: 
178 
 
For example, if I feel I am having bad luck or I want to achieve something, like 
for an exam, I will tell my mom to chant for me. My mom will also burn incense 
praying to Buddha. 
Religion is something she will turn to when she is out of luck or has a wish to realise, 
even though she knows it might not be useful. This is the case for other young 
respondents as well, as I heard from Zeji, a young woman in Jiuzhaigou:  
I will chant mantras when I’m in danger. For instance, [if I] watch a horror film 
before going to bed, I will chant. I won’t think about it [the film] while I’m 
chanting.  
Members of the younger generation also let their parents do religious practices when 
they have exams, have babies or get ill etc. It shows that even though young people stay 
in school most of the time and do not practice religion, they still have bonds with their 
religion through their parents (see also Section 6.4.4).  
Why do young people seem to pursue the blessings of Bon even though there might be 
no actual results? Duga, a young man in Jiuzhaigou, thinks these rituals and ceremonies 
are necessary but not essential. For him, it is because of the existence of these rituals 
and ceremonies that Bon becomes accessible to laypeople. In his words:  
Buddhism [note: Duga uses Buddhism and Bon interchangeably] takes much 
account of sentient beings. Humans are all sentient beings. Why did they 
believe this [Bon] at the very beginning? For the wise men, [most of] the 
sentient beings are ignorant [of philosophies of Bon]. In order to make them 
believe this, Bon needs to satisfy their needs. They ask for blessings for 
themselves and their families [from Bon]. But this is not the core of Bon, even 
though it is necessary.  
Duga provided an explanation of why people conduct religious practices from a historical 
and theological perspective. From Duga’s understanding, unlike the wise men who are 
enlightened by Bon ideas, most laypeople are ignorant of the philosophies of Bon. In 
order to make Bon accessible to laypeople, some Bon practices were designed to meet 
their basic life demands. He has a very pragmatic perception of Bon which echoes 
previous accounts that emphasise the inner peace and consolation provided by Bon. 
Religion not only matters because it is seen as providing spiritual peace and consolation, 
it is also important in enhancing Tibetan ethnic identity as discussed in Sections 6.2 and 
6.3.2. For young people, religion is also a mark of ethnic identity. “As Tibetans, we must 
keep our religion.” I heard this expression very often during my conversations with young 
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people in Jiuzhaigou, whom I found to be particularly inclined to understand religion in 
the sense of ethnic identity. Duga went on:  
Many things are in your blood. It can’t be wiped away. [We were] born with 
Bon. … It is a culture or a tradition.  
Here Bon is again identified as fundamentally intertwined with Tibetan ethnic identity. 
The linking of religiosity with ethnic identity by young Tibetans appears to stem in large 
part from their school education as they will have had frequent and deep contacts with 
Han Chinese since they were very young.  
Some young people take their religiosity further and think Bon is good for establishing 
ethical standards for young people. Jamyang, a young man in Jiuzhaigou, provided an 
explanation of this when I asked him why Bon is meaningful for him:  
People should do good deeds throughout their whole lives. The advantage of 
our belief lies here. It tells you not to do bad things, or there will be bad 
consequences.  
The moral advantages of Bon were emphasised by many respondents. They are proud 
of the ethical models Bon has established for young people. The models require them to 
perform good acts.  
6.4.2 Women and religion 
In this section, I turn to an examination of women’s important role in maintaining the 
intergenerational transmission of religion. As found by Mazumdar (1999), Muslim women 
play a pivotal role in sustaining and transmitting religious practices in the non-institutional 
domestic spaces. Women in Jiuzhaigou also play a major role in organising religious 
practices (see Fig. 6.1 for a woman praying). 
In Chapter 5, I discussed a number of gendered aspects of religious space (see Sections 
5.2.6 and 5.3.5). This discussion illustrated that in the religious sphere, women are 
ascribed an inherently lower status than men. This is evidenced by public religious 
events in which “women do everything, men do nothing”. The following comments made 
by Zezhen, a middle-aged woman in Jiuzhaigou illustrate the general familial position of 
women.  
Zezhen: Our Tibetan men do nothing [in terms of housework]. Women do it all. 
If men do the housework, grandparents will speak to their daughter-in-law 
and ask her why she had her man do the work.  
180 
 
Ying: Do women have a say in big familial decisions? 
Zezhen: Women speak a lot. But decisions are mostly made by men. In the 
past, people will make fun of men who do the laundry and cook, saying ‘you 
[are] a soft ear27. You are useless.’ … My sister earns more than her husband. 
She often jokes to her husband that ‘you come back home to take care of the 
children. I go outside to do business.’ But as a matter of fact, she still does all 
the housework.  
Even though women in some cases make bigger economic contributions to the family, 
men are still in charge of big family decisions and refrain from housework. Women 
normally seem to accept this unequal status. Differing from the young female Korean-
American Christians who oppose their status as “second-class citizens” in the church 
(Chong, 1998: 281), Jiuzhaigou young women rarely voiced clear oppositional ideas 
concerning their unequal gender status. However, the joke made by Zezhen’s sister 
implied that there is potential now for Tibetan women in Jiuzhaigou to have their social 
status changed, as women started to at least think about role swapping with men. This is 
mostly attributed to the increasing economic independence and success of women.  
However, this process seemed to still be in its infancy in Jiuzhaigou. 
According to my interviewees, women, especially older women, were normally identified 
as the most pious believers in the whole family, organising most of the familial religious 
rituals and conducting religious practices. Diki, a young woman in Jiuzhaigou, said her 
mother is the most pious person in her family as she insists on chanting mantras and 
burning incense every day:  
Ying: Who’s the most pious person in your family? 
Diki: Of course it’s my mom.  
Ying: Why do you think so? 
Diki: Because she chants every day. Chanting [the Bon mantra] ‘Om Mazhi 
Meyi Salangdu’ every day. Burning incense in the scripture room every day. 
With few exceptions, all my respondents agreed that their mothers or grandmothers were 
the most religious people in their families. Bamu, a middle-aged woman in Jiuzhaigou, 
described her mother as more professional than monks:  
Bamu: My mom is much more professional than monks. 
Ying: Why do you think she is more professional? 
Bamu: My mom’s study has reached a significant level. Her degree of belief is 
deeply ingrained. She herself not only believes, but she also tells us that, ‘The 
                                                
27
 Soft ear refers to a man who likes to listen to and heed his wife’s decisions. 
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spirit of Buddha is very great. You should do this, this, that. Then we said ‘yes, 
yes, yes’. Sometimes we feel she nags us too much. 
Like other older people in Jiuzhaigou, Bamu’s mother spends most of her time and 
money on religion. Older women not only conduct religious practices, but also in many 
ways become the centre of influence on younger generations. The issue of how older 
people influence young people will be further discussed in Section 6.4.3.  
Compared to women’s major role in organising and sustaining religious practices, men 
do not have much religious work to do. However, some vital rituals cannot be done 
without men. Even though women do most of the work to make religious practices 
happen, men are still regarded as more important than women. Zeduo, a young woman 
in Jiuzhaigou, explained that her father wished she had been a son rather than a 
daughter since a son could do certain religious practices that women are not allowed to 
do.  
My Dad once said ‘It would be great if you were a son. Then you could do 
some rituals.’ I know my father loves me very much. But he regrets not having 
a son. Some familial rituals need sons to perform them. For example, a son is 
responsible for taking swords and the treasury box to the sacred mountain. 
This reveals the different roles of women and men in religion: men as dominant and 
women as subordinate. Daughters in Muslim families were also found to be held back 
from taking part in many activities than Muslim sons (Ijaz and Abbas, 2010: 319). This 
differential treatment is associated with ideas of shame and pollution concerning women 
(see Sections 5.2.6 and 5.3.5). 
Duoji, a young man in Jiuzhaigou, shared his thoughts with me on his parents’ 
differentiation in the religious education they gave him compared to his sisters. Sons 
occasionally are even specially educated at home as they are perceived to have greater 
religious importance.  
Ying: Did your parents give you a different religious education to you and your 
sisters? 
Duoji: Yes. I don’t think they taught my sisters anything special. They [my 
sisters] don’t need to learn. Now my brother is learning. I’m still young, so I 
don’t need to do any of these things. My parents are old. Some rituals need to 
be done by men. So we need to start to learn some Tibetan toast songs and 
some words needed to be chanted by men in rituals. My brother is recording 
these materials from my parents and is trying to learn by himself. 
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Duoji knows and accepts women’s and men’s different roles in Tibetan religion. He and 
his brother are trying to fulfil their religious responsibility as a man in Jiuzhaigou, which 
cannot be achieved by his sisters. The gender difference still exists in religious 
transmission among generations.   
6.4.3 The power of imitation: learning from parents 
For people who were born in religious families, religious identity was normally firstly 
formed at home through parents’ influence. Young second-generation Muslim 
immigrants in the US were found to follow what their parents required them to do without 
knowing the reasons (Peek, 2005). This type identity was termed “ascribed identity” by 
Peek (we briefly discussed the meaning of ascribed identity for young Tibetans in 
Section 6.3).  
Practicing religion at home is the main mechanism for transmitting religion among 
generations in Jiuzhaigou as well. Min (2010: 202) found that Indian Hindus practice 
religion more at home than elsewhere and that this has a stronger impact in retaining the 
younger generation’s religiosity and ethnicity compared with religious practice in 
congregations. In Jiuzhaigou, Tibetan parents do not often specifically teach their 
children about religion. For young Tibetans, there are no accessible sacred texts like the 
Bible or Qu’ran to learn from. The main source of their knowledge on religion comes from 
their parents who mostly have little formal knowledge of theories and writings of Bon. 
Thus both Bon and Tibetan Buddhism are very much practice-inclined religions. 
Knowledge and patterns of (practicing) religion are transmitted through practice-imitation 
from parents.  
Wangcuo, a young woman in Jiuzhaigou, emphasised the importance of imitating her 
mother on the formation of her religiosity:  
I didn’t ask my mother questions about religion specially. But I gradually 
understood it in the process of imitating my mom. I just followed what my mom 
did and asked me to do. Now my daughter is the same, influenced by my 
mother. My daughter tries to learn from my mom and is curious about some 
religious practices my mother does. She once reminded me to prostrate when 
we were in a temple, because she saw this being done by her grandma.  
This view was widely acknowledged by other people I talked to in Jiuzhaigou. There was 
only a single exception to this pattern in my interviews.  
Ying: Who has the biggest influence on your belief? 
Zeren: My parents. 
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Zeji: The Panchen Lama28 [here she means the 11th Panchen Lama] 
Ying: Why do you think the Panchen Lama has the greatest influence on your 
belief? 
Zeji: Because since the Dalai incident [referring to the Dalai Lama’s escape 
from Tibet to India], he kind of appears to be the chief of our Tibetans. 
Ying: Why do you think so? And when did you have this thought? 
Zeji: I’m not sure. I always have this feeling.  
Ying: You think he is great and holy? 
Zeji: Yes. 
Zeren: Really? What does he do for you? I don’t think so. 
Zeji: No. I mean in a TV news programme I saw the Panchen Lama host a 
meeting with people who are not Tibetans and talk about Buddhism. There 
were many famous people there. And he used English through the whole 
meeting. He spoke very well and he is so young. 
This conversation with sisters Zeren and Zeji suggests, even though it may be just an 
anomaly, that there can be a difference in people’s understanding of religion between 
older teenagers and comparatively mature young people. Debates between Zeji and 
Zezhen might suggest different religious understanding caused by the age difference29. 
The Panchen Lama is one of the most important religious figures in Tibet, and is publicly 
recognised and publicized by the Chinese government. The reason the Panchen Lama is 
regarded as influential is because he was considered young and knowledgeable about 
Buddhism, rubbing shoulders with stars and good at English. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, tourism plays a significant role in transforming religious 
spaces in Jiuzhaigou. In Section 6.3, tourism was argued to be providing young people 
with education opportunities in state boarding schools, which further contributes to 
reshaping laypeople’s religious and ethnic identities and patterns of intergenerational 
transmission of religion. Tourism is also the main cause attracting young college 
graduates back home as it offers them easier means of income and becomes a factor 
reinforcing the power of imitation and helping young people to create a habit of 
                                                
28 Panchen Lama is the highest ranking Lama after the Dalai Lama in the Gelugpa (Dge-
lugs-pa) lineage of Tibetan Buddhism. The 11th Panchen Lama Gyaincain Norbu is 
acknowledged and publicized by Chinese government. He is also the vice president of 
the Buddhist Association of China and a member of the National Committee of the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. 
29 Actually Zeji was the youngest person I interviewed. My original plan was to interview 
her elder sister Zeren, but Zeji wanted to stay with her sister during the interview. 
Given she was over 16, I decided to interview them together. 
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conducting religious practices regularly. In the words of Zeduo, a young woman in 
Jiuzhaigou: 
I started to willingly practice religion when I was in my sixth grade of 
elementary school [about 12 years old]. I went to rent costumes with my mom. 
At first, I just followed mom to throw prayer papers. She walked around the 
Stupa then I followed. After a while, I automatically got used to it. I took prayer 
papers every morning, even though my mom didn’t go. Now this becomes my 
habit if I go to do business. I think it could bless me.  
Tourism was the reason that motivated Zeduo’s mother to start praying in the mornings 
before the tourism business took off. Now it is also an important reason for Zeduo to 
follow her mother’s routine of religious practice. Tourism encourages Jiuzhaigou young 
people to create a habit of constantly conducting religious practice. Tourism made her 
willing to do religious practices as a young teenager. Tourism became a force in forming 
a new religious habit and having it transmitted.  
Apart from this example, young people also follow their parents and pray in other shrines 
near their business location every morning with other community members. As I stated in 
Section 5.3, tourism has become a major theme of religious practices in Jiuzhaigou, the 
young people also mainly ask for blessing of more earnings from tourism on that day.  
6.4.4 Parental love as a key of intergenerational transmission of 
religion 
As young people mature, they seem to become more introspective about their beliefs 
and values. As Peek argues, “Individuals absorb and internalise many norms, values and 
behaviours when they understand them intellectually” (Peek, 2005: 225). In this section, I 
examine how the process of becoming a parent was significant for encouraging people 
(particularly younger people who had been educated away from Jiuzhaigou) to become 
more reflective about their religious belief. I argue that parents viewed the 
intergenerational transmission of religion as an act of love, and as such this played an 
important role in maintaining this form of transmission. Chong (1998) had similar findings 
in his research on young Korean-American Christians. He found they went to church not 
only for religious purpose, but also to preserve their ethnicity and culture for their children. 
But the ways of showing parental love through religion are slightly different between 
Korean parents in Chong’s finding and Jiuzhaigou young parents. Jiuzhaigou parents 
conduct more religious practices for Children by themselves, whereas Korean parents 
encourage their children to actively be involved in religion.  
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In my interviews and conversations with younger parents, I found that they often 
expressed the view that it was love of their children that encouraged them to reconsider 
religion and to take part in more religious practices. The following account of a young 
woman, Wangcuo, illustrates this phenomenon:  
Every time when we see a big lama [a particularly important lama], the thing I 
hope most is to take my daughter there. I think my daughter should not miss 
the head-touching ceremony [by the lama]. This reflects changes in my belief. I 
didn’t believe so much in the first place. But now, because of my daughter, I 
believe [in Bon] more.  
The head-touching ceremony was considered a way to make Wangcuo’s daughter 
blessed by the big lama. Parental love embedded in the simple wish that she wanted to 
make her daughter blessed changed her attitudes toward religion which had been 
influenced by parents and school education. In this process of religious transmission, 
both parents’ and children’s religiosity was strengthened. Another middle-aged mom also 
similarly recollected her experience of taking children to religious practices:  
Zhuoga: When I was young, I often took my children to walk around the sacred 
mountain in Songpan. I took my oldest son and the second son while he was 
still in his mother’s womb. It was hard. We saw monks’ dancing and performing 
religious ceremonies. I was young at that time, [so I] didn’t feel tired.  
Ying: Why did you take your children given it’s a hard journey? 
Zhuoga: Just for the good of my children. I want to make wishes in the sacred 
mountain and let the lama touch my children’s heads to bless them to be 
healthy and safe. 
In this instance, a mother’s strong love of her children helps the sustenance of religion. 
When she made the pilgrimage, Zhuoga made her children’s well-being the priority. This 
is her most important motivation for conducting religious practices and overcoming the 
hardship involved.  
This process was evident not only among mothers but also fathers. Nuobu, a middle-
aged man in Jiuzhaigou, described his changing religiosity before and after having 
children.  
Nuobu: I think it is the love of children that makes religion. 
Ying: Why? 
Nuobu: This is my personal experience. When I was in secondary school, I was 
strongly against religion. There was a moment I resisted everything religious. 
But when my mom passed away, suddenly, I felt her spirit had gone with her 
body. … So I think religion must originate within close relationships with this 
186 
 
emotion. There must be relations, [between religion and] remembrance, a 
sense of absence and love for the people you love most. My sensibility tells me 
[there are] no [relations]. But according to my experience with my mother, I 
suddenly felt that my mother’s spirit left her body.  
Ying: So your mom’s death is a turning point? 
Nuobu: Yes. This is the reason. And my love for children is another reason. 
Because of my love, I prefer to believe in religion. I hope he could have this 
religion. If I burn incense, I would pray for him. I hope it really exists. I think this 
might be the reason that religion persists. 
It is noteworthy that Nuobu pointed out that love of children was a key force that helped 
his transformation from an atheist into a believer. As mentioned earlier, young people 
might turn to be believers again once they leave secular school and go back to their 
sacred home. Moving from the sacred home that initiated his religion feeling to schools 
that criticise religion, Nuobu also changed from a religious follower to a complete atheist 
in school. As discussed in Section 6.3, young people’s ascribed identity is variable with 
place and time. Being exposed to a different environment would reshape young people’s 
volatile religious identity. It is apparent that when they were at home, religion was not 
fully internalised and they did not even have much knowledge of their religion, which was 
mostly taken for granted. Strictly speaking, they were more like followers, and might not 
be called believers. Their religious identity was a superficially ascribed identity. Nuobu’s 
experience in school created for him chances to reflect and to form fresh understandings 
on his religion.  
When Nuobu went back home, he experienced another change. His personal life 
experiences enriched his understandings of religion and brought about a new change in 
his religious identity. The love for his mother and his children were marked as another 
factor transforming his religiosity. The death of his mother and the birth of his children 
both influenced Nuobu to reflect upon his religious beliefs. He found religion to be 
meaningful in transmitting his love to the people he cared about most. Now he takes part 
in religious practices and hopes that the Buddha exists. He then finally claims that love is 
the reason that religion sustains him.  
Apart from blessing children, some parents expressed a desire to transmit religion 
because it teaches children some moral codes. Xila, a middle-aged man in Jiuzhaigou, 
made this claim:   
I have stronger religious responsibilities. Now my family often do religious 
chanting. This makes our children have religious feelings. This is good for the 
nurturing of a good heart and suppressing qualities like brutality and 
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maliciousness. This is the best result. So children are influenced [to have moral 
standards] since they were young. It’s good for people having a belief, really. 
Xila felt stronger religious responsibilities than before as he thought religious practices 
are valuable for teaching children moral codes and giving them a good ‘heart’. Positive 
moral qualities of religion were claimed by most of my other Jiuzhaigou respondents as 
something making religion important to pass on from older generations to younger 
generations.  
Children, for their part, are willing to seek religious help from their parents. Parents were 
considered by young respondents to be the most reliable people to assist with children’s 
religious needs and requests. The following quotation from Zhuoga, a middle-aged 
woman in Jiuzhaigou, illustrates this form of religious reliance on parents:  
My elder sister was very religious. Every time she felt something wrong with 
her health, she said to me, ‘I’m ill. Medicines don’t work. Is there something 
wrong with our house? Is something in the wrong place?’ Then I said ‘Don’t be 
mysterious. Take some medicines. You will be fine.’ She then replied ‘No. 
There must be something wrong. I have to ask mom to invite someone to look 
at it.’ Every time she ended up asking for [religious] help from mom. Mom is in 
charge of everyone’s religious affairs. 
Religious expression of parents’ love for their children is not unidirectional. In response, 
children are also willing to seek for religious assistance from their parents. Zhuoga’s 
sister had got used to the help from her mother and religion. Her mother is the medium 
connecting her and religion. She did not intend to find monks by herself to resolve her 
problem. In contrast, she turned to her mother who always plays a professional role in 
her family’s religious affairs. She trusted her mother’s knowledge of religion and her 
capacity to resolve this problem using a religious method. It again shows that older 
people are always supposed to take the leading role in religious practices.  
It is necessary to point out that Zhuoga’s sister was like this when she was living with her 
mother. But after she married, her religious role was transformed. In the following section, 
the importance of marriage for religious transmission will be explored.  
6.4.5 Marriage and religion 
As indicated in the previous section, Zhuoga’s sister was highly dependent on her 
mother’s religious help before she got married. Her mother conducted religious practices 
on her behalf. However, marriage changed her attitudes toward religion. After marriage, 
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she was expected to step forward and fulfil her religious responsibilities to the whole 
family (although these responsibilities were moderated by the fact that her husband’s 
parents live with them, lessening the pressure on her to undertake all the family’s 
religious practices).  
Marriage was considered by respondents as an important turning point at which both 
young Tibetans, especially women, become closer to religion. In Jiuzhaigou, women are 
expected to take on household duties, including religious duties. One of the most 
important parts of ‘managing the family’ is taking charge of domestic religious affairs. 
Therefore, parents, especially very religious ones, hope their son can find a wife who can 
continue their religion.  
A young man, Duoji, told me his mother wanted him to marry a woman who could keep 
up religious practices at home. He said: 
In the past, my mom expressed her wish that my future wife should be able to 
continue the religious line [of the whole family]. This is important for the long-
term prosperity of the whole family.  
This implies that parents’ first priority is for their son to marry a Tibetan woman who has 
some religious background. Parents have this gendered expectation that daughters/ 
daughters-in-law should remain guardians of the family’s prosperity and religious 
inheritance. In Dwyer’s (2003) research Pakistani Muslim women in Britain were found to 
be expected to teach their children about Pakistani culture.  
Parents show particular preferences regarding the marriage partners of their sons. In 
terms of daughters, as they are assumed to leave home when they get married, parents 
do not have specific requirements on religious awareness of their spouses. But how do 
the sons think about it? I subsequently asked Duoji for his perspective on the issue:  
Ying: Have you personally considered this a criterion of your wife-to-be? 
Duoji: Not really. I mean I hope to find a Tibetan girl. We would have the same 
religion. It’s good for the family. But if I can’t find a Tibetan girl, I have no way. 
Ying: Then how to keep the religion? 
Duoji: En… My future wife could learn from my mom, or other aunts and elder 
sisters. 
Duoji did not take the religious transmission from his mother to his wife as seriously as 
his mother did. He had a comparatively relaxed attitude. Having a Tibetan wife was an 
ideal result, but he did not only consider Tibetan women. The reason he did not restrict 
himself to Tibetan women was that it was felt that religious practices could be learnt by a 
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non-Tibetan wife from other elder women. This implied that Duoji still held the traditional 
view on the gendered division of labour in which women are supposed to carry on the 
familial religion. Regardless of whether his wife is Tibetan or not, religious or not, she will 
be expected to practice his religion and to be able to manage religious affairs. This was 
evidenced by a few cases in which non-Tibetan wives learned to practice religion after a 
long-term stay in Jiuzhaigou. A few non-Tibetan and non-Jiuzhaigou wives I met seemed 
very familiar with how to do religious practices. 
From the following account of another middle-aged woman, Gexicuo, the importance of 
marrying a Tibetan woman was emphasised again. 
My children don’t know much about religion. They just feel scripture-chanting 
ceremony is too complicated. It is possible that they won’t chant in future if they 
have no idea of it now. Some older people like my mom said ‘Our generation 
do scripture-chanting ritual. But how about future generations?’ If my younger 
brother marries a Han wife, how can we keep on the scripture-chantings given 
she is a Han knowing nothing about our religion. … My father likes to scold us 
for not obeying the family rules. Once my sister made fun of him saying ‘if your 
son finds you a Han daughter-in-law, I want to see how you would scold her.’ 
The stories about generational conflicts over religion as in Gexicuo’s family are not 
exceptional. The following section will explore the issue of mutual misunderstandings 
and understandings between generations in greater depth. 
6.4.6 Mutual misunderstandings/understandings and compromise 
between generations 
In the process of religious transmission, there can also be tensions and conflicts. For the 
young people who have been educated with atheist and rationalist views, religious 
tensions mostly happen between them and the older generations who have grown up 
almost exclusively in the local religious environment. 
Based on observations and interviews, these conflicts in Jiuzhaigou seemed mostly to be 
of a relatively small scale nature. For example, parental goodwill expressed through 
religion was not always accepted or welcomed by young people. In the quotation below 
Xiuying describes her clashes with her mother-in-law and her interpretation of her 
mother-in-law’s behaviour. 
My mother-in-law is a very religious person. Once my child was sick and 
coughing, she immediately called a monk to do the fortune-telling for my son. 
And the monk asked us to do a ritual to expel ghosts. To be honest, I don’t 
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believe in this very much. I think this is an irrational part in Bon. I was against 
this decision and she was very unhappy. I know she believes [in Bon] from her 
bones… I think this is a consolation for older people, even though it doesn’t 
have much effect. 
This description of Xiuying’s mother-in-law is also typical of other older people in 
Jiuzhaigou who have religious belief ‘from their bones’ and who have internalised religion 
both in their body and mind (see Section 6.4.1.1). Xiuying, who went to state school, was 
not as religious as her mother-in-law and doubted the irrational parts of Bon religion. As 
such, she resisted her mother-in-law’s approach to helping her unhealthy child. In the 
end, however, Xiuying conceded and allowed her to have say in religious affairs about 
her children, as she realised the significance of religion for the older people. 
Similarly, other generational conflicts regarding religion also seemed to be resolved 
through compromise on the part of younger people, who deferred to older people’s 
strength of feeling. The brother of Laji, a young woman in Jiuzhaigou, had been through 
a process of transformation from being a religious rebel to a religious adherent. She 
recounted his transformation as follows: 
Religious practices are a bit annoying for my brother, but he doesn’t really 
resist it or get angry. I think deep in his heart, he has already understood the 
meaning of religion. In the past, he liked to say to parents ‘What are you doing 
all these days? It’s a waste of money! Does it really make you healthy or bring 
you money?’ -- things which we [others] never say. … My brother was a 
rebel…. After he got married and had a baby, he was different. When he had 
the first child, he ask mom to chant for him. Now he calls my mom to do 
something for him every time when he has problems. It means he has 
understood mom and religion, or he won’t ask for consolation [from religion]. 
People like to find something to rely on when helpless, to find a spiritual pillar. I 
think all the people I know are like this. 
I have never seen conflicts around religion between old and young last a long time. The 
tensions surrounding religion are resolvable and subject to compromise, with young 
people’s deeper understandings of their parents and their religion. Actually, as shown 
above, even though young people have critical thinking toward religion, the supernatural 
side of religion is not considered non-acceptable. Young people’s compromises on the 
one hand show that religion, generally reckoned as a way of maintaining ethnicity and 
expressing generational love, plays an important part in their lives; on the other hand the 
negative results are controllable and acceptable. Additionally, filial duties also require 
young people to respect and please their parents. Young people are supposed to 
understand and support parents’ primary activities in life: religious practices. 
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6.4.7 New challenges to religious transmission  
As discussed previously, intergenerational transmission of religion is maintained in that 
children immersed in religious environment imitating parents and parents saw the 
practice of religion as an expression of love for their children. However, at the moment, 
Jiuzhaigou is facing a challenge of religious transmission as more and more children are 
sent to study outside since they were very young. This threatens the intergenerational 
religious transmission by displacing children from local religious place to outside secular 
place, cutting them off from the religious teaching of parents.  
Zewang, a middle-aged man in Jiuzhaigou, talked about perceived differences between 
contemporary young people and young people during the time of his youth.  
Ying: Compared to your youth, what do you think about young people’s 
religiosity today? 
Zewang: It is different. Nowadays young people easily feel tired when you ask 
them to do something [religious]. They just say no. But we were very active in 
the past. We did what our elders asked us to do.  
Ying: So young people are not as religious as before? 
Zewang: Yes. They have become the Han. Haha… They don’t believe in this 
[Bon] very much. 
Ying: What’s the reason? 
Zewang: It’s mainly because in the past [we] stayed with our parents every 
day. They asked us to practice religion and said it is good for us. Nowadays 
children don’t have time to learn. They come back to stay for only about ten to 
twenty days [in each holiday].  
The results of this disconnection are conspicuous. Older generations sigh that “children 
cannot speak Tibetan”, and “they barely know Tibetan culture”. The following 
conversation with Gaxi, a young man in Jiuzhaigou demonstrates this perception of the 
differences of religiosity between teenagers, and those in their twenties, suggesting that 
the generational difference might be becoming even more pronounced: 
Ying: Is there a difference between your religiosity when you were young and 
the religiosity of young people today? 
Gaxi: There definitely is. I even doubt if they still have belief. 
Ying: Who are you referring to? 
Gaxi: Those teenagers.  
Ying: Did you have belief when you were at the same age? 
Gaxi: Of course I did. How couldn’t I have? At least I know those basic things. I 
know what I should do. ... When we performed the dragon ritual, women could 
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not stay under the dragon and touch it. But nowadays children know nothing 
about these things. 
According to Gaxi, who is in his late twenties, young teenagers have little knowledge of 
religion. He even claimed that young teenagers do not have belief of their religion at all, 
because they do not even have some very basic religious knowledge. Most of these 
young teenagers and children are sent to big cities for education from kindergarten or 
primary school. It is foreseeable that intergenerational transmission of religion will be 
further affected in the future.  
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, attention has been placed on relationships between intergenerationality 
and religion, which has been suggested as an effective approach to understanding 
religious change and young people’s changing religiosities (Hopkins et al., 2011; 
Vanderbeck, 2007). More specifically, the chapter centred on the younger generation 
and explored the changing patterns of intergenerational transmission of religion and its 
impact on them. Among the various official and unofficial religious spaces which have 
the potential to reshape religiosities of young people (Vincett et al., 2012), school and 
home spaces were identified as the two most important sites of transformation and were 
examined in more detail.  
I first examined relationships between religion, language and ethnic identity from young 
people’s perspective to gain a better understanding of their changing religiosities. 
Religion is normally mentioned together with language as an important signifier of 
Tibetan ethnic identity. Rather than making a clear distinction between religion and 
culture, the two tend to be bundled together. Religious identity is closely intertwined with 
ethnic identity.  
I then explored the ways in which state schooling, as a significant interruption of 
intergenerational transmission of religion, recasts young people’s religious and ethnic 
identities. Thanks to the wealth brought by tourism, young people in Jiuzhaigou are given 
educational opportunities in big Han-populated cities. Young Tibetans’ volatile and 
variable religious identity is challenged by school education which encourages them to 
critically and rationally consider their religion. In response, their attitude toward religion is 
neither simply one of rejection nor of acceptance. They adopt a neutral way by treating it 
as an ethnic cultural norm which is compatible with the state’s construction of religion as 
‘a flavour of ethnic culture’. Facing these challenges, ethnic identity emerges crucially to 
strengthen religious identity, especially when the state discourse, schooling practices 
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and Han students come together to raise tensions between Tibetan and Han to reinforce 
young Tibetans’ feeling of difference. I argue that in the Chinese communist and 
scientific ideological climate, ethnicity becomes an umbrella maintaining their religious 
identity. 
Following the discussion of school as an atheist and multi-ethnic space, I turned to 
intergenerational transmission of religion at home, a comparatively homogeneous 
religious and ethnic space. For young college graduates, it is the economic benefits of 
tourism that attract them back to the place their religion originated, to the traditional 
environment of religious transmission. They on the one hand encounter conflicts over 
religious practices with middle-aged and older people who “believe from the bone” and 
constantly mediate between religion and young people. On the other hand, they 
gradually take religion more seriously with their changing familial roles. Marriage urges 
young people, especially women, to take on traditional familial religious duties. Having 
children further ignites young people’s religious awareness and enthusiasm in involving 
themselves and their children more in religious practices. As their parents did for them, 
they start to more actively conduct religious practices on behalf of their children. Parental 
love for their children can change people’s attitudes toward religion. Some of my 
interviewees told me that they had even become religious having been completely 
atheist once they became parents. 
The first concluding point that can be drawn from this chapter is that religious practices 
and religious belief are not together equally and uniformly transmitted intergenerationally. 
In the whole process of intergenerational transmission of religion, doing religion has 
been given much more weight than thinking religion. It is religious practices that are 
more stressed in the process of learning from imitation and as an expression of parents’ 
love for their children. Moreover, the main conflicts and anxieties concerning religion also 
mainly lie in the maintenance of religious practices. The result is that when young 
people’s religious belief is challenged and questioned by scientific and rational ideas, 
they choose to “just practice, don’t think too much” (as reported by Duga in Section 
6.3.3.2). The second result is that when young people do not have a clear understanding 
of their religion, ethnic identity emerges as a significant factor maintaining and enhancing 
their religious identity. This also partly explains why young people treat religion as a 
cultural tradition, which to them is a legitimate standpoint in the mainstream Chinese 
context of viewing religion as superstition. This echoes local people’s interpretation of 
Risang Festival (Chapter 5) more as a cultural festival in order to acquire support from 
Jiuzhaigou Administrative Bureau.  
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The second conclusion is that intergenerational transmission of religion is a complex and 
nuanced process rather than the previously assumed unidirectional and linear process 
(Hopkins et al., 2011; Vanderbeck, 2007). Young people are not passive recipients of 
religious influence. They have their own reflections and choices. Children can also be the 
source of a strengthening of parents’ religious practices and beliefs (Gallagher, 2007). 
Furthermore, other intergenerational processes which have been under-examined in 
traditional intergenerational studies, including grandparents-to-grandchildren, teacher-to-
student, and classmates-to- classmates, also play a significant role in reshaping young 
people’s religious understanding in complex ways.  
Thirdly, if intergenerational transmission of religion is placed in the long term, as a whole 
life experience, the means of religious transmission vary in time and space. If in the 
school stage, young people’s religious identity is volatile, subject to change and largely 
upheld by ethnic identity, in the post-school stage at home, their religious identity 
becomes more stable and mainly maintained by their internal demand of religion.   
The fourth conclusion is that national homogenisation as the main purpose of school 
education has not been as successful as expected. The “Tibetan vis-à-vis the Han” 
dichotomy is reinforced. The ethnic difference becomes a factor enhancing young 
people’s religious awareness. 
Finally, I conclude that tourism has played an important role in transforming the trajectory 
and patterns of intergenerational transmission of religion through directly becoming an 
important element of religious practice and indirectly changing local people’s economic 
status, for example, blessing tourism prosperity through chanting.  
In sum, religious practices and religious belief among laypeople in Jiuzhaigou still 
maintain well to different extents through continual intergenerational transmission, even 
though rationalist and scientific thinking creates some obstruction in the transmission. 
However, there are big challenges to keeping the intergenerational religious transmission 
in Jiuzhaigou. With more and more children removed from home to the outside world at a 
younger and younger age, the connection between children and home, children and 
parents might become cut off in a more dramatic and fundamental way. This has posed 
great worries. In future, the problems of intergenerational transmission of religion might 




Chapter 7 Monks and religious identity – seeking authenticity in 
Bon religion 
7.1 Introduction  
Research in religious studies has often tended to ignore religious professionals, for 
whom “religion is not just a label but is the centre of their lives, a major investment and 
commitment” (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi, 2014: 63). They are all too easily regarded by 
social scientists studying religion as taken-for-granted background for understanding 
laypeople’s religious beliefs and practices. Religious professionals, however, are people 
with power, authority, expertise, religious knowledge, and a distinct lifestyle. Religious 
change cannot be fully understood without considering the changes occurring to them. 
This chapter focuses specifically on how monks have been involved in and affected by 
processes of religious change, with particular attention to debates that have become 
prominent at my research site regarding the authenticity of Jiuzhaigou monks’ religious 
identities. The chapter prefaces its consideration of the lives and experiences of monks 
with a discussion of what authenticity means to ordinary laypeople in Jiuzhaigou and 
how it is linked to a sense of ‘pure’ Tibetan-ness, to better understand the identity issues 
confronting monks in contemporary Jiuzhaigou.  
Reflecting on questions of authenticity, Erickson (1995: 140) did not see “the primary 
question as being whether people are authentic or inauthentic per se, but rather under 
what conditions or contexts the experience of inauthenticity becomes a problem”. 
Authenticity is not only of importance for highly individualised and industrialised Europe, 
but also of relevance for reform-era China in which people have deep concerns over 
various forms of counterfeits, such as fake merchants, fake money, and fake souvenirs 
(Notar, 2006). In China, the explosive growth of the market economy and consumerism 
has encouraged the rise of inauthentic products, people, performances, etc. As for Tibet, 
there is a need to consider why and how issues around authenticity have become a 
concern in the contemporary rapidly changing political, economic, social and cultural 
environment and how authenticity is perceived, reflected and negotiated.  
Authenticity is of importance because it reflects societal and cultural transformations 
(Erickson, 1995). In contemporary Tibet, Bon is facing challenges which have been 
obviously demonstrated in Jiuzhaigou, a frontier of modernisation in Tibet (see Chapters 
5 and 6). In the process of situating themselves in this challenging society, monks have 
been through rounds of identity negotiation and adaptation. This chapter aims to 
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examine the issues of ‘authenticity’ in the context of modern Tibet in China. In other 
words, this chapter will focus on the identity and the meaning of self for Tibetan Bon 
monks. As Delyser (1999) argued “Authenticity is not simply a condition inherent in an 
object, awaiting discovery, but a term that has different meanings in different contexts, in 
different places, to different people, and even to the same person at different times”. 
What I want to explore is how the meaning of authenticity is constructed and negotiated 
by monks, as well as by local people in Jiuzhaigou, and how this is more broadly 
significant for understanding religious and ethnic identity. These are all areas which have 
been under-researched (Vannini and Williams, 2009). 
Tourism greatly improved Tibetans’ material life by creating job opportunities and 
increasing incomes. Tibetan monks who are supposed to stay in their monastery have 
had their whole life changed because of tourism. Monks in Zharu Monastery have in 
many ways left their sacred sphere; they have become involved in the tourism business, 
selling souvenirs, renting Tibetan costumes, taking photographs for tourists and running 
hotels; taking up secular identities as fathers, husbands, sons and business men. These 
new patterns of life have provoked criticism from some quarters -- for example, from 
some fellow monks -- but have elicited understanding from others such as family 
members. Thus it is worth exploring how this special religious group adapted themselves 
and their lives to the development of tourism. However, few studies focus on tourism 
impacts on destination and its people’s religion (Mustafa, 2014), and fewer give real 
attention in these circumstances to religious professionals’ lives in non-western contexts.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 will provide a broader discussion of the 
imaginative geographies of authenticity and religion among both laypeople and monks. 
Section 7.3 will explore the meanings of tourism and religion to Jiuzhaigou monks. In 
doing so, a picture of how the livelihoods of monks are changing will be presented. 
Section 7.4 will examine people’s understandings of authenticity and the ways in which 
monks negotiate their identities. The articulation of authenticity in monks’ identities in the 
local context of Jiuzhaigou exemplifies a wider discourse of “inauthentic self, authentic 
other”, a concept which provides one of the major themes of this chapter.  
7.2 Imagined geographies of authenticity: inauthentic self, 
authentic other 
When I was undertaking my fieldwork in Jiuzhaigou, I was struck by how the people I 
spoke to during my fieldwork in Jiuzhaigou tended to think that religion was authentic in 
other parts of Tibet but not in their own place. In this section, I will discuss and reflect on 
this perception entertained by so many Jiuzhaigou people.  
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In Jiuzhaigou, when I asked local people to talk about what religion meant to them, they 
often gave me answers similar to this one, supplied by Zewang, a middle-aged man in 
Jiuzhaigou:  
If you want to know about Bon, you should go to TAR [Tibet Autonomous 
Region] or Aba County. Religion and belief in these places is still pure and 
authentic. Places like these can let you truly know about the history of Bon, 
about how it originated and developed. Our places are impure now, almost 
hanified. You have a look; our children cannot even speak Tibetan anymore. 
Do not even mention the [importance of] religion or belief [among children].  
In their answers to me, it became clear that Jiuzhaigou people generally thought I could 
not come to know Bon well from my experiences in Jiuzhaigou alone. In their mind, their 
own place is not a proper place to know Bon, because it is hanified and not pure 
anymore. Hanification is a term widely used by people I talked to in Jiuzhaigou and 
Anbei, and has also been widely identified as a prominent process underway among 
ethnic minorities in other parts of China, such as the Miao in Guizhou (Oakes, 1998), the 
Naxi in Yunan (Su and Teo, 2009), the Uighur in Xinjiang (Bovingdon, 2004) and the Yao 
in South China (Alberts, 2006). From the point of view of people in Jiuzhaigou, 
modernisation associated with hanification is a key reason why their place is becoming 
less authentic and less ‘pure’. Here, being ‘pure’ is considered a quality of authenticity. 
This is similar to Paine’s (2000: 82-86) research in which ‘pure’ was used to represent 
the authenticity of aboriginality and was equated with ‘simple’. In China this quality of 
‘pure’ is usually associated with simplicity, remoteness, backwardness, primitiveness, 
etc., which characterise Han people’s general perception of ethnic minorities in China 
(Gladney, 1994, see also chapter 3). This echoes Paine’s (2000: 84) claim that 
aboriginality is “an act of distancing” through which the aboriginal was constructed as a 
spatial and temporal stereotypic other. Through this ‘pure’ logic the minorities are 
differentiated from the sophisticated, civilised and advanced Han.  
Tibet has always been constructed as ethnically ‘pure’, religiously sacred and materially 
insufficient in the mainstream discourse in China (see Chapter 3). This image somehow 
coincides with Tibet’s image in westerners’ eyes (Hilton, 1960; Lopez, 1999) as well as in 
the mind of Tibetans themselves (the Dalai Lama, 1995), even though this western 
romanticised view has been also criticised for its Orientalism and its colonialist and 
imperialist aspersions (Lopez, 1999; Dreyfus, 2005).  
Power is exerted through the imaginative geographies over the imagined ‘other’. As 
discussed in chapter 2, this set of discourses and state development projects on ethnic 
minorities is a kind of internal Orientalism for maintaining the state’s purpose of 
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achieving a homogenised nation. Under this influence, many minorities – but not all – 
feel the need to develop and become ‘civilised’, a perception enhanced by state 
education (see Chapter 6). In the case of Tibetans, the logic of ‘purity’ is also partly 
accepted and used, especially by students, in differentiating themselves from Han 
Chinese (Bass, 2008; Zhu, 2007). That is to say, Tibetans are not simply passively 
distinguished by the dominant ideology of Han/minority; they also actively differentiate 
themselves from the Han based on the same ideology. This further helps to show that 
the stereotypic understanding of minorities is internalised by the Tibetans and shapes 
Tibetans’ understanding of self (see Chapter 3), as does the Han/Tibetan dichotomy 
constantly appearing in locals’ everyday discourses (see also the discussion in Chapters 
5 and 6). Moreover, as we can see from the comment quoted above, this same logic of 
purity was accepted and adopted by Jiuzhaigou people in differentiating themselves not 
only from Han Chinese but also from other Tibetans. The Jiuzhaigou Tibetans I spoke to 
considered themselves impure and inauthentic in the cultural sense, in relation to their 
underdeveloped, remote Tibetan counterparts, because Jiuzhaigou has become 
developed and hanified. The religiously authentic, pure Tibetan places were considered 
comparatively backward and undeveloped. A similar logic was also evidenced by Xie 
(2003: 12) who found that in the tourist brochures in Hainan the poorest and most 
remote villages were presented as the most ‘authentic’ communities.  
TAR and Aba County appeared many times in my conversations with Jiuzhaigou people. 
Despite the high frequency with which these places were mentioned by local people as 
widely accepted models of religiously and culturally authentic places, many of my 
respondents had never been to either, despite the relative proximity of Aba County. They 
simply imagine that TAR and Aba County are ‘authentic’ based on this logic of purity. 
These perceptions are no doubt due to TAR’s long importance in the history of Tibetan 
politics, religion, culture and economy. For many Tibetans, especially those living outside 
of the TAR, TAR is their religious centre because of its many well-known Bon and 
Buddhist pilgrimage sites such as monasteries, sacred mountains and lakes. These 
places have a long history and wide reputation. TAR is the place that everyone “must go 
to at least once in their life” (Laji, a young woman in Jiuzhaigou) and that “Tibetans most 
wish to travel to” (Caidan, a middle-aged man in Jiuzhaigou). Making a pilgrimage to 
TAR is a way of showing Tibetan ethnic identity. Zeduo, a young woman in Jiuzhaigou, 
told me that, “As a Tibetan, I of course want to go [to TAR]. Once I have time, I will go.” 
Many other respondents expressed a similar view that going to TAR was connected to 
their ethnic identity. Jiuzhaigou people’s geographies of authenticity might also be partly 
attributed to the culturally peripheral position of Jiuzhaigou. As Tenzin (2013) found in 
Danba County, which is also on the Sino-Tibet border, the Han-influenced ethnicity of 
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Tibetans there and their Bon religion were also disputed and not acknowledged by 
neighbouring Tibetans.  
As Peterson (Peterson, 2005: 1083) writes, “Issues of authenticity most often come into 
play when authenticity has been put in doubt” for certain reasons and under certain 
conditions. For Jiuzhaigou people, hanification and modernisation are the two major 
causes of what amounts to an identity crisis stemming from their distinction between 
authentic TAR and inauthentic Jiuzhaigou. Hanification was usually coupled with 
modernisation for Jiuzhaigou people when they were reflecting to me on their culture and 
religion. As Su and Teo (2009: 86) suggest, hanification, as a state-driven process, is 
assisted by Chinese capital and political administration. Under the consistent pressure of 
enhancing Chinese nationalism (Oakes, 1998), both hanification and modernisation are 
actually mutually reinforced. Through their study in Lijiang in the north of Yunnan 
province, Su and Teo (2009: 88) asserted that hanification was further reinforced through 
tourism in minority areas. This mutual relationship was also sensed by Jiuzhaigou people 
for whom being modernised means being like the Han mainly in cultural and economic 
aspects. Hanification in general was thought to be changing Jiuzhaigou people’s 
economic condition and cultural integrity.  
This is echoed in the way that another Jiuzhaigou person perceived ‘purity’. Zeren, a 
young layman, maintained that Jiuzhaigou culture is not pure, and “the purer places are 
those that are undeveloped”. He explained this view by stating that “Because it is 
undeveloped, it is pure. Once a place is developed, it will be destroyed, I believe.” Zeren 
and Zewang shared similar thoughts that ‘pure’ is associated with ‘undeveloped’. For my 
other Jiuzhaigou respondents, the criterion of authenticity for Tibetan religion and culture 
hinges on the state of development. Undeveloped places are those that have not been 
through modernisation and hanification, which encourages cultural and economic 
homogeneity. For them, development sabotages their cultural particularity and integrity. 
Therefore, as an economically better-off and culturally hanified place, Jiuzhaigou was 
considered inauthentic in terms of the Bon religion and Tibetan culture.  
Hereby now, we have got a rough map of religious authenticity in the minds of 
Jiuzhaigou people. This map categorises places with a scarcity of material goods and 
with little Han influence as religiously authentic, while places with an abundance of 
material goods and with strong Han influence as religiously inauthentic. Jiuzhaigou 
people’s geographies of authenticity reflect the fact that religious centre is still located in 
inner Tibet, to which eastern Tibet is still peripheral. The central-peripheral juxtaposition 
is also positively connected to the extent of Han influence.  
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According to Derek Gregory (1997: 271), “Imaginative geographies describe not only 
representations of other places -- peoples, landscapes and cultures -- but also the ways 
in which these representations project the desires, fantasies and preconceptions of their 
authors and the grids of power between them and their subjects”. Authenticity has 
become something in Jiuzhaigou that shows the uncertainties and struggles about 
identity and culture in contemporary modernising Tibet. Two levels of imaginative 
geographies of authenticity have been found forming Jiuzhaigou people’s understanding 
of self and other. The first is at the inter-ethnic group level; Tibetans are ‘pure’, simple, 
backward, undeveloped and uncivilised compared to the sophisticated, advanced, 
developed and civilised Han. The second is at the intra-ethnic group level, Tibetans in 
undeveloped, remote places are ‘pure’ and authentic compared to Tibetans in developed 
and hanified Jiuzhaigou. The intra-group level is influenced by the inter-group level. That 
is to say, Jiuzhaigou Tibetans’ perceptions of other Tibetans is influenced and heavily 
shaped by the civilisation discourse of China and the broader majority/minority ideology. 
It seems both levels have a similar logic. However it is exerted differently with different 
meanings and power relations. At the inter-ethnic group level, the ‘pure’ logic functions in 
justifying a series of civilisation and development projects in the ethnic minority areas 
and further differentiates the Tibetans from the Han. The boundaries between self and 
the imagined other are set by the Chinese state. At the intra-ethnic group level, the ‘pure’ 
logic shows the strength of the sense of Tibetan identity. The boundary between self and 
the imagined other is set by Tibetans themselves to stress their ethnic difference from 
the Han. These intra-group imaginative geographies of authenticity are actually a 
reaction to and the result of the inter-group imaginative geographies of authenticity.   
Chapters 5 and 6 have discussed the ways in which Jiuzhaigou laypeople’s religiosity, 
ethnic identity, religious practice and language change with hanification and 
modernisation. The preceding section looked at the sense of authenticity among lay 
people in Jiuzhaigou. In the following sections, we will focus on monks’ understanding of 
religion and their identity.  
7.3 “Tourism provides my physical food; religion gives me 
spiritual food” 
Chapter 5 provided a picture of the ways in which Zharu Monastery and the monks were 
involved in local religious life and tourism. In this section, I further explore the lives of 
Jiuzhaigou monks and the ways in which they are intertwined with tourism and religion. 
Specifically, this section will explore monks’ involvement in and feelings about tourism 
and will construct a picture of monks facing an identity crisis, which I will discuss in the 
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remaining parts of the chapter. Firstly, the difficulties involved in continuing the monastic 
life and monasticism in Jiuzhaigou will be discussed in Section 7.3.1; Section 7.3.2 will 
discuss monks’ involvement in tourism; following that, Section 7.3.3 will examine monks’ 
familial roles; finally, an assessment of the importance of tourism for Jiuzhaigou monks 
will be provided in Section 7.3.4. 
The views of Agu Caidan, a young monk in Zharu Monastery, on tourism and religion 
offers a clear introduction to what tourism and religion mean to many of the monks I 
spoke to: 
Ying: Which one is more important for you, religion or tourism? 
Agu Caidan: Both of them are very important. 
Ying: What do religion and tourism respectively mean for you? 
Agu Caidan: Tourism provides me with my physical food; religion gives me 
spiritual food. Without tourism, I cannot live. And of course I cannot live 
without religion.  
While not all the other monks in Jiuzhaigou whom I interviewed spoke so unequivocally, 
these words from Agu Caidan capture what it seems to me that most Jiuzhaigou monks 
think about tourism and religion. For them, both tourism and religion are as important as 
food. Tourism is a crucial mean of making a living; religion is the source of spiritual 
satisfaction. Tourism and religion are intimately interwoven within the lives of Jiuzhaigou 
monks.  
7.3.1 Difficulties of monasticism in Jiuzhaigou 
In order to better understand the sense that Jiuzhaigou monks have as to what is 
authentic, this section will briefly discuss the current situation of Zharu Monastery and its 
struggle to maintain its membership.  
As discussed in chapter 3, the monastery was once the supreme spiritual ‘holy land’ in 
Tibet. Being a part of it made people spiritually and materially superior to their lay 
counterparts (Goldstein, 2010). Becoming a monk was a good thing both for the monk 
and his family in Tibetan society. It offered the monk a worry-free future. He was free of 
intensive labour and worries about subsistence. For the parents, it brought religious merit 
and a way of showing love to their children. Because of these factors, mass monasticism 
has existed in Tibet for several hundred years. In 1951 about 10% to 15% of the 
population were monks (Goldstein, 2010: 3). It was normally the parents who decided a 
child’s future as a monk. The following comments were made by Caidan, a middle-aged 
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layman in Jiuzhaigou (not to be confused with the monk Agu Caidan quoted above), 
illustrate the biggest motivation for going into the monastic life: 
We should realise that it was a parents’ dream [that their child should become 
a monk]. [Monasteries] provided children with a good environment for study. 
[Monks] were knowledgeable people. The old generation told us that if you 
study hard, then you don’t need to do physical work and you can be a monk. 
Being a monk actually equals being a government official now. You [as a monk] 
just sit in other people’s house and eat delicious food. There are even people 
specially coming to [your house] to invite you [to chant sutras].   
At present, Tibetans at school are much more likely to study to become government 
officials than they are to become monks. This shift not only shows the declining 
importance of monasticism, but also represents the rising influence of the state in Tibet.  
Candidates to become a monk normally come from within the parish. The monastery and 
its parish have reciprocal relationships. The monastery is responsible for various 
religious services and spiritual needs for the surrounding villages. The parish provides 
novices and donations for the monastery. Any layman in this area who wants to become 
a monk must enter his local monastery. Zharu Monastery is a local monastery of this 
kind.  
Zharu Monastery is gradually losing its appeal to local Tibetans (see Chapter 5). Only 
about 10% of the monks were aged under 30 in 2012. Fewer and fewer young people 
have chosen to take up a monastic life during the past several decades. From my 
interviews and discussions with local people, it became clear that parents prefer to send 
their children for education at school rather than at the monastery because they think 
finishing university can give children “a good future”, whereas the monastery cannot 
guarantee “a good future” any more. Here, “a good future” refers to “getting a good job 
and earning an easy living”, in the words of Zerenzhu, middle-aged layman. On the one 
hand, as religion has been differentiated from the political and social spheres, the 
monastery no longer enjoys the highest prestige in Tibetan society, and has lost its 
exclusive position as the only way of getting educated and being superior to others; on 
the other hand, tourism has become an easy way of earning a good living with little effort. 
Most university and college undergraduates in Jiuzhaigou came back home selling 
souvenirs, running family inns, photographing for tourists or joining the JAB. As a result, 
going into the monastery has become a last resort for parents and young people.  
Nearly all the current newly recruited young monks in Zharu monastery are from areas 
outside of Jiuzhaigou where there are far fewer working opportunities than in Jiuzhaigou. 
They attended normal schools before coming to the monastery. The monastery was their 
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choice of last resort simply because, the words of Agu Zhaxi, a young monk in Zharu 
monastery, they “don’t like maths… [Maths] is very hard”; or, according to Agu Cairang, 
a young monk in Zharu monastery, they “don’t have good results in exams” and they 
“can’t catch up with others”. Muslim mosques in China also face the same challenge in 
enrolling students as Tibetan monasteries do. In 1980s in Northwest China, learning the 
Koran and becoming an ahong30 guaranteed high social status and a decent income. 
Nowadays, however, many manla31 leave the mosque and move into the secular life to 
achieve their ultimate purpose, to have a good life materially and spiritually (Hong, 2013: 
168). Wang and Yang (2011) also found that Muslim manla left mosques because of 
financial problems. However, by transforming the aim from creating ahong to transmitting 
basic Islamic culture and practices, religious education is still vibrant in many Muslim 
communities. In Yunnan, Tai people are also inclined to let their children study longer in 
public schools other than monasteries (Hansen, 1999).  
By providing other life choices, tourism has greatly increased difficulties in recruiting new 
monks in Jiuzhaigou. For people in other Tibetan areas, being a monk might still be a 
comparatively good choice. For Jiuzhaigou people, however, tourism provides them with 
far more choices; and in any case all of the Jiuzhaigou monks are more or less involved 
in tourism at the moment. The following three sections will explain the ways in which 
Jiuzhaigou monks interact with tourism. 
7.3.2 Being a monk and working in tourism 
Monks in Jiuzhaigou are operating hostels, running souvenir shops, guarding tourist sites, 
photographing for tourists and working in the tourism bureau. Although they are monks, 
they are neither living in the monastery nor regularly conducting religious practices.  
As described in Sections 3.4.3 and 5.2.5, monks in Jiuzhaigou were barely providing 
religious services for local people. They only attended three routine religious events 
organised by Zharu Monastery every year. These events are Mazhi Festival in June, 
Niangmei Dejing Ceremony in the first month of the lunar year and Guduo Ceremony 
also in the first month of the lunar year. The three festivals account for 16 days in total. 
These are the biggest public religious events in which all monks are supposed to gather 
in Zharu Monastery chanting scriptures and conducting rituals together. As a matter of 
                                                
30 Ahong (imam in Islam), refers to the clergy in Muslim mosques who teach the Koran 
and serve in Muslim religious practices. 
31 Manla are students who are studying in the mosque to becoming ahong in the future. 
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fact, monks were free to be excused from attending these ceremonies. I asked the 
reason why they participate in these events rather than just quitting everything. Agu 
Duoji, a middle-aged monk in Zharu Monastery, replied as follows: 
I’m still a monk in Zharu Monastery. I go to Zharu Monastery merely out of a 
sense of responsibility and obligation. These [three annual religious] events 
have to be participated in. [But] Attending them is enough.  
Clearly, monks regard attendance at these three ceremonies as their only obligation as a 
monk in Zharu Monastery -- an occasional duty to fulfil. During the rest of the time, they 
take the sort of tourism-related jobs mentioned above. It is worth noting that going to the 
monastery to attend these three festivals would not affect their daily business a great 
deal as these events are in the off-season, a time during which, in the words of Agu 
Wuden, a middle-aged monk in Zharu Monastery, “there are no tourists, so it’s okay to 
stay in the monastery…. Normally we just eat and drink at home”.  
The monks’ infrequent participation in religious practices has made them rusty in 
conducting religious practices, and, as Agu Luorang, a middle-aged monk in Zharu 
Monastery, states, they no longer feel they enjoy them: 
I haven’t worn a monk’s robes for a long time.… The robe is very long, and 
inconvenient. Sitting still for a whole day is unendurable [when doing religious 
practices]… It is rather difficult to get used to the chanting again.  
Similar feelings were also mentioned by other monk respondents in Jiuzhaigou. However, 
Agu Jiacuo in Gami monastery told me that, “Taking off my robes is like wearing no 
clothes at all”. These two distinct attitudes to robes reflect how far Jiuzhaigou monks 
have moved from religious life. 
The direct result of the infrequent religious participation by local monks is a large number 
of monks from outside the area coming to Jiuzhaigou. Given that Jiuzhaigou monks are 
engaging in the tourism business every day, local laypeople turn to Gami Monastery as 
well as other nearby monasteries in Songpan and Jiuzhaigou inviting their monks over. 
They know, in the words of Qudeng, a middle-aged man in Jiuzhaigou, that, “Monks here 
don’t have time to chant for you. They are busy with doing [tourism] business and 
earning money.” If people need religious services, they will directly contact outside 
monks without even bothering to ask local monks.  
As mentioned in Chapter 5, monks from outside areas have been attracted to Jiuzhaigou 
and have become the main force in satisfying locals’ religious needs. They are attracted 
here firstly because they are paid more in Jiuzhaigou than in their hometowns. In 
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Jiuzhaigou, monks are normally paid about 100 CNY per day. In comparison, the daily 
salary for a monk in Anbei Village is about 60 CNY. Secondly, transportation which was 
the main obstacle for communication is becoming more and more convenient. On the 
one hand, all Jiuzhaigou families have their own cars which allow them to pick up the 
monks; on the other hand there are many kinds of public transportation available now. It 
only costs about 10-20 CNY between Jiuzhaigou and Gami Monastery. Each family has 
the telephone numbers of several monks. In particular, older people normally establish a 
long-term relationship with at least one monk from an outside monastery as they have far 
more demand for religious services than younger people. This enables these families to 
have stable and regular religious practices without having to worry about obtaining the 
services of local monks.  
With a large number of monks coming to Jiuzhaigou, the standing of local monks in the 
community is directly threatened by being exposed to comparisons with outside monks. 
Agu Caidan, the young monk from Zharu Monastery quoted earlier, recounted to me a 
conversation he had with Agu Dongzhu, a senior Jiuzhaigou monk, about the threats he 
felt from outside monks:   
Although there are many monks who are more knowledgeable [now], but for a 
small place like Jiuzhaigou, Agu Dongzhu was once the best [before the 
advent of tourism]. He said to me once that “a person like me was highly 
respectable in my time”… [However] since Songpan monks started coming 
over, there has been more communication [between the two places], and he 
[Agu Dongzhu] began to feel he was useless.  
As a senior monk in Jiuzhaigou, Agu Dongzhu was considered a learned and 
knowledgeable man capable of chanting many kinds of sutras, even though he learned 
fewer sutras than monks do today. He enjoyed a high reputation among the locals before 
tourism began, but he felt he was not good anymore because Songpan monks were 
better trained. As a result, Agu Caidan told me, Agu Dongzhu decided to start working in 
tourism himself.   
7.3.3 Being a monk and living as a husband/ father/son/brother 
Tourism is important for local monks mainly in a material sense. As explained at the start 
of Section 7.3, Agu Caidan metaphorically regards tourism as physical food. The 
‘physical food’ is mainly produced for monks’ families.  
Because of the influence of the way that religion and tourism have developed since the 
Cultural Revolution, Jiuzhaigou monks are not only monks and tourism workers, but also 
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husbands/fathers/sons/brothers. In Jiuzhaigou, all monks have close connections with 
their family. They live at home with their wife, children, parents and siblings. They 
shoulder responsibility as a family member, a responsibility which they feel tourism best 
helps them fulfil.  
When I asked monks what tourism meant for them, they often stressed a good quality of 
life. Agu Gongbo, a young monk in Zharu Monastery, answered with these words:  
I need to feed my wife and children. Is chanting enough [to feed my wife and 
children]? I must do business. I must think about this [family].  
Feeding his family is Agu Gongbo’s main motivation for working in the tourism business, 
as he clearly thinks income from chanting sutras is not enough. This reluctance to 
perform sutra-chanting is not accepted among many monks from outside who criticise 
these split identities.  
A few monks from outside Jiuzhaigou, however, do express their understanding for the 
situation in which the monks of Zharu Monastery find themselves. When we were talking 
about the involvement of Jiuzhaigou monks in the tourism business, an ‘outside monk’, 
Agu Quden, expressed his understanding, saying that, “It is not easy for monks here. 
There is big economic pressure here”. Among the many critical voices, Agu Quden 
expressed his understanding from an economic perspective. As a matter of fact, 
however, Jiuzhaigou people are economically better off than people in most other 
Tibetan areas, so “the economic pressure” he refers to is actually in large part caused by 
mental competition pressure from the surrounding environment and comparisons that 
Jiuzhaigou people draw.  
The economic pressure is not just felt by monks, but also experienced by laypeople as 
well. According to local people, the economic pressure has become a prominent factor 
since the introduction of tourism. Before tourism, they had land to farm and stock to feed 
which enabled them to have a relatively stable and economically equal and sustainable 
life. Older generation who witnessed the economic and social transformation before and 
after tourism have the most profound personal experience of the economic pressure. An 
old woman Quzhen told me that she was under a lot of pressure as a result of severe 
business competition from her neighbours. She told me of her feelings about the life she 
led before the advent of tourism and now:  
Quzhen: In the past, we didn’t have food and clothes. Life was hard. But I 
didn’t feel tired at all. Now I have everything. But I feel tired. Tired in my heart. 
Ying: Why do you feel tired in your heart now?  
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Quzhen: (I) worry about my business every day. The competition is too great 
now. 
This feeling is widely shared by many other older people and some middle-aged people I 
talked to in Jiuzhaigou. Economic development has not only brought them wealth, but 
also caused uneasy feelings which have given rise to a sense of nostalgia for the old 
days. An account from a middle-aged woman, Cuomo, helps to explain Quzhen’s feeling. 
She told me why she left the Mazhi Festival very early to attend to her souvenir stall: 
“Tourism is different from farming. By doing (tourist) business one day we earn money 
one day. Without doing [tourism business], we have no income.” Tourism for her is not 
as stable a business as farming. She left the most important religious event in the 
calendar and rushed back to her stall as she felt the daily stress of earning a living. In the 
past, she said, she “normally stayed in the monastery until [the ceremony] finished, but 
now I leave once I get the mazhi32”. Hers is not the only case. I observed many other 
women leaving the ceremony early to look after their business. This kind of perception of 
tourism engenders a very competitive and stressful environment.  
Monks’ familial obligations further increase the pressure on them. Even though the 
young monks I spoke with did not have clear ideas of what having a family would be like, 
they still thought, in the words of Agu Zhaxi, a young monk in Zharu Monastery, that they, 
“Probably could [get married]. The monks here are all married”. 
In Gami Monastery, monks had different attitudes to families. Having a family is regarded 
as a burden. The Gami monks like their celibate life because being a monk means being 
free without concerns about family and money. Agu Qiongji, a young monk in Gami 
Monastery described the reason why he likes his current life as a monk as follows: 
I really like to go and have a look at the outside world. I want to travel to as 
many places as I can. My current lifestyle [as a monk] gives me perfect 
convenience [for doing this]. I can do whatever I want to do and go whenever I 
want with no concerns.  
For Agu Qiongji, having a family would prevent him from travelling. Agu Qupei, a young 
monk in Gami Monastery, also thinks that, “Having a family is a huge burden. You are 
not free and cannot go anywhere. And you need to look after kids and wife. Being a 
monk is truly good.”  
                                                
32 A mazhi is a barley seed which is blessed and sanctified by lamas and monks. 
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Apart from these negative attitudes towards a secular life, I also heard many positive 
aspects about being a monk in Gami Monastery. For Agu Yongzhong, being a monk 
provided him happiness, comfort and respect.  
Ying: Is there anything which makes you proud? 
Agu Yongzhong: Not especially. I think I am happy now. If a monk can 
concentrate on religious practice, he then catches the very meaning of being a 
monk. Even if he fails to do religious practice, he enjoys the happiness and 
comfort.  
Ying: So you think being a monk is enjoyable? 
Agu Yongzhong: Why should it not be enjoyable? You just rest and eat every 
day [as a monk]. If you are a government official or a successful person, you 
will be led to sit in the most important spot when you visit a family in a village. If 
you are a monk and invited to do chanting for a family, you will be served with 
a woollen carpet as your cushion, various soft drinks and fruits in front of you. 
Everyone shows a high level of respect for you. When you leave, you get 
remuneration. They greet you politely saying “How are you, Agu Yongzhong”. If 
you are a carpenter or a builder, you can expect to haggle even fight over the 
price. If you are a monk, even though you are young, you will be invited to sit in 
the place of honour. And you are always the first one to be served food. 
From Agu Yongzhong’s understanding, a monk can enjoy happiness and comfort by just 
resting and eating every day, receiving a high level of respect in Tibetan society. What 
he depicted is a simple life without pressure and concerns for basic needs. A monk’s 
social position is as important as that of a government official or a successful person in 
any other walk of life. Unlike a carpenter or a builder who might need to argue with his 
employers or his customers, a monk earns money with dignity and high respect. It was 
indeed this vision of a simple life which Agu Yongzhong described that was being valued 
and portrayed as authentic by Jiuzhaigou monks (see Section 7.4).  
7.3.4 The importance of tourism in the lives of monks in Jiuzhaigou  
The identities we claim for ourselves engender certain modes of behaviour. Based on 
these, loose norms and models are established and further shape “the life plan of those 
who make these collective identities central to their individual identities” (Appiah, 2011: 
159).  
In Jiuzhaigou, older and middle-aged monks, for whom tourism has become an essential 
part of their lives, have become models reshaping the way in which young monks pursue 
their vision of monkhood. When I asked a young monk, Agu Zhaxi, about his future plans, 
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he replied as follows: “I don’t know. [A five second pause.] Before too long, [Zharu] 
monastery should have been rebuilt. I could stay in the monastery guiding the tourists”. 
Agu Zhaxi’s expectation about his future life is closely connected with tourism. Guiding 
tourists in the newly rebuilt monastery has become his career expectation. When I asked 
why he wanted to do this, he explained that, “Agu Wangzha [a senior monk in Zharu 
Monastery] said that we are going to introduce tourism here when the monastery 
construction work finishes. They said it’s easy to earn money by doing that.” This 
comment sheds light on the influence exerted by the older generation of monks, many of 
whom consider tourism as an easy way to earn money. Agu Zhaxi further reflected that 
he did not want to continue his religious studies, as “Being a student is hard. It’s hard to 
learn so many things. I can’t understand them.” For the young monks, one of their 
reasons for stopping religious study is because of the hardship in learning Bon.  
In comparison, many young monks in Gami Monastery put their future expectation in 
religion, even though they are facing the same hardship in religious study. I talked to two 
young monks, Agu Jianpa and Agu Wangdui in Gami Monastery about their future plans.  
Ying: What’s your biggest dream now? 
Agu Jianpa: To be a Gexi33; 
Agu Wangdui: To become a buddha. 
Ying: So you want to be a Gexi and you want to become a buddha? 
Agu Jianpa: Yes. Becoming a buddha means you could gain a better afterlife. But 
being a Gexi means that you remain a monk in the afterlife.  
Agu Wangdui: If you are a Gexi, you understand the meanings of all the sutras.   
These two young monks, although contemporaries of Agu Zhaxi, have completely 
different plans, clearly wishing to pursue and get achieved in their religious studies. Agu 
Jianpa’s wish is deeply connected with his understanding of the principle idea of Bon: 
transmigration. He even wanted to be a monk in the afterlife. Both monks would appear 
to be undergoing systematic religious training and have a much deeper religious 
understanding compared to their counterparts in Jiuzhaigou.  
Through comparison, we can see that tourism has been critical for and has made a huge 
impact on young monks in Jiuzhaigou. This contrasts with young monks in Gami 
Monastery, who seem more dedicated to religious study. 
                                                
33 Gexi is the highest level of attainment in Bon and Tibetan Buddhism. 
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So far in this chapter, we have looked at the interactions between tourism and religion in 
the lives of monks. The following section will specifically explore how Jiuzhaigou monks 
approach issues of authenticity.  
7.4 Authenticity negotiation: being a Bon monk 
This section will pay special attention to the authenticity of monks in Jiuzhaigou, 
examining what it means to be an authentic monk and how to become one.  
“Ethnic identity is the result of a dialectical process involving internal and external 
opinions and processes, as well as the individual’s self-identification and outsiders’ 
ethnic designations – that is, what you think is your ethnicity, versus what they think is 
your ethnicity” (Nagel, 2000: 83). In accord with Nagel’s perception of ethnic identity, the 
formation of Jiuzhaigou monks’ identity has also been affected by internal and external 
opinions and processes.  
Here, therefore we will examine both the perception of outsiders on what makes for an 
authentic monk and the self-reflection of monks. More specifically, this section will start 
with an exploration of other people’s understanding of what it means to be an authentic 
monk through their questioning of this issue (Section 7.4.1); this will be followed by a 
discussion of other people’s practical understandings of issues of authenticity (Section 
7.4.2). From there we move to a discussion of how Jiuzhaigou monks negotiate their 
own sense of authenticity (Section 7.4.3). 
Tsering Woeser (2013), a well-known Tibetan activist, blogger, poet and essayist in 
China, published in her blog a speech made by a Tibetan scholar called Byangkar in a 
conference of Tibetan scholars. The speech was entitled “Reform of the Monastic 
Management System – Improving the Function of the Monastic Community and Leading 
Secular Society Toward a Better Road”, and in it Byangkar urged Tibetan monks to 
rethink their identity and called for reform in the monastery. She placed the reincarnation 
system at the centre of this urgently needed reform. She argued that:   
Nowadays, one hardly finds a reincarnated Lama who does not get involved 
with worldly desires and attention and some reincarnated lamas and their 
families are involved with economic exploitation from the monastery and 
monopolized privileges.  
Byangkar did not specifically explain what he meant by worldly desires and attention, but 
according to the rest of this speech and my understanding, worldly desires refers to 
desire for money while worldly attention refers to the publicity from medias like blogs and 
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Weibo. He further blamed the “inappropriate behaviour of the reincarnated Lamas” for 
leading to deterioration in “the morals of the people in the three provinces of Tibet”. The 
reasons were not explained in the speech. It might be because the reincarnated Lama 
should be a spiritual model and because there are not enough religious teachings from 
learned reincarnated Lama as some reincarnated Lamas are not well educated. 
Byangkar even pointed out that this inappropriate behaviour is “very harmful both for the 
reputation of Tibetan society and for Buddhism as a whole”. He argues, therefore, that 
there is a compelling need to reform the management system of the monastery to 
regulate monks under rules “based on the Buddhist teachings and the principles of 
modern democracy”.  
This speech also gave a definition of a reincarnated Lama. Reincarnated Lamas should 
“act according to the regulations of the monastery” and should “bear the qualities of 
wisdom, discipline and goodness”. Even though the speech is mainly targeted at 
reincarnated Lamas, other normal monks also have monastic rules to obey. According to 
Byangkar’s speech, monks should have “renounced the secular world. Therefore, the 
monastic community is supposed to be very different from our secular society”. “In order 
for the monastery to function in a proper way, it needs fixed regulations, which is a part 
of the Vinaya Sutra of the monastery. … based on the Buddhist teachings and the 
principles of modern democracy.” The role of monastery regulations is stressed in 
maintaining the image of monks and should be strictly obeyed. Byangkar argues that 
there is no doubt that secular desire and attention are contradictory to monks’ life. 
Debates about monks’ misbehaving by ignoring monastery rules have not only occurred 
among Tibetan scholars, but also take place among Jiuzhaigou people. Local people as 
well as monks have questioned and negotiated the meaning of ‘authentic monkhood’. 
7.4.1 Authenticity questioned – the ideal of an authentic monk 
“[Authenticity does] not inhere in the object, person or performance said to be 
authentic. Rather, authenticity is a claim made by or for someone, thing or 
performance and either accepted or rejected by relevant others” (Peterson, 
2005).  
With regard to the question “what does it mean to be an authentic monk”, different 
people in Jiuzhaigou have their own perceptions. Similarly, what it means to be an 
authentic Jew could be interpreted differently by traditionalist, “feminist, progressive, 
gay/lesbian, environmentalist, secular and many other kinds of Jews” and non-Jews 
(Charme, 2000: 133-135).  
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Generally, the authenticity of Jiuzhaigou monks has been questioned from different 
perspectives. In this section, I will mainly discuss the external opinions of what it means 
to be an authentic monk from the views of the families and relatives of monks, from 
laypeople and from fellow monks.  
As mentioned before, Jiuzhaigou monks live at home with their families and occasionally 
take part in events at the monastery. I talked to the families and relatives of some monks. 
They clearly feel that their fathers or brothers are different from their vision of an 
authentic monk. A young man, Renqing, gave me a distinctive view of his father’s identity 
as a monk. When I interviewed him, I expressed my intention to talk to his father 
because his father is a monk. But he directly refused and said: 
There is no need to talk to my Dad. He knows nothing [about religion]. My 
father is a fake monk. He drinks alcohol and smokes cigarettes. You can see 
that he stays at home and does not go to monastery. 
Renqing mentioned three criteria – proper knowledge of the Bon religion, abstinence 
from alcohol and tobacco, and residence in a monastery, each of which his father failed 
to meet – constitute his understanding about what it means to be an authentic monk, 
even though these criteria might only form part of his vision. Drinking alcohol and 
smoking cigarettes are regarded as worldly things which monks are banned from. Living 
in a monastery is another standard prerequisite in determining a monk’s authenticity. 
Renqing went on to say, however, that his father being a fake monk is “normal here. My 
dad is not the only one like that. All monks here are like that…. – getting married, 
smoking cigarettes and drinking alcohol.” Renqing was thus almost absolving his father 
in his own eyes by maintaining that his father was no different from other Jiuzhaigou 
monks.   
As well as the families and relatives of monks, other laypeople who share the same 
religious and social space have also questioned the authenticity of Jiuzhaigou monks. A 
local young man called Gaxi spoke to me of his perception about monks as follows: 
Ying: Do you respect them as monks?  
Gaxi: We respect them, but don’t show special respect to them. Because we 
are too close. We are their friends, their relatives. And we often hang out and 
drink alcohol together. So I don’t think they are different from us. Sometimes I 
forget they are monks. 
Ying: What do you think about that -- being so similar to you and close to you? 
Gaxi: Sometimes I feel it’s a little bit strange, because a monk is supposed to 
keep away from the secular world, staying in the monastery. So sometimes I 
tease them and ask, ‘How can a monk drink alcohol and smoke cigarettes?’  
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From this conversation, we can see that because some monks are too close to local 
people and secular life, they become little different to laypeople. This makes them lose 
respect among laypeople and even being teased for breaking monastic rules such as 
drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes. The requirements of an authentic monk 
mentioned by the previous respondent are emphasised here again. The laypeople I 
spoke to generally had consistent views on what it means to be an authentic monk. The 
meaning of authenticity for monks is constructed in discrete details, such as no alcohol, 
no cigarettes, no marriage, living in a monastery. Using these details, the general image 
of authentic monk is constructed. Another thing that needs to be stressed here is that 
difference is a key characteristic of authenticity. Being different from laypeople is usually 
used to define an authentic monk. In our conversation, Gaxi emphasised that monks 
should be special and be different from laypeople. This difference and specialness make 
monks authentic and deserving of respect and authority. In other words, the key point 
differentiating monks from others is their detached lifestyle. However, in Jiuzhaigou, the 
difference is diminishing.  
Monks themselves also agree that being different and detached from laypeople is 
important in preserving a sense of authenticity. Agu Wuden, the middle-aged monk in 
Jiuzhaigou whom we met earlier, thought monks should not “mix with others”, as mixing 
with others would be “a kind of ‘communication’. Monks will drink alcohol if the others are 
drinking. Monks will smoke cigarettes if the others are smoking.” From Agu Wuden’s 
understanding, this ‘communication’ makes monks “no longer special. Then laypeople 
will think, ‘we are equal, because they do the same thing as we do’.” From Agu Wuden’s 
point of view, monks should stay away from the lay world in order to avoid being affected 
in negative ways. They need to keep their specialness through their distance from the lay 
world. Doing the same thing as laypeople do degrades monks, who should be spiritually 
superior to laypeople.   
Criticisms of Jiuzhaigou monks for their apparent inauthenticity come not only from 
laypeople but also monks from other places. When I asked his opinion of the way of life 
of Jiuzhaigou monks, Agu Yongzhong, the middle-aged monk in Gami Monastery who is 
quoted earlier, was severely critical: “It’s totally contrary to the rules and laws for monks. 
They should not do these things. If they break the rules and laws, they are not monks 
anymore.” Agu Yongzhong made it quite clear in conversation with me that it is not 
acceptable to be like Jiuzhaigou monks. If monks behave like this, he added, they should 
be expelled from the monastery. In this way, the views of fellow monks differed from 




Professional knowledge is another criterion used to identify the authentic monk. Agu 
Dunzhu. a middle-aged monk in a monastery outside Jiuzhaigou, told me that, “They 
[Jiuzhaigou monks] are fake monks. They can’t [read and] chant sutras…They only know 
a few sutras. And they can’t chant properly.” Being able to read and chant sutras is a 
yardstick used to evaluate whether one is an authentic monk or not. Jiuzhaigou monks 
were considered inauthentic based on this criterion. Agu Pengcuo, a middle-aged in 
Gami Monastery, also criticised Jiuzhaigou monks for their ignorance of Bon.  
Ying: I have heard Jiuzhaigou monks say that even though they have to earn 
money to feed their family now, they plan to go back to live in the monastery 
when they are old. 
Agu Pengcuo: This is only what they say. This proves that their knowledge of 
[religion] is very shallow…. If [they really] practice Bon, they know life is 
uncertain. [They should] practice one step more today, and a second tomorrow.  
They should not consider [earning money] at all. If they do think about this, it 
demonstrates that [they] know nothing about Bon at all. … It is just an excuse. 
Among Bon monks from areas near to Jiuzhaigou, Jiuzhaigou monks and Zharu 
Monastery have usually been regarded as a bad example to be looked down upon. Agu 
Jiacuo, a middle-aged monk in Gami Monastery quoted earlier told me that, “We just 
make jokes when we chat, saying ‘if we don’t administer the monastery properly, we will 
end up being like Zharu Monastery’”. He explained how this joke came about. He said 
“monks there do not do a monk’s jobs but get married instead. They break the monks’ 
laws.” The laws are important because, “Rules and laws are the root of a monastery. If a 
monastery does not have a strong root and base, it’s meaningless no matter how fine a 
building is built on this base.”  
Speaking of the monks’ role in maintaining a good monastery, Agu Yongzhong was not 
optimistic. He told me in a regretful tone that:  
In future, Buddhism [he said ‘fojiao’ in Chinese which means Buddhism, but he 
was referring to Bon and Buddhism as a whole] would just be an outer covering 
without inner things. Just making monasteries majestic and magnificent. Monks 
who are really qualified would be very few, not to mention religious achievers. 
Agu Yongzhong was concerned about the absence of qualified monks even in a 
splendidly built monastery. He told me that the Jiuzhaigou case even made him 
convinced that, “Some Bon ideas are not compatible with modern society”.  
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Agu Caidan, a young monk in Zharu Monastery, experienced contempt because of his 
identity as a Jiuzhaigou monk when he studied Bon in Gami Monastery Songpan. He 
recounted that:  
They [monks in Gami Monastery] look down upon monks from Jiuzhaigou. 
When I first went to Gami Monastery, they recognized by my accent that I was 
from Jiuzhaigou. They just despised me. They think Jiuzhaigou monks are not 
good, getting married, smoking and drinking alcohol and so on. Because of that, 
I spent a long time trying to learn their accent and study hard.  
Agu Caidan told me that he did not complain about the treatment he received because 
he too did not agree with the behaviour of Jiuzhaigou monks. Thus he studied very hard 
to not to be looked down upon.  
The comments we have heard bear out the thoughts of Vannini and Williams (2009: 3) 
that, “Authenticity may be seen as some sort of ideal, highly valued and sought by 
individuals and groups as part of the process of becoming”. So far we have seen how the 
ideal of an authentic monk is built up by monks’ families and relatives, by laypeople, and 
by fellow monks in other places: an authentic monk is supposed to be learned, refraining 
from alcohol and cigarettes, celibate and keeping his distance from the secular world. 
However, the difficulties in reality make this ideal hard to achieve. This will be discussed 
in the following section.  
7.4.2 Understanding the practical difficulties of being an authentic 
monk 
Constructionists believe that authenticity is shaped by specific social and cultural 
conditions (Fine, 1996) and goes through compromises and negotiations (Vannini and 
Williams, 2009: 8). In Jiuzhaigou, even though people have a clear sense of an authentic 
monk, in reality what it means to be a monk is negotiable and the inauthentic is 
understandable. In a similar vein, Valentine et al. (2010a) found that abstinence as a 
traditional Muslim culture is able to be negotiated in contemporary society.  
Zewang, a middle-aged lay man from Jiuzhaigou whom I quoted earlier, expressed his 
understanding of Jiuzhaigou monks as follows:  
Zewang: I understand monks getting involved in the tourism business. Because 
it is their way of earning a living. They learned Tibetan and Bon scripture, but 
found they are useless and cannot provide them with a stable way of living in 
today’s society. So I can understand why some monks said they want to go 
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back to the monastery when they are 60 because they need to earn enough 
money before 60 for their old age. When they raise enough money, they have 
no worries when they are old.  
Ying: Do you feel disappointed about these changes [in the way monks live]? 
Zewang: They have no choice. Anyway, as long as they still attend some 
religious activities and chanting, it’s alright.  
Zewang’s views differ markedly from those of Agu Pengcuo, who criticised the monks for 
their ignorance of Bon. Zewang reminded me that parents are not willing to send their 
children to monastery, because learning Chinese in regular schools provides them with 
more job opportunities and a more stable life. Most of the young children who are sent to 
monastery cannot proceed normally in Chinese-language schools for whatever reason. 
In this sense, modern Chinese-language schools win, and monasteries (traditional 
Tibetan education) lose. Given these practical reasons, it seems local people’s 
expectations of monks have suddenly been reduced to a basic requirement to attend 
some religious activities. The ambivalent attitudes of local people and monks to the 
question of authenticity reflect the confrontation between modern Han education and 
traditional Tibetan education and the difficulties Tibetan society faces in adapting to 
modernity.  
Paine (2000) thinks that differentiating between ‘authentic’ and ‘counterfeit’ is an issue of 
acceptance of claims of authenticity. Acceptance is an issue of relative power. Those in 
positions of relative power define authenticity. In Jiuzhaigou, monks as people in high 
demand are in a position of power, so it is hard for laypeople and monasteries to sustain 
a strong critique. The ‘inauthentic monks’ are seldom publicly criticised or punished. 
According to Agu Jaicuo, the middle-aged monk from Gami Monastery, the practicalities 
and difficulties in recruiting monks made it hard for monasteries to punish misbehaving 
monks who were not strictly obeying the rules and laws because otherwise “there will be 
many fewer monks”. Most of the time monasteries just open one eye and close the other, 
so to speak. On the one hand, monks promote the significance of laws and rules; on the 
other hand, they acknowledge and understand their own day-by-day difficulties. Even the 
faithful supporter of monastery rules like Agu Jiacuo expressed his understanding in the 
face of practicalities. In other words, accepting the existence of the less-than-authentic 
monks is a pragmatic compromise, an accommodation to various changes in society.  




Agu Yongzhong: [In] places with better [economic] development, there are no 
good monks. Just as in Jiuzhaigou, if this place [Anbei Village] could be 
developed like Jiuzhaigou, monks would go back to the village doing tourism. 
Ying: Are you sure? 
Agu Yongzhong: [I’m] sure. Why? Because they [Jiuzhaigou monks] have this 
economy [meaning tourism], plus they don’t practice [Bon] well, they see the 
outside world as very important and religious practice as unimportant. Once 
they have money, they can eat, drink, and even gamble.… Here [the 
monastery] is a place without enough food to eat and clothes to get warm. If 
the monastery could guarantee [monks] a living, giving them enough food to 
eat and clothes to wear, then everyone would come to the monastery, even if 
only for food and clothes. So the difference is so big [between the monastery 
and outside world]. You get only 10 Yuan in a monastery, but you get 100 
Yuan outside. They prefer to go to the place with 100 Yuan. 
Agu Yongzhong is clearly suggesting that a good monk and a strong economic 
performance contradict each other. Good economic conditions will affect monks and 
spoil them by tempting them to leave for the outside world and to give up their religious 
practice, which stressed a detached life and bodily effort. He further explained the 
shortage of monks from a pragmatic view. This echoes the previous respondent, 
Zewang’s view of the difficulties faced by Jiuzhaigou monks. However, under the 
imbalanced power relations between the monks and laypeople and the practical 
difficulties, these only suggest that Jiuzhaigou monks’ behaviour are understood, but are 
not accepted as authentic.  
7.4.3 Monks’ self-negotiation 
“The contents or meanings underlying a social identity that others attribute to an actor 
may not be the same as those meanings that the actor attributes to self” (Erickson, 1995: 
126). In the previous two sections, I have discussed outsiders’ views on the meaning of 
what it means to be an authentic monk. In this section, I will examine how Jiuzhaigou 
monks define and compromise their authenticity.  
In her conceptualisation of authenticity, Erickson (1995: 131) claimed two important 
points: “self-values as stable and unchanging standards for self-evaluation, social 
comparison; and feelings of relative inauthenticity as violations of commitment to the 
self-values”.  
In order to understand monks’ understanding of authenticity, first of all, I explore monks’ 
self-values, which are established based upon relationships between self and others 
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(Section 7.4.3.1). Then the focus shifts to their self-reflection on and compromises of 
authenticity, in other words, the ways in which they actually react to the evaluated 
(in)authenticity (See Section 7.4.3.2 and 7.4.3.3). Authenticity is contested in many 
circumstances (Cohen, 1988). As shown for example in research by Olson et al. (2012), 
young people in Glasgow has been through reconciliation between their understandings 
of authentic Christianity and external inscriptions of what it means to be Christian. They 
have little basic knowledge of Christianity such as the sectarian affiliation of their church. 
They face challenges in individual transcendence from friends, schoolmates, workmates 
which force them to adapt their ways of embodying Christianity.  
7.4.3.1 Authentic other 
The ‘other’ is an important term in this particular language of the self. ‘Authentic others’ 
are usually used as examples and references of authenticity. For American Jews the 
traditional shtetl life in East Europe has been idealised and regarded as a contrast with 
the American Jews’ inauthentic, assimilated, suburban life (Charme, 2000). Authentic 
other has also constantly appeared in Jiuzhaigou people’s discourses on religion (see 
Section 7.2). In this section, I will focus on the view of monks themselves on an authentic 
monk based on the relationships between self and other. 
Studying hard was generally seen as the basic requirement for an authentic monk. This 
was stressed to me by all monks. It shows that monks understand their role as Bon 
scholars first and foremost. They need to dedicate their lives to Bon study. On top of this, 
living in an austere and simple environment is another important requirement. Agu 
Sanlang and Agu Luorang, both middle-aged monks in Zharu Monastery, gave clear 
accounts of their understanding of authentic monkhood through comparisons with 
laypeople and other monks. This is how Agu Sanlang saw it:   
Our society is better than before. [However] we cannot compare with other 
worldly people, even though religious practitioners are a part of this society. 
We must study hard and live a simple and austere life. If you can’t do this, you 
will not succeed [in achieving enlightenment]. 
Agu Sanlang firstly stressed that society is better in a material sense, as Jiuzhaigou 
people are having an economically better life than before. However, this better society to 
some extent contradicts the “simple and austere life” monks should be living. For Agu 
Sanlang, the differences between monks and laypeople were stressed as an important 
quality of monkhood, and are mainly expressed in scripture study and life style. This 
difference determines if they could achieve ultimate enlightenment.  
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Agu Luorang had a similar understanding about what makes for authenticity in monks, 
but he explained it by comparing himself with other monks. We were talking about a well-
known and prestigious Tibetan Buddhist college, Serda Buddhist College. 
Agu Luorang: The belief in those places is different. For the monks there, being 
a monk is just being a monk, living in the monastery. If you truly want to be a 
monk, you just don’t come out with a bowl like we do. Some monks just live in 
a cave, only hearing the sound of the birds. 
Ying: Why should you be like them? 
Agu Luorang: Being like them is good; [you can] fully concentrate on scripture 
study. 
Authenticity is “a struggle, a social process” (Bruner, 1994: 408). Even though Agu 
Luorang had never been to Serda, through words told by others he imagined this place 
as a sacred place quite different from Jiuzhaigou. For Agu Luorang, Jiuzhaigou monks 
are not authentic monks. For him, proper monks should live in a monastery, 
concentrating on scripture study. The example of monks who live in caves was used to 
further illustrate what the living conditions of a true monk should be. Talking about cave-
living in this way is prevalent both among Tibetan laypeople and monks. Even though 
few people might actually have come across monks living in caves, it is believed to be 
true and set as an ideal monk’s image. This is a further elaboration of the “simple and 
austere life” mentioned by Agu Luorang. Living in a cave and hearing the sound of birds 
vividly depicts the ideal living environment for monks, which should be materially simple, 
detached from the secular world, austere and even crude. It also echoes the previous 
account from Agu Sanlang, who thought that a “better society” might be an obstacle to 
being an authentic monk. Being authentic necessitates monks drawing a clear boundary 
between their simple living space and the materially better society.  
From my interviews with monks, two matters always cropped up in discussions about 
authenticity with monks: concentrating on scripture study and living “a simple life”. This 
implied that a materially simple life was the most effective way to guarantee for monks 
concentration on scripture study. Therefore, the wider surroundings have a determining 
role in influencing a monk’s life. In terms of the influence of a “better society”, Agu 
Yongzhong from Gami Monastery claimed that contemporary society is a source of 
distractions which have a considerable negative influence on the religious achievement 
of monks. He told me wistfully that, “In the past there are many big achievers. But 
nowadays there are only a few.” And he explained that because of the “influence of 
societal development”, monks do not practice religion as properly as before.  
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You see, playing on mobile phones is [a demonstration of] lack of resistance to 
the colourful world. History records how Bon beads and scriptures were used 
by great monks in the past. But now there are nothing like these. After a few 
decades, people will talk about the cars and phones which great monks once 
used. 
Yongzhong used the term “a colourful world” to describe his perception of the 
contemporary society. It is this “colourful world” that was the reason why monks are 
different from before. For him, playing on a mobile phone and owning a car are negative 
results of the current colourful world which are irresistible for monks. Bon beads and 
scriptures represent a plain lifestyle which was once promoted among monks. Bon 
beads and scripture also imply that monks are Bon scholars, whereas mobile phones 
and cars which represent a life of extravagance are contradictory to the austere image of 
an authentic monk. Great monks who have a plain lifestyle and work hard would leave a 
good name for posterity. At the end of this conversation, Yongzhong claimed that this 
change is absolutely not good. He said that, “If it continues like this, Bon will become 
history, gradually become history. Nowadays monks can barely resist temptations.”  
Like these three monks, most local Jiuzhaigou monks share the same feelings about the 
incompatibility between contemporary society and monks’ authenticity.   
Authentic others as examples might just be those who one has heard of (such as Serda 
monks for Agu Luorang, great monks in history for Agu Yongzhong). It could also be 
familiar monks. In the following quotation, Agu Sangji, a middle-aged monk in Zharu 
Monastery, describes his teacher, a monk who was an example from whom he learnt 
much.  
I have a teacher who is really a living Buddha. He was teaching me when I was 
22 or 23 years old. It is very hard to find a person like him now. At that time, 
there were about 70 young guys studying together under him. He taught us in 
the day time. Apart from teaching, he practiced Bon every night from 8 pm to 
12 am. He just practiced alone in his room and didn’t have any connections 
with others during that time. What accompanied him? Just a pot of grass. He 
didn’t have money, assets and home [family]. He distributed all the donated 
food he got from laypeople among his students, and didn’t leave any for 
himself. The only assets he had were scriptures and books which filled his 
bookcase. 
Agu Sangji saw his teacher as “really a living Buddha”, dedicated to Bon study without 
any earthly desires. Being regarded as a living Buddha is a supreme compliment as this 
is the ultimate goal of Bonpos and Buddhists. Agu Sangji went on to say that, “Nowadays 
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monks are different from before.” Like him, other older and middle-aged monks whom I 
interviewed are nostalgic for the old time, when, so they state, monks had the virtues of 
studying hard, living simply and enjoying respect. Being affluent and selfish, they told me, 
is contrary to being an authentic monk, who needs to have the qualities of generosity, 
wisdom, simplicity and obedience.  
Agu Dawa, also a middle-aged monk from Jiuzhaigou, used Songpan monks as 
examples once again. He emphasised the basic requirement for being an authentic 
monk, which is chanting scriptures and studying Bon: “Monks in Songpan are different. 
Monks should only do monks’ job. No matter whether they chant sutras or study Bon, 
they are doing monks’ job exclusively. But it’s different here.” To explain the difference, 
he added that, “Like here, monks are supposed to do monks’ job, but we [monks] do not 
have time. We are busy doing this and that”. I further asked if Agu Dawa thought the 
ideal way of being a monk was to be like the monks in Songpan. To my surprise, he 
demurred, and then answered negatively: “Um… It’s also fine to do a little bit of other 
things. It’s relatively free [to be like this]. Just staying in the monastery every day is not 
so free. ”  
This comment suggests that for the reality of his own life, he does not insist on the 
authenticity he just claimed. He excused himself from conforming to the standard he 
claimed for an authentic monk and thought that doing a little bit of other things is 
acceptable. Here, other things refer to secular things which are not relevant to religion. 
Like Agu Dawa, monks in Jiuzhaigou have got used to their current lifestyle, which 
contradicts the requirements of an authentic monk in their mind. In psychology, the 
contradicting beliefs occurring to an individual are called cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1962). When facing this dissonance, Jiuzhaigou monks chose to make a compromise. 
Despite of the ideal authentic image of a monk, in practice monks do not strictly obey this 
ideal.  
The next section will show the specific compromises that monks have made in order to 
meet the requirements of being an authentic monk.  
7.4.3.2 Compromises made on monks’ identity  
The maroon robe is the most prominent feature of Tibetan monks. However, Jiuzhaigou 
monks are not willing to physically show their religious identity. As we mentioned before, 
Jiuzhaigou monks only occasionally attend religious practices. Agu Duoji, (Zharu 
monastery middle-aged monk) only wears his monk’s robe during the main public 
religious ceremonies. He said wearing a robe is “not convenient. I have to do business 
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every day. It’s not possible wearing monk’s robe to take photos for tourists. They will not 
come to me. And I haven’t worn it for a long time. I can’t get used to it any longer.” 
Wearing a monk’s robe gets in the way of carrying out tourism business. Agu Duoji’s 
identity as a monk prevents him from doing business properly. Wearing his robe is not a 
comfortable experience, and so he chooses to conceal his identity as a monk. Agu Luoyi 
expressed the same feeling that he does not wear his robe everyday because he cannot 
get used to it. The robe is inconvenient and long, and makes him “feel a bit embarrassed” 
when wearing it. In particular, when he goes to the town and to big cities like Chengdu, 
he feels embarrassed as it makes him think that “I’m different from others”. His 
uncertainties about wearing a monk’s robe show that he is not fully confident of being a 
monk. To the colleagues working with him together, he does not like to expose his 
identity willingly. As a result, his colleagues were shocked to recognise him among the 
monks during a religious ceremony in Jiuzhaigou. He claimed to me that, “I have been a 
monk since childhood. If you ask, I will not deny it.” Yet, he chose to strategically hide his 
identity as being a monk conflicts with his secular life.  
In contrast, monks in Gami monastery have completely different views toward wearing 
robes. Agu Qujian is a young monk whom I interviewed at Gami monastery. He was 
quick to say that his monk’s robe is already a part of him.  
Ying: Have you ever taken off your monk’s robe and worn other clothes? 
Agu Qujian: Certainly not. My monk’s robe is already a part of me. I’ll feel 
uncomfortable if I take it off, just as if I lost something. Even my legs would feel 
colder.  
Ying: Do you feel uncomfortable when you wear your monk’s robe in 
Chengdu? 
Agu Qujian: No. I didn’t take it off even during the crisis in 2008. 
Agu Qujian was referring the tense situation that prevailed after the disturbances that 
occurred in Lhasa in that year. At that time, the political situation was very tense. 
According to the monks I talked to, all of them agreed that it was a hard time for them as 
monks. Because of the disturbances, many Han Chinese were hostile towards Tibetans, 
and Tibetan monks reported that they were not accepted by hotels in Chengdu. Wearing 
a monk’s robe is the easiest way to expose one’s identity. In order to avoid 
inconveniences, a few monks changed to normal clothes at that time. However, Agu 
Qujian showed his strong identity by insisting on wearing his robe.  
Through comparison, it is apparent that Jiuzhaigou monks have a weaker sense of 
identity as they have compromised their religious visibility for the sake of their 
businesses. They also made compromises in religious practices because of their familial 
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responsibilities. As mentioned in Section 7.3.3, monks are under significant economic 
pressure to feed their families. They take up tourism-related jobs and cut back 
considerably on their religious practices. The young Zharu monk Agu Caidan ceased his 
Bon studies in the monastery and started a tourism business in order to earn money for 
his family. He said “I have no choice.… We need the money.” Agu Caidan undertook 
familial responsibilities which are not supposed to belong to a monk. Financial pressure 
forced him to reduce his religious practices. He knows that “it is not good for a monk to 
do business” and promised to go back to his studies once his family issues had been 
resolved. However, as far as I know he is still staying at home and working in the tourism 
business. During a recent conversation I had with him, Agu Caidan said, “I felt the past 
years are valuable. [I] not only have earned money, but also have made many friends 
from different places.” When we talked about his return to monastery, he said: “Um… I 
don’t know. [I] probably cannot go back now. Because my family still needs me. This is 
the only income for our family now. I have to keep on doing it. Going back has to be 
considered later. But I insist on attending all religious ceremonies.”  
Agu Caidan has gained pleasure and profit from his business, which he told me he 
enjoyed. Facing the contradictory pull between a monk’s duty and family responsibilities, 
Agu Caidan postponed his returning plan even though he also stroke a balance by 
insisting on “attending all religious ceremonies”.   
These questions become all the more pertinent when one recalls that there is a lack of 
home space in Zharu Monastery, and this is given as another reason why monks stay 
away. The following section will discuss the problems monks have in going back to the 
monastery.  
7.4.3.3 No home in monastery, how can I go back? 
Building a house in the monastery’s compound signifies the formal separation of monks 
from original home and establishment in the monastery. Goldstein (1985: 21) compared 
a monk to “a single stick of incense standing alone, burning slowly and steadily in a 
world of chaos and suffering”. This vividly echoes the way monks and laypeople quoted 
above imagine the solitary and detached life of an authentic monk. An important part of 
this detachment is that each monk should have his separate house detached from the 
secular world to retreat to. The “compartmentalized apartment cell” (Goldstein and 
Tsarong, 1985: 21) in the monastery is the physical assurance of their solitary life. 
Building a house in the monastery is a tradition and a requirement for a monk in Tibet, as 
it signifies a monk’s separation from their original home. The following conversation with 
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a middle-aged monk, Agu Deqin, in Gami Monastery explains the meanings of home for 
him.  
Agu Deqin: If you don’t build a house, where can you live? Everyone should 
have a house. It’s a home. What can you do when you are old, if you don’t 
have a house. You just go around on the streets? It’s impossible. So when you 
have a house, you can happily live in it without any concerns. 
Ying: So having no house had made you concerned?  
Agu Deqin: Yes, certainly. I’ve left my original home, [so] I needed to build a 
home of my own. And every monk has their own house in the monastery. So 
my family helped me build one. Having a house makes me feel at ease. I know 
I have a place to go finally. 
Having a home in the monastery for Agu Deqin means both physically and emotionally 
having a home. Building a house is one of the most important things for a monk. A house 
means a shelter to retreat to when he is old. Home in a monastery is an emotional 
comfort which provides monks a sense of security, ease, and happiness. Building a 
house of his own signifies his formal separation from the original home. It is generally 
agreed among scholars that home offers “security, familiarity and nurture” (Tuan, 2004) 
but also conflict, violence and exclusion (Brickell, 2012; Johnston and Valentine, 1995). 
Home is also seen in a ‘Western’ context as being closely connected to sense of self 
through a process of belonging or alienation (Blunt and Varley, 2004). For monks who 
are supposed to live in isolation from their original families and the secular world, home 
must to some extent have different meanings from the conventional ones. However, 
there is little research conducted on this particular group, on their understandings, use 
and negotiations of home.  
Home is “highly fluid and contested” (Blunt, 2005: 512). For example, Johnston and 
Valentine (1995) argued that the meaning of home for gay women is contradictory and 
fluid. Comparing to the parental home, the ‘lesbian home’ sometimes provides a stronger 
sense of home. Without a house in a monastery, the word ‘home’ does not have special 
meanings for monks. For Agu Caidan, home is fluid, and could even be any place with 
the person who is closest to him.  
Ying: Which place do you think gives you a sense of belonging, your monastery 
(Zharu Monastery) or your original home? 
Agu Caidan: I think I don’t have a concept of ‘home’ in my mind now. 
Ying: Why? 
Agu Caidan: I don’t know. Because I have always drifted. 




Agu Caidan: I feel stronger attachment to my master.  
Ying: To you master? 
Agu Caidan: Yes. Monastery is meaningless to me, because I had just stayed 
there for a very short time. And I haven’t built a house there either.  
Ying: How about your original home and your family? 
Agu Caidan: Not so strong. Because on the day I became a monk, I decided 
not to have a close relationship with my original home. A monk doesn’t have a 
family. 
Ying: Okay.  
Agu Caidan: In the past, my original home was strange for me every time I 
went back. I felt it was not my house, and not my home. 
Ying: Why? 
Agu Caidan: Because I have nothing to say to or communicate with my 
parents, brothers and sisters. I felt they cannot understand me. But my master 
can. I mostly share my thoughts with my master. 
Ying: Why do you feel you have nothing to say to your family? 
Agu Caidan: Because I think we are living in different worlds. My living 
environment is different from theirs. 
Ying: Where do you feel most comfortable? 
Agu Caidan: Staying with my master. 
Agu Caidan has been mentioned several times before in this section for his involvement 
in the tourism business. He was studying in Gami Monastery, which he regarded as his 
home as he thought home is where he lived. There had been no specific concept of 
home formed in his mind, as he had ‘drifted’ for a long time. Neither his original home nor 
Zharu Monastery provided a meaning of home for him.  
Agu Caidan’s life experience might help to give him a stronger feeling of attachment to 
his master Home for him here is not fixed in a specific time or space, but changeable and 
entails alteration. As for his original home, he insisted that as a monk there should be a 
distinct line drawn between him and his family. He has lived in a monastery since he was 
very young and his family has lived in the secular world. The concept of home cannot be 
sourced neither from his original family nor from his monastery, Zharu Monastery.  
In a recent phone interview after my fieldwork in 2012, Agu Caidan said, “Home should 
be in the monastery, but there is no room for me to build a house in Zharu Monastery. 
What can I do? I don’t know. Whatever will be will be.” He believes that his home should 
be in the monastery. But when he wants to be settled, the current situation of Zharu 
monastery leaves him no choice. The monastery cannot provide monks land for a house 
anymore because it is in Jiuzhaigou where there is limited land and strict rules on land 
use. In order to preserve the environment and natural resources in Jiuzhaigou, all 
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construction work and land use require strict inspections. Monks are not likely to get 
permission to build their houses in a monastery. Building a house is not as easy as it is 
in many other monasteries. Agu Wuden, middle-aged monk in Jiuzhaigou, saw no way 
he could go back and live in the monastery when I asked if he wanted to go back to 
Zharu Monastery:  
It’s not possible. Because, you see, there is no land left for us to build our 
houses on in the monastery. The new constructions have occupied all the land 
in the monastery. Besides, the Tourism Administration Bureau has very strict 
rules on using new land and building new houses. It will not allow us to build a 
house there. 
However, a monastery is not considered a proper monastery without houses and monks. 
Based on the new construction plan, Zharu Monastery has built a two-storey dormitory 
for monks. Commenting on this development, Agu Wuden said: 
It’s impossible for us to move into the dormitory. It is okay for young monks, but 
it’s definitely not fine for middle-aged and older monks. A dormitory is not a 
house. It is not your house. They can let you go at any time.  
The new construction plan of Zharu Monastery also leaves no space for the traditional 
compartmentalised house. A two-storey dormitory built in Zharu Monastery as a place of 
residence for the monks is contrary to the traditional idea of a detached house. Monks 
are expected to live in one building together. This essentially changes their patterns of 
living which might affect qualities of independence and detachment and sabotage monks’ 
sense of home and security. The dormitory cannot provide Agu Wuden with a sense of 
belonging. This new plan is likely to further change the religious landscape and reshape 
monks’ relationship with their monastery.  
7.5 Conclusion 
Concerns about authenticity do not only exist in a Europe where so many people are 
pursuing individualism, but also happens in reform-era China with “increased 
commodification, the intensified circulation of unfamiliar people and objects, and the 
profit” (Notar, 2006: 72). Authenticity became problematic for Jiuzhaigou Tibetans, 
because they are in the forefront of Han influence and economic modernisation. Their 
collective pursuit of ‘authenticity’ in religion on the one hand shows their deep belief in 
Bon, and on the other hand reflects their difficulties in positioning themselves within 
current trends.  
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Generally, Jiuzhaigou people’s sense of religious authenticity is geographically imagined 
and has two levels. At the inter-ethnic group level, Jiuzhaigou people use the logic of 
purity to differentiate themselves as ‘pure’, simple, backward, undeveloped and 
uncivilised from the sophisticated, advanced, developed and civilised Han. At the intra-
ethnic groups level, contrary to the conventional understanding that people should be 
proud of their ethnic culture and religion, Jiuzhaigou people generally think their culture 
and religion is inauthentic and impure compared to other undeveloped and non-hanified 
Tibetan places. I argue that the internal-Orientalist logic of ‘purity’ and development and 
minority/majority ideology of the Chinese state frame the imaginative geographies of 
Tibetan laypeople and monks, even though the result is actually that Tibetan identity has 
been enhanced. The line between the Han and the Tibetans demarcated by the state 
has been further reinforced by Tibetans. What needs to be emphasised is that the issues 
of authenticity could have arisen simply because of modernisation, with hanification 
being the vehicle bringing modernisation to Tibet.  
In terms of monks’ identity in particular, tourism not only directly and greatly changed the 
hosts’ economic, social and cultural lives, but also accelerated an identity crisis felt by 
monks. Both laypeople and monks have formed the same overall perception of what it 
means to be an authentic monk. For both these groups, being an authentic monk is an 
ideal which generally involves a loose ideal image of a monk living a humble and isolated 
life, with little material wealth, staying away from the secular world (including having a 
wife and children, communicating with their family, drinking, smoking and entertaining) 
and focusing on Bon studies and practices. Based on these, Jiuzhaigou monks are 
generally not considered authentic. Even though the changes in a monk’s identity were 
perceived in some ways to degrade religious tradition because their embodiment of 
religion is completely different from their imagined view of authenticity, in practice, local 
people reached a silent agreement to discount their ideal and accept this situation. As I 
argued in Chapter 2, both the essentialist view of authenticity as not negotiable and 
achievable (Vannini and Williams, 2009) and the constructionist perspective of 
authenticity as constantly changing are insufficient conceptual tools to explain some 
manifestations of authenticity. Based on my research, I argue that authenticity is 
essentially an ideal which consists of two broad parts: a non-negotiable part and a 
negotiable part. To be perceived as an authentic monk, the non-negotiable part is 
adherence to the basic rules and regulations, such as celibacy and abstinence from 
tobacco and alcohol; the negotiable part is represented by qualities such as generosity 
and learnedness. Jiuzhaigou monks violate the non-negotiable components of 




Nowadays being an authentic monk becomes an unachievable ideal. This reflects the 
inevitable conflicts and gaps between the modern and the ‘traditional’. From the case of 
Jiuzhaigou monks, we can see that the traditional has in some way to accommodate the 
modern. This results in the monks’ departure from the monastery, which accelerates the 
deinstitutionalisation of religion (see Chapter 5). An important issue with which I wish to 
conclude this chapter is the controversy and the compatibility between Bon tradition and 
modern society. Habermas (2008) declared that we had entered a “post-secular age” in 
which as Gorski and Altinordu (2008: 56) argue that the religious and secular world 
views are coexisting and communicating with each other. Is this really the case? This 
could only be assured partially. The identity crisis of monks reflects the incompatibilities 
between religious traditions and the modern society. Traditionally, a Buddhist or Bon 
monk does not join the secular world. The entire notion of the Buddhist/ Bon monk is 
leaving behind all worldly possessions to undertake a life of spiritual purity. The idea of 
authentic monks is a historical, social and religious construction which needs to be re-
examined in the modern context. The requirements for being an authentic monk have 
given rise to many contradictions with modern society. This makes us think about the 
need for reform of the monastic system. Suggestions have been proposed to solve the 
‘inappropriate’ behavior of monks. Woeser (2013) has argued that “It is crucial to design 
regulations which are not influenced by negative traditional ideas and do not contradict 
the fundamental principles of Buddhism… With this effort, the learned monks can finally 
restore the good moral image of the Tibetan people”. However, there is perhaps no need 
for monastic reformation. Speaking back to the intergenerational change discussed in 
Chapter 6, there might be another possibility that with the passage of time younger 
generations will not have the same distinction between authentic/inauthentic monks, and 
may come to see the 'inauthentic' monks as simply normal.  
As to the extent to which it is possible to generalise from my case study, I would say that 
in one sense Jiuzhaigou is a unique case, but in another, it captures a wider picture of 
Tibet’s confrontation with modernity and Han-Chinese style. I acknowledge that in some 
other Tibetan areas, monks are also involved in different kinds of business apart from 
their religious duties. They are facing the challenges to their traditional perceptions of 
religion as a result of political and economic changes to society. What is happening in 
Jiuzhaigou is a crystallized reflection of this phenomenon. What Jiuzhaigou monks have 
been through is an example of what many other Tibetan monks have experienced as a 
result of their confrontation with a modernised hanified world. Meanwhile, because of its 
uniqueness, Jiuzhaigou might represent a new frontier of religious change and hence is 
different from many other places, and could represent new forms of religious division. In 
this small place, tourism has accelerated the change in traditional Tibetan society and 
completely altered local people’s (monks and laypeople) lives. By examining Jiuzhaigou 
229 
 
as a case study area, I hope to have revealed some ways which Tibetans negotiate the 
difficulties and contradictions they have faced, and to present the new trends of religious 





































Chapter 8 Conclusions 
This thesis has investigated processes of religious change in a Tibetan region of China 
that has experienced relative economic prosperity stemming from a government-led 
tourism initiative. The research has used a case study approach, focusing on Jiuzhaigou 
with some contextual comparisons being provided by additional empirical research in 
nearby Anbei. I have used a spatially-sensitive qualitative approach to researching 
religious change, focusing on both micro- and meso-scales, as well as both institutional 
and non-institutional forms of religious practice. In this concluding chapter, I seek to 
review the main findings of the thesis, stress the original empirical and theoretical 
contributions of the research, and suggest directions for further research.   
8.1 Tourism and changing religious spaces 
In Chapter 5, I explored the forces driving changes in the religious landscape of 
Jiuzhaigou, with a particular focus on the dynamics of institutional and non-institutional 
religious change in Jiuzhaigou. Specifically, I discussed the contested nature and role of 
monastery as the main religious institution and a public religious space and the changing 
expression of domestic religion as the main non-institutional religious force. Tourism, as 
a vehicle of modernisation in Tibet plays a fundamental role in reshaping the institutional 
and non-institutional religious landscape of Jiuzhaigou. Local government, laypeople, 
and monks have jointly involved in this process of religious transformation.  
The qualities, meanings and functions of Zharu Monastery and monasticism have been 
highly contested. This resonate with Davie‘s (2013) argument (made primarily in relation 
to western contexts) that in modern societies “institutional religion at least in its traditional 
forms is in trouble”, although in the context of Jiuzhaigou this change is not necessarily 
being driven by the same forces that contribute to deinstitutionalisation in the west. The 
traditional quality of a monastery as a sacred, public and male-dominant space, which 
upholds monastery’s authority is being challenged and transformed. In particular, the 
government treats the monastery as a tourist product which is contrary to local people’s 
perception of monastery as a holy space. Religious commodification generates forms of 
resistance (some active, some of a more passive variety) and critiques among the local 
people who generally consider it violating the holy nature of monastery. In terms of its 
public nature, the position of the monastery has been challenged in three ways: local 
government and laypeople compete for the ownership of monastery with monk mangers; 
laypeople buy up parts of the stupa, leading to privatisation and fragmentation of religion; 
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and the monastery is not considered by local people to be fulfilling its public role by 
providing public services. Moreover, the male dominated monastery is transgressed by 
female tour guides and laywomen whose bodies are regarded as polluting and having a 
lower position than men in religious sense. Finally, in confrontation of Han businessmen 
and tour guides, Tibetanness is emerging and ascribed as a new quality of the 
monastery for differentiating Tibetans from the Han. All these downgrade Zharu 
Monastery’s reputation, appeal and significance among the laypeople. This in turn drives 
local people away to other monasteries in Songpan. 
In contrast to the monastery which has faced challenges and contestations, domestic 
religion in Jiuzhaigou has flourished in many respects since the start of tourism. 
Domestic religious buildings and objects such as stupas, home chanting rooms, shrines, 
prayer flags have been seen dramatic increase. Meanwhile, the religious chantings and 
ceremonies have been hugely revitalized and been conducted with very high frequency. 
This leads to huge competition for the services of monks. Moreover, the Prosperity Sutra 
and the Risang Festival which were relatively marginal have been revived among the 
local laypeople. By strategically emphasising the cultural and touristic significance of and 
downgrading the religious implication of the Risang Festival, laypeople successfully 
acquired JAB’s permission and support. However, the religious practices which require 
greater bodily efforts such as the circumambulation of the sacred Mount Zhayizhaga 
have decreased. To save bodily effort, laypeople use new technology reforming their 
traditional ways of religious practices.  
Key theoretical contributions 
Based on these findings, some key theoretical contributions can be noted. Firstly, this 
research tries to speak back to western-dominated theories of secularisation and 
religious change. As stated in Chapter 2, secularisation theory, despite its limitations, 
provides some useful tools for understanding how religious change in modernising Tibet 
is (and is not) occurring. I argued that more attention should be given to changes of non-
western religions at meso and micro scales with qualitative methods. By adopting this 
approach, which stresses micro and meso scales of analysis, a more concrete and 
nuanced picture of religious change has been presented in three analytical chapters. 
Secondly, I have contributed to debates around secularisation theory by arguing that the 
traditional one-sided explanation of religious change, namely merely considering either 
the institutional religion (supply side) or non-institutional religion (demand side), 
mechanically cut off the natural connections between the two and lead to simplified and 
over-generalised secularisation claim. This cannot reflect the full picture of religious 
change, because institutional and non-institutional religion are actually mutually 
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influenced and complexly connected in a very dynamic way. Thus by considering 
changes of both institutional (monastery and monks) and non-institutional religions 
(laypeople), this research provides a better understanding of how religious change 
happens. Overall, in this thesis both institutional and non-institutional religions present 
complex expressions of change alongside dramatic political, economic, social and 
cultural changes in contemporary Tibet. A shift toward non-institutional expression of 
religion can be identified. But this does not mean that institutional religion and non-
institutional religion are simply push-and-pull relationships. The whole picture of religious 
change is complicated with contestations and negotiations among monastery, local 
laypeople, and government. This perspective is also useful in investigating small-scale 
religious change and those religions which religious institutions and believers have close 
relationships.   
This research further challenges the previous over-generalised secularisation claim 
which is simply based on the declining authority (Chaves, 1994), plausibility, and 
legitimacy (Berger, 1967) of religious institutions. Although arguably Jiuzhaigou has 
experienced all three of these phenomena to some degree, there has been no 
straightforward overall secularisation in the sense of a decline in religious identity, belief 
or practice both among the laypeople and monks (although there have of course been 
transformations, as I have documented). My findings also have resonances with 
research on deinstitutionalisation which witnessed the established religion is shrinking 
while new forms of religiosity are emerging (Luckmann, 1967; Pollack and Pickel, 2007; 
Roof, 2001). However, the form of deinstitutionalisation in Jiuzhaigou is different from 
these findings in that Bon adherents neither convert to other sects or cults nor practice 
religion completely independent of monks and monastery. The maintenance, practice of 
non-institutional religion still links in important ways to institutional religion, further 
stressing the theoretical need to consider the dynamic interplay between the two in order 
to understand the nature of religious change.     
Thirdly, in terms of the relationships between religion and economy, I contribute to 
ongoing discussion regarding the relationship between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’ by 
stressing how these categories are not mutually exclusive from one another. Sometimes 
the profane is helpful for religion’s growth. In the case of Jiuzhaigou, despite the conflicts 
and critiques it generated, religious commodification is accepted both by the believers 
and government under certain conditions, rather than absolutely denied. Tourism creates 
new space both for institutional religion’s growth in the sense that it neutralises the 
sensitivity of its religious nature (by emphasising its ‘cultural’ aspect) while also leading 
to financial and policy support from the government and for non-institutional religion’s 
growth as tourism economy provides laypeople financial resources of religious 
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revitalization. Contrary to Norris and Inglehart’s (2004: 25) claim that the rich societies in 
the world are becoming less religious whereas poor societies are more religious, from 
the local level, Jiuzhaigou as a rich place in Tibet is experiencing flourishing forms of 
religious expression. Economic development does not necessarily lead to religious 
decline. This conclusion also speaks back to the question of the existence of Tibetan 
religion in China and refutes the general assumption that the story of Tibetan religion in 
China is only one of repression and decline.  
Finally, this research makes a broader contribution to understanding the nature of 
Chinese modernity. I argue that the internal ambivalence of Chinese modernity actually 
makes different levels of Chinese governments have ambiguous and ambivalent views 
toward religious issues in Tibet. On the one hand, they want to promote religious tourism 
to realise economic development, on the other hand, they do not want to over-publicise 
religion as it is regarded as a potential threat to integration between ethnic groups. This 
is related to the particular form of Chinese modernity in ethnic minority areas. Integration 
and economic development are its two overriding principles. China, as Oakes (1998: 7) 
suggests, is obsessed with modernity. Chinese modernity in minority areas is imbued 
with a logic of economic development, minority/majority division and the goal of 
integration. Chinese modernisation is government oriented and mainly for improving the 
economic condition of ‘backward’ Tibet and for civilising ‘uncivilised’ Tibetans and 
enhancing integration. Within the tense political atmosphere, Tibetan religion is 
considered a threat to state security.   
8.2 Intergenerational transmission of religion, laypeople  
With an understanding of the general religious situation and its relationships with tourism 
in Jiuzhaigou, the second analytical chapter (Chapter 6) focused on another important 
aspect of religious change: intergenerational transmission of religion among laypeople. 
This is particularly relevant for understanding if and how religion is surviving in 
contemporary Tibet. Strong mechanisms of intergenerational transmission and exchange 
can reflect religion’s vitality. Building on recent work on intergenerational geographies, 
this thesis demonstrates how the intergenerational transmission of religion is variable in 
different time and spaces. Focusing on a fixed environment (Hopkins et al., 2011; Min 
and Kim, 2005; Roest et al., 2010) cannot fully explain the changing process of 
transmission. Thus, by adopting an approach that is both spatially and temporally 
sensitive, Chapter 6 has helped trace the dynamic and multi-directional change of 
intergenerational transmission of religion.  
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The chapter particularly centred on young people and explores the patterns of 
intergenerational transmission of religion happens to them along their different spatial 
and temporal life stages. It particularly looks at spaces of home and school and pre- and 
post-schooling periods as schooling experience is important in reshaping religious 
identity. For young Tibetans, home is an ethnically and religiously homogenous 
environment which fosters their initial perceptions on what it means to be a Tibetan and 
how to practice and believe in Bon. For them, religion is ascribed with their ethnic identity 
when they were born in a Tibetan Bon family. Their ethnic affiliation largely determines 
their religious orientation. Older and middle generations are the major source of initiating 
and maintaining children’s religion. Before going to school, young people primarily learn 
religion through imitating their parents as well as grandparents, without teaching much 
on religious ideas. At this stage, both their religious identity and ethnicity are taken for 
granted and subject to influence.  
Education significantly interrupts the intergenerational transmission of religion at home. 
Young people’s religious and ethnic identities are reshaped in public schools which 
promote atheist, patriotic, national ideologies and permeate stereotypes of minorities. 
Perhaps paradoxically, young Tibetans’ ethnic awareness is enhanced by schools’ lack 
of teaching on Tibetan language, culture and history, and by the Han schoolmates’ 
stereotypical understanding of Tibetans as different, backward, barbaric and uncultivated. 
In the meantime, young people’s religious identity is challenged by the ideas of 
superstition, science and rationality emphasised in the curriculum of state schools. This 
leads them to start questioning their religion. However, religious identity is mutually 
enhanced with ethnic identity. Jiuzhaigou young people rationalise and legitimise their 
religion by considering it a manifestation of ethnic culture.  
Upon leaving school, the economic benefits of tourism attract young people back to 
home, a comparatively homogeneous religious and ethnic space. They on the one hand, 
encounter differences about the ways of religious practices with middle and older 
generations who “believe from the bone”, on the other hand, they gradually take religion 
more seriously with their changing familial roles. Parents describe their love for their 
children as motivating their efforts to pass on the Bon religion to them. As a result young 
parents are more motivated to be involved in religious practices themselves. In this stage, 
the religious identity becomes stable and internalised after reflections and negotiations. 
Key theoretical contributions 
This research has extended and challenged conventional approaches to understanding 
intergenerational religious transmission in several ways. Firstly, I argue that religious 
practices and religious belief are not equally and uniformly transmitted 
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intergenerationally. In the whole process of intergenerational transmission of religion, for 
particular religions doing religion sometimes is more important than thinking religion. In 
this thesis, school education which nurtures scientific and rational ideas further pushes 
young people to, in the words of one respondent previously quoted, “just practice, don’t 
think too much”. Furthermore, apart from the transmissions from older generation to 
younger generation, there are other important transmissions and exchange between 
grandparents and grandchildren, teacher and student and classmates and classmates.  
Secondly, I argue that children are not passively bearing, unconditionally accepting and 
internalising their parents’ religious influence, but with strong agency of partially 
accepting, reflecting, doubting, negotiating and self-adjusting older generations’ religious 
influence. They sometimes even seek to correct their (grand)parents’ religious ideas and 
practices which they consider as superstitious, irrational and unscientific. They tactically 
treat religion as important cultural norm to rationalise the superstitious aspects of religion.   
Thirdly, I argue that education’s influence on young people’s religiosity has its 
temporality. In the long run education does not necessarily have lasting effects on young 
people’s religiosity that the Chinese government desire and that researchers might 
presume. The previous research has ignored the post-school effects of education. In this 
case, education interrupts young people’s religiosity by nurturing young people’s rational 
thinking, scepticism and reflections about religion (McFarland et al., 2011; Schwadel, 
2011; Hill, 2011) when they are in school, but when they leave school education these 
university/college graduates go home, the religious seed planted in their childhood and 
teenage period is reactivated and grows. Even though they use rational and scientific 
ideas in thinking through religion, they still consider themselves to believe relatively 
strongly. 
Fourthly, the research speaks directly to debates about the relationships between 
religious and ethnic identities. I argue that it is actually partly Tibetans’ deliberate action 
of connecting religious identity to ethnic identity, because ‘ethnic culture’, as a state-
recognised category provides them an umbrella under the dominant Chinese communist 
and scientific ideological climate. This resonates with local people’s tactical promotion of 
Risang Festival (see Section 8.1). For Tibetans, especially young people, their religious 
identity is closely connected with and greatly enhanced by their ethnic identity.  
Finally, in response to the secularisation theory, this research suggests the need for a 
temporal and spatial sensitive approach to examine religion’s intergenerational 
transmission which is significant for religion’s reproduction. In Jiuzhaigou religion is 
growing through transforming yet persistent intergenerational transmission of religion in 
which home and ethnic identity play crucial roles.  
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8.3 Monks and religious authenticity 
Chapter 7 provided original insights into the changes in the lives of monks and their 
ambiguous understanding of religious authenticity which has emerged since the 
development of the local tourism industry. The chapter prefaced its consideration of the 
lives and attitudes of monks with a discussion about what authenticity means to ordinary 
laypeople in Jiuzhaigou and how it is linked to a sense of ‘pure’ Tibetanness. Contrary to 
the conventional understanding that people should be proud of their ethnic culture and 
religion, Jiuzhaigou people generally think their culture and religion are not as ‘authentic’ 
and ‘pure’ as other remote Tibetan places, as their place is exposed more to Han 
influence and modernisation. Hanified and economically developed Jiuzhaigou is 
considered inauthentic compared to those remote and undeveloped Tibetan places. This 
is only one level of Jiuzhaigou people’s understanding of self which I termed the intra-
ethnic group level. At the inter-ethnic group level, Jiuzhaigou people use the same logic 
of purity to differentiate themselves as ‘pure’, simple, backward, undeveloped and 
uncivilised from the sophisticated, advanced, developed and civilised Han.    
I continued the discussion on this understanding of “inauthentic self and authentic other” 
by focusing on monks who have experienced similar authenticity issues in their 
understanding of self. The lure of the tourism industry has played a pivotal role in moving 
monks from the sacred and solitary life to the secular world and accelerating the identity 
crisis felt by Jiuzhaigou monks. For both laypeople and monks, their understanding of 
what it means to be a monk has two levels: the ideal and the practical. Being an 
authentic monk is an ideal that involves living a humble and isolated life, with little 
material wealth, staying away from the secular world (including having a wife, and 
children, communicating with their family, drinking, smoking and entertaining, secular 
entertainment), and focusing on Bon studies and practices. In practice, the changes in a 
monk’s identity were perceived in some ways to degrade religious tradition because their 
embodiment of religion is completely different from their imagined view of authenticity. 
Thus, even though local people reached a silent agreement to discount their ideal and 
accept this situation, Jiuzhaigou monks are still generally not considered authentic.  
Key theoretical contributions 
Firstly, this study offers an important complement to the existing body of research on the 
othering of Chinese ethnic minorities as forms of internal colonialism and internal 
Orientalism (Gladney, 2005; Oakes, 1998; Schein, 1997; Harrell, 1995b) which has given 
limited attention in geography discipline, and to the ‘suppressed’ and ‘imagined’, in this 
case minorities’, especially Tibetans’ understanding and reaction to this dominant image 
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of themselves. I argue that a group could simultaneously be both imaginers and the 
imagined, both of which constitute their understanding of self. They could be in two 
simultaneous othering processes, namely an Orientalist process and an internal 
Orientalist process. In this case, Jiuzhaigou Tibetans are the imagined for the Han and 
the imaginers of other Tibetans. This double othering processes is deeply influenced by 
the state minority/majority ideology which is internalised by Tibetans and deeply shapes 
their understanding of self and other (including non-Tibetan other and Tibetan other). 
Imaginative geographies of authenticity thus constitute a framework for differentiating 
themselves from others at two levels. I argued that the result of this double othering 
processes is contrary to the state’s expectation of homogenising ethnic minorities. It 
actually reinforces Tibetans’ difference from the Han and their ethnic identity. Secondly, I 
argue that even though authenticity is subject to change in different situations, there are 
essential elements which mark the basic differences between the authentic and the 
others remaining immutable. If the core elements of authenticity change, authenticity is 
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Jiuzhaigou monks fundamentally transgress the non-negotiable part, that they are 
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Appendix A: Figuration 
 


































Figure 3.5 Virgin Forests   By Simon Perrin, 2008 
From: http://www.jiuzhai.com/language/english/photos.html 













Figure 3.6 Map of Jiuzhaigou National Park (self-annotated) 
Base map from: http://www.gogocn.com/article/2005123132618_337.htm  


















Figure 3.7 Shuzheng Village in Jiuzhaigou 










Figure 3.8 A Tibetan house 












Figure 3.9 The old temple in Zharu Monastery 











Figure 3.10 The new temple in construction 













Figure 3.11 Monks of Zharu Monastery 




























Figure 3.12 The Stupa  











Figure 3.13 The construction plan of Zharu Monastery  






Figure 3.14 Locations of Jiuzhaigou and Anbei 





















Figure 3.15 The gate of the Gami Monastery 











Figure 3.16 The main temple of the Gami Monastery 
From: Y. Nan, 2012 
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Figure 5.1 Tourists 
spinning the prayer 
wheel in front of a 
white tower               











Figure 5.2 Tourists praying in front of Jiubaolianhua Stupas 








       
Figure 6.1 A Tibetan woman 
praying     




Appendix B: Interview schedule 
1) Bon laypeople interview schedule 
Introductions and their family constitution 
Role of tourism 
 How has tourism grown in this area? (for older and middle-aged people)  
 What does tourism mean for you? Can you use three words to describe your 
feelings about tourism? (explain or examples) 
 Can you please tell me your experience during the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake? How 
did you feel about it? 
 Where do the tourists like to go and when? What do they normally do?  
 Do you have any interactions with tourists? If yes, describe them. How do you think 
about the tourists? 
 Do you mind letting tourists have a look at your chanting room? Why? Do you mind 
to do religious practices with tourists at present? 
 Has tourism changed your life (economic, social and political living conditions)? If 
yes, describe the changes. What is its impact on religious belief?    
Religious practices 
 Do you often conduct religious practices? If yes, what kinds of religious practices do 
you do? Please describe the details. For example when, where, with whom, how 
and how often do you do these religious practices? If no, why? 
 What do these religious practices mean for you? Which aspects do you like and 
dislike about them? 
 What kinds of religious practices do you like or dislike? Do you like to attend public 
religious practices? Which one is more meaningful for you, public or private religious 
practice? Please give me an example. 
 Is there anything you don’t like about doing a prayer? If yes, what are they? 
 Can you tell me two most impressed or memorable religious experiences for you?  
 Can you please tell me what you know about gendered regulations in your religion? 
For example, what kinds of religious practices do men do? What kinds of religious 
practices do women do? Are there any differences between men’s and women’s 
religious practices? If yes, please describe. (examples) 
 What kind of role does your family play for your belief? For example, does your 
mother or father mainly organize the religious events and activities? How and why? 
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 Do your parents have any instructions on your belief? For example, rules of 
suggestions about how to do or how to think religion. 
 How did you start to know about Bon religion? Who has the greatest influence on 
your belief in and out of family? Why? What did that person teach or tell you? 
 Who hold the strongest persistence for Bon belief in your family? Why? Who plays 
the leading role in religious practices? What does he/she do for religious practices?  
 Did you teach your children/grandchildren how to do or think religion? If yes, how 
and why? (for parents and grandparents)  
 Did your parents teach you how to practice or think about religion?  
 Compared to the current young people’s religious practices, can you please tell me 
how did you do religion when you were young? What is the difference between the 
young people in your age and the current youngsters? (middle-aged and old people) 
 Can you please tell me your experience and feelings about the Cultural Revolution, 
especially the religious aspect? Did you practicing religion at that time? How? 
Spirituality and religiosity 
 What do you know about Bon? Do you know the differences between Bon and 
Tibetan Buddhism? 
 How much do you believe in Bon? Why do you think so? Can you use three words 
to describe your feelings about your belief? 
 Did you involve in the monastery reconstruction during the Cultural Revolution? How 
and why? 
 How much do you know about Reconstruction Plan? How do you feel about the 
reconstruction plan of the Zharu Monastery? Did (will) you provide some support? 
Why? (for Jiuzhaigou people) 
 What are the differences between monks now and before in your mind? Why do you 
have this feeling? 
 How do you feel monks’ involvement in tourism? (for Jiuzhaigou people) 
 Can you please describe your attitudes toward monks? 
 Do you identify yourself as a Bon believer? Why? 
 Where do you feel most sacred in Jiuzhaigou? Why? 
 Does the chanting room (and sacred mountain) have any spiritual meanings for 
you? If yes, what are they?  
2) Bon monks interview schedule 
Introduction and their brief information, such as their age and role in monastery 
Role of tourism 
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 Can you please tell me how has the Zharu monastery/Gami monastery developed? 
(for older and middle-aged monks)    
 Can you please recall the monastery’s involvement in tourism in the past? How has 
this changed? 
 Have/are you involved in tourist business? If yes, please specify how and why. What 
benefits do you gain? Has it had any negative consequences for you? 
 What does tourism mean for you? Can you use three words describing your feelings 
about tourism? 
 Does tourism have any impacts on your personal life, esp. religious life? If yes, 
describe them. 
 What do you think the impact of tourism is in this area? What is its impact on 
religious belief?  
 Do you have any interactions with tourists? If yes, describe them. Negative 
examples? 
 Have you heard about the new Monastery Tourism Development Plan? What do you 
think about this? Positive/negative?  Probing for likely benefits and risks. 
 Will you mind that tourists coming to the monastery and viewing you? 
Religious practices 
 What are your everyday religious practices? Describe the details about with whom, 
when, where, how and how often are these religious practices conducted. How have 
they changed with time? How and why? 
 What do these religious practices mean for you? Which parts do you like or dislike? 
 What kinds of religious practices do you like or dislike? Do you like to attend public 
religious practices? Which one is more meaningful for you, public or private religious 
practice? 
 When do you do chanting, do you enjoy doing it? Why? 
 Can you tell me two most impressed or memorable religious experiences for you? 
Please specify. 
 Can you please tell me what you know about different rules for men & women in 
your religion? For example, what kinds of religious practices do men do? What kinds 
of religious practices do women do? Are there any differences between men’s and 
women’s religious practices? If yes, please describe. 
 What did you learn from older monks? How?  
 What do you teach younger monks? How? 
 How did you start to develop your belief and do religious practices? Who have the 
greatest influence on your belief before and now? 
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 Compared to the current young people’s religious practices, can you please tell me 
how did you do religion when you were young? What is the difference between the 
young people in your age and the current youngsters? (middle-aged and old people)   
What stayed the same? Changed?  
 How were religious traditions practiced in Cultural Revolution? 
 Can you please tell me the new monastery reconstruction plan? How is this plan 
implemented? (managerial monks) 
 How do you feel about the new monastery reconstruction? Likely benefits/impacts? 
 How has the Bon religion adjusted to tourism? How have you personally adjusted 
your religious practices? 
Spirituality and religiosity 
 What do you know about Bon? Can you tell me the differences between Bon and 
Tibetan Buddhism? 
 How much do you believe in Bon? Why do you think so? Can you use three words 
to describe your feelings about your belief? 
 What are the differences between laypeople now and before in your mind? Why do 
you think so? How do you think their adherence to Bon? 
 Can you please tell me when and why did you become a monk? 
 Is there anything you like or don’t like about being a monk? 
 When and under what circumstances do you feel proud to be a monk? 
 Where do you feel most sacred? What do monastery and your home of origin mean 
for you? Why?  
 Where do you feel most comfortable? Why?  
 How has tourism affected when/where you feel most sacred? 
 Non-religious life 
 Except the religious related practices, what do you normally do in your spare time? 
Please describe details. 
 Do you still have bonds with your home of origin? What kinds of connections do you 
have? 
 What is your future life plan? 
3) Government officials interview schedule 
 Introduction and their working experience  
 Can you please tell me general social, cultural, economical situations here?  
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 Are there any religious related rules or acts enacting or have the government 
contributed to any religious issues? If yes, describe details about them.  
 Have you seen or attended religious practices in study area? If yes, describe the 
details of and feelings about your experiences. 
 How do you think about religious change here? Have you found any signs of it? If 
yes, what are they? 
 How has the government (Jiuzhaigou Administrative Bureau) contributed to tourism 
development? How the local people involved in tourism? (for officials in Jiuzhaigou) 
 How do you think about tourism? Have you found any influences on local culture 
made by tourism, especially on religion? (for officials in Jiuzhaigou) 
 Can you please tell me the Reconstruction Plan of Zharu Monastery? (for officials in 
Jiuzhaigou) 
 What is your future tourism plan in terms of Tibetan culture and religion? Explaine. 
(for officials in Jiuzhaigou) 
4) Tourists interview schedule (for tourists in Jiuzhaigou) 
Introduction and their age and origin 
 Have you seen or attended religious practices in study area? If yes, tell me the 
reasons why you attend these practices and describe the details of and feelings 
about your experiences. 
 What kinds of effects do you think tourism makes on the locals? 
 Do you have any interactions with locals? If yes, please specify details and your 
feelings. 
5) Others interview schedule  
(Migrating Bon monks34, Workers inside, Han Chinese inside35 and Bon monks and 
laypersons outside in Jiuzhaigou) 
 Introduction and their individual information, such as religious orientation, 
experience in Jiuzhaigou and work 
                                                
34 There are some monks who belong to other monasteries migrating to the research 
area for long-term and short-term stay for conducting rite for local laymen and 
learning as a visiting scholar. 
35  There should be a few Han Chinese living in the study areas. For example, in 
Jiuzhaigou there are roughly 10-20 Han Chinese who has lived there for years and 
some of whom changed their nationality into Tibetan on their identity card. 
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 What are the purposes for your migrating behaviour? Why do you come here? (for 
migrating Bon monks) 
 What are the differences and similarities of religious practices and social, 
economical and spiritual conditions between the study areas and your home 
monastery? (for migrating Bon monks) 
 Have you adopted Bon as your belief in order to integrate into Tibetan majority 
society? (for Han Chinese inside) 
 Have you seen or attended religious practices in study area? If yes, describe the 
details of and feelings about your experiences. 
 How do you think about religious change here? Have you found any signs of it? If 
yes, what are they? 







Appendix C: Information sheet 
You are being invited to take part in a research project titled, ‘Construction of religious 
spaces and religious change of Tibetan Bon religion’. Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if 
you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for 
reading this. 
 
What is the project about? 
This project is a three-year doctoral research project being undertaken by Ying Nan at 
School of Geography of the University of Leeds. The project aims to understand the 
dynamics of religious change of Bon religion by examining the religious practices in Bon 
believers’ (monks’/laypersons’) everyday lives, meanwhile exploring the mechanisms of 
construction of religious spaces, such as monastery or home shrine.  
 
Why Bon religion? 
Tibetan religions (Tibetan Bon and Buddhism) are facing strong challenges from 
globalisation and modernization. Bon is an ancient religion which has a very small 
number of believers at present. It is significant and timely to figure out how to preserve 
Bon religion in this very situation. So far very little attention has been paid to Bon religion 
and the dynamics of its change. It is rarely known about the everyday religious practices 
and their implications for dynamics of religious change.  
 
What would I do? 
Helping out with the research would consist of an interview (of about 1 hour) with each 
interviewee, including children and/or young people, to talk about their everyday religious 
practices and attitudes to religious change. The interviews will take place in a venue and 
at a time convenient to the participants. If you are willing, an audio recording may be 
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made of your interview. Please inform me if you feel uneasy about this and I will not 
record the interview.  
How is the information going to be used? 
All answers will be kept strictly confidential and pseudonyms will be used for each 
participants in all the written articles produced for the project. The information will be 
used to write a thesis and academic articles. No other use will be made of them without 
your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the 
original recordings.  
 
I would be very grateful if you decide to take part in the research. Questions or concerns 
about the research can be addressed to: Ying Nan, School of Geography, University of 
Leeds, LS2 9JT or to my supervisor: Prof. Gill Valentine, School of Geography, 
University of Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK. You may also contact me at 07715398858 or 
gyyn@leeds.ac.uk or Prof. Gill Valentine at +44 (0 in UK) 113 34 33396 or 
g.valentine@leeds.ac.uk. 
 
Thank you for your attention. 
 
Ying Nan  










Appendix D: A sample of an interview transcript 
Agu Luorang is a middle-aged monk in Jiuzhaigou. In this transcript, confidential 
information and some irrelevant chats are left out.  
YING: What kinds of religious practices do you do most? 
AGU LUORANG: We mainly chant Zezhu [a kind of sutra], for blessing long life. 
Ying: Chant each year? 
Agu Luorang: several times every year. And Nongba Jiewa [a kind of religious festival]. 
Normally we chant according to the season. We chant when the dragon in the sky roars. 
The dragon doesn’t roars in winter, so we don’t chant when the dragon doesn’t roar. [The 
dragon normally roars] in the middle of the May. 
Ying: What does this ritual mean? 
Agu Luorang: Mainly for feeding the dragon. Taking hada and going at the river, and 
feeding the dragon. 
Ying: Do you mean water god?  
Agu Luorang: Yes. Feeding the water god. It is good for making fortune.  
Ying: Apart from this what others do you let monks chant? 
Agu Luorang: We have Boa [a kind of sutra], for blessing the safe and peace. It needs 
one day if you chant fast, two days if you chant slowly.  
Ying: How many times do you have chantings a year? 
Agu Luorang: Seven or eight times, or ten times. 
Ying: Where do you find monks for chanting? 
Agu Luorang: Most from Songpan. 
Ying: Why don’t you invite local monks? 
Agu Luorang: Not many now. Most are not too busy. Songpan monks are specifically for 
being monks. Being monks here, [means] busy with this and that [non-religious things]. 
In winter monks are busy. But most of time in summer it is a bit easier for inviting monks. 
Ying: How do you contact monks? 
Agu Luorang: We normally have a few contact numbers. We normally call someone who 
is easier to invite.  
Ying: How do you organise? 
Agu Luorang:  We call them and let them to find the auspicious date when we could 
chant. Then they come or we go to invite them 
Ying: Apart from chanting sutra, what other religious activities do you participate in? 
Agu Luorang: No others. 
Ying: For example, circumambulating the sacred mountain, burning incense or throwing 
longda36? 
                                                
36 Longda is the Tibetan name for the prayer flags and prayer papers on which prints 
sacred animals and objects. It is used to get blessed.  
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Agu Luorang: We still sometimes walk around the sacred mountain. [We] throw longda 
every day. My wife throws longda every morning. We also throw longda on our way out 
near the sacred mountain. 
Ying: Near the Zhayizhaga mountain? 
Agu Luorang: Jiawu [Mountain] is also a sacred mountain. It is efficacious for blessing 
safety, [so] we go there when we go out every time. 
Ying: So aunt is the one who constantly insists on belief? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. 
Ying: Do you circumambulate often? 
Agu Luorang: [We] did it more in the past. [Even though] the policies were strict, we did it 
secretly with adults. [I was] 8 or 9 years old. In the day time we were working, and at 
night [we were] circumambulating the mountain. At that time, we were more eager to 
walk around the mountain even though [policies were] strict. It [policy] is more relaxed 
now, but [there are] fewer people doing this. 
Ying: Why? 
Agu Luorang: Probably because we are too busy now.  
Ying: What different religious practices mean for you? Such as chanting the sutra? 
Agu Luorang: Sometimes we are ill and sutra-chanting may alleviate the illness. Now 
most of us believe science for curing [illness]. Chanting is our old tradition and is also 
very efficacious. 
Ying: Is it okay without chanting? 
Agu Luorang:  No. We must do it. It makes us feel assured. [And] we always [have] had 
this tradition. 
Ying: What does circumambulation mean? 
Agu Luorang: The hardships from circumambulation are good. It is specifically for 
making you feel the bodily tiredness [through which you could have greater merit].  
Ying: How about throwing longda? 
Agu Luorang: It is for blessing whole family’s safety. Everything will be alright [by doing 
this], such as doing business. 
Ying: Are there any practices you particularly like or dislike? 
Agu Luorang: No. They are all the same. 
Ying: Can you tell me the process of Mazhi Festival? 
Agu Luorang: In the past there were many big festivals. There are just a few now. On 
that day [of Mazhi Festival] the biggest lama and many other lamas chanted sutra for a 
couple of days and sanctified the mazhi. If you put the mazhi in the water for washing 
your face, your eyes won’t be painful and sore.  
Ying: Did you go to chant the sutra in the festival? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. 
Ying: Didn’t you reluctant to go? 
Agu Luorang: Normally not. That’s just once a year. And monastery has been in 
construction, so I haven’t gone for years.  
Ying: Is there difference between the festival this year and before? 
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Agu Luorang: Monks normally attend the same as before. 
Ying: How about laypeople’s enthusiasm? 
Agu Luorang: They are involving in this less.  
Ying: Why? 
Agu Luorang: Probably because they are too busy [with tourism businesses]. 
Ying: Do you [personally] like to chant sutra now? 
Agu Luorang: I can’t chant all the sutras. I can only chant a little. [But I can’t] make the 
barley dough [which is for mimicking the devils]. 
Ying: Then how did you participate in [the Mazhi Festival]? 
Agu Luorang: Just follow others to chant. Tibetan [language] is hard to learn, needing at 
least ten years. We didn’t learn well, so we can’t chant properly. 
Ying: Do you have to attend this festival? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. According to the rules, we need to go. But we have jobs now, so we 
can’t go there. [During these times] we request a leave.  
Ying: So you still listen to what the monastery ask? 
Agu Luorang: Of course. The monastery administers strictly, just like in military. Rules 
and regulations are strict. We need to ask for a leave from the monk managers. If we 
don’t go, we need to pay the fine. 
Ying: Have you considered leaving the monastery? 
Agu Luorang: No. I’m thinking that I’ve been a monk since I was only a teenager. It is not 
good for quitting now. 
Ying: Why it is not good? 
Agu Luorang: Of course it’s not good. You were so sensible to choose to go to the 
monastery when you were young. You should not suddenly stop going. 
Ying: Is it because of the gossips or critiques from the monastery and the community? 
Agu Luorang: [They] would definitely say [these]. People would say that you were monks, 
and now you don’t go. You would feel embarrassed yourself. So usually we will go [to 
attend monastery affairs] if we are free. And quitting the monastery is not good for your 
gewa. You’ve already become the person of the monastery. It’s not reversible.  
Ying: Agu, why did you become a monk? Because of your parents or it is your own will? 
Agu Luorang: It’s commune period. [I had] several siblings. I’m the youngest one, so 
parents let me go to the monastery. And they thought it’s good for you. Once you 
become a monk, you eat well and even have salary without effort.  
Ying: So being a monk was a respectable and comfortable work? 
Agu Luorang: Certainly. Even your family could be respected. 
Ying: Did you have your own opinions [about becoming a monk]? 
Agu Luorang: Adults said so then I just listened to them. At that time [after the Commune 
period], we split cows and sheep. I needed to herd the stocks and stopped my study.  
Ying: How was the monastery constructed? 
Agu Luorang: It was all constructed by the villages. All villagers gave money to the 
monastery. And they even went in person to help to construct the monastery. 
Ying: Is it different from the reconstruction carrying on at the moment? 
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Agu Luorang: Almost the same. You see every family donates buddha statues in the 
Stupa.  
Ying: Have you felt the differences of your life before and after the development of 
tourism? 
Agu Luorang: Of course there are differences. In the past our lives were very hard. We 
didn’t have rice to eat. Then we exchanged rice with some Han people and then we 
could make some porridge to eat.   
…  
Ying: Are there different rules about religion? 
Agu Luorang: For example, in the past women cannot sit in the major seats. Now they 
could sit anywhere. In the past, when women serve meals for monks, they need to take a 
bow with respect. Now it is Chinese style. It is the same in temple. Women were not 
normally allowed to get into the temple. Now they go to the temple. 
Ying: Is the difference related to tourism? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. Now we see more than before. In the past, we were much closed. 
Ying: How do you think about the gender differences? 
Agu Luorang: It is good now. Gender equality is good.  
… 
Ying: Do you feel enjoyable and pleasant when chanting? 
Luorang: I felt a bit afflictive when sitting for a long time. I’m a little scared of sitting 
cross-legged the whole day.  
…  
Ying: Why did you stop learning in monastery?  
Agu Luorang: As I grew up, I had businesses to do and had a family, so the religious 
side has been gradually dropped. 
Ying: So your focus is not on religion now? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. I have no time to learn religious things now.  
Ying: Have you taught your children something about religion? 
Agu Luorang: Not specifically. They always learn Chinese and haven’t learnt any [written] 
Tibetan. We haven’t thought of teaching them. 
Ying: They didn’t want to learn? 
Agu Luorang: They don’t have time to learn. They were sent to schools [outside 
Jiuzhaigou] when they were two or three years old.  
Ying: In boarding schools? 
Agu Luorang: When they were little children, they were living in Han teachers’ house and 
we gave [teachers] maintenance fees every month. Now they are living in boarding 
schools.  
Ying: Do you talk about knowledge of Bon with them? 
Agu Luorang: Sometimes when they ask I would tell them. We normally have nothing to 
teach. They naturally know. 
Ying: Why do you think they naturally know? 
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Agu Luorang: Because they gradually learn by themselves. For example, they would 
learn the meanings and the ways of practicing religion when they see us doing [religious 
practices]. 
 
Ying: Who has the biggest influence on your belief? 
Agu Luorang: My mom. My mom sent me to the monastery. She was always very pious.   
… 
Ying: Do you have any expectations about the reconstruction of Zharu Monastery? 
Agu Luorang: I have no idea about [what is going on] in the monastery. We go [to the 
monastery] when we are asked to go. In the past the monastery was united together. 
After tourism contracting, people don’t feel comfortable with the monastery. Some 
families earned money by themselves [from the monastery] without informing [and 
consulting] the [whole] monastery. We are uneasy with this. Now we don’t bother. We 
don’t eat this money, [and] we don’t involve in this kind of thing [profiteering from 
monastery which was said not good for one’s gewa].  
Ying: Is this influencing the role of the monastery in your heart? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. Now we are not united. Someone is selfish, only thinking about 
earning money from the monastery. 
Ying: Will the monastery keep on running tourism business? 
Agu Luorang: Probably yes.  
Ying: How do you think about that? 
Agu Luorang: I don’t have a say. I’m not a manager. I just go to the monastery when I ‘m 
asked to go. I believe in the monastery, other than those [monk managers].  
Ying: If the monastery continue to do tourism in future, do you consider this undermine 
monastery’s reputation? 
Agu Luorang: Of course. In the past, we voluntarily donate money if we had. That’s best. 
Now we have tourism and we don’t believe [in the monastery] as much as before. 
Ying: You’re not as loyal as before to the monastery? 
Agu Luorang: Yes.  
Ying: But I saw a lot of people donating budda statues. 
Agu Luorang: Yes. But that [decreasing loyalty to monastery] isn’t relevant to our belief. 
It’s not possible for not believing in Buddhism just because of the deeds of monastery. 
We still believe in Buddha, but it’s not good for monastery being running like this. People 
pay much money buying pricey incense sticks, but the monastery [managers] took the 
money.  
Ying: Does this affect laypeople’s enthusiasm to the monastery? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. In a village meeting one year, we said [in the past] we all believed in 
the monastery with respect. Everybody donated money for constructing the monastery. 
Now the monastery had been finished, but it’s used to earn money for a certain groups of 
people and contracted to those Han people from Mianyang. Since that time local people 
have had discontents. Although we monks haven’t said anything, all local people know 
and gossip about these things.  
Ying: Is there influence on Bon religion? 
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Agu Luorang: Most of us [local people] say that outside people are not allowed to 
develop tourism [in the monastery]. The monastery needs to be a clean place, not being 
developed. This is what we want. 
Ying: You don’t want the monastery being developed? 
Agu Luorang: Monastery is specifically for burning incense and worshiping the Buddha. It 
is okay for someone to donate money for monks’ salary. [But] other things relating to 
tourism development are not good. Many tourists believe [in buddhas] and think that 
Tibetan monastery is good. They donate lots of money and burning pricey incense. 
Using the donated money [for someone’s own sake] is not good. 
… 
Ying: Do you have stronger belief after marriage? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. I have children and they are usually [studying and living] outside. So 
we chant more sutras to bless their safety and study.  
Ying: How about your belief before your marriage? 
Agu Luorang: [I] hadn’t particularly thought about chanting sutras before. Now it became 
my responsibility.  
 
Ying: Do you know the difference between Bon and Buddhism? 
Agu Luorang: Almost the same. Just have different ways of chanting.  
… 
Ying: Have you been to any other places for pilgrimage? 
Agu Luorang: We studied scriptures in Zharu Monastery when we were teenagers. We 
said we need to go to TAR at least once in a life, so we [including other monks and 
laypeople] rented a coach and went to TAR. … 
Ying: Went with other monks in your monastery or with laypeople? 
Agu Luorang: Most are young monks. … At that time tourism developed. I earned some 
money from selling the firewood and used that money to make that trip. 
 
Ying: Do you think laypeople’s belief has changed? 
Agu Luorang: No. [It’s] the same. They [still] believe.  
Ying: Someone from Jiuzhaigou told me your belief is becoming weaker. 
Agu Luorang: Um. We are now following the science side. This develops faster than our 
monastery. For example, in our place monks are very busy with other things and having 
no time to do monks’ jobs. So it must be weaker than before. In the past, the belief was 
stronger.  
…  
Ying: How’s your living standard change? 
Agu Luorang: The best time was when we opened hostels [in Jiuzhaigou] in the past. My 
family had ** beds and [we could] earn about 30,000 – 40,000 Yuan a year. Plus some 
other businesses including barbeque restaurant and souvenir shops, we could earn 
about 50,000 – 60,000 Yuan a year in total. … Now we don’t have hostels hence life is 
not as well as before. … Only the tuition and maintenance for my children cost about 




Ying: You do chantings many times. My family only does this twice a year.   
Agu Luorang: We do about a dozen or two dozen times in the village. My family does 
about ten times a year. 
… 
Agu Luorang: Many monks from Songpan also said they do less than us, only once or 
twice in a year. They only do once in winter and another one in early spring.  
… 
Ying: Agu, who is the most pious person in your family? 
Agu Luorang: My wife. 
Ying: Why? 
Agu Luorang: She usually organises most religious practices in my family. 
Ying: She knows how to do all the religious practices? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. 
Ying: Haven’t you taught her how to do? 
Agu Luorang: Just a little. Her parents also believe. They took her to do religious 
practices. My mother-in-law believes in religion very much.  
Ying: So aunt’s parents have big influence on her belief? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. Her parents had strong belief. … In a word, everyone is the same [in 
the way that] once they get married, they get matured and have different views [on 
religion].  
 
Ying: Do you think which place is the most sacred place in Jiuzhaigou? 
Agu Luorang: Almost the same. The most important [practice] is circumambulating the 
sacred mountain. The more you feel exhausted [from circumambulation], the better for 
your gewa. Nowadays people just drive here having a look and then leave. 
Circumambulation needs you to patiently walk around the whole mountain. People in 
Songpan walk around the mountain for hundreds of, even thousands of times a year.  
… 
Ying: Agu, tourism has developed for many years. Do you think if it has impacts on local 
culture? 
Agu Luorang: Almost the same. No big changes. 
Ying: How about your belief? 
Agu Luorang: It’s fine now, [because] policies allow [us to believe]. When I was young, 
there were restrictions, so we did secretly at nights. We even can’t see the roads when 
we walk around the sacred mountain.  
Ying: Did you go with your parents? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. We followed our parents.  
Ying: Did you understand circumambulation? 
Agu Luorang: Parents just told us that doing this is good. I also wanted to go with my 
parents. It’s very dark and we didn’t have any flash light. We just walk in the dark.  
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Ying: Are the current young people different from your young age in religious belief? 
Agu Luorang: Yes, it is different. Young people at the moment are easy to feel tired 
[when they are asked to attend religious practices]. They usually say one word ‘I don’t 
go’. In the past, we did what our parents ask and were willing to participate in.  
Ying: So nowadays young people are not as pious as before? 
Agu Luorang: No. They are Han people now. Haha… 
Ying: Why? 
Agu Luorang: Nowadays children don’t speak Tibetan. And you see, they are reluctant to 
attend religious practices when you ask them.  
Ying: Do girls believe more than boys? 
Agu Luorang: Now all children are the same. Young people generally believe less than 
before.  
Ying: Is it because parents don’t teach much about religion? 
Agu Luorang: It is mainly because children don’t have time to learn [religion]. They just 
come back to stay for about 20 days every holiday. In the past we stayed with parents 
and follow them to practice religion.  
 
Ying: Tourism and religion, which is more important? 
Agu Luorang: Both are important.  
Ying: Why? 
Agu Luorang: Belief cannot be abandoned. It is tradition and rule. Our jobs need to be 
done as well, for making a living. Both are important. 
Ying: Do you think tourism has positive influence on religion? 
Agu Luorang: Chanting Nongba Jiewa sutra is good for tourism. If the waters are blessed, 
all the scenic spots will continue to be very beautiful. Feeding the dragon is beneficial for 
waters and everything. [By chanting this sutra], you could earn a lot of fortune if you do 
business. You can get college degree if you study.  
…. 
Ying: Are tourists allowed to get into your chanting room? 
Agu Luorang: We normally close the chanting room. It is only used for burning incense 
for ourselves. It needs to be clean.  
Ying: Tourists are not clean? 
Agu Luorang: A little bit.   
Ying: What do you normally do in your chanting room? 
Agu Luorang: Burning incense. We must do this every morning. 
Ying: Who normally does this? 
Agu Luorang: Mainly my wife. I’m assured when she is in charge.  
Ying: Is it okay if tourists want to see your familial chanting? 
Agu Luorang: Normally they are allowed to have a look. They might want to see how 
Tibetans and monks practice religion. 
Ying: Do you think tourists have influence on your culture? 
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Agu Luorang: I think no. 
Ying: Have you found tourists offended your religion? 
Agu Luorang: No. 
Ying: What’s your general impression of tourists? 
Agu Luorang: They are fine. 
… 
Ying: Agu, do you only wear monk robe in monastery?  
Agu Luorang: Yes.  
Ying: Why? 
Agu Luorang: I haven’t worn a monk’s robes for a long time.… The robe is very long, and 
inconvenient. Sitting still for a whole day is unendurable [when doing religious 
practices]… It is rather difficult to get used to the chanting again. 
Ying: Do you wear your robe going to other places, like Chengdu? 
Agu Luorang: No. It is a bit embarrassed. 
Ying: Would you introduce yourself as a monk? 
Agu Luorang: Yes, if I’m asked. 
… 
Ying: Do you children speak Tibetan? 
Agu Luorang: Yes. I always speak Tibetan with them. It is not acceptable as a Tibetan 
for not speaking Tibetan.  
… 
Agu Luorang: The belief in those places is different. For the monks there, being a monk 
is just being a monk, living in the monastery. If you truly want to be a monk, you just 
don’t come out with a bowl like we do. Some monks just live in a cave, only hearing the 
sound of the birds. 
Ying: Why should you be like them? 
Agu Luorang: Being like them is good; [you can] fully concentrate on scripture study. 
… 
Ying: Who make decisions about your familial things? 
Agu Luorang: It is me making decisions. 
Ying: Oh. Is it different from the situation before? 
Agu Luorang: Almost the same. In our place normally men make decisions. But if women 
have acceptable reasons, we could do according to them.  
 
 
 
 
